US promised India help if China attacked during 1971 Indo-Pak war

utubekhiladi

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I smell conspiracy, If I am not wrong source of this document is the Government of India is it possible that our government has launched a PR campaign to make USA look good and friendly in the eyes of our people? Who is paying them?
as i said before, congress has been sold out to american lobby and TOI is a mouth piece of congress
 

W.G.Ewald

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'Meh keyn brechen!"
Could that be Irish?
Yiddish. :)

"You could vomit from this!" (Idiomatic.)
 
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sesha_maruthi27

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Why will the Americans help INDIA when they were on the side of pakistan and were ready to attack INDIA with their navy.It was due to the RUSSIAN NAVAL FEET that the Americans saw when they entered the INDIAN OCEAN, due to which they turned back to avoid any conflict with RUSSIA. It was a nuclear submarine of RUSSIA which was in the fleet which entered the INDIAN OCEAN even before the Americans can get a sneak peak.

Also the Americans offered logistical support to the pukes.......

So there is no question of the Americans helping INDIA in the 1971 war what so ever may be the reason........
 
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SADAKHUSH

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On one hand they had despatched seventh fleet and on the other they were willing to help India against China. Indian Air Force was ready for kamakazi attack on the fleet in case situation requires. These new revelations are quiet confusing about USA policy to wards India during that time. If that is all true, Can we trust USA intentions going forward? Overall, I learned few new historical facts as well. How many more unknown will become known to us?
As far as, I am concerned Nixon and Kissinger were from the same mould. Liars and crooks.
 

Ray

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There was no reason for the Americans to assist India, when it was friendly with USSR and had signed the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971 that specified mutual strategic cooperation.
 

Ray

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Reminds me of an Yiddish influenced song "Bei mir bist du schein!" :)

Gaa, I should have guessed this one right!
Hava nagila הבה נגילה Let's rejoice
Hava nagila הבה נגילה Let's rejoice
Hava nagila venis'mecha הבה נגילה ונשמחה Rejoice and be happy
 

W.G.Ewald

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"However, the chances were that if the present
situation escalates into a conflict, it would be
very hard to tell who is to blame. Thus, if India
sent two divisions of irregulars into East Bengal
and Pakistanis sent four such divisions into
Kashmir, it would not be a situation in which the
US could possibly help even if China threw its
weight on the side of Pakistan," Kissinger told
Jha, according to the ambassador's letter.
This letter from the Indian ambassador was seen
by the foreign minister, the secretary to the
prime minister and most other senior officials.
And the letter is now declassified. Is it genuine? Kissinger talking about divisions of irregulars sounds comical, even for a feather merchant like him.
 

asianobserve

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JFK, aides considered nuclear arms in China-India clash

`ANOTHER DOMINO' In newly declassified recordings, then US president Kennedy contemplated the possibility of using nuclear weapons if China attacked India again

NY TIMES NEWS SERVICE , MUMBAI


In May 1963, President John F. Kennedy and his aides discussed the feasibility of using nuclear weapons in the event China attacked India for a second time, according to newly declassified recordings released Thursday by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston.

Over the crackle of the decades-old tapes, Kennedy and his advisers can be heard discussing how to prevent India from becoming, in the popular idiom of the day, another domino to fall to Communism.

Robert McNamara, Kennedy's defense secretary, is heard to say: "Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons. Any large Chinese Communist attack on any part of that area would require the use of nuclear weapons by the US, and this is to be preferred over the introduction of large numbers of US soldiers."

McNamara said in a telephone interview on Thursday that he could not remember the conversation, "but it is probably correct."

Minutes later, after hearing from McNamara and two other advisers, Kennedy says, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India" if attacked. It is not clear from the tapes whether Kennedy was speaking of using nuclear weapons or of defending India in more conventional terms.

"The context is that Kennedy was very, very pro-India," said Stephen Cohen, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington and an expert on South Asian security. "He saw India as a natural balance to China," Cohen said of Kennedy. "That was not true of his advisers. My guess is that they didn't want to see American ground troops get involved in a war."

Cohen recalled the political climate of the time and suggested that Kennedy's aides might have had another motive for bringing up the possible use of nuclear weapons. "We were tied up in Korea; we were worried about the Russians," he said. "And, conceivably, they said `nuclear' because they didn't want him to do anything for India; that this was a way of raising the stakes so high as to make it not an option."

