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Post-event casualty figures are a ridiculous rubric to determine retroactively the 'capability' of the IA to fight the PLA, particularly since it is known that the Indian government tried continuously to avoid the escalation of skirmishes into full-blown conflict. What cost the war was India's political dithering on whether to retaliate or not to retaliate in the face of China's pugnaciously revanchist and openly hostile ['hostile' used in the context of an obvious intent to wage war] policy of reprisal against India's 'forward bases'. This is evident in the revoking of Maj. Kaul's decision to mount an attack on Yumtso La in the eastern theater, before re-entering the lost Dhola post; or the provision of no support to the Indian troops that fought and died in the Galwan valley, the Chep Chap Valley and the Pangong Lake in the Western sector by Army majors- based upon the political developments in New Delhi and the declared intent of the pusillanimous Nehru government to seek a resolution to the conflict by diplomatic means.
On other occasions, the Indian troops were severely undermanned - take for instance the battle in the Eastern theatre at Namka Chu, where a severely attrited and understrength battallion of Rajputs had to face three Chinese regiments- and fought them to the finish; or the battle of Daulat Beg Oldi in the Western theater where Indian troops had to withdraw from forward posts after realizing the magnitude of the Chinese attack because they were so sparsely manned and under-provisioned.
For the vast majority of 'incidents' however, it was political dithering that done us in- take for instance on Oct. 10 when a patrol of some 50 Punjabi troops met an emplaced Chinese battalion of some 1,000 troops, without either reinforcements or the provision of artillery support - because it had been denied them by on high - yet managed to hold off the first assault, inflicting very heavy casualties on Chinese troops; or the battles at Gurung hill or Chushul where logistical inadequacy resulted in the loss of those areas. Later, even when the Indian troops were in a position to mobilize and inflict a withdrawal on Chinese troops with mortar and machine-gun fire, they were denied premission by Brig. Dalvi who chose not to do it because it would mean decimating the Rajputs who were still ensconced in the area of the Chinese grouping; and because of his perception that New Delhi was seeking to curtail assaults on the Chinese so as to avoid exacerbating post-party negotiations. That was a tactical decision to make, and it was made with catastrophic consequences because that single event forced the retreat of Indian troops from the Western sector.
On most occasions however, Indian troops fought bravely to the last - for instance in the Great Walong battle where a small contingent of Indian troops was outnumbered by 400-or so Chinese troops that launched heavy artillery fire, but in return inflicted heavy casualties of 200 dead or wounded on the incursing Chinese troops before Walong was captured- at a cost of more than half their regiment. The only notable exception was the unilateral withdrawal from Tawang - because by then the Indian Army had realized that further resistance in an environment of political inadequacy by the government was futile.
Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy based on his stated concept of "brotherhood" with China. Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials for having promoted pacifist relations with China.
The classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure also led to a massive overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organization and equipment, and also in terms of high altitude and jungle warfare: forms of warfare we've come to develop an increasing expertise in with dedicated schools based in Assam, Mizoram, Agra, Ladakh, Gulmarg und soweiter. - so that the Indian Army today is not the same force as it was 30 years ago.
