Beyond Indo-US Military Bonhomie
Posted on: 01:11 PM IST Apr 13, 2016 IST
Minister Manohar Parrikar and his American counterpart, Defence Secretary Ashton B Carter, have met three times in the last 12 months. Parrikar has been to America once and Carter came to India twice. This, in itself, is an unusual development. This implies that since 1998 when India faced many sanctions for its nuclear tests, the military and the overall strategic relationship between India and the United States has made significant strides.
As Carter said in his blog that he wrote in the Times of India on the eve of his three-day visit to India, (commencing on April 10), the United States and India do not only have a shared vision for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, they also “share share another handshake, a technological one. In 2012, our two countries created the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), a unique initiative that is unlike anything the United States does with any other partner. The kind of co-production and co-development that the DTTI encourages – and is beginning to facilitate – directly complements Prime Minister Modi’s ‘Make in India’ initiative. The United States welcomes India’s entry into global defence supply chains and endeavours to support India’s efforts to contribute not only its own security but others’ as well.”
It is against this background that Carter and Parrikkar are said to have discussed on “cooperation on aircraft carriers and jet fighter technology, and new agreements for science and technology cooperation”. They have also agreed “in principle” to sign a “Logistics Support Agreement” that allows the two militaries to use each other's land, air and naval bases for resupplies, repair and rest. This is something the Americans have been asking for, but India was reluctant to concur with as doing this would be interpreted as compromising on its traditional policy of not allowing foreign military presence, howsoever temporary it may be, on its soil except for purposes of training and joint exercises.
It so happens that Indo-US military exercises have grown dramatically in size, scope and sophistication over the years. The two have regular exercises across all services that help to deepen our military and defence.
Secondly, the US has already become the largest arms supplier to India over the last five years, overtaking Russia. From a mere $200 million in 2009, India’s defence imports from the US increased to $2 billion in 2013. Over the last five years, the US has sold to India over $ 10 billion (Rs 60, 000 crore) worth military components and materials, including C-130J Super Hercules transport planes, the Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and the C-17 Globemasters. But this is not all. India has agreed not only to buy more C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster, it will also acquire Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and 15 CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters for the IAF, valued at $2.5 billion. India is also favourably disposed to acquiring American Sikorsky-70B choppers to fulfill the Navy’s Multi-Role Helicopter requirement for anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Other American technologies on offer for India include design and build of hand-launched “Raven Mini” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), roll-on roll-off surveillance and other kits for C-130J Hercules transporters, Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Source (MEHPS) for grid-independent power generation in remote areas, and Uniform Integrated Protection Ensemble Increment 2 (UIPE-I2) apparel for protection of soldiers against chemical and biological weapons. Besides, India and the US are exploring “joint development” of aircraft carrier technologies and jet engines.
But then there is a catch. So far, all the US systems that India has acquired have come through the tried-and-tested Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route, the route that does not involve other competitors from other nations. The has eliminated the scope of potential corruption that is often noticed in big military deals; but the fact remains that the FMS model does not involve transfer of technology (ToT) or local assembly options that are otherwise essential in modern defence deals between the seller and the buyer.
It is not necessary that the quality of the equipment through the FMS route is questionable. For instance, in 2011, during flight trails in desert and high altitude terrain, the Chinook had outperformed an advanced version of the Mi-26 helicopter of Russia. But then it is also a fact that during the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition for 128 Multi Role fighter aircrafts (bagged ultimately by French Rafale Fighters), both the Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon and Boeing F-18 A Super Hornet did not live up to the expectations when tested in the hot climate of Jaisalmer and the cold dry climate of Leh. In similar open tenders floated by India’s MoD for an anti-tank missile, Israeli Spike missile system was preferred to the US made Javelin missile system. One hears that the Americans have now come out with fresh offers of a more improved version of the same missile and its “joint-development” with India.
Of course, unlike in the past, the US is now more than willing to transform its defence cooperation with India from “simply buying and selling” to “co-production, co-development, and freer exchange of technology”. The US says that it wants “a defence industrial partnership” with India. This fits well with Modi’s “Make in India” programme, inviting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the defence sector. The role of DTTI in developing new areas of technology cooperation in the defence sector including through co-development and co-production assumes significance.
However, one has to become a little cautious with regard to actual progress of the Indo-US defence industrial partnership. How the DTTI will overcome the bureaucratic hurdles in both the countries remains to be seen. It may work with low-end products such as Raven Mini UAV, arguably the world’s most sold and battle tested mini UAVs in operation since 2005 and the roll-on-roll-off suites for the C-130J Super Hercules that can be rapidly placed on board the transporter when required for surveillance (or weaponisation and self-protection suites). But what about the high or cutting-edge technologies that are debarred for exports or collaborations by various US departments and nonproliferation regimes such as Missile and Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? It may be noted that Indian Navy’s P-8I aircraft did not have key communications system and Combat Management system fitted in the original American ones on the ground that India was not a signatory to many controls regimes. US Company Moog Inc, which specialises in designing and manufacturer of motion and fluid controls and control systems for applications in aerospace, did not supply Rotary Actuator for Rustom-2 UAV as it failed to get the export clearance licence by US authorities. The US is usually loath to part with its most puissant capabilities unless it believes that it shares a fundamental affinity of interests with another nation. In fact, the US is thinking of limiting its sharing of high technologies with its European allies, Israel and South Korea, suspecting as it does that these countries are selling defence technologies to China!
Secondly, when one talks of US investment in Indian defence sector, it should be realised that the ability of the American government to be a source of investment is quite limited. It simply does not have enough investible reserves. Instead, the investible resources are in the US private sectors, which, in turn, make their own judgments of where to invest, depending on the recipient country’s infrastructures, legal regime, administrative machinery, and above all broad political consensus on liberalisation of the economy. There is then another limiting factor of the present inabilities of hat India’s arms industries to absorb the technologies that foreign companies are prepared to transfer. It may be noted in this context that if India and France have still not been able to fructify the Rafale MMRCA deal, it is due to as much monetary factor as the lack of absorptive capability for the licensed production of the Rafale.
Unfortunately, the Modi government has a lot to do on all these fronts. As Indian American strategic expert Ashley J Tellis rightly argues, in the ultimate analysis it all boils down to “how Modi pictures India positioning itself as a partner that is valuable enough to the United States to warrant giving it privileged access to America’s most sophisticated capabilities”.
http://www.ibnlive.com/blogs/india/prakash-nanda/beyond-indo-us-military-bonhomie-14452-1229202.html