Indian analysts said they were stunned by the disclosure.

"I do not recollect in the public domain such an explicit commitment to nuke China," said C. Uday Bhaskar, a commodore in the Indian Navy who heads a research organization in New Delhi financed by the Indian Defense Ministry. "I'm sure it will have antennae up in China."

"Obviously, there are resonances between 1963 and 2005," said Sugata Bose, a professor of South Asian history at Harvard University. "How to contain China is the common thread."

In 1963, the US believed that China might have "expansionist designs," Bose said in a telephone interview from Calcutta, while in 2005 "the United States knows the Chinese leadership is consciously pragmatic and is eager to avoid the perception of being expansionist."

At the same time, Bose said, "The reality is that China is a much stronger power today, because the economic dimension has been added to the military and strategic one."

The deliberations in May 1963 are especially striking in light of their timing just seven months after two events that shook geopolitics: the Cuban missile crisis and an invasion of India by China, which sought to acquire disputed border territories.

In one section of the tapes, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is heard telling Kennedy: "This is just one spectacular aspect of the overall problem of how to cope with Red China politically and militarily in the next decade. I would hate to think that we would fight this on the ground in a non-nuclear way."

Also on the tapes, Dean Rusk, Kennedy's secretary of state, counsels that the use of nuclear weapons would have to have support from America's allies. "I think we would be hard pressed to tell our own people why we are doing this with India when even the British won't do it or the Australians won't do it and the Canadians won't do it," Rusk says. "We need to have those other flags flying on these joint enterprises."

George Ball, then an under secretary of state, warned Kennedy that the use of nuclear weapons against China could create a perception of American hostility toward East Asians.

"If there is a general appearance of a shift in strategy to the dependence on a nuclear defense against the Chinese in the Far East, we are going to inject into this whole world opinion the old bugaboo of being willing to use nuclear weapons against Asians," Ball says.



JFK, aides considered nuclear arms in China-India clash - Taipei Times
 
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Ray

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Chinese cannot be taken as East Asians from a geostrategic viewpoint.

They are an entity by themselves and can hardly be clubbed having an East Asian temperament.

They would be best termed as Guru Ghantal in the Indian parlance.
 

Yusuf

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JFK, aides considered nuclear arms in China-India clash

`ANOTHER DOMINO' In newly declassified recordings, then US president Kennedy contemplated the possibility of using nuclear weapons if China attacked India again

NY TIMES NEWS SERVICE , MUMBAI


In May 1963, President John F. Kennedy and his aides discussed the feasibility of using nuclear weapons in the event China attacked India for a second time, according to newly declassified recordings released Thursday by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston.

Over the crackle of the decades-old tapes, Kennedy and his advisers can be heard discussing how to prevent India from becoming, in the popular idiom of the day, another domino to fall to Communism.

Robert McNamara, Kennedy's defense secretary, is heard to say: "Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons. Any large Chinese Communist attack on any part of that area would require the use of nuclear weapons by the US, and this is to be preferred over the introduction of large numbers of US soldiers."

McNamara said in a telephone interview on Thursday that he could not remember the conversation, "but it is probably correct."

Minutes later, after hearing from McNamara and two other advisers, Kennedy says, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India" if attacked. It is not clear from the tapes whether Kennedy was speaking of using nuclear weapons or of defending India in more conventional terms.

"The context is that Kennedy was very, very pro-India," said Stephen Cohen, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington and an expert on South Asian security. "He saw India as a natural balance to China," Cohen said of Kennedy. "That was not true of his advisers. My guess is that they didn't want to see American ground troops get involved in a war."

Cohen recalled the political climate of the time and suggested that Kennedy's aides might have had another motive for bringing up the possible use of nuclear weapons. "We were tied up in Korea; we were worried about the Russians," he said. "And, conceivably, they said `nuclear' because they didn't want him to do anything for India; that this was a way of raising the stakes so high as to make it not an option."

Indian analysts said they were stunned by the disclosure.

"I do not recollect in the public domain such an explicit commitment to nuke China," said C. Uday Bhaskar, a commodore in the Indian Navy who heads a research organization in New Delhi financed by the Indian Defense Ministry. "I'm sure it will have antennae up in China."

