USA the Police state

Kaalapani

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http://rt.com/usa/155028-nyc-judge-overseas-emails/

A US federal judge in New York has ordered Microsoft to turn over their customers' emails and other digital content to law enforcement agencies, even in case the data is being stored on servers physically overseas.

New York Magistrate Judge James Francis does not question the cosmopolitan power of a valid search warrant issued by a US law enforcement agency. In a first-of-a-kind court ruling Friday, the judge created a precedent that no US internet provider, be it Microsoft or Google or another company, can refuse an official demand to share foreign clients' private data, Reuters reported.

The initial search warrant was issued last December in regards of one of Microsoft's clients who stored his data on a server run in Dublin, Ireland. An undisclosed US agency sought information that could be found in the person's email, such as the customer's name, credit card numbers or bank account used for payment.


_______________________________________


Please share Info related to USA and itz Freedom for Security policy .

Illegal snooping and stuff like that.
 

JMM99

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@Kaalapani

Thank you for your interest in the various USA metadata programs. Suffice to say that those programs are both controversial and complicated. My own position on them cannot be painted as a simple black and white image. We do have to start somewhere; and the Magistrate Judge's opinion is that place:

IN THE MATTER OF A WARRANT TO SEARCH A CERTAIN E-MAIL ACCOUNT CONTROLLED AND MAINTAINED BY MICROSOFT CORPORATION; MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, 13 Mag. 2814 (25 Apr 2014; Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV; United States District Court, Southern District of New York).

Magistrate Judge Francis is at the bottom of the Federal judicial "food chain" (Magistrate Judge > District Court Judge > Appeals Court Judge > Supreme Court Justice); though from my brief bio search of him, he is both experienced and well regarded. My point is that his decision is far from the last word on the issues raised and decided in it.

My first "go to" source (after the Federal court docket for the opinion is found) is Lawfare, which covers many issues in which I have an interest. Here are two of its permanent pages, which provide links to the primary documents from both Snowden's and the NSA's viewpoints (which obviously differ):

Catalog of the Snowden Revelations

This page catalogs various revelations by Edward Snowden, regarding the United States' surveillance activities.

Each disclosure is assigned to one of the following categories: tools and methods, overseas USG locations from which operations are undertaken, foreign officials and systems that NSA has targeted, encryption that NSA has broken, ISPs or platforms that NSA has penetrated or attempted to penetrate, and identities of cooperating companies and governments. Each entry includes the date the information was first published. ...
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: 2013 Leaks and Declassifications

Overview:

In the aftermath of unauthorized disclosures by Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper authorized the declassification major caches of documents to respond to Freedom of Information Act lawsuits. These documents relate to the Intelligence Community's activities conducted under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and include several oversight opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). ...
A great number of Lawfare posts in 2013 and into 2014 involve the metadata programs from a legal standpoint. Here are three posts from this week dealing with some of the issues raised in the Microsoft Warrant case.

New Draft Article, "The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet" (by Orin Kerr, April 24, 2014) - full article at SSN, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet:

Abstract:

This article considers how Fourth Amendment law should adapt to the increasingly worldwide nature of Internet surveillance. It focuses on two types of problems not yet addressed by courts. First, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez prompts several puzzles about how the Fourth Amendment treats monitoring on a global network where many lack Fourth Amendment rights. For example, can online contacts help create those rights? What if the government mistakenly believes that a target lacks Fourth Amendment rights? How does the law apply to monitoring of communications between those who have and those who lack Fourth Amendment rights? The second category of problems follows from different standards of reasonableness that apply outside the United States and at the international border. Does the border search exception apply to purely electronic transmission? And if reasonableness varies by location, is the relevant location the search, the seizure, or the physical person?

