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What a War Between China and the United States Would Look Like?
Any Chinese move to take over Taiwan would trigger a confrontation with the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Is the U.S. prepared to counter this growing threat?
:angry_1::angry_1::angry_1:
August 9, 2015 - 0400 Hours
The war for Taiwan starts in the early morning. There are no naval bombardments or waves of bombers: That's how wars in the Pacific were fought 70 years ago. Instead, 1200 cruise and ballistic missiles rise from heavy vehicles on the Chinese mainland.
Taiwan's modest missile defense network—a scattered deployment of I-Hawk and Patriot interceptors—slams into dozens of incoming warheads. It's a futile gesture. The mass raid overwhelms the defenses as hundreds of Chinese warheads blast the island's military bases and airports. Taiwan's air force is grounded, and if China maintains air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, it can launch an invasion. Taiwanese troops mobilize in downtown Taipei and take up positions on the beaches facing China, just 100 miles to the west. But they know what the world knows: This is no longer Taiwan's fight. This is a battle between an old superpower and a new one. Ever since 1949, when Nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, Beijing has regarded the island as a renegade province of the People's Republic. Now, in 2015, only the United States can offer Taiwan protection from China's warplanes and invasion fleet.
The nearest aircraft carrier is the USS Nimitz, which had just left the Japanese port of Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay when the missiles landed on Taiwan. Although Beijing has promised to attack anyone who interferes with this "internal security operation," the U.S. president orders the Nimitz and its escorts to the Taiwan Strait. The Nimitz battle group needs at least two days for the carrier to reach the strait, more than 1300 miles southwest. The closest other carrier group, near Pearl Harbor, is six days out.
Until the Nimitz arrives, it's up to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, 400 miles northeast of Taiwan, to defend the island. By 0515 hours, Air Force pilots are taking off in 40 F-15E fighters to conduct combat air patrols over the island. Half of them are airborne when Kadena comes under attack. First, error messages begin popping up on computer screens. Modern air defense systems share sensor information and targeting data to better coordinate their actions, but this connection is going to become a liability. An army of hackers operating throughout China swarms the base's networks, tying up communications with gibberish and cluttering the digital screens of radar operators with phony and conflicting data.
Next, early-warning satellites detect the infrared bloom of 25 ballistic missiles launched from the Chinese mainland. Five detonate in orbit, shredding American communication and imaging satellites. While not a technical first—both the U.S. and China have knocked down satellites—it's the first outbreak of a hot war in space, and it partially blinds U.S. forces.
The 20 remaining missiles re-enter the atmosphere over Okinawa. Kadena's Patriot batteries fire missiles in response, but they are off-network and in disarray—10 missiles are struck by multiple interceptors, but an equal number slip through the defensive screen and hit *Kadena. Some of the GPS-guided warheads contain bomb*lets that crater the base's two runways. Others air-burst over the base, devastating barracks, radar arrays and hangars. Kadena is far from destroyed, but until its runways can be repaired, it is out of the fight. The F-15s on the way to Taiwan must bank for Guam, 1300 miles southeast—they have the range to reach the base there, but only Kadena is close enough to stage efficient combat patrols. Also, F-22 stealth fighters based at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, now cannot land on the base's shattered runways and reinforce the F-15s. With Kadena's satellites gone, the Nimitz and its flotilla of eight escorts, including Aegis-guided missile destroyers and a pair of submarines, are steaming toward an enemy possessing one of the world's largest submarine fleets and an arsenal of land-, air- and sea-launched antiship missiles.
About 8 hours after the mass raid on Taiwan, klaxons start blaring aboard the Nimitz and her escorts. There are more missiles in the air, this time headed straight for the carrier group. The Taiwan Strait is still more than 1000 miles away, but the war has come to the Nimitz. Skimming the surface of the Pacific are four supersonic missiles flying faster than their own roar.
Chances are that a war between China and the United States will not happen in 2015, or at any other time. Under normal circumstances, a war for Taiwan would simply be too costly for either side to wage, especially given the chance of nuclear escalation. But circumstances are not always normal.
"I get criticized often for saying this, but I think Beijing is capable of acting irrationally when it comes to Taiwan," says retired Rear Adm. Eric McVadon, who served as a naval attaché in Beijing and is currently senior adviser of Asia-Pacific studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge, Mass. "They are obsessed with Taiwan. On some given day, it's entirely possible for people to be standing around a table in the Politburo in Beijing, and someone gets the ball rolling. And when it stops, we're at war."
The deciding factor could be anything from domestic unrest in China's increasingly rebellious rural provinces to a spike in aggressive, vocal Taiwanese nationalism. However, like many Pentagon war games, this notional conflict is not concerned with potential political triggers, but instead with evaluating China's raw military capabilities. The scenario is based on analyses by civilian think tanks including RAND Corp., Chinese defense papers and interviews with senior Pentagon officials.
The chance of war may be remote, but the Chinese strategy to deny American access to battlegrounds near China's coasts—and the hardware to pull it off—certainly exists. Since the Gulf War, the Chinese military has shifted from academic analysis of how to defeat U.S. aircraft carriers in the East China and South China seas to buying and building the weapons to make the plan a strategic reality. This is not a Cold War–era buildup, aimed at waging or deterring an apocalyptic last stand. This is a force engineered to win a limited local war—for example, keeping the United States away long enough to win Taiwan.
China's economic boom has allowed its military to rapidly expand its inventory of cruise missiles, aimed at Taiwan, and multistage ballistic missiles with enough range to hit much of Asia. The People's Liberation Army has also bought submarines*—including at least 12 whisper-*quiet diesel–electric models from Russia—and is developing a large fleet of warplanes.
But China's most dangerous new weapon could be an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM), specifically designed to target a moving aircraft carrier. The United States has 11 carriers. To win a future conflict, China would not have to destroy every one of them, just the pair that would be available to respond to a fight off China's coast.
The mobile DF-21D can target aircraft carriers, and there are no reliable U.S. defenses against it.
Senior Pentagon leaders are becoming increasingly concerned about the Chinese arsenal. Adm. Robert *Willard, head of the Navy's Pacific Command, told Congress in March that "the PLA's continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-strait military balance in Beijing's favor." In June, in a speech at the Asia Society in Washington, D.C., Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added that he has "moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned" about the buildup.
The man who would face the Chinese in battle, Adm. Patrick Walsh, the current commander of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet, sees preparation as a way to avoid a future fight. "When we look at these sorts of developments, such as the ASBM, they are technological developments that we respect, but do not necessarily fear," Walsh says. "The key element in any sort of deterrent strategy is to make it clear to those who would use a given piece of technology that we have the means to counter it, and to maintain a technological edge."
Right now the Chinese seem to have taken the lead in this new arms race. When RAND released a report in 2000 describing the potential outcome of a Sino-*American conflict over Taiwan, the United States won the war handily. Nine years later, the nonpartisan think tank revised its analysis, accounting for Beijing's updated air force, its focus on cyber warfare and its ability to use ballistic missiles to take out American satellites. RAND's new conclusion: The United States would ultimately lose an air war, and an overall conflict would be more difficult and costly than many had imagined.
( contd...)