No.
Though funds for Kashmir come from other nations too. And these days a good percentage of the terrorists are non-Kashmiri.
Absoloutely, although the bulk of arms and ammunition, foreign recruits and logistical support still come from across the border - in particular from Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir and Muridke: the headquarters of the 'Save Kashmir Movement', Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba respectively. As well, the largest insurgency group operating in IaK is (still) the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, which, alongwith its progeny al-Badr has established, acknowledged ties (as is the case with many others repeatedly alleged and evidenced by the government) with the ISI's Kashmir cell. And it is fairly known that the 'Muttahida Jihad Council' addresses publik gatherings, publishes matériel and recruits new fighters inside Pakistan's 'Azad' Kashmir. It is in this sense that I allege that the ISI both "sponsors" and "exacerbates" the Kashmir insurgency. To "sponsor" an insurgency is to extend all material, financial and 'moral' support with a view to achieving a local geopolitical or military objective, or otherwise to subvert a continued authority with a strategic (usually long-term, pernicious) objective in mind. And it is also true that while funding and support "may come from other nations too", Pakistan acts as a conduit for nearly all of these.
An insurgency, and particularly a protracted one, simply cannot exist without a foreign or domestic recreant backer. And when the shit hits the fan, there will always be a pretext or grouse - legitimate or otherwise - to premise an insurgency on.
Separatism or the call for Azadi in Kashmir has been existent since the 40s,
insurgency is Pak's creation.
True, but the "insurgency" is predicated on the "separatist cause". It is the moral and socio-epistemological foundation for both the contumacy and the insurrection. Moral, because the miscreants involved believe they are fighting for a legitimate cause- the goal of self-determination; social because, bereft of the separatist cause, the insurgency would lose its broad-based popular support and be rendered even more onerous; epistemological, because the 'separatism' both defines and proscribes the insurgency: in that participation in the conflict is exhorted as part of a wider moral duty owed to jihad; while simultaneously, there exists the subtle realization that Kashmir, as a political entity can never be truly independent- politically, economically, culturally and in every other sense- given its unique location and geo-strategic significance, as well as the reality that it is surrounded by one medium-size and two large states. Indeed, the insurrection is the aspect of the separatism that is truly bothersome, that has bled India for the past 60 years, is the cause that necessitates the stationing of hundreds of thousands of our troops there. The 'stone-pelting, effigy burning, freedom-chanting mobs' can be adequately dealt with by local security forces, with "the assistance of paramilitary forces from the centre". The long-term political solution for a
pax sempiterna is economic development, inculturation, countervailing perception-remedials and political accommadation within the bounds of the sacred Constitution. The insurgency is our most exigent priority.
Looking at your sources, and some other sources, it appears that at present,
CRPF is concerned with law and order/policing in Kashmir Valley and secondary/urban COIN(CT) ops by virtue of them being in an "urban agglomeration" ie a densely packed valley, the prime target of terrorists. PC wants this policing functions to be done by JK Police in the Valley instead of CRPF, staffed by mostly IPS officers.
RR's primary and perhaps the only role in Kashmir is COIN ops. It is based in border districts where a majority of infiltration and coin ops take place.
Apart from the "policing" aspect, that is correct. "Maintaining law and order" is a loosely applied term, but I am yet to read about the CRPF performing any regular "policing" duties (apart from guarding strategic installations and diplomatic personnel), although the RAF contingent of the CRPF may be deployed on an ad-hoc basis. As for the rest of your quote, you are saying no different from what I did. My statement remains: The CRPF have been involved in COIN ops in J&K's urban conglomerations after having taken over from the BSF, ever since the composition of counter-insurgency forces was changed in 2004. The RR is involved in intensive patrolling and COIN ops in the adjacent countryside.
Further, from the following article from the Economic Times:
It's official, BSF leaves Kashmir for CRPF
MASOOD HUSSAIN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 09, 2003 08:24:23 AM ]
SRINAGAR : Despite objections, the Border Security Forces will start its phase-out from Kashmir next week. It will be replaced by CRPF and the process begins from Old City of Srinagar where eight battalions of BSF would vacate their positions for the CRPF.
BSF inspector general, Kashmir frontier, Vijay Raman confirmed the decision. “We will be shifting to borders and would do duties for which we are meant for. We will be engaged in controlling the infiltration from across the border”, he said. The CRPF would be overall in-charge of the situation including counter-insurgency.
Raman said that the situation has improved to an extent, but the bottomline remains the same. “Unless and until the infiltration is stopped, the situation can’t come to normalcy”, said Raman.