"Obviously, there are resonances between 1963 and 2005," said Sugata Bose, a professor of South Asian history at Harvard University. "How to contain China is the common thread."

In 1963, the US believed that China might have "expansionist designs," Bose said in a telephone interview from Calcutta, while in 2005 "the United States knows the Chinese leadership is consciously pragmatic and is eager to avoid the perception of being expansionist."

At the same time, Bose said, "The reality is that China is a much stronger power today, because the economic dimension has been added to the military and strategic one."

The deliberations in May 1963 are especially striking in light of their timing just seven months after two events that shook geopolitics: the Cuban missile crisis and an invasion of India by China, which sought to acquire disputed border territories.

In one section of the tapes, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is heard telling Kennedy: "This is just one spectacular aspect of the overall problem of how to cope with Red China politically and militarily in the next decade. I would hate to think that we would fight this on the ground in a non-nuclear way."

Also on the tapes, Dean Rusk, Kennedy's secretary of state, counsels that the use of nuclear weapons would have to have support from America's allies. "I think we would be hard pressed to tell our own people why we are doing this with India when even the British won't do it or the Australians won't do it and the Canadians won't do it," Rusk says. "We need to have those other flags flying on these joint enterprises."

George Ball, then an under secretary of state, warned Kennedy that the use of nuclear weapons against China could create a perception of American hostility toward East Asians.

"If there is a general appearance of a shift in strategy to the dependence on a nuclear defense against the Chinese in the Far East, we are going to inject into this whole world opinion the old bugaboo of being willing to use nuclear weapons against Asians," Ball says.



JFK, aides considered nuclear arms in China-India clash - Taipei Times
As I said in my earlier post, timeline. It was all good under JFK. But some goof ups happened. Nehru asked for fighters, JFK didnt give. In fact I have read about US pushing India to go nuclear herself back then in response to China. India was too engrossed in some self righteousness as well under Nehru. We missed the bus which could have made us allies of the US back then. After that the tilt went towards China and Pak.
 

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Excerpts, INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES (?)
McMillan India (Google documents)


xxx

Why was Nehru Anti-American?

Although Nehru had good relations with President Eisenhower and
his successor John F. Kennedy, he was seen as anti-American as Nehru
was wedded to his non-alignment policy. The then Indian ambassador
to the US B.K. Nehru refers to this in his book Nice Guys Finish
Second.1 He recalls how one day I dared to ask him a very rude
question which was 'why are you so anti-American?' Prime Minister
Nehru answered sharply that he was not anti-American. I said 'Oh
yes, Sir, You are'. He asked why I said so? I answered 'Because your
instinctive reaction to any proposal that may come from the United
States is to reject it, however good it may'. After a long silence he
said in a low voice:

May be there is some truth in what you say. May be I am
instinctively anti-American. I remember that when I was at Harrow
(in the UK) there was one single American boy in the school. He
was very rich and the rest of us disliked him for his preoccupation
with money and looked down upon him for that reason. It may be
that my negative reaction to America is because of that experience.


May be this explains the Nehru psychology.

Nehru's Visit to the United States

Nehru visited the United States as prime minister in November 1961,
his third state visit and the last to that country. Kennedy was the
president then. A confidential internal report at that time stated that
Nehru's popularity was exceeded only by that of late Mahatma
Gandhi. It pointed out that Nehru was seen as an Indian who became
a westerner; an aristocrat who became a socialist; and an individualist
who became a mass leader. It would have been quite easy to have
established a dictatorship for Nehru, a man of such eminence, giving
all the excuses for doing so that so many of his contemporaries had
given. Nehru instead chose to lead India on the immeasurably more
difficult path of parliamentary democracy and to ensure that during
his lifetime it would be a democracy of substance as well as form. 'It
was debated whether Nehru desires to be or is a great world leader.

Certainly, India's wide involvement in matters of global concern
suggests that he does so desire. However, his interest in world affairs
is derived from and secondary to his consuming concerns for Indian
problems.' (see Appendix 1.2)

Ambassador B.K. Nehru terms this visit as a 'disaster' because
Jawaharlal Nehru was tired, moody, and not very responsive. B.K.
Nehru writes in Nice Guys Finish Second, that President Kennedy
wanted to have a special relationship with Pandit Nehru and broke
all protocol in receiving him when Nehru visited his private home at
Hammersmith farm. The idea was to have talks in an informal setting.
While Kennedy repeatedly tried to evoke some response from Nehru
on the Vietnam issue (Vietnam became one of the reasons for the
deteriorating Indo-US relations) the latter remained silent throughout.

