The main issue with helos is that too many people use them in environments to which they are ill-suited. Operating in independent pairs backed by a wide-area datalink, attack helos can wreak unmatched levels of destruction on traditional troop formations.
One US Army war game, for example, had eight Apache helicopters tasked with blocking off three 40km-long mountain roads against two whole armored battalions exploiting a hypothetical breakthrough. The Apaches had no infantry support, and their only C4ISR came from intermittent datalinks with a distant AEW aircraft. In less than three hours, the Apaches "killed" nearly twenty simulated tanks and over forty other combat and support vehicles, including the command tanks for both battalion commanders and all the long-range communications trucks. In the ensuing chaos, sizeable chunks of both battalions got lost in the mountains and what few companies emerged on the other side were easily picked off by defending infantry.
That sort of flexible defense in difficult terrain is what helos can excel at - but frontal raids to clear out entire armored divisions is not. The Iraq anecdote
@Ray cited demonstrates stupidity on the part of divisional staff, not the fault of the helos themselves.
). At the end of the day we definitely need a few good numbers of CAS/multirole helos as they are needed and while the work of CAS planes can be done by any MRCA. I think the combination of higher number of Helos with good fighter support can be good. Also in future if we have adequate number of jet fighters then probably the LCA MK2 can also be converted to CAS role focused plane.
