WAR 1971
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Tibetans who fought in 1871 war-Interview of SFF Combatants.
Rediff.com » News » The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war
The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war
Last updated on: January 10, 2012 21:08 IST
Dapon Ratuk Ngawang was one of the senior leaders of the Voluntary Freedom Fighter Force in Tibet, a Tibetan guerrilla outfit which fought Chinese rule and played a key role in the Dalai Lama's escape to India in March 1959.
After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Ratuk Ngawang commanded the Tibetan secret regiment, known as the Special Frontier Forces, SSF, or Establishment 22, based near Dehra Dun in Uttar Pradesh.
Now 84, Ratuk Ngawag lives in the Tibetan colony of Majnu Ka Tilla in Delhi. He recently published his memoirs (in Tibetan) in which he recounts his early life in Kham province of Eastern Tibet and the escape to India as well as the Tibetan participation in the 1971 operations.
In an exclusive interview, he tells Claude Arpi about the SSF's role during the Bangladesh Liberation War.
In 1971, Ratuk Ngawang was a 'Dapon', often translated as 'Brigadier'; they were also known as 'Political Leaders.'
One of the aspects of the 1971 War which has never been publicised is the participation of Tibetan troops in the operations.
The official history of the war mentions all the victorious battles, but the Tibetan regiment is not mentioned. Today we have no document proving the Tibetan soldiers' participation.
We would be interested to hear from you more about the Tibetan Forces' role in the Bangladesh operations. We are also curious to find out about the directives (if any) from the Central Tibetan Administration (the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile) towards the Tibetan soldiers?
I have covered all these issues in my memoirs (published in Tibetan by the Amnye Machen Institute, Dharamsala). The Tibetan Regiment known as Special Frontier Forces or Establishment 22 has never officially been under the Indian Army.
It was established in 1962, after the Indo-China War. The main objective of the regiment was to fight the Chinese army with the help of the Indian Army.
At the time of the creation of the Force, we thought that the operations could be based at Lhuntse Dzong in Tibet (near the Indian border).
The plan was to engage the Chinese army in a military conflict within 5, 6 months of the Force's creation. But the Indo-China war came to an abrupt end (on November 22), and due to severe international pressure to maintain peace, no further military engagements occurred with China.
Therefore, the services of Establishment 22 regiment were not used as planned.
Tell us more about Establishment 22.
The Chinese took over Tibet in 1959. In 1960, the Government of India established a Force known as the Indo-Tibetan Border Force. Tibetan Establishment 22 was established in November 1962.
Who ordered the SFF to take part in the war?
A senior Indian Army officer, Major General Sujan Singh Uban (The SSF became known as 'Establishment 22' or simply 'Two-twos' because General Uban earlier served as commander of the 22 Mountain Brigade). At that time, he was the commander of the Tibetan Force.
A special army meeting was held in New Delhi; later we heard that General Uban had volunteered to lead the Establishment 22 regiment in the Bangladesh war.
It was S S Uban and my colleague Dapon Jampa Kalden who voluntarily decided to take part in the war.
Later they told me about their plans. First, I refused to join them, because to voluntarily go to war was for me 'illegal.' I told them that only if we got an order from the Government of India or from the Central Tibetan Administration, could we join the operation.
Moreover, I told them that Establishment 22 had not been created to fight 'for India'; rather it was established with the sole aim to fight the Chinese.
In fact, it is the reason why we get less salary as compared to Indian soldiers. We are not part of the regular Indian Army.
When the regiment was established, there was a mutual agreement that we would fight the Chinese. This did not happen.
However, I told General Uban and Dapon Jampa Kalden that if we were to get a formal order from the Indian government then we could join the operations.
Did Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother, give the directives to the Tibetan soldiers to join the Bangladesh war or was it someone else?
The directive came from the department of security of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.
The department had called us for a meeting. They told us that there was no alternative but to go to war 'for India.'
Moreover, they told us that the Indian government was in a very critical situation at that time and our participation in the war could help save a lot of Indian lives.
Did you have any contact with R N Kao who was responsible for external intelligence in the Cabinet secretariat?
Yes. R N Kao was a high level officer of the Indian government and Indira Gandhi's close associate. But our commander was General S S Uban. He had visited New Delhi and also informed the Central Tibetan Administration about his plans to lead the SFF in the Bangladesh war.
After he came back to our base (in Uttar Pradesh), he sent Jampa Kalden and me to meet officials of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.
We told the administration about our initial reluctance to join the war. But since the Central Tibetan Administration had already decided about sending Establishment 22 to the war, we would go for it.
Was R N Kao involved in the decision?
R N Kao was a high level official and not a military man. So he was not directly involved in the operations. But he instructed us and advised us to prepare ourselves and fight well.
Was Mr Kao giving orders to General Uban?
General Uban was a military officer. R N Kao was a high ranking official, therefore he had greater authority.
When we captured Chittagong, R N Kao came to visit Establishment 22 and gave awards and speeches in praise of the Tibetan unit's heroic battles. R N Kao was a very patriotic person.
After the decision to participate in the operations was taken, Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang (who lost his life during the 1971 operations), Dapon Pekar Thinley and myself divided the regiment into three units.
We decided that each one of us would lead one unit in the war.
Due to his age and despite his military experience, Dapon Jampa Kalden couldn't take part in the war. He remained the administrative link between the Indian government and Establishment 22.
Gyalo Thondup was the chief strategist of Dehra Dun's SFF, but he was not involved in the decision to send Tibetan soldiers to the Bangladesh war.
When the Tibetan refugees first came to India, the Indian government had categorically urged the Tibetans not to participate in any political activities.
Much before the Bangladesh war, Gyalo Thondup and Andrug Gonpo Tashi (the founder of the Tibetan Volunteer Force in Tibet) had already resigned from their military posts
How many Mukti Bahini were trained at Uttar Pradesh by General Uban?
After Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was imprisoned in West Pakistan, more than 1,000 of his supporters escaped to India. Many of them were stationed near by the SSF camp.
We trained them in military combat. They were known as the Mukti Bahini.
Some of them were related to Mujibur Rahman. They later acted as our guides and contact persons during the war though they did not actually fight with us.
Though it was us who fought the real war and suffered the casualties, all the credit has later been given to the Mukti Bahini (because the Tibetan Force was involved under the guise of the Mukti Bahini).
Were the Mukti Bahini also under the command of General Uban?
Yes. General Uban provided the training to the Mukti Bahini.
When did you and the other two Dapons reach Bangladesh?
It was in November 1971. I was 39 years old at that time.
Did you go to Bangladesh before the beginning of the war or during the war?
We went before the Bangladesh war started. Though we were meant to fight the Chinese in a guerrilla warfare, during the Bangladesh war, our main enemy was the Mizo insurgents.
Just as the Tibetans were trained by the Indian Army, the Mizo soldiers were trained by Pakistan.
When and how did you go?
We went from the base of Establishment 22 in Uttar Pradesh to Dum Dum airport (Kolkata) by plane. From Dum Dum we went to Demagiri in Mizoram by motor vehicles. It took us three days.
After reaching the Bangladesh border (the Chittagong Hill Tracks), we had a meeting and went straight into the battle.
We left for the war on November 12 and fought for 28 days after which we came out victorious.
Many soldiers from the Pakistani side were killed and many surrendered.
What was General Uban's military objective in the war?
We were thoroughly trained in commando warfare to fight the Chinese; we were requested to use these skills to fight in the Bangladesh war.
The Indian authorities had assured us that the Indian Army would fight with the Tibetans for the cause of Tibet. Their reasoning was that the Tibetan soldiers alone could not defeat the Chinese army.
That's why we decided to join the Bangladesh war. It was in the hope that the Indian Army will help us militarily one day to fight the Chinese
Before going to the war, did General Uban gave you any instructions to capture specific places or specific Pakistani military bases?
We had a map of the area (Chittagong Hills). Each of the three units (battalions) with a little more than 1,000 soldiers each included the Tibetan soldiers and some Mukti Bahini partisans.
Since General Uban was the commander of the Tibetan Special Frontier Forces, he gave us instructions in Hindi (we had Tibetan translators). He told us where to go and later through walkie-talkie we could inform him where we had reached and he would then tell us what we had to do.
The three Tibetan battalions had three Tibetan Dapons and three Indian colonels. The three Dapons and the three colonels always discussed the strategies, but the decisions were taken by General Uban after we had informed him.
Other than Demagiri, in which other places did the Tibetan soldiers fight?
Demagiri was the main military base. About 100 Tibetan soldiers and 100 Mukti Bahini were posted to guard the base.
Apart from senior military officials stationed at Demagiri, the base also had a hospital, where those who got injured in the battle could be treated. Most of the doctors were majors and captains of the Indian Armed Medical Corps.
The preparation for this had been done much before the beginning of the war.
The severely injured soldiers were taken by helicopters to other hospitals, but since the war was going on in the jungle of the Chittagong Hills, it was difficult for the helicopters to land. That is why many of the injured had to be sent by boats through the river.
When the Indian Army came to Demagiri at the beginning of the actual war, were the Indian soldiers able to help the Tibetan soldiers?
No. The Indian soldiers were not able to help us. Similarly, the Tibetan soldiers were also not able to help the Indian soldiers since both have been trained in different types of military warfare.
The Tibetan commandos were trained in guerrilla warfare whereas the Indian soldiers were trained in urban warfare.
Were your military objectives fulfilled?
Within ten days, we captured almost all the enemy bases except for two.
Most of the enemy bases had only 50 soldiers or so and when we attacked them, they were hugely outnumbered and surrendered within an hour of fighting.
On December 16, when news of the Indian Army's conquest of Dhaka became known, most of the remaining smaller units surrendered.
After the victory in the Bangladesh war, did you go to Chittagong for the official victory parade?
General Uban did organise a trip for us to go to Chittagong for the official victory ceremony. But we couldn't go as the Tibetan soldiers had been scattered in many different places.
Therefore, General Uban and R N Kao went to Chittagong to attend the official ceremony and discuss the perks and rewards for the Tibetan soldiers's contribution in the war.
We stayed back and celebrated the victory at our bases.
Claude Arpi notes: It is said General S S Uban's plan was to use the Tibetan Force to capture Chittagong, but the SFF did not have the artillery and the airlift support to conduct such a type of mission.
However, they conducted smaller missions in the Chittagong Hill Tracks including the operation at the Kalurghat radio station, attacks on bridges and on the Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli River, 65 km upstream from Chittagong in Rangamati district.
They managed to stop the Pakistani 97 Independent Brigade and the 2nd Commando Battalion from retreating into Burma by cutting off their rear defences.
Establishment 22 lost 56 men and 190 were wounded in the 1971 operations.
The Indian government gave cash awards to 580 soldiers for their valourous conduct, but no bravery awards as the Tibetan soldiers were only 'The Phantoms of Chittagong', fighting a war which was not theirs under the guise of the Mukti Bahini.
I am indebted to Jamphel Shunu and Tenzin Lekshay for the translation of the interview.
The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war - Rediff.com News
Rediff.com » News » The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war
The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war
Last updated on: January 10, 2012 21:08 IST
Dapon Ratuk Ngawang was one of the senior leaders of the Voluntary Freedom Fighter Force in Tibet, a Tibetan guerrilla outfit which fought Chinese rule and played a key role in the Dalai Lama's escape to India in March 1959.
After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Ratuk Ngawang commanded the Tibetan secret regiment, known as the Special Frontier Forces, SSF, or Establishment 22, based near Dehra Dun in Uttar Pradesh.