With over 60 battalions of the BSF deployed in J&K, the state is virtually sanitised by this force. For many years now, the city of Srinagar has been manned by the BSF alone. The capital city has as many as 32 battalions deployed to fight the militants. Raman said Kashmir exhibited a great change from the days when it was handed over to the BSF in late 1989. Then, there was a complete breakdown of the official machinery and total collapse of the routine intelligence gathering networks.
Even a section of the police forces became a suspect before the security forces. They would limit their activities in maintaining the mortuary and identifying the corpses.
Senior Congress leader and J&K’s deputy chief minister Mangat Ram Sharma had recently appealed MHA to reconsider the decision of getting BSF replaced by CRPF. “Withdrawal of the force at this juncture will have adverse affects, as the state government is successfully moving ahead for restoration of peace in the state”, Sharma said. Instead, he said, there was need to supplement the force to tackle the continued cross border terrorism more effectively. The decision of sending CRPF to replace BSF in the hinterland is part of the recommendations made by a group assigned the job to see the functioning of the security agencies after the Kargil war. It said that since BSF was meant for guarding the Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh borders, and the ITBP for guarding the borders with China , the two paramilitary forces be relived of their CI duties.
“For BSF, it was not an easy job to take over Kashmir in 1989 when there were explosions everywhere”, Raman said. However, he said, the force did its best in preventing the situation going out of control and was brought into normalcy”, he said.
At the same time the BSF official admitted that the militancy continued and in fact the foreigners now were a major force in Kashmir militancy. The BSF sacrificed a lot in this process. From 1989, the forces lost 668 jawans and officers. The number of injured went up to 3000 mark. In 2003 alone, 24 BSF personnel including some officers were mowed down by militants in various counter-insurgency operations.
At one stage, the BSF was almost the only agency that represented the government. With apparent absolute authority, the BSF was the source of almost two third cases involving the human rights. The cases registered against the BSF in various police stations across Kashmir must be running in the hundreds.
Describing the achievement of of the BSF, Raman said that the forces had killed 2,040 militants, apprehended 9,525 others and managed surrender of 919 others. In 2003 so far, Raman said, they mowed down 109 militants including 61 Pakistanis besides apprehending 199. As for the seizure goes, Raman said they had recovered 5,495 weapons of all types besides seven lakh rounds of assorted ammunitions, 785 wireless sets, 6,950 kilograms of explosives, 986 pieces of IEDs.
Meanwhile, some CRPF officers said that the replacement of all the BSF battalions had reached Srinagar . However, prior to complete take over, senior officers said, the incumbent force personnel will be jointly patrolling the respective areas of responsibility.
Taking over the BSF manned positions, however, will not affect the CRPF’s responsibility of being part of the CI operations with the state police’s SOG or guarding the vital installations or being deployed to secure the VVIPs. Right now, officials said, there are 24 CRPF battalions deployed in Kashmir.
The link to the original article is broken. It however can be accessed from the BharatRaxak link I provided you.
Furthermore, from the 'History' section on the CRPF entry in Wikipedia:
In recent years, the Central Government has decided to follow up on recommendations of the Cabinet to use each security agency for its mandated purpose. Therefore, the counterinsurgency operations in India has been entrusted to the CRPF. The CRPF is currently charged with securing the Kashmir valley. Recently CRPF have completely relieved the Border Security Force in the Kashmir Valley of its Internal Security duties.
Central Reserve Police Force - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Counter-insurgency operations therefore are just as priority (if not more) and are on an equal footing with the other responsibilities of the CRPF.
As well, the following image, also from BharatRaxak, makes clear that the RR are deployed almost exclusively in the countryside:
Interestingly, from your article:
The Centre on Thursday ruled out troops reduction in the Kashmir Valley but favoured replacing the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) with the Jammu and Kashmir police.
[....]
This is not the first time that the Centre has decided to withdraw security forces from counter-terrorism duties. The NDA government had first withdrawn the Army from internal security functions, using only the Rashtriya Rifles for the purpose. Subsequently, the BSF was also removed from counter-terrorism duties [which occurred in 2004, consequently which the CRPF replaced the BSF's counter-insurgency functions in all "urban agglomerations", i.e. cities and townships, in the Kashmir valley: my interjection] and redeployed to perform its original function as a border guarding force.
Your Bharat Rakshak link is from Volume 3(2) September - October 2000. Reread my preceding post and the (more recent) BR link in connection with the changing composition of counter-insurgency forces post 2004.
some more definitions...
