Undersea Warfare:The Shape Of Things to Come/Doctrine/ Strategy/ Tactis/News/Articles

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The Shape Of Things to Come?
Top NASA Scientist Discusses The Future of Undersea Warfare

by Dennis M. Bushnell

Since the 1950s, when more than 50 percent of the nation's work force became engaged in some type of "information-intensive," activity, the United States (and the world) have been in the midst of an unprecedented Technological Revolution, currently centered around Information, Biological, and Nanoscale technologies. These technologies are all pushing the frontiers of the miniscule in a synergistic "feeding frenzy" among each other, and are causing tremendous changes in all areas of human endeavor. One of these areas is warfare. The character of these new technologies is altering both the context of potential conflicts and the diversity, effectiveness, survivability, and affordability of the techniques and material applicable to waging war.
In today's environment, some 70 percent of all research is now conducted within a "commercial" framework outside the United States and is thus readily available to likely adversaries. In terms of sheer size, several economies (Japan, China, and the European Union, for example) are approaching the magnitude of ours, and may even exceed it. Moreover, inexpensive, highly-motivational, web-based distance learning on demand promises to greatly accelerate these trends. With respect to techniques and materiel, the Info/Bio/Nano-technology revolution(s) are providing:

* Increasingly small, ubiquitous, inexpensive, networked, scientific and commercial, land-, sea-, air-, and space-based sensors applying multiple physics and hyper-spectral techniques
* Robotics and automation "in the large"
* Long-range precision strike
* Inexpensive mini/micro/nano"everything," including platforms, sensors, and weapons
* Wholly new classes of biological weaponry
* Hard-to-jam optical communication and navigation systems
* Greatly enhanced explosives and "volumetric" munitions... and finally,
* A fourth "weapon of mass destruction" in the form of physical or electronic
information operations (IO)

Current estimates indicate that over the next 25 years, computing will increase in speed by some six orders of magnitude, and communication speeds will increase by four orders of magnitude as optical systems replace microwaves. Further, the use of large active-volume or broad-area techniques and advanced energetic materials in weaponry will increase their destructive power by up to four orders of magnitude.

The "Slingatron" launcher offers the potential for rapid-fire intercontental bombardment using advanced boost-glide vehicles and unconventional payloads.

The overall impacts of these largely-commercial and globally-available capabilities on the outlook for military operations are far-reaching. In particular, these technologies will enable much more effective "warfare on the cheap," in which "peer competitors" are no longer defined by their possession of megatons of Industrial Age artifacts in steel and aluminum. They create dangerous implications for any attempt to carry late-20th century U.S. power-projection concepts into the 21st century. Numerous systems are emerging that could be used in tandem to wreak havoc on U.S. air and sea-surface logistic and strike platforms, both en route and in the operational theater. Non-stealth and undefended logistics platforms are particularly at risk. What will be "new" in this future threat environment are the omnipresent, omniscient sensor suites mentioned previously and the sheer number and variety of long-range and pre-positioned precision munitions that can be brought to bear. Unless platforms and weapons enjoy the sanctuary of the deep ocean, being targeted will be a "given" in the out-years. New age weapons and munitions will include:

* Lurking, semi-submerged, anti-air or anti-surface missiles in the water column, with off-board targeting by netted sensor "webs"
* Transoceanic unmanned underwater and air vehicles (UUVs and UAVs)
* "Brilliant" mines
* Long-range cruise and theater ballistic missiles
* Very long-range "guns," using Blast-wave Accelerator and Slingatron technology

Just consider the last. The Blast-wave Accelerator was analyzed at the University of Texas/Austin by Professor Dennis Wilson and is under study by both the Army and NASA for inexpensive access to space. The concept involves sequential detonation of charges behind a projectile (without a barrel) yielding ICBM or IRBM speeds after only 100 to 200 feet of acceleration. Essentially this is a "rocket" in which the external structure and propellant never leave the launcher - only the warhead. The latter could be proected in flight by a technique test-flown by NASA in the 1960s at 18,000 to 25,000 feet per second - injection from the nose of a thin stream of liquid water, which can be thrust-vectored. The 1,000-pound projectile would operate in a boost-glide, vice ballistic, trajectory and offer not only stealthy launch - no plume - but also exceptional flexibility, affordability, and survivability, while retaining the ability to be recalled. The Slingatron, also being studied for inexpensive space access, would use an oscillating horizontal tube - much like a "hula-hoop" - to accelerate projectiles in a spiral path until launch velocity is reached. Such an arrangement appears capable of lofting hundreds to thousands per minute of ten-kilogram projectiles over even intercontinental ranges.