Now 84, Ratuk Ngawag lives in the Tibetan colony of Majnu Ka Tilla in Delhi. He recently published his memoirs (in Tibetan) in which he recounts his early life in Kham province of Eastern Tibet and the escape to India as well as the Tibetan participation in the 1971 operations.
In an exclusive interview, he tells Claude Arpi about the SSF's role during the Bangladesh Liberation War.
In 1971, Ratuk Ngawang was a 'Dapon', often translated as 'Brigadier'; they were also known as 'Political Leaders.'
One of the aspects of the 1971 War which has never been publicised is the participation of Tibetan troops in the operations.
The official history of the war mentions all the victorious battles, but the Tibetan regiment is not mentioned. Today we have no document proving the Tibetan soldiers' participation.
We would be interested to hear from you more about the Tibetan Forces' role in the Bangladesh operations. We are also curious to find out about the directives (if any) from the Central Tibetan Administration (the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile) towards the Tibetan soldiers?
I have covered all these issues in my memoirs (published in Tibetan by the Amnye Machen Institute, Dharamsala). The Tibetan Regiment known as Special Frontier Forces or Establishment 22 has never officially been under the Indian Army.
It was established in 1962, after the Indo-China War. The main objective of the regiment was to fight the Chinese army with the help of the Indian Army.
At the time of the creation of the Force, we thought that the operations could be based at Lhuntse Dzong in Tibet (near the Indian border).
The plan was to engage the Chinese army in a military conflict within 5, 6 months of the Force's creation. But the Indo-China war came to an abrupt end (on November 22), and due to severe international pressure to maintain peace, no further military engagements occurred with China.
Therefore, the services of Establishment 22 regiment were not used as planned.
Tell us more about Establishment 22.
The Chinese took over Tibet in 1959. In 1960, the Government of India established a Force known as the Indo-Tibetan Border Force. Tibetan Establishment 22 was established in November 1962.
Who ordered the SFF to take part in the war?
A senior Indian Army officer, Major General Sujan Singh Uban (The SSF became known as 'Establishment 22' or simply 'Two-twos' because General Uban earlier served as commander of the 22 Mountain Brigade). At that time, he was the commander of the Tibetan Force.
A special army meeting was held in New Delhi; later we heard that General Uban had volunteered to lead the Establishment 22 regiment in the Bangladesh war.
It was S S Uban and my colleague Dapon Jampa Kalden who voluntarily decided to take part in the war.
Later they told me about their plans. First, I refused to join them, because to voluntarily go to war was for me 'illegal.' I told them that only if we got an order from the Government of India or from the Central Tibetan Administration, could we join the operation.
Moreover, I told them that Establishment 22 had not been created to fight 'for India'; rather it was established with the sole aim to fight the Chinese.
In fact, it is the reason why we get less salary as compared to Indian soldiers. We are not part of the regular Indian Army.
When the regiment was established, there was a mutual agreement that we would fight the Chinese. This did not happen.
However, I told General Uban and Dapon Jampa Kalden that if we were to get a formal order from the Indian government then we could join the operations.
Did Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother, give the directives to the Tibetan soldiers to join the Bangladesh war or was it someone else?
The directive came from the department of security of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.
The department had called us for a meeting. They told us that there was no alternative but to go to war 'for India.'
Moreover, they told us that the Indian government was in a very critical situation at that time and our participation in the war could help save a lot of Indian lives.
Did you have any contact with R N Kao who was responsible for external intelligence in the Cabinet secretariat?
Yes. R N Kao was a high level officer of the Indian government and Indira Gandhi's close associate. But our commander was General S S Uban. He had visited New Delhi and also informed the Central Tibetan Administration about his plans to lead the SFF in the Bangladesh war.
After he came back to our base (in Uttar Pradesh), he sent Jampa Kalden and me to meet officials of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala.
We told the administration about our initial reluctance to join the war. But since the Central Tibetan Administration had already decided about sending Establishment 22 to the war, we would go for it.
Was R N Kao involved in the decision?
R N Kao was a high level official and not a military man. So he was not directly involved in the operations. But he instructed us and advised us to prepare ourselves and fight well.
Was Mr Kao giving orders to General Uban?
General Uban was a military officer. R N Kao was a high ranking official, therefore he had greater authority.
When we captured Chittagong, R N Kao came to visit Establishment 22 and gave awards and speeches in praise of the Tibetan unit's heroic battles. R N Kao was a very patriotic person.
After the decision to participate in the operations was taken, Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang (who lost his life during the 1971 operations), Dapon Pekar Thinley and myself divided the regiment into three units.
We decided that each one of us would lead one unit in the war.
Due to his age and despite his military experience, Dapon Jampa Kalden couldn't take part in the war. He remained the administrative link between the Indian government and Establishment 22.
Gyalo Thondup was the chief strategist of Dehra Dun's SFF, but he was not involved in the decision to send Tibetan soldiers to the Bangladesh war.
When the Tibetan refugees first came to India, the Indian government had categorically urged the Tibetans not to participate in any political activities.
Much before the Bangladesh war, Gyalo Thondup and Andrug Gonpo Tashi (the founder of the Tibetan Volunteer Force in Tibet) had already resigned from their military posts
How many Mukti Bahini were trained at Uttar Pradesh by General Uban?
After Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was imprisoned in West Pakistan, more than 1,000 of his supporters escaped to India. Many of them were stationed near by the SSF camp.
We trained them in military combat. They were known as the Mukti Bahini.
Some of them were related to Mujibur Rahman. They later acted as our guides and contact persons during the war though they did not actually fight with us.
Though it was us who fought the real war and suffered the casualties, all the credit has later been given to the Mukti Bahini (because the Tibetan Force was involved under the guise of the Mukti Bahini).
Were the Mukti Bahini also under the command of General Uban?
Yes. General Uban provided the training to the Mukti Bahini.
When did you and the other two Dapons reach Bangladesh?
It was in November 1971. I was 39 years old at that time.
Did you go to Bangladesh before the beginning of the war or during the war?
We went before the Bangladesh war started. Though we were meant to fight the Chinese in a guerrilla warfare, during the Bangladesh war, our main enemy was the Mizo insurgents.
Just as the Tibetans were trained by the Indian Army, the Mizo soldiers were trained by Pakistan.
When and how did you go?
We went from the base of Establishment 22 in Uttar Pradesh to Dum Dum airport (Kolkata) by plane. From Dum Dum we went to Demagiri in Mizoram by motor vehicles. It took us three days.
After reaching the Bangladesh border (the Chittagong Hill Tracks), we had a meeting and went straight into the battle.
We left for the war on November 12 and fought for 28 days after which we came out victorious.
Many soldiers from the Pakistani side were killed and many surrendered.
What was General Uban's military objective in the war?
We were thoroughly trained in commando warfare to fight the Chinese; we were requested to use these skills to fight in the Bangladesh war.
The Indian authorities had assured us that the Indian Army would fight with the Tibetans for the cause of Tibet. Their reasoning was that the Tibetan soldiers alone could not defeat the Chinese army.
That's why we decided to join the Bangladesh war. It was in the hope that the Indian Army will help us militarily one day to fight the Chinese
Before going to the war, did General Uban gave you any instructions to capture specific places or specific Pakistani military bases?
We had a map of the area (Chittagong Hills). Each of the three units (battalions) with a little more than 1,000 soldiers each included the Tibetan soldiers and some Mukti Bahini partisans.
Since General Uban was the commander of the Tibetan Special Frontier Forces, he gave us instructions in Hindi (we had Tibetan translators). He told us where to go and later through walkie-talkie we could inform him where we had reached and he would then tell us what we had to do.
The three Tibetan battalions had three Tibetan Dapons and three Indian colonels. The three Dapons and the three colonels always discussed the strategies, but the decisions were taken by General Uban after we had informed him.
Other than Demagiri, in which other places did the Tibetan soldiers fight?
Demagiri was the main military base. About 100 Tibetan soldiers and 100 Mukti Bahini were posted to guard the base.
Apart from senior military officials stationed at Demagiri, the base also had a hospital, where those who got injured in the battle could be treated. Most of the doctors were majors and captains of the Indian Armed Medical Corps.
The preparation for this had been done much before the beginning of the war.
The severely injured soldiers were taken by helicopters to other hospitals, but since the war was going on in the jungle of the Chittagong Hills, it was difficult for the helicopters to land. That is why many of the injured had to be sent by boats through the river.
When the Indian Army came to Demagiri at the beginning of the actual war, were the Indian soldiers able to help the Tibetan soldiers?
No. The Indian soldiers were not able to help us. Similarly, the Tibetan soldiers were also not able to help the Indian soldiers since both have been trained in different types of military warfare.
The Tibetan commandos were trained in guerrilla warfare whereas the Indian soldiers were trained in urban warfare.
Were your military objectives fulfilled?
Within ten days, we captured almost all the enemy bases except for two.
Most of the enemy bases had only 50 soldiers or so and when we attacked them, they were hugely outnumbered and surrendered within an hour of fighting.
On December 16, when news of the Indian Army's conquest of Dhaka became known, most of the remaining smaller units surrendered.
After the victory in the Bangladesh war, did you go to Chittagong for the official victory parade?
General Uban did organise a trip for us to go to Chittagong for the official victory ceremony. But we couldn't go as the Tibetan soldiers had been scattered in many different places.
Therefore, General Uban and R N Kao went to Chittagong to attend the official ceremony and discuss the perks and rewards for the Tibetan soldiers's contribution in the war.
We stayed back and celebrated the victory at our bases.
Claude Arpi notes: It is said General S S Uban's plan was to use the Tibetan Force to capture Chittagong, but the SFF did not have the artillery and the airlift support to conduct such a type of mission.
However, they conducted smaller missions in the Chittagong Hill Tracks including the operation at the Kalurghat radio station, attacks on bridges and on the Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli River, 65 km upstream from Chittagong in Rangamati district.
They managed to stop the Pakistani 97 Independent Brigade and the 2nd Commando Battalion from retreating into Burma by cutting off their rear defences.
Establishment 22 lost 56 men and 190 were wounded in the 1971 operations.
The Indian government gave cash awards to 580 soldiers for their valourous conduct, but no bravery awards as the Tibetan soldiers were only 'The Phantoms of Chittagong', fighting a war which was not theirs under the guise of the Mukti Bahini.
I am indebted to Jamphel Shunu and Tenzin Lekshay for the translation of the interview.
The Tibetans who fought the 1971 war - Rediff.com News
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Forty years ago in 1971 on a cool and scary November 14 night in Chittagong a Pakistani sniper of Special Service Group perched silently on his hidden location near his camp felt he saw a 'phantom'. The days were then uncertain and nights were too risky. So, the Pakistani soldier did not take any chance and opened fire. And the shadowy creatures just melted away in the darkness. One among them was, however, dying. He was shot at fatally. The Pakistani soldier did not know that he had just killed one of the toughest and CIA trained Tibetan guerrilla leaders — Dhondup Gyatotsang. As Gyatotsang — a Dapon or Brigadier in Tibetan language — died his comrades, all armed simply with a Bulgarian AK 47 and their Tibetan knives, made radio contact with a turbaned Sikh some kilometres away and across the border. The Sikh barked at them the order: carry on with the task you are assigned to. As the order came the Tibetan guerrillas once again spread in the darkness and coiled up behind the Pakistani barracks and posts. They remained as shadows as long as they wanted and when the right time came they just struck with lightning speed raiding the Pak positions. One after another Pakistani posts fell as the Tibetans, who by this gained the title 'Phantoms of Chittagong', swept the hills and valleys of the hilly district of East Pakistan and restrained the Pakistani military movement to only small pockets. Weeks before the real war actually broke out on December 3rd, the Tibetan guerrillas turned Chittagong into a virtually a free zone with pre-emptive strikes for Indian army movement. On December 16, 1971 when the Pakistani army surrendered, the Tibetan commandos were only 40 km from the Chittagong Port. By this time they had successfully accomplished the task that their chief, General Sujan Singh Uban had assigned to them: The Operation Mountain Eagle. They had, however, lost 49 of their comrades and had 190 injured.
Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang (left) and Dapon Ratu Ngawang (right).
Ratu Ngawang (far left), former brigadier of Establishment 22, escorted the Dalai Lama (right) on his way to India in 1959. Seen here with Sujan Singh Uban (2nd from right), the first inspector-general of the regiment, in Chakrata, India, 1972. (© Hindustan Times)
'Operation Mountain Eagle' launched in East Pakistan during 1971 Indo-Pak War was, perhaps, till date the most closely guarded and top most secret operation of Indian authorities in the eastern flank of the war areas. Officially the operation could not be recognized as the Tibetan guerrilla force — known as Special Frontier Force (SFF) or Establishment 22 or simply called 'two-two' — does not officially exists. The name it got from the fact that their first commander (at the rank of Inspector General) Maj. Gen. Sujan Singh Uban had once commanded 22 Mountain brigade. Since their inception in November 1962, the Establishment 22's direct engagement in Indo-Pak war is also significant for the mere fact that it was not their 'war' at all. They were fighting for the cause of their host country and for liberation of another country — not for Tibet. Their sacrifice was never officially or publicly recognized — neither by India nor by Bangladesh till today.
Formation of top secret force, Two-Two
At the end of the 1962 Indo-China war the then Intelligence Bureau chief Bhola Nath Mullick took the initiative to form a special guerrilla force from the Tibetan youths who had been sheltered in India. Some documents indicate that former Chief Minister of Orissa Biju Patnaik had first come up with the idea while he was closely working with the CIA at the behest of Indian authorities in setting up of air surveillance ARC in Charbatia in his home state. Patnaik, a daredevil pilot with experience in several covert operations, according to Kenneth Conboy who authored an authoritative book on CIA operations relating to Tibet, wanted to raise a resistance force of Tibetans in Assam. However, the IB continued with the plan which ultimately materialized with the help of Chushi Gandruk, the main organization of the Khampa resistance and the CIA.
Following the green signal from the Cabinet secretariat the Special Frontier Force or Establishment 22 or was formed on November 14, 1962.
The Dalai Lama and Maj. Gen. Uban inspect the SFF at Chakrata, June 1972 (The CIA's Secret War in Tibet).
According to the plan the force would formed with Khampa fighters from Chushi Gandruk — and most of them would be brought from CIA run Mustang base in Nepal that housed as many as 2032 members. The force would be handled and trained by the IB at their Chakrata base near Dehra Dun. The CIA would provide all other supports for their training and related matters.
The CIA had first trained the Khampa fighters at Saipan in March 1957 and then Camp Hale in Colorado for guerrilla warfare so that they could be dropped inside Tibet for sabotage against the Chinese. The operation under the code name of 'ST Circus' was first headed by a US marine, Roger McCarthy. They trained in several batches about 259 Tibetan guerrillas. The CIA had also dropped some of them inside Tibet for sabotage and intelligence gathering.
Major General Sujan Singh Uban
"A formation agreement was signed in 1962. The parties to this formation agreement were the Indian Intelligence Service, the CIA and Chushi Gangdruk. General Gonpo Tashi Andrutsang and Jago Namgyal Dorjee, signed this three-party joint formation agreement on behalf of Chushi Gangdruk. Our organization took main responsibility for recruiting, and an initial strength of 12,000 men, mostly Khampas, were recruited at Chakrata, Dehra Dun, UP. Chushi Gangdruk sent two of the commanders to this new outfit to be political leaders in the initial stage", said Dokham Chushi Gangdruk, the Tibetan organization fighting for the Tibetan cause.
Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama met the Khampas in Mustang. Conboy said, 'Gyalo also sought four political leaders who could act as the force's indigenous officer cadre"¦.an initial contingent of Tibetans, led by Jamba Kalden, was dispatched to the hill town of Dehra Dun'.
Soon, the CIA, sent eight of its advisers on a six-month temporary duty assignment. The team was led by a veteran CIA operative in several covert and deadly campaigns Wayne Sanford who was recipient of two Purple Hearts. "He was acting undercover from US Embassy as special assistant to Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith", wrote Conboy.
Major General Sujan Singh Uban
The USA provided all the weaponry to them mostly M-1, M-2 and M-3 automatic rifles. As the covert guerrilla force was raised, Major General Sujan Singh Uban was assigned the task to command them as their Inspector General. The SFF ultimately came to be known as 'Establishment 22"² or simply 'Two-two'. Interestingly, the guerrilla forces cap insignia was designed as if it was '12th Gorkha' regiment-crossed khukri with '12"² on top. This was a deception tactics as at that time there were only 11 Gorkha regiments, seven regiments were with Indian army and four with the British after independence. It was so decided to confuse common people, in case of meeting the guerrillas, with Gorkhas as the facial features were same.
For next several years both Indian army, MARCOS, IB and CIA trained the guerrillas with special focus on para-trooping and sabotage as well as intelligence collection it was kept in mind that in case of another war with China they would be pressed into service. Some of the Camp Hale trained Tibetans were also included in the Establishment 22 and they held senior positions. They ultimately became one of best ever guerrilla forces in the world, efficient in land, air and water campaigns. While the 'Establishment 22"² was commanded by Maj. Gen. Uban, the guerrillas had their own political representatives and Dapon — a position equivalent to 'Brigadier' — mostly held by first generation Camp Hale trained guerrillas.
The Dalai Lama was aware of the formation of the guerrilla force since the beginning but he and his Dharamshala officials always maintained a distance from them neither supporting nor opposing the Indian initiative. According to some, Jawaharlal Nehru once visited the guerrillas in Chakrata and was impressed by their training and discipline. The Dalai lama also visited them once but it was much later.
Until late 1960 the CIA officials had kept relations with the Establishment 22 on numerous levels, but since 1968 their connections with the Tibetan guerrillas both in Mustang and Chakrata started thinning. CIA link with Chakrata completely died out in 1970s. The USA under Richard Nixon tilted towards Pakistan and also developed secret negotiations with China as Indo-Pakistan war seemed imminent.
Operation Mountain Eagle
SFF members during the Bangladesh campaign, 1971
Since the RAW headed by R. N. Kau was created on 21 September, 1968 the responsibility of the Establishment 22 also went to the agency. But their chief Maj. Gen. Uban had been worried at the way the trained commandos — as many as 64 companies, divided into eight battalions having six companies each and including other support units — were gathering moss in their Chakrata camps. They were not used against China or Pakistan for any real armed combat and the IG was worried that inaction and absence of field operations might reduce the morale and capabilities.
It was at that time the East Pakistan went up in flames with Pakistan army resorting to large scale massacres and rape on March 25, 1971 as 'Operation Searchlight'. Two days later Major Zia Ur Rehman — a Bengali military officer with the Pakistan army announced 'independence' in Chittagong radio and attacked the Pakistani army cantonment. Within a day, many more military officers followed and millions of refugees poured into India to flee the Pakistani Army's massacres and rapes. India was playing the card well and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was successful in garnering massive international support, barring USA and China of course, for the brutalized East Pakistani Bengali population. By this time Mukti Bahini was formed from the refugee youths sheltered in Indian states for launching guerrilla wars and intelligence collections inside East Pakistan against the Pakistani forces. The idea was to create a pre-emptive strike force before the Indian regular army moved in after the rainy season was over.
Incidentally, Maj. Gen. Uban was entrusted with the overall task for training of the Bengali forces like Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini.
Maj. Gen. Uban did not miss the chance and moved New Delhi to send his Tibetan forces to East Pakistan who, according to him were already better trained and itching for an operation. After initial hesitation Indira Gandhi agreed to use the Tibetans, but sent the ball to the court of the Tibetans.
Writes Tashi Dhundup, in article titled 'Not their own Wars', "Indira Gandhi in the lead-up to the SFF's deployment, Indira Gandhi wired a message to the Tibetan fighters, conveyed through their Indian commander: 'We cannot compel you to fight a war for us,' Gandhi wrote, "but the fact is that General A. A. K. Niazi (the Pakistan Army commander in East Pakistan) is treating the people of East Pakistan very badly. India has to do something about it. In a way, it is similar to the way the Chinese are treating the Tibetans in Tibet, we are facing a similar situation. It would be appreciated if you could help us fight the war for liberating the people of Bangladesh."
Following the letter the senior commanders of the Establishment 22 guerrillas discussed and agreed to help the Bengalis of East Pakistan to achieve their new nation Bangladesh.
The Operation Mountain Eagle was launched in a second cool November night, apparently avoiding the Eastern Command directly by the RAW.
SFF members during the Bangladesh campaign, 1971
It was sometime in third week of October 1971 that one of the most top secret armed campaigns against the Pakistan army in East Pakistan, the Operation Mountain Eagle, was quietly launched. More than 3000 Tibetan commandos from Establishment 22 were dropped at an obscure and extreme border village Demagiri in Mizoram. The Indian secret services used AN 12 plane from the ARC to bring the guerrillas by night sorties. Demagiri which was located across the river Karnafulli and Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan was by that time was crowded with refugees. The Tibetan stayed incognito with the refugees for sometimes and then began small hit-and-run raids into East Pakistan. They would cross the river and, strike a Pakistani force and return to Dimagiri. In the second week of November, 1971, the Tibetan guerrillas led by Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang crossed the river using nine canoes and went inside East Pakistan to launch a decisive guerrilla campaign. Since the Establishment 22 or SFF did not officially exist, Indian authorities could deny any complicity in any eventuality. The fighters were armed with them Bulgarian AK 47s instead of Russian ones. On the very first night they ran over a Pakistani post. Within hours next morning they captured one more post and they kept on sweeping and then stopped — for sometime — when their Dapon was shot dead. But again, they swung into action.
The task to Establishment 22 was clear: blow up Kaptai dam, damage the Pakistani military positions and kill as many Pak soldiers — at that time nicknamed 'Khan Sena'– as possible, destroy the bridges, military infrastructures, and restrain the Pakistani military movement. Divided in three columns their hit and run modus operandi and the task specified were to create a situation that when the Indian army would move, they could march through the Chittagong hills and plains without much resistance from the Pakistanis.
According to specialists on the subject the Establishment 22 guerrillas were extremely successful in their campaign. At that time the Pakistani 97th Independent Brigade and their 2nd commando battalion of SSG were positioned strategically in Chittagong. The guerrillas successfully restrained them in their respective positions and also cut off all the routes that the Pakistani soldiers thought of opening towards Burma. In fact the Pakistani soldiers were seeing ghosts in all the shadows and they were fighting against merciless ghosts who were always on the prowl, would swoop down from nowhere and mercilessly eliminate them and destroy the posts and would immediately vanish for their next target. Within one month of their operations, the Tibetan guerrillas virtually cleaned up the Chittagong area and when the Indian army moved in they did not face much resistance at all.