At one point of time later at the Blair House, Nehru showed glimpses
of his vision about this issue and told his Secretary M.J. Desai, 'Tell
them. Tell them not to get into Vietnam. They will be bogged down.
They will never be able to get out.' B.K. Nehru observes that if only
Nehru had told this to Kennedy, things may have turned out to be
different.


Later Ambassador Nehru got the impression that Kennedy thought
that Prime Minister Nehru was 'finished' because he was for long
periods 'spiritless, listless, uninterested in surroundings, and uncomm-
unicative' – the very reverse of the usual Jawaharlal Nehru's
personality. Despite the great charm of Kennedy, Pandit Nehru did
not find him extraordinary. Kennedy, on the other hand praised Nehru
in his State of the Union address on 31 January 1961 for his soaring
idealism which no US president had ever done since about any Indian
leader.
Prime Minister Nehru was more relaxed later when he visited
California where he enjoyed himself in Disneyland and also met the
English writer Aldous Huxley, the Hollywood actor Marlon Brando,
and the historian couple Durranis. He went to see a film studio in
Hollywood before returning to Delhi.3

Change in Indo-US Relations

Within a year, the relationship between the United States and India
changed. This was mainly due to the Chinese aggression on 20
October 1962. The country was taken unawares and the Indian
Armed Forces were not ready to face the Chinese might. It is common
knowledge that Nehru did not know the real state of affairs initially
because he blindly believed his Defence Minister Krishna Menon.
After the Chinese aggression, Nehru's other cabinet colleagues
demanded the immediate ouster of Menon. Bowing to their pressure,
Nehru reluctantly made him a minister without portfolio and later
altogether dropped him from his cabinet.

Six days later, Pandit Nehru was forced to seek American military
help on 26 October 1962. This was the first time Nehru had changed
his earlier stand on non-alignment out of sheer compulsion. According
to B.K. Nehru who met President Kennedy on behalf of the Indian
government, the latter assured that help would come without delay.
Kennedy's next question was did India ask the Russian leader
Khrushchev for help? When B.K. Nehru expressed uncertainty,
Kennedy said, 'You should ask him, you would know who your real
friends are and who are just content to talk. Tell Khrushchev to put
up or shut up,' Kennedy said.4 This explains the mistrust between
the Americans and the Soviets at that time. Kennedy was trying to
taunt that it was the US and not the Soviets who would come to
India's help against the Chinese.

A month passed but the Chinese aggression continued on the
border. On 19 November 1962, Prime Minister Nehru wrote another
letter to Kennedy requesting direct and substantial military help to
meet the Chinese onslaught. He asked for two squadrons of B-47
bombers and speedy training of Indian pilots to bomb the Chinese in
Tibet. He also requested that the US Air Force send 12 squadrons of
supersonic fighters to protect Indian cities against the Chinese
attacks. According to a State Department telegram sent to the US
Embassy in New Delhi giving the text of Nehru-Kennedy letter, Nehru
ended his letter by saying, 'Your great country will in this hour of
trial help us in our fight for survival and for the survival of freedom
and independence in this subcontinent as well as the rest of Asia'.5
The plea for more help from Pandit Nehru arrived in the form of two
more telegrams on 22 November 1962. The letters showed Nehru's
desperation clearly. These letters were promptly passed on to
President Kennedy by Ambassador Nehru.

Before Kennedy could reply the war had ended but not without
having altered the fundamentals of the Indo-American relations.

Although India continued to talk of non-alignment, she now became
more of a friend to the US in their efforts to confront China.
There
was a military understanding between the two countries for the supply
of US arms and equipment for this purpose. There was also a political
quid pro quo – India's defence plans would have to be approved by
the US before it would agree to provide necessary supplies, and India
would have to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. Pakistan
was quite upset with the US military supply to India and its President
Ayub Khan made strong protests to Washington contending that India
may use the American supplied weapons against Pakistan. Kennedy
wrote to Ayub Khan assuring him that military assistance to India
was only to be used against China.