As an example of progress in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the University of Washington recently flew a UAV across the Atlantic on only 1.5 gallons of fuel and intends to make a trans-Pacific attempt next. Increased precision, along with technology advances in materials, are also enabling a "mini-ICBM" option with terminal guidance for mid-ocean strike. Another potentially potent innovation is the Vortex Combustor under development at Penn State's Applied Research Laboratory, which burns nanoscale aluminum particulates and sea-water to provide inexpensive air-independent propulsion (AIP) for both submarines and very long range UUVs.

One way for the "Enemy-After-Next" to defeat or deter U.S. power projection with relatively little expenditure is to ensure that our forces do not "arrive at the party." The notional weapons described above - and others - are all based on enabling technologies already "in the pipeline," and they will make crossing the ocean in the air or on the surface like running the gauntlet. Attrition by enemy action could well begin within the continental United States (CONUS) itself and then over the continental shelf, since we typically deploy from a relatively small number of ports and airfields, thus simplifying the pre-positioning of smart, "pre-need," anti-air and anti-surface missiles and a variety of mines. As we will discuss below, "kill" mechanisms will probably not be restricted to high explosives.

The "density" of the threat will grow even more dangerous with increasing proximity to enemy-held coastlines. This is the "area denial" problem discussed for some time now by the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment, among others. Well before mid-century, "country-sized" magazines may be available to loose "hordes" of inexpensive, long-range precision weapons with advanced warheads bearing a "devil's brew" of lethal components: electromagnetic-pulse generators and radio frequency blankers, IW payloads, mines, fuel/dust/air or other volumetric explosives, chemical/biological/microwave anti-functionals and antipersonnel weaponry, as well as carbon fibers and "blades."

In the face of such an onslaught, friendly platforms will be hard pressed not to run out of "bullets" just defending themselves, thus causing both unacceptable attrition and the defeat of strike or power projection operations. Beam weapons are sometimes suggested as at least a partial counter to such a threat scenario, but even these have multiple and inexpensive counter-countermeasures available to an adversary. One quickly concludes that late-20th century power-projection or forced entry approaches could be gravely threatened by a determined opponent with access to these new, generally-available technologies.

What, then, might be some alternatives? Possibilities include global-range cruise missiles and exo-atmospheric precision-strike munitions, launched directly from CONUS on conventional or miniature ICBMs, and hypersonic boost-glide projectiles launched from the several types of global-reach guns mentioned above. The latter could be far less expensive and far more survivable than our current options for global precision strike - tanking B-2s and steaming aircraft carriers. Obviously, many information operations could also be prosecuted directly from CONUS.

For shorter time-of-flight munitions, a deep-water "arsenal" submarine deploying various "swim-ins" or "pop-ups" provides a survivable option. Deep-water standoff is necessary because of the danger posed by multi-static, low-frequency active (LFA) acoustics and increasing capabilities for sensing the many non-acoustic "indiscretions" associated with submarines in shallow water. These include hull detection by visual, lidar, infrared, or bioluminescent means; sensing the underwater wake by perturbations in the pressure field; and measuring salinity scars, chemical releases, internal and surface waves, turbulence, magnetic effects, radar returns, and other phenomena. In the context of swarms of inexpensive, omnipresent sensors, based on multiple physics, and operated on a "take-a-vote" sensor-fusion principle to minimize false alarms, survival of shallow-water submarines appears problematical.

Deep-water arsenal submarines would obviously need tremendous capabilities for loading out munitions. Thus, as almost a reductio ad absurdum approach in designing such platforms, "almost-spherical" configurations should certainly be investigated.

Because of increasing area-denial threat, "almost spherical" arsenal submarines could well become our best land-attack option.

his shape would yield several synergistic benefits, including minimum wetted area and friction drag, plus the smallest structural weight for increased depth capability. The serious pressure-drag issue with such a shape could be ameliorated to yield very low overall drag by using a fully-integrated "Goldschmied" pump-jet propulsion approach, with thrust vectoring for control. In this configuration, the pump-jet inlet provides potential flow "sinks" inside the body and should convert the back of the pump-jet shroud into a stagnation region instead of a stagnation point. For enhancing the affordability and survivability of such volumetrically-efficient platforms, a number of ab initio design features suggest themselves:

* Extreme automation for minimal crew size
* An on-board chemical plant for producing drag- reducing polymer from phyto- and zoo-plankton sieved from the power plant coolant intake
* Active acoustic masking to defeat LFA
* Inclusion of a replenishable, burst-speed "afterburner" system - perhaps a hydrogen-oxygen rocket as an adjunct to a down-sized main propulsion plant
* Manufacture of underwater platforms via robotic/magnetically-steered, electron-beam, free-form fabrication - essentially "virtual prototyping" of the final product

Admittedly, this concept submarine would be very different from what might result from continuing with our current and evolving design practice. However, along with affordability and survivability, volumetric loadout is the major issue for power projection from submerged platforms. An "almost-spherical," deep-water, arsenal submarine would have sufficient volume for many of the design options listed above; space for adjunct sensors, such as mini UAVs; and large capacity for storing munitions.