"About one-third of its full strength was developed adjacent to the Chittagong Hill Tracts as Mukti Bahini. They captured many towns and garrisons in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in continuous fighting of about one month", according to Dokham Chushi Gangdruk.
In fact Maj. Gen. Uban and his guerrillas were keen to capture the Chittagong Port. They were very close and Pakistan army were not at all in a position to stop them. But Indian military and other authorities were not ready to assign them with the task as, though it would have been easier for the guerrillas to capture the Port, to keep it under their control they would have needed heavy artillery weapons — which they did not have with them.
Tibetan troops of SFF after victory in Chittagong where they conducted clandestine operations during 1971 war. They are equipped with Bulgarian variants of AK-47 and M-1 Garand rifles supplied by the USA. (© Elite Forces of India and Pakistan)
According to a document, when the Chittagong Port was captured by Indian military, the guerrillas were then asked to sit quiet about 40 kms away. However, on December 16 when the Pakistan army surrendered at Dhaka, the Phantoms of Establishment 22, for the first time in their history, came out in the open on the Chittagong road, rejoicing the victory of India over Pakistan. The common people were stunned by their sudden appearance — happy and rejoicing — virtually from nowhere, Even many Indian soldiers, who were also not aware of their presence in the vicinity were taken by surprise. But soon Maj. Gen. Uban was informed about the public appearance of the Tibetans on the Chittagong streets and he ordered them back to the shadows. They were never seen again. Their happy moment in public was only for some hours.
Though the Tibetan guerrillas were arguably the main force that played the key role in Chittagong in the 1971 war, — sacrificing 49 (according to Tibetans' estimate 56) including one of their top leader and 190 injured, they could not be officially recognized.
"The Indian government gave awards to 580 members of the force for their active involvement and bravery in the battles. The contribution made by Establishment 22 in liberating East Pakistan was great and the price paid by the force was also high", said Dokham Chusi Gandruk, the New York based organization.
It then added: "(The fight and sacrifice) would have been of great value had it been used against communist China, the intended enemy"¦.The SFF never had a chance of being used in operations against its intended enemy, Red China, but it was used against East Pakistan with the consent of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1971"³.
It is, however, a different story that the Establishment 22 was later used in many Indian operations including in Operation Blue Star, Siachen, Kargil. They are also being used as a main anti-terrorist force in many parts of the country. According to a report, in between Indira Gandhi's assassination and the formation of SPG, it was these Establishment 22 commandos who were in charge of the protection of the Gandhi family. But in all the cases down the decades they remained unsung heroes — the 'unknown' warriors from a different country who fought and sacrificed for others.
Rangzen Alliance � Phantom Warriors of 1971
Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang (left) and Dapon Ratu Ngawang (right).
Ratu Ngawang (far left), former brigadier of Establishment 22, escorted the Dalai Lama (right) on his way to India in 1959. Seen here with Sujan Singh Uban (2nd from right), the first inspector-general of the regiment, in Chakrata, India, 1972. (© Hindustan Times)
'Operation Mountain Eagle' launched in East Pakistan during 1971 Indo-Pak War was, perhaps, till date the most closely guarded and top most secret operation of Indian authorities in the eastern flank of the war areas. Officially the operation could not be recognized as the Tibetan guerrilla force — known as Special Frontier Force (SFF) or Establishment 22 or simply called 'two-two' — does not officially exists. The name it got from the fact that their first commander (at the rank of Inspector General) Maj. Gen. Sujan Singh Uban had once commanded 22 Mountain brigade. Since their inception in November 1962, the Establishment 22's direct engagement in Indo-Pak war is also significant for the mere fact that it was not their 'war' at all. They were fighting for the cause of their host country and for liberation of another country — not for Tibet. Their sacrifice was never officially or publicly recognized — neither by India nor by Bangladesh till today.
Formation of top secret force, Two-Two
At the end of the 1962 Indo-China war the then Intelligence Bureau chief Bhola Nath Mullick took the initiative to form a special guerrilla force from the Tibetan youths who had been sheltered in India. Some documents indicate that former Chief Minister of Orissa Biju Patnaik had first come up with the idea while he was closely working with the CIA at the behest of Indian authorities in setting up of air surveillance ARC in Charbatia in his home state. Patnaik, a daredevil pilot with experience in several covert operations, according to Kenneth Conboy who authored an authoritative book on CIA operations relating to Tibet, wanted to raise a resistance force of Tibetans in Assam. However, the IB continued with the plan which ultimately materialized with the help of Chushi Gandruk, the main organization of the Khampa resistance and the CIA.
Following the green signal from the Cabinet secretariat the Special Frontier Force or Establishment 22 or was formed on November 14, 1962.
The Dalai Lama and Maj. Gen. Uban inspect the SFF at Chakrata, June 1972 (The CIA's Secret War in Tibet).
According to the plan the force would formed with Khampa fighters from Chushi Gandruk — and most of them would be brought from CIA run Mustang base in Nepal that housed as many as 2032 members. The force would be handled and trained by the IB at their Chakrata base near Dehra Dun. The CIA would provide all other supports for their training and related matters.
The CIA had first trained the Khampa fighters at Saipan in March 1957 and then Camp Hale in Colorado for guerrilla warfare so that they could be dropped inside Tibet for sabotage against the Chinese. The operation under the code name of 'ST Circus' was first headed by a US marine, Roger McCarthy. They trained in several batches about 259 Tibetan guerrillas. The CIA had also dropped some of them inside Tibet for sabotage and intelligence gathering.
Major General Sujan Singh Uban
"A formation agreement was signed in 1962. The parties to this formation agreement were the Indian Intelligence Service, the CIA and Chushi Gangdruk. General Gonpo Tashi Andrutsang and Jago Namgyal Dorjee, signed this three-party joint formation agreement on behalf of Chushi Gangdruk. Our organization took main responsibility for recruiting, and an initial strength of 12,000 men, mostly Khampas, were recruited at Chakrata, Dehra Dun, UP. Chushi Gangdruk sent two of the commanders to this new outfit to be political leaders in the initial stage", said Dokham Chushi Gangdruk, the Tibetan organization fighting for the Tibetan cause.
Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama met the Khampas in Mustang. Conboy said, 'Gyalo also sought four political leaders who could act as the force's indigenous officer cadre"¦.an initial contingent of Tibetans, led by Jamba Kalden, was dispatched to the hill town of Dehra Dun'.
Soon, the CIA, sent eight of its advisers on a six-month temporary duty assignment. The team was led by a veteran CIA operative in several covert and deadly campaigns Wayne Sanford who was recipient of two Purple Hearts. "He was acting undercover from US Embassy as special assistant to Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith", wrote Conboy.
Major General Sujan Singh Uban
The USA provided all the weaponry to them mostly M-1, M-2 and M-3 automatic rifles. As the covert guerrilla force was raised, Major General Sujan Singh Uban was assigned the task to command them as their Inspector General. The SFF ultimately came to be known as 'Establishment 22"² or simply 'Two-two'. Interestingly, the guerrilla forces cap insignia was designed as if it was '12th Gorkha' regiment-crossed khukri with '12"² on top. This was a deception tactics as at that time there were only 11 Gorkha regiments, seven regiments were with Indian army and four with the British after independence. It was so decided to confuse common people, in case of meeting the guerrillas, with Gorkhas as the facial features were same.
For next several years both Indian army, MARCOS, IB and CIA trained the guerrillas with special focus on para-trooping and sabotage as well as intelligence collection it was kept in mind that in case of another war with China they would be pressed into service. Some of the Camp Hale trained Tibetans were also included in the Establishment 22 and they held senior positions. They ultimately became one of best ever guerrilla forces in the world, efficient in land, air and water campaigns. While the 'Establishment 22"² was commanded by Maj. Gen. Uban, the guerrillas had their own political representatives and Dapon — a position equivalent to 'Brigadier' — mostly held by first generation Camp Hale trained guerrillas.
The Dalai Lama was aware of the formation of the guerrilla force since the beginning but he and his Dharamshala officials always maintained a distance from them neither supporting nor opposing the Indian initiative. According to some, Jawaharlal Nehru once visited the guerrillas in Chakrata and was impressed by their training and discipline. The Dalai lama also visited them once but it was much later.
Until late 1960 the CIA officials had kept relations with the Establishment 22 on numerous levels, but since 1968 their connections with the Tibetan guerrillas both in Mustang and Chakrata started thinning. CIA link with Chakrata completely died out in 1970s. The USA under Richard Nixon tilted towards Pakistan and also developed secret negotiations with China as Indo-Pakistan war seemed imminent.
Operation Mountain Eagle
SFF members during the Bangladesh campaign, 1971
Since the RAW headed by R. N. Kau was created on 21 September, 1968 the responsibility of the Establishment 22 also went to the agency. But their chief Maj. Gen. Uban had been worried at the way the trained commandos — as many as 64 companies, divided into eight battalions having six companies each and including other support units — were gathering moss in their Chakrata camps. They were not used against China or Pakistan for any real armed combat and the IG was worried that inaction and absence of field operations might reduce the morale and capabilities.
It was at that time the East Pakistan went up in flames with Pakistan army resorting to large scale massacres and rape on March 25, 1971 as 'Operation Searchlight'. Two days later Major Zia Ur Rehman — a Bengali military officer with the Pakistan army announced 'independence' in Chittagong radio and attacked the Pakistani army cantonment. Within a day, many more military officers followed and millions of refugees poured into India to flee the Pakistani Army's massacres and rapes. India was playing the card well and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was successful in garnering massive international support, barring USA and China of course, for the brutalized East Pakistani Bengali population. By this time Mukti Bahini was formed from the refugee youths sheltered in Indian states for launching guerrilla wars and intelligence collections inside East Pakistan against the Pakistani forces. The idea was to create a pre-emptive strike force before the Indian regular army moved in after the rainy season was over.
Incidentally, Maj. Gen. Uban was entrusted with the overall task for training of the Bengali forces like Mukti Bahini and Mujib Bahini.
Maj. Gen. Uban did not miss the chance and moved New Delhi to send his Tibetan forces to East Pakistan who, according to him were already better trained and itching for an operation. After initial hesitation Indira Gandhi agreed to use the Tibetans, but sent the ball to the court of the Tibetans.
Writes Tashi Dhundup, in article titled 'Not their own Wars', "Indira Gandhi in the lead-up to the SFF's deployment, Indira Gandhi wired a message to the Tibetan fighters, conveyed through their Indian commander: 'We cannot compel you to fight a war for us,' Gandhi wrote, "but the fact is that General A. A. K. Niazi (the Pakistan Army commander in East Pakistan) is treating the people of East Pakistan very badly. India has to do something about it. In a way, it is similar to the way the Chinese are treating the Tibetans in Tibet, we are facing a similar situation. It would be appreciated if you could help us fight the war for liberating the people of Bangladesh."
Following the letter the senior commanders of the Establishment 22 guerrillas discussed and agreed to help the Bengalis of East Pakistan to achieve their new nation Bangladesh.
The Operation Mountain Eagle was launched in a second cool November night, apparently avoiding the Eastern Command directly by the RAW.
