Why did China withdraw from Arunachal in 1962 skirmish?

Discussion in 'Defence & Strategic Issues' started by roma, Aug 15, 2009.

  1. roma

    roma NRI in Europe Senior Member

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    with reference to the discussions in the page given below

    http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/na...-no-need-worry-defence-experts.html#post54420

    in which many colleagues including mr ahmedsid participated by saying that

    " You are correct in your thinking, The Chinese can overpower their way through, but to defend will be a mammoth taks. And by that time, Indian counter attack will be huge! This is the same reason I feel the chinese didnt stay on and capitalise on their surprise victory in 1962. "

    IF i understand correctly, mr ahmedsid u seem to have said theat the terrain was a limiting factor to defend arunachal which they overran in 1962 ...... so please if you would and i mean i would be most grateful to know why they gave up their conquest in 1962 but held onto the aksai chin area which is also high altitude ....i alway s had thought that it was because the IAF which was then superior to theirs was statoned in the arunachal area and it was a silent threat that if they remained then india would use the IAF to dislodge them which is why they did a PR exercise to quit the territory.
    but i would be enlightened to know ( not being sarcastic ) ....i would really like to learn not only from yourself but indeed other well-informed persons on this great forum . ~
    Thanks in advance
     
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  3. Officer of Engineers

    Officer of Engineers Defence Professionals Defence Professionals

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    Their LOCs collapsed.
     
  4. SATISH

    SATISH DFI Technocrat Stars and Ambassadors

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    Simple they couldnt resupply their troops and diverted the public attention from the problems they were facing. Above all Mao spanked Nehru...
     
  5. ahmedsid

    ahmedsid Top Gun Senior Member

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    I didnt say the terrain was too hard for them, well it is hard, but not as much as a limiting factor like the Indian Counter attack.

    Yes the IAF was good in 62, but our leaders didnt use it fearing a full chinese retaliation.

    Even today, if the Chinese try hard they can push through, but once inside, their troops will starve to death, with the IAF taking on their supply routes and they being cut off logistically.
     
  6. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    NDTV.com:

    Why India lost the 1962 border war?
    Tejas Patel
    Web Correspondent
    Tuesday, August,14 2007 (New Delhi)
    "I remember many a time when our senior generals came to us, and wrote to the defence ministry saying that they wanted certain things... If we had had foresight, known exactly what would happen, we would have done something else... what India has learnt from the Chinese invasion is that in the world of today there is no place for weak nations... We have been living in an unreal world of our own creation."

    The statement was made by then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Rajya Sabha, in 1963, after India's humiliating defeat at the hands of China. It is an eye opening statement from a leader who always viewed international politics from his own utopian prism.

    The defeat in the 1962 border war made him realise that there is indeed no place for weak nations in the world politics.

    "In the political and diplomatic fields too, significant changes came through the 1962 episode, bringing more realism," notes the official Indian history of the border war between India and China.

    The India-China war was an eye-opener for India. But even after 45 years, the people of India are not aware of the circumstances and reasons that led to India's defeat. The popular belief among the masses is that China betrayed Indian trust and attacked our defenses in the Ladakh and North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) region.

    But the government inquiry in the defeat (still classified), the official history of the Government of India (1992), declassified documents from China and United States of America, and a huge amount of research on the subject by Indian analysts and experts reveal startling facts about the war.

    The most significant reason of our defeat is that the political leadership of that time failed India. It was not Chinese betrayal, but then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon's arrogant belief that they would solve the crisis through diplomacy and that China would not dare attack India despite the latter's 'Forward Policy'.

    This policy and the duo's assumption of Chinese in-action in event of crisis was firmly supported by then Intelligence Bureau Director B N Mullick, who, according to some analysts, was also responsible for misleading the political leadership.

    After going through the available material important factors which possibly led to India's defeat on the eastern front emerge. They are:

    * Erroneous assessment by the political leadership that China will not react to India's 'Forward Policy' in NEFA region and Ladakh.
    * Ill-equipped and ill prepared Indian army.
    * China's unfounded perception of Indian designs to seize Tibet.

    Damning report

    After the humiliating defeat, the Indian Army entrusted Lieutenant-General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P S Bhagat to inquire into the debacle. Although the terms of reference set for them were very limited, the duo dug deep and discovered a great deal about the initial formulation of the "Forward Policy" and how the Indian Army was forced into the conflict by the political leadership of that time.