Other design alternatives for providing additional volume - such as simply "plugging" existing designs - have already been proffered. But in the opinion of this author, the revolutionary design approach suggested here has enough potential to warrant its inclusion in a design "runoff" for a future, submerged, deep-water "arsenal ship." It could well constitute the only survivable "close-in" strike platform for assuring naval power projection in the future.





The Future of Undersea Warfare - The Shape of Things to Come?

 

[Patriot]

Net-centric undersea warfare

More Effective Use of Resources to Dominate the Battlespace; Data Fusion on Multiple Levels

The Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) Forward from the Sea requires free navigation of the world's oceans and battlespace dominance in both deep water and littoral areas. In order for the U.S. Navy to dominate the ocean battlespace, it must conduct effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) especially in littoral waters. Our ability to dominate the maritime battlespace is being challenged by the dramatic progress in threat quieting, threat weaponry advances, acoustically and tactically difficult littoral environments, reduced force levels covering multimission tasking, and reduced atsea exercise and training opportunities. In addition, inadequate acquisition program integration has resulted in current solutions not keeping pace with technology. Advanced ASW capabilities have been hindered from fleet introduction by platform-specific vice coordinated solutions, and a failure to treat the operator as part of the system in training and in operator interface systems development.

The promise of network-centric warfare is to enhance fleet performance by getting the right information to the right people in the right format at the right time. This requires exchanging and fusing information from distributed sensors thus enabling collaborative analysis and joint planning across widely dispersed multitasked platforms. As pressures for reduced manning and force downsizing increase, the need for a capable network-centric approach to warfare is increasing and as automation technologies and communication capabilities continue to improve the likelihood of developing and validating a capable network-centric warfare capability increases. Enabling elements required by the net-centric approach include:

- High-quality informatio, backplane: a network to permit system predictions utilizing in-situ data bor collaborative planning and analys,.s

- A sensor grid: a system of sensors/platforms networked into a sensor field/grid fused into a common display/presentation from a common database to generate the common tactical/environmental picture, and a level of automation to control false alert rates

- Engagement grids: a system of coordinated weapons/assets allowing rapid and timely response to threats.

Increased ability to manage multiple sensors and sensor types: ASW starts with the sensors and the information they provide give meaning to the network and true value to the warfighter. The ability to capture as much sensing information as possible and get it to the right decision-maker in theater is key. This is essential to the operation of multistatic active sonar systems and the effective use of the emerging generation of offboard sensors.
Improved detection, classification, localization: the ability to configure and operate sensors and platforms to detect, classify and localize threat targets improves with greater knowledge of the operating environment derived from battlespace information sharing; the ability to reduce false contacts and detection-classification time-lines and to potentially be able to operate sensors with lower thresholds; the control of significant contact management issues in multistatics is germane; the ability to exploit "whiffs and sniffs" to add up to a contact that would otherwise have been missed; the ability to reachback to an analysis center to provide on-site operators with additional expertise could shorten the search phase.
Real-time battlespace awareness: the ASW problem has a significant level of uncertainty associated with it due to the inherent difficulty in gaining contact with threat targets over relatively large volumes of the battlespace. Total understanding of the system and tactical mission capabilities and progress leads to an awareness of the warfighter's true situation, whether good or bad, with subsequent increased ability to manage the battlespace uncertainty. To this end the netcentric USW system will have an improved common tactical picture based on more immediate access to the needed data, tactical and environmental, and more effective intuitive display capabilities allowing the choice of display to be based on the data not on hardware limitations to simple twodimensional displays. The use of two or three-dimensional displays will be driven by the data and the tactical situation with a mixture of operator specified displays. The tactical picture will be improved by: all source contact information with associated AOUs, environmental overlays (meteorological information establishing how well systems can perform), navigation charts, and intelligence information allowing best estimate of threat location and intent. Tactical options reduction will be assisted by TDAs using the information available on the tactical picture as well as common validated environmental data bases, access to real-time in-situ environmental data, validated performance prediction models that run with sufficient speed and accuracy to allow "what if" assessments. In addition, the ability to assess own force vulnerability evaluates force level risk.