The article explores and answers each of these questions through the lens of equilibrium-adjustment. Today's Fourth Amendment doctrine is heavily territorial. The article aims to adapt existing principles for the transition from a domestic physical environment to a global networked world in ways that maintain the preexisting balance of Fourth Amendment protection. On the first question, it rejects online contacts as a basis for Fourth Amendment protection; allows monitoring when the government wrongly but reasonably believes that a target lacks Fourth Amendment rights; and limits monitoring between those who have and those who lack Fourth Amendment rights. On the second question, it contends that the border search exception should not apply to electronic transmission and that reasonableness should follow the location of data seizure. The Internet requires search and seizure law to account for the new facts of international investigations. The solutions offered in this article offer a set of Fourth Amendment rules tailored to the reality of global computer networks.
An Update on the Status of FISA Transparency Reporting (by Carrie Cordero, April 23, 2014):

What follows is a quick recap on the status of FISA transparency reporting (most of this was news in late January but is summarized here with some useful links) along with a couple of observations on what may lay ahead.

Up until the unauthorized disclosures regarding surveillance activities, communications providers on the receiving end of requests for information pursuant to FISA were precluded from including statistics in their periodic transparency reports. (These transparency reports traditionally concerned compliance with law enforcement requests.) Following the disclosures, as a result of advocacy by the companies concerned with the effects of the disclosures on their business both present and future, the government said the companies could publicly disclose overall numbers that combined criminal process, FISA orders and National Security Letters (NSLs). Not satisfied by this result or by progress of continued negotiations with the government, five companies filed suit in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) challenging the government's restrictions. The companies argued, generally, that FISA does not prohibit public disclosure of the specific information sought by each company, and that the government's restrictions violated the First Amendment. ...
Catherine Tucker on Google Trends and NSA Surveillance (by Benjamin Wittes, April 23, 2014) - full article at SSN, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior:

Abstract:

This paper uses data from Google Trends on search terms from before and after the surveillance revelations of June 2013 to analyze whether Google users' search behavior shifted as a result of an exogenous shock in information about how closely their internet searches were being monitored by the U. S. government. We use data from Google Trends on search volume for 282 search terms across eleven different countries. These search terms were independently rated for their degree of privacy-sensitivity along multiple dimensions. Using panel data, our result suggest that cross-nationally, users were less likely to search using search terms that they believed might get them in trouble with the U. S. government. In the U. S., this was the main subset of search terms that were affected. However, internationally there was also a drop in traffic for search terms that were rated as personally sensitive. These results have implications for policy makers in terms of understanding the actual effects on search behavior of disclosures relating to the scale of government surveillance on the Internet and their potential effects on international competitiveness.
These references should keep you busy for a bit; albeit, they will interfere with your stick cricket practice. :wave:

Regards

Mike
 
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Kaalapani

Tihar Jail
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Messages
613
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281
@Kaalapani

Thank you for your interest in the various USA metadata programs. Suffice to say that those programs are both controversial and complicated. My own position on them cannot be painted as a simple black and white image. We do have to start somewhere; and the Magistrate Judge's opinion is that place:

IN THE MATTER OF A WARRANT TO SEARCH A CERTAIN E-MAIL ACCOUNT CONTROLLED AND MAINTAINED BY MICROSOFT CORPORATION; MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, 13 Mag. 2814 (25 Apr 2014; Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV; United States District Court, Southern District of New York).

Magistrate Judge Francis is at the bottom of the Federal judicial "food chain" (Magistrate Judge > District Court Judge > Appeals Court Judge > Supreme Court Justice); though from my brief bio search of him, he is both experienced and well regarded. My point is that his decision is far from the last word on the issues raised and decided in it.

My first "go to" source (after the Federal court docket for the opinion is found) is Lawfare, which covers many issues in which I have an interest. Here are two of its permanent pages, which provide links to the primary documents from both Snowden's and the NSA's viewpoints (which obviously differ):





A great number of Lawfare posts in 2013 and into 2014 involve the metadata programs from a legal standpoint. Here are three posts from this week dealing with some of the issues raised in the Microsoft Warrant case.








These references should keep you busy for a bit; albeit, they will interfere with your stick cricket practice. :wave:

Regards

Mike
This totally creepy art project will make you think twice about NSA mass surveillance - Salon.com

This totally creepy art project will make you think twice about NSA mass surveillance:rolleyes::p
 
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JMM99

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Jan 19, 2014
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@Kaalapani

I've already thought more than twice about NSA mass surveillance.