    The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report is still classified but a British Correspondent, Neville Maxwell, had seen the report and he published a summary of what the report contains. How he got to see the report is unclear but rumour has it that a senior minister passed a copy of the report to him.

    The Indian Government published an official history - The History of the Conflict with China, 1962, which was written by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence in 1992. Both the reports point out that an ill-equipped and ill-prepared Indian Army was forced to take on superior Chinese PLA.

    Infact, General K S Thimayya, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) until 1961, wrote in Seminar Magazine in 1962 that, "I cannot even, as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own; we could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security."

    Despite this, the political leadership, backed by the Intelligence Bureau, ordered the army to setup forward posts in all areas that India claimed its own. This included areas which were disputed.

    The 'Forward Policy', which called for establishing posts in the disputed areas often behind Chinese forward posts, had been continuing since 1954 despite repeated protests by the Chinese Government.

    Chronology of India-China Border War, 1962

    Nehru's going ahead with this policy was based on assumptions. He was of the belief that China would not oppose Indian patrols and border outposts out of fear of an India backed by both the United States of America and Soviet Union.

    The rationale behind the policy was to setup border posts and drive out the Chinese from the areas which India considered its own.

    Several Indian Army officers opposed the policy as militarily perilous as they were aware that the Indian Army was not adequately prepared to face the Chinese force in the frontiers.

    The official Indian version of the war states that: "In the years 1959-1960, LT General S P P Thorat, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had made an appreciation about the magnitude of Chinese threat to Indian borders in the Eastern Sector and had made projections about his requirements to meet that threat. But the Army HQ as well as the Defence Minister paid little heed to Gen Thorat's appreciation. It was not even brought to the notice of the Prime Minister."

    Politicisation of Army HQ

    Instead of heeding sound military advice, Nehru replaced the military top brass with more submissive officers, who would carry out his orders and eventually lead to India's humiliation. This overt politicisation of the army high command was one of the reasons why India lost.

    To top it all, irresponsible and jingoistic statements by the political leadership precipitated matters and gave a handle to the Chinese to attack Indian posts in 'self-defense'.

    Then Home Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, declared on February 4, 1962 that "If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa. She will certainly drive out the Chinese forces."

    Nehru also gave a statement on October 12, 1962, that he had "ordered the Indian Army to throw the Chinese out."

    Driving out the Chinese forces was an optimistic declaration by the political leadership but the ground situation was different. Indian Army was logistically weak and ill-prepared to take on the superior Chinese forces that were well trained in mountain warfare.

    Although Indian and Chinese forces were involved in a series of clashes along the border throughout 1962, significant fighting of the India-China Border War took place from October 10, 1962 to November 20, 1962. The fighting took place in Walong, Tawang, and Aksai Chin.

    According to military analysts, a series of factors led to Indian Army's debacle. The Indian intelligence apparatus in the Himalayas was lacking. They had no clear indication of Chinese strength, mobility and tactics, especially the human wave attacks, states a report.

    Roderick MacFarquhar, in his book The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966, blamed the Indian intelligence community for not properly analysing Chinese domestic and diplomatic developments. According to him, they relied on CIA briefings, newspaper account and dispatches from the Indian embassy in Beijing about China's economic crisis, its split with the Soviet Union, and the Taiwan crisis. Depending on these reports, Indian political, army and intelligence leadership concluded that China will not react aggressively to India's 'Forward Policy'.

    Even militarily, successive inquiries in the border war would reveal, Indian Army was not ready to take on the Chinese. Very few Indian soldiers had operated in mountain areas. The troops were using obsolete weapons unsuitable for mountain warfare and that too were in short supply. The Chinese were well supplied as they had stocked supplies in Tibet and their soldiers were well acquainted with mountain warfare.

    Logistical, leadership failure

    The Indian soldiers, on the other hand, did not even have enough winter clothing and shoes. Even the line of communications was difficult as there was no road network. The supplies and reinforcements for the troops were sent most by air, states the official Indian history.

    Apart from that the troops were short on artillery and ammunition and the artillery they had was very often immobile in the mountains.

    Besides, the morale of the forces was at its lowest. The decision making in the army was totally ad-hoc. The official Indian history states: "Some of the decisions were patently incomprehensible. For example, when 2 Rajput were stopped in their way to the plains for reinduction, they were sent to Kameng, a totally new area for them, instead of being sent back to Walong Sector with which they were quite familiar. The result was confusion all around."