- Improved undersea battlespace preparation: ASW is conducted in the context of preparing the battlespace for other mission warfare activity (e.g. strike, theater missile defense, etc.) The warfare action group relies on ASW to succeed in preparing the battlespace for execution of other missions.

Timely and appropriate decisions and response: The improved capabilities above ultimately must translate to warfighting power as manifested by timely and appropriate decisions resulting in successful maneuver and/or attack. The optimum allocation of assets based on "fusing information for effective management of available ASW sensors & assets," collaborative tactics, dynamic update of tactics, and the development of overarching TDA to optimize use of forces. The more effective allocation of resources has potential of freeing up multimission assets.

This capability is not here today and will take time to develop but the threat continues to improve. Critical issues associated with these capabilities include:
- Type of sensor contact data to be distributed across the network

- When or if to use subject experts at remote sites

- How likely are simultaneous/near simultaneous contacts on diverse sensors ?

- Likelihood of advanced offboard sensors

- How to maintain control of false contact rates

- Communication bandwidth requirements

- Compatibility/interoperability with allies (CONOPS/Doctrine/Tactics)

- What information is needed by command and control?

What are the right measures of performance and effectiveness?

Navy Programs

The Navy has several programs ongoing that are addressing many of these issues ranging from communications programs, environmental programs, and two new programs: Integrated ASW (IASW) and the Advanced USW Concept program (AUSWC). The AUSWC project is an initiative being developed by the program executive officer for USW, Advanced Systems Technology Office (ASTO) to rapidly take existing technolgy that facilitates a net-centric USW capability and move this capability, integrate those applications, and field this capability into the fleet for demonstration. The AUSWC goal is to deliver an enhanced capability for cross-platform ASW through the integration of cross program technologies. The approach taken to effectively integrate diverse technologies will be based on the proven data-driven buildtest-build approach used in the Advanced Processor Build (APB) program, which provided rapid updates to the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion program. The program is focusing on a horizontal integration of off-the-shelf technologies based on an integratetest-integrate paradigm. The intent is to field and demonstrate a networkcentric USW theater combat system by providing a common tactical/operational picture, a common environmental picture, common decision aids/models, common communications/database services, and exploiting existing collaborative planning tools. AUSWC will be implementing the existing technolgy in state-of-the- art, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and will deploy the system in FY01 AUSWC provides a framework for future science and technolgy initiatives to be integrated and demonstrated in the USW community and the ability to migrate into existing USW programs of record.

The integrated ASW program is a joint Offfice of Naval Research (ONR) and Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) program to provide improvements to antisubmarine warfare through enhanced data exchange, fusion, and utilization of senior-information and environmental data. The goal is to develop and demonstrate the means to automatically fuse ASW tactical and environmental signal event data on and across platforms engaged in ASW to form and maintain an improved Common Tactical and Environmental Picture (CT/EP). The goals will be addressed by implementing trackbefore-detect algorithm that exploits the platform's multiple sensor and netderived information. The initial demonstrations of this technolgy will occur in FY02 and will focus on sonobuoy information as well as information available on a surface combatant. The next step for IASW will then be to incorporate insitu environmental data in the development of the CT/EP and into the data fusion paradigm. This new technolgy will then be demonstrated in later sea tests.

The technology for IASW, once proven will be transitioned to AUSWC for further testing and evaluation. The first phase of IASW technolgy will be transitioned to AUSWC in support of the FY02 deployment.

By Dr. Larry H. Green & Barry E. Raff


BNET Technology | Top Industry News, Statistics, Research and Trends | BNET

 

[Patriot]

The Next Arms Race
"¦will be undersea, say Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, and will have big political repercussions for the entire Asia-Pacific region.

A naval arms race is gathering pace in the Asia-Pacific. It will be unlike the competition that gripped Europe over a century ago, when the great powers sought to outdo each other in the number and tonnage of warships. Today, a major component of this maritime rivalry is taking place in the murky world of undersea warfare where, instead of the big-gun battleships that became the hallmark of the arms buildup prior to World War I, nations over the next decade will put to sea small, seemingly unassuming submarines.

As a result, neither gun size nor displacement will be accurate measures of sea power. Rather, Asian capitals will invest in the subtleties of hull design, propeller blades and propulsion systems that maximize stealth and endurance for the quiet hunter-killers. Current trends suggest that submarine warfare will emerge as a growth industry in Asia, becoming a defining feature of the regional military balance over the next decade.