A week after the end of the Sino-Indian war on 28 November
1962, Ayub Khan under pressure agreed for negotiations with India
on Kashmir when Kennedy sent a high level team headed by Averill
Harriman. After talks with both Ayub Khan and Nehru, Harriman,
in a National Security Review Committee meeting on 3 December
1962, expressed hopelessness with regard to finding a solution to the
Kashmir issue. However, the then Assistant Secretary of State, Philips
Talbot believing that this failure of talks would mean that the problem
would continue for decades advised Kennedy to continue efforts.

Just before the Kashmir talks resumed Kennedy sent letters to both
Ayub Khan and Nehru about the need for dialogue. Prime Minister
Nehru replied to the president that, 'To give up the valley to Pakistan
or to countenance its internationalisation (poses) political and
strategic problems for India which (render) such solutions
impossible'.6

Realising that there was an impasse, three weeks later, Kennedy
made it clear to Ayub Khan in a letter dated 22 December 1962 that:
'we agreed on a reasonable and frugal programme of military
assistance designed solely to enable India to defend itself better should
Chinese Communists renew their attacks at an early date'. He also
made it clear that the supply of arms to India would not be made
contingent on a Kashmir settlement.
7

Kennedy continued his efforts for the next few months. The US
military aid continued as Kennedy was keen on providing a long-
term assistance to India. He also tried to help resolve the Kashmir
problem by constantly persuading both Nehru and Ayub Khan to
continue dialogue. Several rounds of talks on Kashmir throughout
the year, however, did not yield any results.

On 22 November 1963, when Kennedy was assassinated, India
deeply mourned his death. As T.N. Kaul reflects in his book
Reminiscences Discreet and Indiscreet8 if Kennedy had lived, it is
possible, 'our relations with the US would have been put on even
keel, on the basis of mutual respect and understanding'.


When Lyndon Johnson took over after Kennedy's assassination, there
was a change in the Indo-US relations at the White House. Johnson
continued with some of Kennedy's aides like Komer and Philips Talbot
which helped the Indo-US relations remain balanced. Johnson had
also visited India and Pakistan when he was the vice president in 1961,
and was familiar with both countries. Prime Minister Nehru in the
meantime wrote two letters to Johnson – one offering condolences
when Kennedy was assassinated, and the second sent through his
daughter Indira Gandhi when she visited the United States in April
1964. Indira Gandhi met Johnson briefly and handed over the letter to
him. She also had a separate meeting with Mrs Johnson.

xxx

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&...&sig=AHIEtbQENydre153y1JPFRmYi_x0Sia1NA&pli=1
 
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Ray

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Nehru was not anti western.

He was anti none.

He has a massive ego - he thought he was the second coming of Buddha - the pacifist!
 

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(Cont.)

Meanwhile, Nehru's health began to deteriorate. In fact, Nehru
never really recovered from the shock of the Chinese aggression.
The US government closely kept track of Nehru's health in his last
days and also had accurate information from various sources such
as top Indian officials and ministers like S.K. Patil, T.T. Krishna-
machari, and even from the then President S. Radhakrishnan. The
White House knew that Nehru was now not physically fit to lead
the nation.

The All India Congress Committee's sixty-eighth annual session
took place in Bhubaneswar, the capital of Orissa on 9–10 January
1964 when K. Kamaraj took over as the new Congress president from
Damodaram Sanjivayya. Kamaraj had resigned as Tamil Nadu chief
minister under what was known as the 'Kamaraj Plan' when Nehru
drafted strong men from the government into the party to refurbish
it. Nehru arrived on 6 January, but he suffered a stroke the next day.
A telegram from the US Embassy reported to Washington on
7 January 1964, that the Governor of Orissa had informed President
Radhakrishnan that Nehru was unwell as he suffered from high blood
pressure and was recommended rest for three weeks. Radhakrishnan
immediately deputed a medical team to fly out to Bhubaneswar. This
was the first indication of the failing health of Nehru to the Americans
(see Appendix 1.3).

Impact of Nehru's Failing Health

However, Nehru's deteriorating health condition was not revealed
to the public. The news of his illness was squealed by an aide of the
Orissa governor to the PTI (a news agency) which was asked to
withdraw its story in this regard. Doctors later issued a health bulletin.
Earlier in the week the president met Nehru and advised him to take
rest and reduce workload.