    "Unplanned induction of troops on ad hoc basis and the consequent breaking of original formations ruined the cohesiveness and compactness of fighting formations," the report states.

    One such incident, which merits attention is the government's order attack and evict the Chinese force that was threatening Dhola Post. The field commanders argued that it was militarily impossible to take on the superior Chinese forces at the point of confrontation, below Thagla Ridge near McMahon Line.

    According to a study, sometime in September, the Army HQ ordered the troops to capture a Chinese post 1000 yards north-east of Dhola Post and contain the Chinese concentration south of Thagla Ridge. The army official inquiry into the war, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, while commenting on the order state: "The General Staff, sitting in Delhi, ordering an action against a position 1000 yards north-east of Dhola Post is astounding. The country was not known, the enemy situation vague and for all that there may have been a ravine in between [the troops and their objective], but yet the order was given. This order could go down in the annals of history as being as incredible as the order for the Charge of the Light Brigade."

    The political leadership and the Army HQ then decided to give the task of attacking and driving the Chinese forces off Thagla Ridge to the newly formed IV Corps. Interestingly, the command of this new formation was given to Lieutenant General B M Kaul, who had never commanded an active fighting outfit.

    The official history also blamed Kaul for frequently ignoring the chain of command. The report accused him of directly approaching the Chief of Army Staff, bypassing the GOC-in-C and also giving orders directly to junior officers, bypassing a chain of middle officers.

    General Kaul was subsequently relieved after the ceasefire was announced. He later resigned from the army.

    No use of IAF

    Another important factor, which many analysts and defence experts believe could have altered the outcome of war, was India's decision of not using the air force. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was not used for any offensive action and was only confined to air dropping supplies to the troops.

    Former Air Vice-Marshal A K Tewary, in an article in Indian Defence Review, said that had India pressed in the IAF, the outcome of the war would have been different.

    "In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China," he said in the article.

    He blamed the IB Director B N Mullick for exaggerated assessment of attack by Chinese bombers on Indian cities if India had used the air force.

    At one point of time, Nehru got so worried that he sent two letters to then US President John F Kennedy requesting the support of US Air Force in fighting the Chinese. The letters, delivered between November 15 and November 20, 1962, are still classified.

    But S Gopal, in his biography of Jawaharlal Nehru, has summarised the content of the letters: "Nehru, without consulting anybody in his Cabinet, wrote two letters to Kennedy describing the situation as 'really desperate' and requesting the immediate dispatch of a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till Indian personnel had been trained."

    "Nehru also sought two B-47 bombers squadrons from the US to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would be sent immediately for training in the US," Gopal had written.

    But on November 20, 1962, China declared a unilateral ceasefire. India lost extensive territory. In NEFA, the Chinese captured huge territory, advanced nearly 200 km and almost reached the Assam plains. In the end, both the sides withdrew their troops 20 km from new boundary lines on December 1, 1962.

    Appropriate time to strike

    Some analysts have suggested that India was at fault in this war and that it pursued an aggressive policy and provoked China, which left them with no alternative but to act in self defense. This assessment is incorrect as historical evidence suggests that China was well aware of Indian moves and was waiting for an appropriate time to strike, which it did, once it got respite from its external problems.

    China was facing a threat of invasion from Taiwan during the initial months of 1962. But once, that situation eased in June, it committed more troops to border with India.

    Careful analysis of historical events suggests that Chinese attack October 20, 1962 was a well planned move and it coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis, an event which brought the world on the brink of obliteration.

    The Chinese move is appropriately explained by the official Indian history, which state: "It is indeed plausible to speculate that the Chinese deliberately timed their attack to coincide the Cuban missile crisis. The superpowers, who were engaged in a deathly struggle, ensured the required degree of freedom for the Chinese to use force against India without fear of their interference."

    China declared unilateral ceasefire on November 20, 1962, immediately after the resolution of crisis in the Caribbeans.

    Indian designs to seize Tibet

    Another important factor behind the flaring up of the border war between India and China was China's unfounded perception of Indian designs to seize Tibet.

    According to analysts, after the declassification of documents regarding the 1962 War in both China and India, new facts have emerged about the Chinese deliberations before the war.