So why pursue a submarine program? Essentially, submarines confer operational advantages that appeal to Asian naval planners. The submarine is the ideal platform for sinking merchant shipping and choking off maritime commerce. With most Asian nations dependent on seaborne trade, undersea warfare exploits the acute vulnerabilities of integrated economic systems. The unrestricted submarine warfare undertaken by the German and US navies (against Great Britain and Japan, respectively) during World War II exemplifies the potential of commerce raiding. Submarines also pose an enduring threat to warships. Used defensively, a picket line of subs could erect a no-go zone, effectively denying a hostile naval task force control of the seas. Employed offensively, attack submarines could clear a nautical area of enemy vessels as a prelude to its own exercise of sea control.

Additional strategic factors create further incentives for submarine development. Professional submariners proclaim that the best antisubmarine platform is another submarine. By that logic, navies often feel compelled to compete 'symmetrically' with prospective adversaries, matching their submarine build-ups on a one-for-one basis. Submarine competition can thus quickly degenerate into a zero-sum game over numbers, whereby numerical superiority for one side is perceived as a grievous disadvantage for its opponent. And since aircraft-carrier warfare is affordable only to an exclusive club of great powers, submarines offer weaker nations a financially sustainable option for exercising sea power–a capability that would otherwise remain out of reach. It's unsurprising, then, that a cluster of submarine fleets is taking shape in the region.

The Russian Navy deploys the best-known submarine fleet indigenous to East Asia, if only because it's the successor to the vaunted Soviet Pacific Fleet. In terms of raw numbers, the Soviet Navy possessed an astonishing undersea fleet–by the early 1970s, some 300 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) or nuclear guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) were in the Soviet naval inventory, along with 50 nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). For the sake of comparison, the entire US Navy numbered less than 500 vessels by the late 1970s, before the rebuilding effort of the 1980s.

On the other hand, Soviet submarines laboured under a variety of geographic, technical and human constraints. While quantity has a quality all its own, as Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov liked to say (channelling Josef Stalin), numbers are not everything. The northern arc of the 'first island chain' encloses the Russian coast in East Asia, offering a hostile submarine force a ready-made defence perimeter. And indeed, Japanese and US antisubmarine forces made expert use of maritime geography. While Soviet boats outshone their Western antagonists in some respects–for example, they were ruggedly built, and thus were able to dive deeper–they were also noisy. As a result, they were relatively easy for Western sonar operators to hear. (One retired US submariner likened the noise levels emitted by early Soviet craft to two skeletons making love inside a metal trash can.)

The din of machinery, then, compromised stealth–the most critical attribute of any submarine. Moreover, the submarine force, like the rest of the Soviet Navy, suffered from a severe deficit in seamanship and skill compared to US and Japanese mariners. Not for nothing did Western submariners boast of how often they bested their Soviet counterparts in the cat-and-mouse game that comprised the Cold War at sea. This same litany of woes persists in the Russian Navy today. To use the three indices posited above, geographic obstacles are permanent. The Russian Pacific Fleet, such as it is, still must contend with an offshore island chain. From a material standpoint, the economic travails that followed the Cold War devastated the Russian navy. In fact, one component of US aid to Russia following the Soviet collapse helped dismantle Soviet nuclear submarines that were rusting pier side. The accidental sinking of the Oscar II-class SSGN Kursk in 2000 and last year's deadly fire on board the Akula-class attack boat Nerpa–a vessel that was undergoing sea trials before being leased to India–constitute worrisome portents for Moscow.

So, despite the upswing in Russian economic prospects in this era of relatively high oil prices, it's doubtful that the Russian Navy has yet recovered from the days when Russian sailors were reduced to selling uniform parts for food, as they were on occasion during the 1990s. Morale, engineering proficiency and tactical skill take time to rebuild after such traumas. And the Russian Pacific Fleet is now a shadow of its former self by material measures like numbers and capability. Of the 23 strategic and tactical submarines stationed at Pacific bases, 10 are laid up in reserve, while the material condition of even the active boats is dubious. Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, second president of the US Naval War College, wrote that an authoritarian government can create a great navy with impressive speed, but that the fleet could suffer rapid decay should the attention of that government wander. If Mahan is right, Russia will remain a secondary Pacific naval power for the foreseeable future.

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), meanwhile, deploys perhaps the most modern and capable diesel-electric submarine force in the world. Japanese defence planners have kept the fleet at the technological cutting edge by routinely retiring boats well ahead of schedule while introducing ever more capable replacements. Thus, even though the numbers have remained relatively still (at roughly 16 boats) over the past decade, the MSDF has maintained an impressively high proportion of advanced submarines. For example, the latest class of submarines, the Soryu, is superior to its predecessor by virtually every index of performance. The Soryu is the first Japanese boat fitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP), a fuel-cell technology that permits submarines to operate underwater for extended periods while quieting their noise signature. It is a formidable undersea platform. In short, the MSDF leads the region in conventional submarine warfare–constituting the benchmark against which other Asian navies will be compared against over the next decade.