Prime Minister Nehru, however, participated in the AICC session
on 10 January, which was the last such meeting he attended. It was
then that Nehru invited Shastri to return to his cabinet and take
charge of all his work as minister without portfolio.

Nehru's illness brought to the fore two questions: Various methods
of handling key decisions, and eventual succession to the post of the
prime minister. On 28 January 1964, Chester Bowles sent a telegram
to the State Department that a trio of T.T. Krishnamachari, Indira
Gandhi, and Gulzari Lal Nanda was formed to resolve the first issue.
Indira Gandhi controlled the access to Nehru and was thus in a unique
pos-ition to influence her father on any decision. As for the successor,
Biju Patnaik, a senior congress leader from Orissa, soon made a press
statement in Bhubaneswar suggesting that Indira Gandhi should be
appointed as the deputy prime minister. Many delegates spoke against
a dynastic solution and soon came on board supporting Lal Bahadur
Shastri for the post. Bowles' message concluded that Shastri was in
a commanding position for succession unless Nehru personally
intervened on behalf of Indira (see Appendix 1.4).

On 14 January 1964, another telegram from the US Embassy to
the State Department revealed that Nehru had suffered a coronary
thrombosis resulting in partial paralysis. The next day Bowles'
followed it up with another dispatch that the rat race for the office
of prime minister had already begun in early January. The Krishna
Menon-Madan Mohan Malaviya group assumed that Indira Gandhi
could be used to capture power. Gulzari Lal Nanda, who was number
two in the cabinet, began to preside over cabinet meetings. Bowles'
telegram mentions other candidates like T.T. Krishnamachari, Morarji
Desai, and S.K. Patil and added that Patnaik was a strong possibility
for the future (see Appendix 1.5).

Ten days later, a CIA report dated 24 January 1964 provided a
detailed analysis of the succession war. It pointed out that Nehru's
strength lay in the fact that he was the political heir to Gandhi. Nehru
had arrived at the pinnacle of government and party's power in 1947
at the age of 58 in vigorous health, with 35 years of experience in
Indian politics and with most of the powers already in his hands or
within his grasp. By the early 1950s, the death of some of his
colleagues and isolation of some others had eliminated all his political
rivals. Nehru's leadership of the Congress Party's massive majority
in the lower house of Parliament had provided him the base of power.

After early 1962, Nehru's vigour and along with it, his political
influence began to wane. Added to that, the death of some dear
colleagues, the unexpected Chinese aggression in 1962, and a prostate
illness sapped his energy. Despite these problems, Nehru seemed to
draw some strength from the challenge posed by the threat of mutiny
within his party and by the demands of managing the national
emergency. By 1963 Nehru appeared to have made a remarkable
recovery. Although Nehru remained the strongest figure in Indian
politics, his pronouncements and policies were no longer accepted
without challenge. The executive committee of the Congress
parliamentary group operated with a new independence of spirit
and was less intimidated by Nehru.

The CIA report dated 24 January 1964 also analyses how Nehru
turned the 'Kamaraj Plan' devised by Kamaraj, the then Chief
Minister of Tamil Nadu to his advantage. This plan envisaged shifting
several influential ministers at both national and state level to full-
time party work. Nehru used the 'Kamaraj Plan' not only to weed
out troublesome ministers but also sent back some strong leaders
like Shastri to strengthen the party. This shake up left the party
gaping. The plan was motivated by Kamaraj's concern for rural
dissatisfaction with the Congress in his own state. A number of losses
in prestigious by elections strengthened the idea.

If Kamaraj and other leaders who were eclipsed by Nehru felt
that Nehru's successor should listen to strong regional leaders,
Kamaraj succeeded in this effort as Shastri was eventually chosen
by the powerful regional satraps leaving the Congress Parliamentary
Party wondering about its role (see Appendix 1.6).

On 29 January 1964, 'the prime minister's office issued a press
bulletin which indicated Nehru had "completely recovered" and said
no further medical bulletins would be issued'. A telegram sent by
Ambassador Bowles on 30 January commented that the Bulletin
seemed to have been issued to reassure the public (see Appendix
1.7). Nehru was more active, including attendance at a Republic
Day parade. 'However, we believe Nehru has by no means recovered
from his illness. Lord Mountbatten, who has seen Nehru several times,
told Ambassador (Bowles) Nehru looked better, but actually was in
"poor shape",' Bowles reported to the State Department.
When Nehru died on 27 May 1964, Kamaraj cleverly managed to
get the Congress chief ministers on his side and successfully managed
to install Shastri despite the tough fight put up by Morarji Desai.