SFF members during the Bangladesh campaign, 1971
It was sometime in third week of October 1971 that one of the most top secret armed campaigns against the Pakistan army in East Pakistan, the Operation Mountain Eagle, was quietly launched. More than 3000 Tibetan commandos from Establishment 22 were dropped at an obscure and extreme border village Demagiri in Mizoram. The Indian secret services used AN 12 plane from the ARC to bring the guerrillas by night sorties. Demagiri which was located across the river Karnafulli and Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan was by that time was crowded with refugees. The Tibetan stayed incognito with the refugees for sometimes and then began small hit-and-run raids into East Pakistan. They would cross the river and, strike a Pakistani force and return to Dimagiri. In the second week of November, 1971, the Tibetan guerrillas led by Dapon Dhondup Gyatotsang crossed the river using nine canoes and went inside East Pakistan to launch a decisive guerrilla campaign. Since the Establishment 22 or SFF did not officially exist, Indian authorities could deny any complicity in any eventuality. The fighters were armed with them Bulgarian AK 47s instead of Russian ones. On the very first night they ran over a Pakistani post. Within hours next morning they captured one more post and they kept on sweeping and then stopped — for sometime — when their Dapon was shot dead. But again, they swung into action.
The task to Establishment 22 was clear: blow up Kaptai dam, damage the Pakistani military positions and kill as many Pak soldiers — at that time nicknamed 'Khan Sena'– as possible, destroy the bridges, military infrastructures, and restrain the Pakistani military movement. Divided in three columns their hit and run modus operandi and the task specified were to create a situation that when the Indian army would move, they could march through the Chittagong hills and plains without much resistance from the Pakistanis.
According to specialists on the subject the Establishment 22 guerrillas were extremely successful in their campaign. At that time the Pakistani 97th Independent Brigade and their 2nd commando battalion of SSG were positioned strategically in Chittagong. The guerrillas successfully restrained them in their respective positions and also cut off all the routes that the Pakistani soldiers thought of opening towards Burma. In fact the Pakistani soldiers were seeing ghosts in all the shadows and they were fighting against merciless ghosts who were always on the prowl, would swoop down from nowhere and mercilessly eliminate them and destroy the posts and would immediately vanish for their next target. Within one month of their operations, the Tibetan guerrillas virtually cleaned up the Chittagong area and when the Indian army moved in they did not face much resistance at all.
"About one-third of its full strength was developed adjacent to the Chittagong Hill Tracts as Mukti Bahini. They captured many towns and garrisons in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in continuous fighting of about one month", according to Dokham Chushi Gangdruk.
In fact Maj. Gen. Uban and his guerrillas were keen to capture the Chittagong Port. They were very close and Pakistan army were not at all in a position to stop them. But Indian military and other authorities were not ready to assign them with the task as, though it would have been easier for the guerrillas to capture the Port, to keep it under their control they would have needed heavy artillery weapons — which they did not have with them.
Tibetan troops of SFF after victory in Chittagong where they conducted clandestine operations during 1971 war. They are equipped with Bulgarian variants of AK-47 and M-1 Garand rifles supplied by the USA. (© Elite Forces of India and Pakistan)
According to a document, when the Chittagong Port was captured by Indian military, the guerrillas were then asked to sit quiet about 40 kms away. However, on December 16 when the Pakistan army surrendered at Dhaka, the Phantoms of Establishment 22, for the first time in their history, came out in the open on the Chittagong road, rejoicing the victory of India over Pakistan. The common people were stunned by their sudden appearance — happy and rejoicing — virtually from nowhere, Even many Indian soldiers, who were also not aware of their presence in the vicinity were taken by surprise. But soon Maj. Gen. Uban was informed about the public appearance of the Tibetans on the Chittagong streets and he ordered them back to the shadows. They were never seen again. Their happy moment in public was only for some hours.
Though the Tibetan guerrillas were arguably the main force that played the key role in Chittagong in the 1971 war, — sacrificing 49 (according to Tibetans' estimate 56) including one of their top leader and 190 injured, they could not be officially recognized.
"The Indian government gave awards to 580 members of the force for their active involvement and bravery in the battles. The contribution made by Establishment 22 in liberating East Pakistan was great and the price paid by the force was also high", said Dokham Chusi Gandruk, the New York based organization.
It then added: "(The fight and sacrifice) would have been of great value had it been used against communist China, the intended enemy"¦.The SFF never had a chance of being used in operations against its intended enemy, Red China, but it was used against East Pakistan with the consent of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1971"³.
It is, however, a different story that the Establishment 22 was later used in many Indian operations including in Operation Blue Star, Siachen, Kargil. They are also being used as a main anti-terrorist force in many parts of the country. According to a report, in between Indira Gandhi's assassination and the formation of SPG, it was these Establishment 22 commandos who were in charge of the protection of the Gandhi family. But in all the cases down the decades they remained unsung heroes — the 'unknown' warriors from a different country who fought and sacrificed for others.
Rangzen Alliance � Phantom Warriors of 1971
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Tuesday, March 27, 2012
Four decades after Bangladesh came into being as an Independent Nation, the country formally recognized the role played by the Indian Armed Forces during the Bangladesh 1971 Liberation War. At a glittering function in capital Dhaka Bangladesh President Mohd. Zillur Rahman, in the presence of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, conferred an award on the Indian Defence Minister on behalf of the Indian Armed Forces.
The award was received by the Minister of State for Defence Dr. MM Pallam Raju during at the Bangabandhu International Conference Center. The award consists of a gold-plated silver metallic plaque bearing a replica of the National Mausoleum and a citation on a silk cloth. It is a formal recognition by the Government of Bangladesh of the supreme sacrifice made by about 1,400 Indian Armed Forces personnel during Bangladesh's nine-month long Liberation War.
The award was recommended by a National Committee constituted by the Government of Bangladesh under Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni and consisting of State Minister for Liberation War Affairs M. Tajul Islam to honour the foreign friends who had assisted Bangladesh in its Liberation War.
Indian and Bangladesh Forces were put under a Joint Command structure, led by Lt. General Jagjit Singh Aurora, and this force came to be known as the 'Mitra Bahini', says the Committee's note, adding that this alliance of the Indian Army and Bangladesh Forces engaged the Pakistani Forces in December, 1971 and was instrumental in the defeat of the Pakistan Army which surrendered on December 16, 1971, a few days after the formal declaration of War.
Pallam Raju, who is on two-day visit to Dhaka, also represented India at the Bangladesh Independence and National Day celebrations in the capital today. It was on this day in 1971 the Bangladesh' Father of the Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared Independence.
The Government of Bangladesh is conferring awards on 110 foreign nationals and organizations tomorrow for their contribution to the country's Liberation War, including Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar. In the first phase Sonia Gandhi received the Bangladesh Freedom Honour awarded to former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at a function in Dhaka on July 25 last year.
defence eXpress: Bangladesh to acknowledge sacrifice of Indian soldiers in 1971 War
Four decades after Bangladesh came into being as an Independent Nation, the country formally recognized the role played by the Indian Armed Forces during the Bangladesh 1971 Liberation War. At a glittering function in capital Dhaka Bangladesh President Mohd. Zillur Rahman, in the presence of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, conferred an award on the Indian Defence Minister on behalf of the Indian Armed Forces.
The award was received by the Minister of State for Defence Dr. MM Pallam Raju during at the Bangabandhu International Conference Center. The award consists of a gold-plated silver metallic plaque bearing a replica of the National Mausoleum and a citation on a silk cloth. It is a formal recognition by the Government of Bangladesh of the supreme sacrifice made by about 1,400 Indian Armed Forces personnel during Bangladesh's nine-month long Liberation War.
The award was recommended by a National Committee constituted by the Government of Bangladesh under Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni and consisting of State Minister for Liberation War Affairs M. Tajul Islam to honour the foreign friends who had assisted Bangladesh in its Liberation War.
Indian and Bangladesh Forces were put under a Joint Command structure, led by Lt. General Jagjit Singh Aurora, and this force came to be known as the 'Mitra Bahini', says the Committee's note, adding that this alliance of the Indian Army and Bangladesh Forces engaged the Pakistani Forces in December, 1971 and was instrumental in the defeat of the Pakistan Army which surrendered on December 16, 1971, a few days after the formal declaration of War.
Pallam Raju, who is on two-day visit to Dhaka, also represented India at the Bangladesh Independence and National Day celebrations in the capital today. It was on this day in 1971 the Bangladesh' Father of the Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared Independence.
The Government of Bangladesh is conferring awards on 110 foreign nationals and organizations tomorrow for their contribution to the country's Liberation War, including Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar. In the first phase Sonia Gandhi received the Bangladesh Freedom Honour awarded to former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at a function in Dhaka on July 25 last year.
defence eXpress: Bangladesh to acknowledge sacrifice of Indian soldiers in 1971 War
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=228046
Expressing its deep debt of gratitude, the country yesterday honoured individuals and organisations from across the world for their wholehearted support to its liberation in 1971.
President Zillur Rahman and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina conferred the awards on the nation's foreign friends at a special ceremony at the Bangabandhu International Conference Centre.
The state accolades, titled "Bangladesh Liberation War Honour" and "Friends of Liberation War Honour", went to 83 -- 75 individuals, six organisations, Mitra Bahini (allied forces) and the people of India.
Recalling the recipients' contributions to our independence war, the president said, "Their valuable inspiration and support gave us impetus for achieving victory."
Hasina said, "They gave us all sorts of help available -- food, shelter, medicine, and even military training. Most importantly, they gave greater voice to our legitimate cause, facilitated our access to global media, mobilised public opinion and financial support.
"Their moral and logistics support had been a constant source of inspiration for our valiant freedom fighters."
This was the second phase of presenting awards to foreign nationals and organisations.
Earlier on July 25 last year, "Bangladesh Freedom Honour" was posthumously conferred on former Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi.
At yesterday's ceremony, eight heads of state and government were awarded the "Bangladesh Liberation War Honour" and the others "Friends of Liberation War Honour."
Of the eight, only Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav is alive. The others are Third King of Bhutan Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, former Soviet presidents Leonid IIyich Brezhnev and Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, ex-Soviet prime minister Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, former Yugoslav president Marshal Josip Broz Tito, ex-UK prime minister Sir Edward Richard George Heath and former Nepalese prime minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala.
The organisations that received awards are the BBC, Akashbani (All India Radio), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Oxfam and Kolkata University Shahayak Samiti.
The award consists of a gold-plated silver metallic plaque bearing a replica of the National Memorial and a citation on a silk cloth.
Bangalees received support from these foreign friends at a time when they stood up against genocide and other atrocities by the Pakistan occupation forces and their collaborators.
The nine-month war eventually led to the emergence of a sovereign Bangladesh.
The ceremony yesterday was a unique experience for many who travelled to Bangladesh for the first time to receive the awards on behalf of the recipients.
The awardees thanked the Bangladesh government for honouring them.
Hari Kumar Shrestha, Nepalese ambassador in Dhaka, was the first to receive the "Bangladesh Liberation War Honour" from Zillur Rahman on behalf of his country's President Dr Ram Baran Yadav.
Lyonpo Chenkyab Dorji, chairman of the Royal Privy Council, took the award on behalf of Third King of Bhutan Jigme Dorjio Wangchuck.
Alexander A Nikolaev, Russian ambassador in Dhaka, received three awards on behalf of two former presidents and a prime minister.
Aleksandar Broz, son of former Yugoslavia president Marshal Tito, received the award on behalf of his father. The EHF trustee received the award for ex-British prime minister Edward Richard George Heath.
The son of former Nepalese prime minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala took the award for his father.
Pankaj Saran, the Indian high commissioner in Dhaka, received the "Friends of Liberation War Honour" award for the people of India, while Indian State Minister for Defence MM Pallam Raju took the award as a Mitra Bahini representative.
Meghalaya Chief Minister Mukul Sangma received the award for his late mother Rawshan Ara Begum Sangma.