Sea-lane defence occupies a dominant place in Japanese naval thinking. Potential disruptions to seaborne traffic, the lifeblood of the Japanese economy, represent a threat to national survival. One need look no further than the bitter lessons of World War II. During the Pacific War, the US Navy sent over 1,100 Japanese merchantmen to the bottom, reducing the home islands to the brink of mass starvation. At the peak of the Cold War in the 1980s, the Japanese submarine force took up blocking positions along the first island chain, detecting and tracking Soviet submarines that sought access to the Pacific. Many Soviet skippers opted to remain safely within the Sea of Japan rather than run the risk of being sunk in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. Given the economic and strategic imperatives confronting Tokyo, it's unsurprising that undersea craft rank near the top of Japan's defence priorities, and will do so for years to come.

The Chinese Navy too boasts a long pedigree in undersea warfare. Swayed by Soviet naval orthodoxy, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) devoted virtually all of its attention to coastal defence, a function for which submarines are well suited. Maoist China's landward orientation and defensiveness at sea reinforced this predilection for undersea combat. Following its quixotic 1950s struggle against Taiwanese and US forces over offshore islands, Beijing transfixed its strategic gaze upon defeating a potential seaborne invasion of the mainland. The submarine force–in conjunction with coastal patrol boats–thus became the first line of homeland defence and an adjunct to army operations. The Chinese naval force structure throughout the Cold War bore witness to this priority and by the 1980s, Beijing had not only put to sea nuclear-powered submarines but also boasted the largest undersea fleet in Asia.

Today, China's submarine force labours under the weight of this Cold War legacy. The vast majority of the fleet, reverse-engineered from Soviet models of the 1950s and 1960s, is obsolete by Western standards. Yet age is only one measure of effectiveness. A well-placed submarine, even a rickety one, could lie in wait and ambush passing enemy vessels. The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, during which President Bill Clinton dispatched two carrier groups as a show of force, is illustrative. As the cross-strait confrontation reached its climax, US defence planners fretted over Beijing's capacity to deploy much of its undersea fleet to waters near the island. Despite the operational and technological superiority of the US Navy to its Chinese counterpart, American naval commanders nevertheless viewed the potential PLAN deployment with genuine alarm.

Why? US antisubmarine warfare (ASW) is an operational art that atrophied from neglect in the post-Cold War period. ASW remains one of the most demanding missions facing any navy. The burden falls disproportionately on the side that must seek, find and destroy submarines to guarantee an acceptable margin of safety at sea. By contrast, the clever submariner only needs to ensure that a single torpedo reaches a primary target to wreak physical and psychological havoc on the enemy fleet. The asymmetric nature of undersea warfare means that no commander worth his salt takes a submarine threat lightly–however antiquated the enemy boats might be. The sheer number of Chinese submarines magnifies this lopsidedness.

Beijing embarked on a naval modernization program more than a decade ago that is remaking the submarine fleet. In the 1990s, the Chinese purchased two batches of Russian-built Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines armed with deadly wake-homing torpedoes, which seek out the turbulence created by ship propellers and are extraordinarily difficult to evade. Kilos also sport land-attack cruise missiles and antiship cruise missiles. Once thought to be a failing program due to technical difficulties, the indigenous Song-class diesel attack submarine entered serial production early this decade. Attesting to the impressive advances in China's industrial-military complex, these capable submarines have been built at a rapid pace of two per year. The Yuan-class diesel attack boat made its debut in 2004 to the apparent surprise of the US intelligence community. The Yuan reportedly incorporates the best features of the Kilo and the Song and may even be equipped with indigenously designed air-independent propulsion. The expected entry of the next-generation Shang-class SSNs will add even more striking power to the fleet.

These four classes of modern attack boats already constitute a third of China's entire undersea force. Over the next decade, as the PLAN commissions new platforms, the majority of its submarines will be modern. In all likelihood, the navy will reverse the steep decline in the overall quantity of its fleet by 2015, as it completes the mass retirement of older hulls. By 2020, then, the fleet will not only be newer but will have made up for the deep cuts in the inventory that began with the end of the Cold War.