Impact of Nehru's Death

Writing about the impact of Nehru's death, Bowles reports on 18
August 1964:

However frustrating Nehru may have been on occasion, he was a
great man whose impact on India will continue for generations.
His control over the Congress Party organization and the minds
of the Indian people had almost no precedent among modern
democratic societies. With some notable exceptions, he was
extraordinarily skilled in his grasp of basic principles. He had a
clear concept of what he wanted India to be, with a proud
commitment to democratic concepts. His sense of political timing
was often brilliant.9

Nehru's Weaknesses

At the same time Bowles has described Nehru as a poor judge of
people and consequently often clung to individuals who were a
detriment to what he wanted to accomplish. Even when Krishna
Menon's political liability had become clear to his most trusted
colleagues and friends, Nehru was reluctant to let him go. Bowles
pointed out quoting a cabinet minister of Nehru, 'Jawaharlal clung
to Krishna as a French monarch might have clung to his favorite
mistress.

Another of Nehru's weaknesses according to Bowles was his failure
to outgrow his ideological perspectives of the 1930s.
Bowles pointed
out:

Although Nehru often spoke admiringly about socialism, he never
clearly defined what he meant by it; it was a good word suggesting
social justice and a better life. Capitalism, in an equally vague
sort of way, was a bad word suggesting exploitation, greed, and
skullduggery. If India must tolerate a private sector, let it be limited
and closely watched, Nehru felt. Bowles pointed out that in view
of the enormous grip that Nehru had on the Indians, the transfer
of power to the new regime was a 'spectacular' political
achievement.

Although Indian constitution served as a legal guide, there was no
tradition to shape its application, Bowles added in his report. He
also talked of the contribution by the then President Radhakrishnan
to the regime change. Being a keen student of government, Radha-
krishnan was determined that a new government which had been
elected directly by the people should assume office promptly. Thus,
at the instance of President Radhakrishnan, Gulzari Lal Nanda, the
number two in the Nehru cabinet became pro-tem prime minister
minutes after Nehru died. Within six days the Congress Party chose
Lal Bahadur Shastri as the new prime minister of India.

Nehru never projected anyone as his successor and was confident
that the Congress Party would choose correctly which it did. C.P.
Srivastava, Shastri's private secretary in his book Lal Bahadur
Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics claims that Nehru's public position
was that the Congress should be free to choose his successor as he
did not want the stigma of promoting dynastic rule. Had he wanted
to perpetuate his dynasty, he could have appointed Indira Gandhi as
a Cabinet Minister and she could have then succeeded her father.
Quoting Dharmavira, Nehru's principal secretary, Srivastava
concludes, 'Nehru was building up Indira Gandhi for the position of
prime minister but thought in 1963–64 that she was not ready for
the job. Nehru had the greatest faith in Shastri and had promoted
him in the expectation that he would be a "stop gap" prime minister
who would be fair to Indira Gandhi when the time came.'10

Thus, began the Shastri era after the successful regime of
Jawaharlal Nehru. On the political side, just before Nehru's death,
India was on the verge of concluding a military pact with the US.
Nehru's Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan was in Washington when
Nehru died and he was scheduled to meet President Johnson on 28
May. However, he had to curtail his trip and return to India, by
bagging a lift from the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk who was
attending the funeral in New Delhi.11
 

asianobserve

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This book would be an interesting read on the matter. I can't get the title from the link though. In any case, the excerpts bring to mind "What ifs.." Nehru really dragged his feet on the matter of closer alliance with the US until he and the issue were taken over by events and personalities. The current Indian mindset on the US is clearly a product of the Indo-Soviet after Kennedy alliance, and it seems to be holding on (the misconceptions).
 
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ice berg

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This book would be an interesting read on the matter. I can't get the title from the link though. In any case, the excerpts bring to mind "What ifs.." Nehru really dragged his feet on the matter of closer alliance with the US until he and the issue were taken over by events and personalities. The current Indian mindset on the US is clearly a product of the Indo-Soviet after Kennedy alliance, and it seems to be holding on (the misconceptions).
The history is full of what ifs.
 

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