Director General of All India Radio Leeladhar Mandloi received the award for Akashbani.
The ceremony started with the screening of a documentary on the foreign friends after the prime minister had reached the venue around 10:00am.
Cabinet Division Secretary Mohammad Mosharraf Hossain Bhuiyan introduced the foreign friends to the audience and read out a citation describing their role during the Liberation War.
Lt Gen Jack Frederick Ralph Jacob of India gave a salute to the audience after receiving the award. He then chanted "Joy Bangla" and the audience reciprocated with an even louder chant.
Speaking on behalf of the recipients, former British Labour MP Michael Barnes said they were greatly honoured at the Bangladesh government's invitation.
"We accept the honour. Long live Bangladesh. Joy Bangla."
A list of 132 foreign friends was made but the government finally invited 110, of which, 83 have attended or sent representatives to receive the awards.
The government has so far prepared a list of 568 foreign friends from all over the world. They include 257 Indians, 88 Americans, 41 Pakistanis, 39 Britons, nine Russians, 18 Nepalese, 16 French and 18 Japanese.
At the function, the prime minister said the government would continue to honour foreign friends.
A foreign ministry source said lawmakers and leaders of most political parties, except Jamaat-e-Islami, were invited to the ceremony. No BNP leader was seen at the programme.
Gono Forum President Dr Kamal Hossain and Communist Party of Bangladesh General Secretary Mujahedul Islam Selim, among others, attended the function.
Expressing its deep debt of gratitude, the country yesterday honoured individuals and organisations from across the world for their wholehearted support to its liberation in 1971.
President Zillur Rahman and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina conferred the awards on the nation's foreign friends at a special ceremony at the Bangabandhu International Conference Centre.
The state accolades, titled "Bangladesh Liberation War Honour" and "Friends of Liberation War Honour", went to 83 -- 75 individuals, six organisations, Mitra Bahini (allied forces) and the people of India.
Recalling the recipients' contributions to our independence war, the president said, "Their valuable inspiration and support gave us impetus for achieving victory."
Hasina said, "They gave us all sorts of help available -- food, shelter, medicine, and even military training. Most importantly, they gave greater voice to our legitimate cause, facilitated our access to global media, mobilised public opinion and financial support.
"Their moral and logistics support had been a constant source of inspiration for our valiant freedom fighters."
This was the second phase of presenting awards to foreign nationals and organisations.
Earlier on July 25 last year, "Bangladesh Freedom Honour" was posthumously conferred on former Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi.
At yesterday's ceremony, eight heads of state and government were awarded the "Bangladesh Liberation War Honour" and the others "Friends of Liberation War Honour."
Of the eight, only Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav is alive. The others are Third King of Bhutan Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, former Soviet presidents Leonid IIyich Brezhnev and Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, ex-Soviet prime minister Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, former Yugoslav president Marshal Josip Broz Tito, ex-UK prime minister Sir Edward Richard George Heath and former Nepalese prime minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala.
The organisations that received awards are the BBC, Akashbani (All India Radio), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Oxfam and Kolkata University Shahayak Samiti.
The award consists of a gold-plated silver metallic plaque bearing a replica of the National Memorial and a citation on a silk cloth.
Bangalees received support from these foreign friends at a time when they stood up against genocide and other atrocities by the Pakistan occupation forces and their collaborators.
The nine-month war eventually led to the emergence of a sovereign Bangladesh.
The ceremony yesterday was a unique experience for many who travelled to Bangladesh for the first time to receive the awards on behalf of the recipients.
The awardees thanked the Bangladesh government for honouring them.
Hari Kumar Shrestha, Nepalese ambassador in Dhaka, was the first to receive the "Bangladesh Liberation War Honour" from Zillur Rahman on behalf of his country's President Dr Ram Baran Yadav.
Lyonpo Chenkyab Dorji, chairman of the Royal Privy Council, took the award on behalf of Third King of Bhutan Jigme Dorjio Wangchuck.
Alexander A Nikolaev, Russian ambassador in Dhaka, received three awards on behalf of two former presidents and a prime minister.
Aleksandar Broz, son of former Yugoslavia president Marshal Tito, received the award on behalf of his father. The EHF trustee received the award for ex-British prime minister Edward Richard George Heath.
The son of former Nepalese prime minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala took the award for his father.
Pankaj Saran, the Indian high commissioner in Dhaka, received the "Friends of Liberation War Honour" award for the people of India, while Indian State Minister for Defence MM Pallam Raju took the award as a Mitra Bahini representative.
Meghalaya Chief Minister Mukul Sangma received the award for his late mother Rawshan Ara Begum Sangma.
Director General of All India Radio Leeladhar Mandloi received the award for Akashbani.
The ceremony started with the screening of a documentary on the foreign friends after the prime minister had reached the venue around 10:00am.
Cabinet Division Secretary Mohammad Mosharraf Hossain Bhuiyan introduced the foreign friends to the audience and read out a citation describing their role during the Liberation War.
Lt Gen Jack Frederick Ralph Jacob of India gave a salute to the audience after receiving the award. He then chanted "Joy Bangla" and the audience reciprocated with an even louder chant.
Speaking on behalf of the recipients, former British Labour MP Michael Barnes said they were greatly honoured at the Bangladesh government's invitation.
"We accept the honour. Long live Bangladesh. Joy Bangla."
A list of 132 foreign friends was made but the government finally invited 110, of which, 83 have attended or sent representatives to receive the awards.
The government has so far prepared a list of 568 foreign friends from all over the world. They include 257 Indians, 88 Americans, 41 Pakistanis, 39 Britons, nine Russians, 18 Nepalese, 16 French and 18 Japanese.
At the function, the prime minister said the government would continue to honour foreign friends.
A foreign ministry source said lawmakers and leaders of most political parties, except Jamaat-e-Islami, were invited to the ceremony. No BNP leader was seen at the programme.
Gono Forum President Dr Kamal Hossain and Communist Party of Bangladesh General Secretary Mujahedul Islam Selim, among others, attended the function.
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Thread already posted.. Merge..
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...ledge-sacrifice-indian-soldiers-1971-war.html
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...ledge-sacrifice-indian-soldiers-1971-war.html
Arnab Banerjee
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the above is the account of war. now what we learn from it?
first bangladeshis start creating public opinion in favour of war by using leaflets. this move drives more and more public into army. this move also creats supports for army in the mind of civilians.
the situation is that bangladesh had no formal army, pakistan and india has formal army. in this scenario, bangladesh declares war against west pakistan. how to win the battle?
pakistan responded by airlifting in two infantry divisions and reorganising their forces. They also raised paramilitary forces of Razakars, Al-Badrs and Al-Shams (who were mostly members of the Muslim League, the then government party and other Islamist groups), as well as other Bengalis who opposed independence, and Bihari Muslims who had settled during the time of partition.
bangladeshi mukti bahini took direct supply of arms from india. so now the situation is pakistan vs. bangladesh + india. the odd is 1 against 2. this move give strength both military and political to mukti bahini.
then mukti bahini took the following strategy. i will explain the reasons behind this strategy:
a] Bengali conventional force would occupy lodgment areas inside Bangladesh and then Bangladesh government would request international diplomatic recognition and intervention. Initially Mymensingh was picked for this operation, but Gen. Osmani later settled on Sylhet.
b] Sending the maximum number to guerrillas inside Bangladesh as soon as possible with the following objectives:[58][59]
1] Increasing Pakistani casualties through raids and ambush
2]Cripple economic activity by hitting power stations, railway lines, storage depots and communication networks.
3] Destroy Pakistan army mobility by blowing up bridges/culverts, fuel depots, trains and river crafts.
4]The strategic objective is to make the Pakistanis to spread their forces inside the province, so attacks can be made on isolated Pakistani detachments.
clearly mukti bahini took a double edged sword against pakistan. just follow: first it would ask for international diplomatic intervention. this move would create political pressure over pakistan govt.
secondly mukti bahini send guerrillas to isolate the entire pakistani force i.e. to break it down in to pieces by casualties, destroying economic activities, destroying mobilities. then conventional army will destroy the broken pieces of pakistani army.
this way the pakistan would be attacked from 2 sides at the same time. it would be politically and strategically destroyed.
half war is won. now rest have done by india.
lesson learned: always attack your enemy politically and armily. destroy the strength of army by guerrilla operation as well as by conventional army.
always make a stronger country your ally.
this way a weak country can destroy a strong country.
what do you think?
MOD Edit:
Original title: "Title: war analysis: what we learn from india-bangladesh war on 1971"
New title: "War Analysis: What did we learn from Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971?"
It was not an India-Bangladesh War.
India and Bangladesh are proper nouns.
Please take care when writing the opening post and thread title. Also, learn to capitalize.
Arnab Banerjee
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the source is: Bangladesh Liberation War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I think Pakistan did try the same with J&K. Mujahideens assisted Pak Army since beginning, politically they made it a strong point everywhere taking support of middle east nations, making issue in UN, asking US to interfere.Their Army tried three times to take J&K.
but still they failed.
Arnab Banerjee
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middle eastern countries are not strong countries. they have no military power of their own. pakistan cannot be benefited from them. pakistan urges UN to interfare in this matter but failed due to its own image of a terrorist nation. so they cannot have support of a strong country and they don't have strong political support.
now only pakistani army attacked and failed.
but this time pakistan has a stronger ally china. they just don't have international support because of their terrorist nation image. but without this political support they can destroy india with the help of china.
india should use the lesson learned in Bangladesh war. india should make america her ally and this move in turn generate international political support automatically. so india will get stronger ally and political support to destroy pakistan and china.
thats why we should analyse war.
i am going to post more war cases here.
now only pakistani army attacked and failed.
but this time pakistan has a stronger ally china. they just don't have international support because of their terrorist nation image. but without this political support they can destroy india with the help of china.
india should use the lesson learned in Bangladesh war. india should make america her ally and this move in turn generate international political support automatically. so india will get stronger ally and political support to destroy pakistan and china.
thats why we should analyse war.
i am going to post more war cases here.
Although there are memorials for Indian Army soldiers in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, there is no National memorial in India itself. We have the India Gate, which is actually a memorial built by the British for Indian Soldiers of the colonial army which faught in the first world war.
BangersAndMash
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By Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh
Dera Baba Nanak (DBN) is a small town about 30 miles north of Amritsar and south of the Ravi. Near it are two strategically important enclaves, north and south of the Ravi, belonging to India and Pakistan respectively. The Indian enclave is called Kasowal and the Pakistani Jassar or DBN. The Pakistani enclave includes the Ravi road-rail bridge, over which the Pakistani communications network in the Passur-Narowal area can be integrated easily with ours in Punjab.
On the other hand, the Kasowal enclave provides a sizable bridgehead across the Ravi from where operations can be developed against the defences of Jassar and Narowal fortress. DBN enclave can be outflanked from Kasowal with ease. Thus both sides have readymade bridgeheads in each other's territory which can be exploited both offensively and defensively, depending upon the requirements of overall strategic planning.
The Indian planners have always been sensitive to the DBN fridge as roads from DBN lead to major towns of Punjab like Gurdaspur, Batala, Beas and Amritsar and militarily outflank the defences of Amritsar and the Pathankot base. In the 1965 war, much embarrassment was prevented when the Pakistanis demolished a span of the bridge in a hurry although the Indians had not been able to eliminate the DBN enclave. With use of the bridge impaired by this premature action of the Pakistani commander, India was able to ward off a flank threat with a minimal containing force.