    Chinese policymakers, analysts believe, held the view that India was colluding with the US to detach Tibet from China. A need to punish Indian aggressive 'Forward Policy' in the border areas was definitely a reason for the Chinese attack.

    But their perception that India was deliberately working towards restoring the status quo in Tibet also played a part in their decision to teach India a lesson.

    New studies reveal that CIA financed and armed a major resistance movement inside Tibet during the 1950's. China suspected that India was an active party to this movement, a fact which is still unconfirmed. Then Director of Intelligence Bureau, B N Mullick, acknowledged CIA's activities in Tibet during that time in his book The Chinese Betrayal (1971).

    Whether India knowingly helped CIA in their Tibet operations or not will be known after India declassifies government papers of that time. But China believed India played an active role and it was one of the reasons for which they decided to punish India.

    Brave soldiers

    The 1962 War has left a deep scar on the Indian psyche. The political and military leadership sacrificed officers and soldiers under them despite knowing that the army was not prepared to take on the Chinese forces in a terrain where we were logistically weak and did not have proper supply lines.

    One thing that united the entire nation in that hour of grief was the exemplary courage shown by the Indian soldiers in the adverse of conditions. It is said that they did not abandoned their rifles even if it meant certain death.

    Their courage can be summed up in the immortal song, Aye mere watan ke logon, jara ankh me bharlo paani penned by Poet Pradeep after the defeat.

    The moving song brought tears to the eyes of Indians when it was sung by Lata Mangeshkar at an all party meeting on January 26, 1963 in New Delhi. As the song ended, Nehru could not hold his tears and broke down completely.

    Till today, the song reminds Indians of the supreme sacrifice of Indian jawans in the Himalayas.
     
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  7. Kumar

    Kumar Regular Member

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    I feel something fishy about the statements about the comparisons done between Indian and Chinese power. The out going Officer did say that we are far behind in terms of power with the Chinese and now the defense experts say that there is no need to worry.

    Are such statements made to make feel china over confident?

    Chinese have made a phycological impact on the world due to the secrecy of their weapon systems and power. Since the Chinese economy is booming, they are bound to increase their military capabilities which is also true for other growing countries.

    But the card played by the Chinese can also cause them heavy damage, as most of the countries with which China has a dispute(India) are preparing heavily for countering them with Technological superiority as the gap is far enough to gain numerical superiority. Now the Chinese weapon systems which are developed in secrecy are not proven and their capabilities are not known which can backfire on them as the countering nation may exaggerate the capacities of Chinese and prepare for countering them in a big way which can be quite a possibility.

    India has long been suspicious about the Chinese if we see the events taking place while the boundary talks are going on we should be always prepared to balance them.

    Events around the boundary talks
    1. An article appears in the Chinese website which speaks about the disintegration of the Indian Federation.
    2. Largest military exercise undertaken by the Chinese near the Tibetan border involving more than 50000 troops exercising a mobility of troops from other parts of China to the border.

    Things like this makes a physcological impact on the countering Nation but can also make the countering nation more alert and prepared which can prove the calculations wrong.

    Now I feel India is playing the same card with Chinese acting as a Small Brother of the Chinese. The events which make me feel like that are
    1. Indian Navy Out going officer says Chinese more powerful in all terms.2
    2. India defining its outer limit of nuclear weapons and missiles. Then why acquire C-130J, Airbus re fullers which are long range weapons.
    3. India raising more Mountain warfare squadrons and placing of Sukhoi 30 MKI at the tezpur base.
    4. Rapid infrastructure developments in Ladakh and the north east region including the opening more ALG and roads.

    Such things will make Chinese think twice while making any moves against the Indian Federation.

    And India is not the same as it was in 1962... :2guns:

    Jai Hind
    Kumar
     
  8. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    The indian government maintained that the chinese had logistical problems. The chinese maintained that it was a gesture of good will. A friend has posted that iaf was stationed. But the truth lies elsewhere. Iaf then was no match for plaaf. V had ww2 vintages while the chinese were licence producing the latest soviet planes or atleast their copies. To really understand the with-drawl, v have to look at the situation the skirmish took place. The indo-chinese war as the then secretary of the ambassador of the US to india put it a misfortune. The great cultural leap frog by mao had miserably faltered. When unrest broke out in tibet. Due to military suppression, the dalai lama fled tibet. The chinese were alarmed when india provide sanctuary to the dalai lama. The chinese were already in border talks with india. So, to assert their claims they were building a road through askai chin. When nehru found about it, he was furious. The chinese took there as india trying to get strategic leverage in tibet. Then came the the goa liberation, the doctrine was called 'the forward strategy'. In 1962 the boundary talks failed. Nehru ordered army to liberate kashmir like goa, this sent the signal as if coming to liberate tibet. So the chinese struck. In the north east, it was poor infrastructure that made our army fall back, on back of massive chinese invasion. By then our pm had called washington, an american carrier was on the way. So to prevent further escalalion, still secure tibet. The chinese pulled back from north-east frontier and retained askai chin.
     
  9. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    The Hindu : National : "India could have won 1962 war"

    India could have won 1962 war"

    # IAF chief not consulted
    # Capability of Chinese air force "over-estimated"

    New Delhi : India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had its air force been used, former Air Vice-Marshal A. K. Tewary said.

    He claimed that the then political-bureaucratic combine sought U.S. Air Force's help and did not even consulted the IAF chief. ``In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China," Air Vice-Marshal Tewary said in an article in `Indian Defence Review.'

    Several factors

    Quoting top military and bureaucratic leadership of that time, he said the "costly and catastrophic omission" of not using the IAF was a result of several factors that ``impinged on the decision-making process at the highest level," including the "influence" on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, of Prof. P. M. S. Blackett, the then Advisor for Defence , as well as the counsel of then U.S. Ambassador John K Galbraith who "over-estimated the capability of the Chinese air force in the absence of proper air defence infrastructure in India."

    Another factor was the analysis of then Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) B. N. Mullick, a close confidant of Nehru, that Chinese bombers would bomb Indian cities in response to the use if IAF's combat jets, he said.

    The former Air Vice-Marshal said "since IB did not have the firsthand knowledge [on Chinese air force capabilities], they sought help from `our good friends' [CIA]," which exaggerated the threat perception.

    He quoted top defence analyst George Tanham and said that while the political-bureaucratic combine "pleaded to U.S. President John F Kennedy for 12 squadrons of Star fighters [F-104] and four squadrons of B-47 Bombers as an immediate USAF help to stem the Chinese advance, they did not deem it fit to even consult the Indian Air Force chief,"

    The IAF officer said the then Army commander responsible for NEFA, Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul, had conceded in his book that "we made a great mistake in not employing our air force in a close support role during these operations."

    He also quoted late National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit, who was then Under Secretary in the China Division of the External Affairs Ministry, as saying that by the time Nehru was coming round to the suggestion for use of air power, the Chinese had declared a unilateral ceasefire.

    Dixit, the IAF officer said, had pointed out that the Chinese logistical arrangements and supply lines were too stretched and that it did not have sufficient air power in Tibet at that point of time.

    "India's air strikes would stop the Chinese advance and neutralise the military successes which they had achieved," Dixit had said, adding that this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it had come from officers who were not military experts. — PTI
     
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  10. advaita

    advaita Regular Member

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    Absolutely relevant

    Boss 62 was as much our failure as a people as Nehrus failure as leader. After all we got him there.
    But it is not as simple as the straight choice between
    1. heaping the blame on Nehru or
    2. Sharing the blame with him
    The world lies in between these two extreams.
    If future is always clearly dicepherable (the way you are now, with the benefit of hindsight) then we could have put a librarian on the PMs post.

    See some element of risk is always going to be there even if the task is as simple as putting the cup to the lip. Nehru took a risk and with Nehru we took a risk and both of us failed or India failed. And failing in great tasks is not something to be ashamed of, not daring to do them is a failure.
    As someone said "Dont blame those who try and fail, blame those who fail to try"

    In any case 2009 is obviously not 1962.
     
  11. Officer of Engineers

    Officer of Engineers Defence Professionals Defence Professionals

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    There's only one reason why the Chinese won in 1962. They did their homework. They studied the maps and being mountainous terrain, they read the fall back positions almost to a T. What's more they've identified the Indian Regiments and more than that, they've identified the commanders (compare this to even today, how many Indians know which Chinese regiments were involved, let alone who commanded them?).