Regards

Mike
 
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Kaalapani

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Prison Planet.com » 27 Edward Snowden Quotes About U.S. Government Spying That Should Send A Chill Up Your Spine

#1 "The majority of people in developed countries spend at least some time interacting with the Internet, and Governments are abusing that necessity in secret to extend their powers beyond what is necessary and appropriate."

#2 ""¦I believe that at this point in history, the greatest danger to our freedom and way of life comes from the reasonable fear of omniscient State powers kept in check by nothing more than policy documents."

#3 "The government has granted itself power it is not entitled to. There is no public oversight. The result is people like myself have the latitude to go further than they are allowed to."

#4 ""¦I can't in good conscience allow the US government to destroy privacy, internet freedom and basic liberties for people around the world with this massive surveillance machine they're secretly building."

#5 "The NSA has built an infrastructure that allows it to intercept almost everything."

#6 "With this capability, the vast majority of human communications are automatically ingested without targeting. If I wanted to see your e-mails or your wife's phone, all I have to do is use intercepts. I can get your e-mails, passwords, phone records, credit cards."

#7 "Any analyst at any time can target anyone. Any selector, anywhere"¦ I, sitting at my desk, certainly had the authorities to wiretap anyone, from you or your accountant, to a federal judge, to even the President"¦"

#8 "To do that, the NSA specifically targets the communications of everyone. It ingests them by default. It collects them in its system and it filters them and it analyzes them and it measures them and it stores them for periods of time simply because that's the easiest, most efficient and most valuable way to achieve these ends. So while they may be intending to target someone associated with a foreign government, or someone that they suspect of terrorism, they are collecting YOUR communications to do so."

#9 "I believe that when [senator Ron] Wyden and [senator Mark] Udall asked about the scale of this, they [the NSA] said it did not have the tools to provide an answer. We do have the tools and I have maps showing where people have been scrutinized most. We collect more digital communications from America than we do from the Russians."

#10 ""¦they are intent on making every conversation and every form of behavior in the world known to them."

#11 "Even if you're not doing anything wrong, you're being watched and recorded. "¦it's getting to the point where you don't have to have done anything wrong, you simply have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, even by a wrong call, and then they can use this system to go back in time and scrutinize every decision you've ever made, every friend you've ever discussed something with, and attack you on that basis, to sort of derive suspicion from an innocent life."

#12 "Allowing the U.S. government to intimidate its people with threats of retaliation for revealing wrongdoing is contrary to the public interest."

#13 "Everyone everywhere now understands how bad things have gotten — and they're talking about it. They have the power to decide for themselves whether they are willing to sacrifice their privacy to the surveillance state."

#14 "I do not want to live in a world where everything I do and say is recorded. That is not something I am willing to support or live under."

#15 "I don't want to live in a world where there's no privacy, and therefore no room for intellectual exploration and creativity."

#16 "I have no intention of hiding who I am because I know I have done nothing wrong."

#17 "I had been looking for leaders, but I realized that leadership is about being the first to act."

#18 "There are more important things than money. If I were motivated by money, I could have sold these documents to any number of countries and gotten very rich."

#19 "The great fear that I have regarding the outcome for America of these disclosures is that nothing will change. [People] won't be willing to take the risks necessary to stand up and fight to change things"¦ And in the months ahead, the years ahead, it's only going to get worse. [The NSA will] say that"¦ because of the crisis, the dangers that we face in the world, some new and unpredicted threat, we need more authority, we need more power, and there will be nothing the people can do at that point to oppose it. And it will be turnkey tyranny."

#20 "I will be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal pardon and irresistible executive powers that rule the world that I love are revealed even for an instant."

#21 "You can't come up against the world's most powerful intelligence agencies and not accept the risk."

#22 "I know the media likes to personalize political debates, and I know the government will demonize me."

#23 "We have got a CIA station just up the road – the consulate here in Hong Kong – and I am sure they are going to be busy for the next week. And that is a concern I will live with for the rest of my life, however long that happens to be."

#24 "I understand that I will be made to suffer for my actions, and that the return of this information to the public marks my end."

#25 "There's no saving me."

#26 "The only thing I fear is the harmful effects on my family, who I won't be able to help any more. That's what keeps me up at night."

#27 "I do not expect to see home again."
 

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