Starting immediately south of the bridge, the DBN enclave runs about 1,000 yards east to west, forming a narrow strip varying from 1,000 to 2,498 metres in depth. Apart from manning the BOPs all along the international border, Pakistan planned to hold the crucial part of the enclave from the bridge to the narrower end, where there was a structure popularly known as Colonel's Hut, in strength and the remaining portion very lightly. Towards this end, a network of skilfully sited concrete pillboxes had been constructed on various bunds in the area and interconnected by bricklined communication trenches. This consisted of our bunds radiating from the eastern end of the bridge and called, in clockwise sequence, the depth, rail, road and river bunds. The Dhussi bund, essentially for flood protection, branches off from the rail bund and runs eastward south of the Ravi up to the Ranger post at Mardana. It has an important feature, 7r, guarding the gauntlet at the narrowest point of the segment and covering the Dhussi bund approach to Colonel's Hut.
To the south of this bund are about seven ring bunds in the form of small mounds covered with scrub which were built earlier to provide immediate defence in the interim period while RCC emplacements were under construction. Although no longer in use, they could be utilized if Pakistan decided to reinforce the enclave.
The whole area was marshy and covered with a thick growth of sarkanda (elephant grass). Immediately south of the bridge was a dense grove of shisham and kikar trees obscuring observation of the area from the Indian side. The assessment of Pakistani strength and disposition in the enclave was assessed from the deployability the bund feature offered rather than from physical confirmation by other sources.
Pakistan was known to have three Ranger posts within the bridgehead. At the outbreak of hostilities, Pakistan was expected to deploy about two companies (one regular and one Ranger) augmented by MMG and RCL guns of reconnaissance and support elements, with the backing of an infantry battalion less one company north of the bridge. Their two embankments astride the bridge known as the western end and Dry Tree Bund, as also the old railway quarters at Jassar, had been converted into formidable defences completely covered from view by trees.
About 2130 hours on the night of 3/4 December, Pakistan launched a surprise attack on the Kasowal enclave with a combat group of tanks and infantry preceded by intense artillery bombardment. The enclave was vacated by 0430 hours on 4 December by our troops as part of the overall plan. Fazal Muqeem describes this action thus: "On the night of 3 December 71, Pakistan 8 Infantry Division cleared Dharam (Indian name Kasowal) enclave without any difficulty as the attack seemed to have come as a complete surprise to the defenders." Brig Gauri Shanker, in command of 86 Infantry Brigade Group responsible for operations in the area, was ordered to eliminate the Pakistani enclave at DBN by first light on 6 December.
In addition to his brigade group units, he was allotted one armoured regiment and an independent artillery brigade consisting of about one field regiment, two medium regiments and one light regiment for the task. His plan broadly envisaged crossing the Ravi west of Metia by 71 Armoured Regiment less one squadron, and 10 Dogra to capture the bund complex immediately south of the bridge as the first phase of the attack commencing at last light on 5 December. This involved 10 Dogra's recrossing the river near the bridge.
In the second phase, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles was to capture the Dhussi bund, from T Junction up to Colonel's Hut by O430 hours on 6 December, and 17 Rajput, so far holding the firm base, was to clear the outposts between the base and the bund by first light the same day. Operations preceding the main attack included securing the 7r feature by the brigade commando company as well as securing and preparing the first crossing on the river by about a company of 17 Rajput. To aid the progress of the main attack, a subsidiary operation to secure the Jassar railway quarters north of the river was also planned.
The plan was put into action at 1700 hours on 5 December. After securing the Metla enclave, 71 Armoured Regiment less one squadron and 10 Dogra group proceeded towards crossing No 1, but progress was slow because of a holdup on the ramp by an overturned vehicle and bogging down of a few tanks which tried to circumvent this obstacle. Movement was further impeded by a combination of tall sarkanda grass, heavy mist and the marshy surface of the ground traversed. On reaching the crossing, the column found the banks about ten to 13 feet high with an abrupt drop, thus barring tanks from negotiating them.
The column was then ordered to follow the south bank of the Ravi and make a crossing wherever feasible. Inching forward, it reached 7r, already secured by the brigade commando company (grouped as such from battalion commando platoons), about midnight. Night and the attendant hours of darkness were flitting away and the column was nowhere near its objective.
The plan was perforce modified to accelerate progress. Making use of the lodgment already achieved in the 7r area, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, the second phase troops, were ordered to attack along the Dhussi bund, using 7r as the forming-up place, instead of from the direction of T Junction.
Working along the bund from bunker to bunker, the battalion captured its objectives by first light on 6 December. The armoured regiment, now unable to cross the river, also moved along the bund in support of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles. The presence of tanks wore down the resistance considerably. Meanwhile, 10 Dogra followed the south bank and reached their FUP about 0315 hours the same day undetected and launched their attack soon after.
The enemy was taken completely by surprise in the rear. The defending toops manned and fired their weapons excessively in panic, but in the wrong direction. 10 Dogra secured the entire eastern end about 0430 hours and 17 Rajput cleared theKhokarke and Sandhuwan Ranger posts by 0700 hours, thus completing the elimination of the DBN enclave. The independent artillery brigade supported the operation throughout, with intimate, timely and abundant artillery fire. So effective was the brigade's counter-battery programme that there was no interference by the enemy artillery.
On completing phase 2, it was planned to open the axis of maintenance along the main road towards the bridge by clearing vehicle lanes through the enemy minefield by trawling. Since trawls could not be fitted in time because of enemy interference, the lanes were handbreached. As tanks of the squadron located south of T Junction were proceeding to the lane, they were engaged by our own tanks operating along the Dhussi bund as a result of faulty identification, but the mistake was rectified after a few casualties.
Soon after, vehicles carrying reorganisation stores passed through the lanes to marry up with their respective battalions. To secure the captured enclave further, the first pier of the DBN bridge on the home bank was destroyed.Fazal Muqeem describes the action thus: "The Indians later countered the action by occupying the small Pakistan enclave on their side of the river Ravi. Throughout the remaining part of the war, Pakistani troops neither attempted to cross the river nor used any artillery fire in the area. The reason was that DBN, a Sikh holy place, is situated in the immediate vicinity. [This is incorrect as the gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur is in Pakistan territory, well away from the enclave.] The Indian troops also remained inactive after blowing up their side of the railway bridge."
1971 War: Battle of Dera Baba Nanak » Indian Defence Review | Page 2
Dera Baba Nanak (DBN) is a small town about 30 miles north of Amritsar and south of the Ravi. Near it are two strategically important enclaves, north and south of the Ravi, belonging to India and Pakistan respectively. The Indian enclave is called Kasowal and the Pakistani Jassar or DBN. The Pakistani enclave includes the Ravi road-rail bridge, over which the Pakistani communications network in the Passur-Narowal area can be integrated easily with ours in Punjab.
On the other hand, the Kasowal enclave provides a sizable bridgehead across the Ravi from where operations can be developed against the defences of Jassar and Narowal fortress. DBN enclave can be outflanked from Kasowal with ease. Thus both sides have readymade bridgeheads in each other's territory which can be exploited both offensively and defensively, depending upon the requirements of overall strategic planning.
The Indian planners have always been sensitive to the DBN fridge as roads from DBN lead to major towns of Punjab like Gurdaspur, Batala, Beas and Amritsar and militarily outflank the defences of Amritsar and the Pathankot base. In the 1965 war, much embarrassment was prevented when the Pakistanis demolished a span of the bridge in a hurry although the Indians had not been able to eliminate the DBN enclave. With use of the bridge impaired by this premature action of the Pakistani commander, India was able to ward off a flank threat with a minimal containing force.
Starting immediately south of the bridge, the DBN enclave runs about 1,000 yards east to west, forming a narrow strip varying from 1,000 to 2,498 metres in depth. Apart from manning the BOPs all along the international border, Pakistan planned to hold the crucial part of the enclave from the bridge to the narrower end, where there was a structure popularly known as Colonel's Hut, in strength and the remaining portion very lightly. Towards this end, a network of skilfully sited concrete pillboxes had been constructed on various bunds in the area and interconnected by bricklined communication trenches. This consisted of our bunds radiating from the eastern end of the bridge and called, in clockwise sequence, the depth, rail, road and river bunds. The Dhussi bund, essentially for flood protection, branches off from the rail bund and runs eastward south of the Ravi up to the Ranger post at Mardana. It has an important feature, 7r, guarding the gauntlet at the narrowest point of the segment and covering the Dhussi bund approach to Colonel's Hut.
To the south of this bund are about seven ring bunds in the form of small mounds covered with scrub which were built earlier to provide immediate defence in the interim period while RCC emplacements were under construction. Although no longer in use, they could be utilized if Pakistan decided to reinforce the enclave.
The whole area was marshy and covered with a thick growth of sarkanda (elephant grass). Immediately south of the bridge was a dense grove of shisham and kikar trees obscuring observation of the area from the Indian side. The assessment of Pakistani strength and disposition in the enclave was assessed from the deployability the bund feature offered rather than from physical confirmation by other sources.
Pakistan was known to have three Ranger posts within the bridgehead. At the outbreak of hostilities, Pakistan was expected to deploy about two companies (one regular and one Ranger) augmented by MMG and RCL guns of reconnaissance and support elements, with the backing of an infantry battalion less one company north of the bridge. Their two embankments astride the bridge known as the western end and Dry Tree Bund, as also the old railway quarters at Jassar, had been converted into formidable defences completely covered from view by trees.
About 2130 hours on the night of 3/4 December, Pakistan launched a surprise attack on the Kasowal enclave with a combat group of tanks and infantry preceded by intense artillery bombardment. The enclave was vacated by 0430 hours on 4 December by our troops as part of the overall plan. Fazal Muqeem describes this action thus: "On the night of 3 December 71, Pakistan 8 Infantry Division cleared Dharam (Indian name Kasowal) enclave without any difficulty as the attack seemed to have come as a complete surprise to the defenders." Brig Gauri Shanker, in command of 86 Infantry Brigade Group responsible for operations in the area, was ordered to eliminate the Pakistani enclave at DBN by first light on 6 December.
In addition to his brigade group units, he was allotted one armoured regiment and an independent artillery brigade consisting of about one field regiment, two medium regiments and one light regiment for the task. His plan broadly envisaged crossing the Ravi west of Metia by 71 Armoured Regiment less one squadron, and 10 Dogra to capture the bund complex immediately south of the bridge as the first phase of the attack commencing at last light on 5 December. This involved 10 Dogra's recrossing the river near the bridge.
In the second phase, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles was to capture the Dhussi bund, from T Junction up to Colonel's Hut by O430 hours on 6 December, and 17 Rajput, so far holding the firm base, was to clear the outposts between the base and the bund by first light the same day. Operations preceding the main attack included securing the 7r feature by the brigade commando company as well as securing and preparing the first crossing on the river by about a company of 17 Rajput. To aid the progress of the main attack, a subsidiary operation to secure the Jassar railway quarters north of the river was also planned.
The plan was put into action at 1700 hours on 5 December. After securing the Metla enclave, 71 Armoured Regiment less one squadron and 10 Dogra group proceeded towards crossing No 1, but progress was slow because of a holdup on the ramp by an overturned vehicle and bogging down of a few tanks which tried to circumvent this obstacle. Movement was further impeded by a combination of tall sarkanda grass, heavy mist and the marshy surface of the ground traversed. On reaching the crossing, the column found the banks about ten to 13 feet high with an abrupt drop, thus barring tanks from negotiating them.