    This meant that while the Chinese don't have the Indian battleplans, they nevertheless had a feel on how their opposition made decisions. Couple that with their correct read of the terrain, they had enough insight into Indian defence plans to the point that indirect fire was already falling on Indian fallback positions before the Indians reached them.

    Even so, the PLA's plans does not include breaking into the plains. That was a direct result of battle momentum overtaking battle discipline. The Indian collapse meant the forces the Chinese wanting to engage were further and further away than they envisioned. Simple battle culture dictates that you do not allow the enemy time, space, or resource to regroup. They drove on and thus they were bingo ammo and water by the time they stopped.

    In other words, not only were the Chinese good but they were lucky.

    That tactical picture, however, disappeared the second the 1962 War was over. The Chola Incident meant the Indians could read the ground just as well as the Chinese could and during 1987, the Indian response posture was superior to that of the Chinese. The Indians moved six brigades as compared to the Chinese 2 regiments.

    To expect the Chinese to repeat 1962 is NOT a realistic picture.
     
  12. badguy2000

    badguy2000 Respected Member Senior Member

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    PLa's logistics could not support long-term battles across Himalayas,before Tibet railways was finished.

    In fact ,it is widely known that only 2-3 divisions of PLA plus several independent regiments were invloved in the war in 1962.

    the troops of PLA involved in the war were not more than Indian armies involved.
    but indian troops were so poorly trained and equipped that they in fact didn't organized any effective resistance.
     
  13. Pintu

    Pintu New Member

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    Thanks for starting a thread a beautiful discussion going on , for an analysis of 1962 war , I am here by posting the link of a back ground report dated 28-3-1963 of Radio Free Europe, as I have already posted the details in different thread in this forum , I am hereby only posting the link for your ready reference:

    Increased Tension in Sino-Indian Relations

    Regards
     
  14. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    They lost because they could not maintain supplies.
    And again this is the reason why we have not had another war since 62. The Chinese know logistics is a problem and will be more difficult now than in 62 because of a more better IAF.
     
  15. badguy2000

    badguy2000 Respected Member Senior Member

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    the so called " IAF was better than PLAAF in 1962" is just a myth.

    with the help of Soviet, PLAAF was global 3rd biggest air force in 1962, armed with thousands of mg19 and mg17. at that time, mig19 and mig17 were still quite advanced.

    Furthermore, during 1953-1957, China succeeded in finishing "1.5" plan and finished the indigenizaiton of mig19.

    if IAF had fought against PLAAF, IAF would have woren up in weeks.
     
  16. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    Well if the PLAAF was that powerful, then it should have been used extensively in the war against indian positions. The fact that it wasn't says a lot about the confidence or the lack of it in the PLAAF by the then powers to be.
     
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  17. badguy2000

    badguy2000 Respected Member Senior Member

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    1. PLAAF was short of effective striking force in 1962.
    In 1962, PLAAF had thousands of mig19/mig17 and most powerful defensive air force only behind USA and Soviet.
    however,PLAAF was short of long-range striking force like long-range bombers. at that time ,PLAAF was mainly armed H5,a short-range lighter bombers ,which was not availabe in sino-india war.

    2. China wanted to limit the scale of the war.
     
  18. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    So what has changed now? I hope you won't be relying too much on the B2s on offer as some stupid blog has reported??
     
  19. badguy2000

    badguy2000 Respected Member Senior Member

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    now ,PLAAF has transformed from a "defensive airforce" to a " defensive&agressive airforce".

    it has enough striking force to lauch long-range strike.
     
  20. masterofsea

    masterofsea Regular Member

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    something does changed.

    advantages
    1,many airports were built along the sino-india border after 1962.
    2,a rail way from Lanzhou to Lhasa was built,the furture branches of the railway are planing.Another railway from Yunnan to Lhasa was planned,some part of it is being built.
    3,china have develped a self-sustainable aviation industry.as far as now,we have designed and built J-5/J-8/JH-7/JF-17/J-10,but during this time,indian only developed one model LCA.
    4,we don't need to worry about the USA&soviet union's attack now.
    disadvantages
    1,india has nuke weapons.when talking about war,we must consider it.But we have tibet plateau,just like the american have Alaska.We can use the highland as a NMD base as american use Alaska.
    2,Chinese trade way mostly pass through India ocean.
     
  21. masterofsea

    masterofsea Regular Member

    Joined:
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    believe me,taiwan will re-unify with mainland without one bullet being fired.
     

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