Definition of DMZ
S: (n) demilitarized zone, DMZ (a zone from which military forces or operations or installations are prohibited)
WordNet Search - 3.0
Definition of Demilitarize
# S: (v) demilitarize, demilitarise (do away with the military organization and potential of)
# S: (v) disarm, demilitarize, demilitarise (remove offensive capability from)
WordNet Search - 3.0
We are getting into a very semantic argument here. In the political sciences, the term "demilitarization" has three very specific connotations: in the first instance, it refers to a withdrawal (partial or absolute) of military troops from a pre-determined area, usually concomitant of a treaty; in the second instance, it refers to the conversion of a military/paramilitary corps into a civilian body that is an appurtenance of the state apparatus; in the third, it refers to the decommissioning, deactivation or phasing-out of certain types of military equipment (synonymous in a sense with disarmament): hence the ABMT, the INFT between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union and the Washington Naval Treaty between the former and the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Japanese empire, the French Third Republic and the Kingdom of Italy, were also referred to as 'demilitarization' treaties as they envisioned the subsequent gradual demilitarization of those specific types of delivery systems and naval platforms - as opposed to an immediate demilitarization - either completely or to an agreed minimum. It is in this third, latter sense that I apply the term "demilitarization" - as I'm sure Indian policy makers alike would not be so frivolous as to presume (merely to suit Musharraf's liking) that a "demilitarization" of the border would involve a
complete demilitarization or removal of all forces from the region. It is simply unfeasible, and no one should know that better than a military general like Musharraf.
The definitions you quote are the simplistic, layman's version of a term that has multifarious connotations. If for some reason you find cause to doubt my elaboration as a student of the political sciences, feel free to corroborate my claim by referencing any half-decent Int'l Relations lexicon. The following are a few humble suggestions:
IPF - International Relations Dictionary
The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations Penguin Reference: Amazon.co.uk: Graham Evans, Richard Newnham: Books
Until then, the following, somewhat comprehensive Wikipedia article on Demilitarization should suffice:
Demilitarisation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
DMZs (De-Militarized Zones) would guarantee the security of Pakistan and weaken India's defences, since there is no suggestion that terrorist militias are going to be "demilitarized".
Should the Indian army leave the Kashmir valley to the mercy of well-organized, finely-trained, generously-financed indiscriminate organisations?
The US advice on Kashmir is lunacy - The Siege Within - MJ Akbar - Columnists - Opinion - The Times of India
Another instance of a very loosely applied, absolutist interpretation and application of the term 'demilitarization'. While being correct in a superlative sense, it is almost certainly safe to assume that it is not what military planners, including perhaps Mushy (if he intended those words from a serious perspective as a statesman and military commander and not merely as rhetoric), had in mind.
General Pervez Musharraf has once again extended offer for conversion of Kashmir into demilitarised zone and changing its status for the sake of resolution of this issue......
convert it into demilitarised zone besides changing its status. It can be possible only if there is no army, no terrorism and nor any freedom movement there and Kashmiris monitor their own security, he added.
Musharraf Again Offers For Conversion Of Kashmir Into Demilitarised Zone
Note the words: "no army"; it does not make allusion to a withdrawal of all security and law & order forces, including the paramilitary and/or border patrol agencies, which can be understood to entail the "bare minimum". Again, a complete withdrawal of security forces is almost inconceivable, rendered even more frangible by the prevailing security environment.
In case of Kashmir, Musharraf and America are implying at a zone which is for all practically purposes largely bereft of military assets and capabilities.
"Largely bereft" is an extremely subjective term, open to a wide range of interpretation and debate, just as "bare minimum" is - (ensconced in the UN-brokered 1948 peace treaty by the way). As a result, we are under no compunction to withdraw any more personnel than we deem fit for the "minimal maintenance of law and order".
PC wants to hand over policing duties in Kashmir to JK police. Continued presence of heavily armed troops, many of whom are non-locals is resented by many a Kashmiri. Locals donning Police uniforms will be more acceptable and a move in the right direction.
Absoloutely. I made no judgment on the prudence of the decision.
Troop increase or reduction is an internal matter of India. We will do as we see fit.
Yes, so I presume I said.
Yep,the paramilitary forces and the army will be stationed in Kashmir but not actively involed in policing in the valley. Complete takeover JK Police will take some years.
Many years if the reverberations of this decision are taken into consideration. And, in a way, it might just as well be so.
I believe in a few weeks PC will come out with a plan, which will be further refined as per the experiences gained in this experiment.
I don't think there will be any significant troop reductions in the future.
Neither do I. But troop deployment is always subject to drastic political alterations- which in the subcontinent, are not a rare phenomenon.
A 'plan' I assume is the minimal prerequisite for such a course-altering decision, and yes, it will in all likelihood be refined as necessary, taking into consideration consultations with the Armed and local security forces, as well as administrators and purveyors of the state apparatus.
What remains to be seen is how the new setup deals with intelligence, counter-intelligence and counter-insurgency. Your guess is just as good as mine.