The column was then ordered to follow the south bank of the Ravi and make a crossing wherever feasible. Inching forward, it reached 7r, already secured by the brigade commando company (grouped as such from battalion commando platoons), about midnight. Night and the attendant hours of darkness were flitting away and the column was nowhere near its objective.
The plan was perforce modified to accelerate progress. Making use of the lodgment already achieved in the 7r area, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, the second phase troops, were ordered to attack along the Dhussi bund, using 7r as the forming-up place, instead of from the direction of T Junction.
Working along the bund from bunker to bunker, the battalion captured its objectives by first light on 6 December. The armoured regiment, now unable to cross the river, also moved along the bund in support of 1/9 Gorkha Rifles. The presence of tanks wore down the resistance considerably. Meanwhile, 10 Dogra followed the south bank and reached their FUP about 0315 hours the same day undetected and launched their attack soon after.
The enemy was taken completely by surprise in the rear. The defending toops manned and fired their weapons excessively in panic, but in the wrong direction. 10 Dogra secured the entire eastern end about 0430 hours and 17 Rajput cleared theKhokarke and Sandhuwan Ranger posts by 0700 hours, thus completing the elimination of the DBN enclave. The independent artillery brigade supported the operation throughout, with intimate, timely and abundant artillery fire. So effective was the brigade's counter-battery programme that there was no interference by the enemy artillery.
On completing phase 2, it was planned to open the axis of maintenance along the main road towards the bridge by clearing vehicle lanes through the enemy minefield by trawling. Since trawls could not be fitted in time because of enemy interference, the lanes were handbreached. As tanks of the squadron located south of T Junction were proceeding to the lane, they were engaged by our own tanks operating along the Dhussi bund as a result of faulty identification, but the mistake was rectified after a few casualties.
Soon after, vehicles carrying reorganisation stores passed through the lanes to marry up with their respective battalions. To secure the captured enclave further, the first pier of the DBN bridge on the home bank was destroyed.Fazal Muqeem describes the action thus: "The Indians later countered the action by occupying the small Pakistan enclave on their side of the river Ravi. Throughout the remaining part of the war, Pakistani troops neither attempted to cross the river nor used any artillery fire in the area. The reason was that DBN, a Sikh holy place, is situated in the immediate vicinity. [This is incorrect as the gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur is in Pakistan territory, well away from the enclave.] The Indian troops also remained inactive after blowing up their side of the railway bridge."
1971 War: Battle of Dera Baba Nanak » Indian Defence Review | Page 2
Dear Lurker Baba,
Many thanks to send me editing link.Please find below the editing which are done heading or Paragraph wise.
Following factual mistakes could be so far determined:
Prologue
Bangladesh naval commando operation actually originated at Toulon, a coastal city of Southern France. In 1971, there were 11 naval crews of East Pakistan who were receiving training in a Pakistani submarine. Among them, only one commissioned officer (Mosharraf Hassain).
Here is the error: Moshraf Hossain was not an Officer of Pakistan navy,he was a Patty Officer.
PLANING
At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani Army had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. As the pace of military operations in East Pakistan slacked off, the civilian morale was adversely affected, which prompted Pakistani authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal".
In response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations:
1) Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG commando).
Here is the error :
The above paragraph is a big facutal error.After 26 March,1971,fighting continued in many places of Bangladesh.For example in Tangail
the kaderia Bahini fought against Pakistan Army,In Khulna and Chittagong fighting continued.The Mukti Bahini started their operation
from Last week of May 71 from Tokipur, Hasanabad.Severat times the attack were launched from Tokipur.
From May 71 til August 1971 more than 100 such attack took place in diffrent district of Bangladesh.
References:Operation Jackpot,Sezan Mahmud,Chetonai Ekattor,Mustak Ahmed Robi etc.
In Preparation Paragraph
It is written that Mr.Moshraf Hossain who was probably a Commodore in Bangladesh Navy.
Here is the error:
Moshraf Hossain was never been in a Commodore in Bangladesh Navy.Among eight Submariner only submariner that was A.W.Chowdhury was commmissioned after Independence of Bangladesh.
In Consequence: Paragraph:
In Mongla operation its written 20 Commandos took part:
Here is error,The above paragraph have lot of factual errors,which I have edited below
It would be 24 Commandos,who took part in Operation In Monglaport
Commanders of the Operation were as Follows:
Chittagong:Commanded by A.W.Chowdhury (60 Naval Commandos were sent to Chittagong Sea Port,Among 60 Commandos only 31 Commandos took part in Operation, and destroyed 2 small ships and 3 Big Ships were destroyed in this operation)
Mongla Sea port: Commanded by Aminur Rahman,Khosru(60 Naval commandos and 200 C&C Commandos were sent to Mongla sea Port,Among 60 Naval commandos only 24 took part in Operation,6 Big Ships were destroyed in this operation.The commander Aminur Rahman,Khosru was youngest among all commanders of Of operation jackpot and under his command highest number of Ships were destroyed in Mongla port on 15th Aug.1971.
Chandpur river Port: Commanded by Badiul Alam(20 Naval Commandos were sent to Chandpur River port operation,amon 20 Naval commandos 18 Commandos took pat in operation and 2 steamers and 4 food grain carrying vessels were destroyed in this operation)
Narayanganj river Port: Commanded by Abedur Rahman(20 Naval Commandos were sent to Narayanganj,All twenty commandos took part in operation,4 Small ships and two steramers were destroyed in this operation.
Among trainer of Naval Commandos from Indian Navy who received the Highest Militaty Award from Indian Govt are as follows:
1.Commander M.N. Sammath MVC
2.Lt.Commander George Martis Vrc,NM
3.Lt.V.P.Kapil ,VrC
4.Lt.Das, VSM
5.Leeading seaman C.Sing, MVC
6.Leading seaman M.K.Gupta, NM
7.Leading seaman K.Singh,NM
The name of above trainer must be included in Operation Jackpot,otherwise Operation Jackpot article will remain empty.
I shall request you to edit the article as soon as possible.
References:
1.Ray,Mihir,K. Vice Admiral,War in the Indian Ocean Page 141,147,154,175,ISBN 1-897829 11-6,Lancer Publisher & Distributer Newd Delhi
2.Robi,Mir Mustak Ahmed,Chetonai Ekattor,Page No 66,68,69,70,ISBN 984-70226-0011-2,Zonaki Publisher,Dhaka
3.Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K. M. Bangladesh At War, p. 159, ISBN 984-401-322-4
4.Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p. 228–230, ISBN 984-412-033-0
5.Shamsul Huda Chowdhury.Ekattor Ranaggon. Publisher:Ahmed Publishing. ISBN 984-11-0505-0.
6.Rahman, Md. Khalilur, Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan, pp. 268–270, ISBN 984-465-449-1
7.Operation Jackpot, Mahmud, Sezan, Mukhobondho
8.Khatun Tayeba,Naval Commando Journal,Pages 13,14,16,17-3698,99,102,1972,Publisher Bijli Press ,Khulna
Best Regards,
Foxtord50
Many thanks to send me editing link.Please find below the editing which are done heading or Paragraph wise.
Following factual mistakes could be so far determined:
Prologue
Bangladesh naval commando operation actually originated at Toulon, a coastal city of Southern France. In 1971, there were 11 naval crews of East Pakistan who were receiving training in a Pakistani submarine. Among them, only one commissioned officer (Mosharraf Hassain).
Here is the error: Moshraf Hossain was not an Officer of Pakistan navy,he was a Patty Officer.
PLANING
At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani Army had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. As the pace of military operations in East Pakistan slacked off, the civilian morale was adversely affected, which prompted Pakistani authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal".
In response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations:
1) Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG commando).
Here is the error :
The above paragraph is a big facutal error.After 26 March,1971,fighting continued in many places of Bangladesh.For example in Tangail
the kaderia Bahini fought against Pakistan Army,In Khulna and Chittagong fighting continued.The Mukti Bahini started their operation
from Last week of May 71 from Tokipur, Hasanabad.Severat times the attack were launched from Tokipur.
From May 71 til August 1971 more than 100 such attack took place in diffrent district of Bangladesh.
References:Operation Jackpot,Sezan Mahmud,Chetonai Ekattor,Mustak Ahmed Robi etc.
In Preparation Paragraph
It is written that Mr.Moshraf Hossain who was probably a Commodore in Bangladesh Navy.
Here is the error:
Moshraf Hossain was never been in a Commodore in Bangladesh Navy.Among eight Submariner only submariner that was A.W.Chowdhury was commmissioned after Independence of Bangladesh.
In Consequence: Paragraph:
In Mongla operation its written 20 Commandos took part:
Here is error,The above paragraph have lot of factual errors,which I have edited below
It would be 24 Commandos,who took part in Operation In Monglaport
Commanders of the Operation were as Follows:
Chittagong:Commanded by A.W.Chowdhury (60 Naval Commandos were sent to Chittagong Sea Port,Among 60 Commandos only 31 Commandos took part in Operation, and destroyed 2 small ships and 3 Big Ships were destroyed in this operation)
Mongla Sea port: Commanded by Aminur Rahman,Khosru(60 Naval commandos and 200 C&C Commandos were sent to Mongla sea Port,Among 60 Naval commandos only 24 took part in Operation,6 Big Ships were destroyed in this operation.The commander Aminur Rahman,Khosru was youngest among all commanders of Of operation jackpot and under his command highest number of Ships were destroyed in Mongla port on 15th Aug.1971.
Chandpur river Port: Commanded by Badiul Alam(20 Naval Commandos were sent to Chandpur River port operation,amon 20 Naval commandos 18 Commandos took pat in operation and 2 steamers and 4 food grain carrying vessels were destroyed in this operation)
Narayanganj river Port: Commanded by Abedur Rahman(20 Naval Commandos were sent to Narayanganj,All twenty commandos took part in operation,4 Small ships and two steramers were destroyed in this operation.
Among trainer of Naval Commandos from Indian Navy who received the Highest Militaty Award from Indian Govt are as follows:
1.Commander M.N. Sammath MVC
2.Lt.Commander George Martis Vrc,NM
3.Lt.V.P.Kapil ,VrC
4.Lt.Das, VSM
5.Leeading seaman C.Sing, MVC
6.Leading seaman M.K.Gupta, NM
7.Leading seaman K.Singh,NM
The name of above trainer must be included in Operation Jackpot,otherwise Operation Jackpot article will remain empty.
I shall request you to edit the article as soon as possible.
References:
1.Ray,Mihir,K. Vice Admiral,War in the Indian Ocean Page 141,147,154,175,ISBN 1-897829 11-6,Lancer Publisher & Distributer Newd Delhi
2.Robi,Mir Mustak Ahmed,Chetonai Ekattor,Page No 66,68,69,70,ISBN 984-70226-0011-2,Zonaki Publisher,Dhaka
3.Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K. M. Bangladesh At War, p. 159, ISBN 984-401-322-4
4.Islam, Major Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p. 228–230, ISBN 984-412-033-0
5.Shamsul Huda Chowdhury.Ekattor Ranaggon. Publisher:Ahmed Publishing. ISBN 984-11-0505-0.
6.Rahman, Md. Khalilur, Muktijuddhay Nou-Abhijan, pp. 268–270, ISBN 984-465-449-1
7.Operation Jackpot, Mahmud, Sezan, Mukhobondho
8.Khatun Tayeba,Naval Commando Journal,Pages 13,14,16,17-3698,99,102,1972,Publisher Bijli Press ,Khulna
Best Regards,
Foxtord50