Not to be outdone, smaller Asian powers have joined the submarine race. In the early 1990s, South Korea began to build the first of nine modern submarines based on the German Type 209, completing the series within a decade. Seoul recently ordered six Type 214s from Germany to join three boats already in service. Once complete, the Type 214 buy will effectively double the size of the submarine force. South Korea also plans to design and construct nine more next-generation boats from the keel up. Planned for launch in the early 2020s, the new boats will boast double the displacement of the Type 214s and possess the capacity to conduct land-attack missions while submerged. Officially, North Korea is the designated target. However, the blue-water potential of all three classes of submarines continues to prompt speculation that Seoul may be looking ahead to the post-unification era, when some strategists foresee rising tensions with Japan at sea.

Since it acquired two Dutch-built Zwaardvis-class submarines in the 1980s, Taiwan, meanwhile, has been effectively embargoed from further purchases abroad, owing to fierce Chinese opposition to such transfers of sensitive naval technology. In April 2001, President George W. Bush approved a massive, controversial arms sale that included eight diesel-electric submarines. But domestic politics on the island, the reality that the United States no longer builds conventional submarines, and intense Chinese pressure against other third parties have since stalled the proposed deal. While it's unclear whether Taipei will ever import or build submarines, Taiwan's apparent persistence and China's intransigence attest to the perceived value of submarines in a cross-strait contingency.

In Southeast Asia, coastal states with limited financial resources have gradually embraced undersea warfare. In the methodical approach typical of the city-state, Singapore purchased four refurbished submarines from Sweden in the 1990s, honing the operational proficiency of its fleet before committing to buy modern boats. In 2005, Singapore agreed to procure two aging Archer-class submarines from the Swedish Navy. Expected to enter service in 2010, they will be equipped with AIP technology and superior torpedo systems. Its neighbours have also entered the fray. Malaysia acquired Scorpene-class submarines from France, while Indonesia inked purchase agreements with Russia for Kilo-class submarines. Even Vietnam, a country long preoccupied with land warfare, is reportedly negotiating a deal with Russia to import six Kilos.

Farther to the south, Australia has embarked on a breathtakingly ambitious program to replace its six Collins-class submarines, the first of which is scheduled for retirement in 2025. Canberra plans to double the size of its fleet, phasing in twelve next-generation submarines equipped with cruise missiles and AIP systems. The replacements are expected to cost more than $A25 billion over the next fifteen years, making the military modernization effort the most expensive in Australia's history. Attesting to Canberra's threat perceptions at sea, Australian strategists cite the rapid proliferation of submarines in Asia as one central rationale for this massive investment.

And no account of undersea warfare in Asia would be complete without India, a rising power with undersea ambitions of its own and a perceived Chinese threat to contend with. Not long ago, a retired flag officer flatly stated that New Delhi cannot tolerate a deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines to the Indian Ocean. What accounts for such candour? India famously sees itself as the foremost power in the Indian Ocean, and it pursues what many in the Indian strategic community forthrightly call a 'Monroe Doctrine.' In strategic and operational terms, this means that New Delhi wants to construct (or procure abroad) a navy superior to the largest foreign naval detachment likely to be sent into regional waters. While Indian leaders evince little worry about the US naval presence, seeing it as harmless if not beneficial, China is another matter.

As a result, the Indian Navy is pursuing both SSBNs and SSNs, though with spotty success thus far. On nuclear deterrence, India is at a marked disadvantage vis-à-vis China, which can range all of India with land-based ballistic missiles and has unveiled a submarine base at Sanya, on Hainan Island. (The Chinese Navy now boasts its first viable SSBN, the Type 094. This new fleet boat represents an incremental improvement for Chinese nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India. For New Delhi, on the other hand, a working SSBN would be a game-changer, letting it hold all of China at risk for the first time.) The performance of the Indian defence-industrial sector has been erratic at best with regard to SSBN-related technology, including naval nuclear reactors, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and warheads small enough to serve as missile payloads. India will likely sort out some of these problems over the next decade, but even viable Indian SSBNs will have to patrol off the East Asian seaboard to threaten important Chinese targets like Beijing. This will create interesting dynamics in the Asian maritime environment, as Indian SSBNs cruise through the South China Sea and off Chinese shores.

The outlook for nonstrategic submarines is somewhat brighter. The Indian Navy already deploys Russian-built Kilos and is building Scorpenes under contract with the French government, while just this year it unveiled its first indigenous SSN, the Arihant. The boat will undergo sea trials before joining the fleet as a full-up operational unit. As mentioned, the navy has also leased the Nerpa from Russia as a training platform for its submariners, who have had little experience operating naval reactors since the 1980s, when India last leased an SSN from the Soviet Union. How effective will the Indian undersea fleet prove by 2020? Time will tell. Like the Russian Navy, the Indian Navy is the navy of a great land power, albeit a democratic one that sees itself under threat, and thus may exhibit greater staying power on the high seas. Indices to monitor will include (a) the amount of time Indian boats spend at sea, the only way for mariners to become proficient at their craft; (b) reports of accidents, technical deficiencies, or human error; and (c) combat performance, should a conflict erupt at sea.

Yet this wave of submarine acquisitions raises some troubling questions about the future of maritime stability in Asia. The geometry of undersea rivalry was relatively simple during the Cold War. By 2020, in contrast, Asia will be home to well over one hundred modern diesel-electric submarines. At least ten navies–operating under a diverse set of strategic assumptions and threat perceptions–will jostle for geopolitical influence beneath the high seas. A new and more complex configuration of maritime power, unprecedented in Asian waters, will take shape as a result. The bodies of water bounded by the Japanese home islands to the north and the Philippine archipelago to the south will become an ever more competitive and challenging theatre. Whether the initial surge in submarine acquisitions currently on display will beget successive, more aggressive build-ups across maritime Asia remains to be seen, though the heavy spending on undersea warfare suggests that the action-reaction dynamic is already in place to impel a classic, regionwide arms race.

Asian navies are clearly determined to augment the precision and lethality of the firepower launched from their submarines. Virtually all of the subs are, or will, be outfitted with long-range land-attack and antiship cruise missiles. This lethal mix of weaponry suggests that many maritime services are contemplating not only traditional sea-control and sea-denial missions but strikes ashore. The prospect of stealthy submarines bringing war directly to one's homeland, possibly without any early warning, is worrisome for governments throughout the region. Asia's many coastal metropolises, the engines of global economic growth, could become especially lucrative targets for coercive military action. Equally troubling, pre-emptive attacks against military bases and naval vessels at anchor are now conceivable for weaker powers that lack the traditional tools for force projection.

Another key trend is the incorporation of air-independent propulsion systems on board the majority of the newer submarines. As a consequence, the interaction between submarine and antisubmarine warfare will likely become even more intense. One possible outcome may be greater exertions by well-financed navies to develop more (and more capable) ASW platforms. These fleets may well accelerate acquisitions of shore-based and carrier-based naval aviation units specializing in antisubmarine operations in the coming years. Indeed, the emerging submarine threat is driving Japan's MSDF's pleas for larger helicopter carriers designed for sub-hunting missions. Japanese carrier development could in turn stimulate a new cycle of rivalry among surface fleets intent on sea control. In other words, a submarine arms race could easily spill over into other dimensions of sea-power competition.

It's worth noting, though, that no amount of gee-whiz hardware will translate into combat effectiveness absent the intangible, moral factors intrinsic to sea combat. The true value of a submarine fleet lies in such 'software' ingredients as doctrine, tactics, crew training and education, regular exercises, and active patrols. In joint exercises with the US Navy, the Singaporeans reportedly demonstrated extraordinary tactical virtuosity by exploiting the unique hydrographic features of the South China Sea. Singaporean submarines displayed an uncanny capacity to elude American antisubmarine units, proving once again that the age of the system matters less than the operator's skill and knowledge of local maritime terrain. Whether newer entrants to the undersea race can duplicate Singapore's experience will depend entirely on their willingness to invest in human capital.

Finally, regional navies will devote substantial energies to tracking the movement of one another's submarines. Encounters among rival undersea fleets, then, will almost certainly become more frequent in the coming years. Incidents similar to the 2004 intrusion of a PLAN Han-class SSN into Japanese territorial waters may come to characterize Asian politics. Increased underwater contact will in turn heighten the prospect of mishaps or miscalculations that could escalate into unintended crises or full-blown shooting wars. Regional crisis management will, accordingly, assume greater urgency in Asian capitals. But with regional institutions and confidence-building measures still immature, it remains uncertain whether Asians can muster the collective political resolve to ensure crisis stability.

Two years ago, renowned historian Paul Kennedy documented a global maritime trend with possibly lasting strategic consequences. Kennedy observed that while Europeans more or less voluntarily retreated from the sea, Asians strode into the nautical arena with alacrity. He asserted that vastly divergent assumptions about power in general, and about sea power in particular, explain this historical anomaly.

As raw geopolitical calculations become passé in Europe, Asian capitals consider military power as relevant as ever to the exercise of statecraft and the nascent undersea rivalry engulfing the region conforms to such unsentimental attitudes about interstate relations. To be ready for 2020, policymakers must start coming to terms with the nexus between power politics and a dizzyingly complex geometry beneath the waves.

By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
The Diplomat

Toshi Yoshihara is an associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and the co-author of Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2007).

James R. Holmes is an associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. Previously, he was a Senior Research Associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security.









The Next Arms Race - Pacific Freeze

 

[Patriot]

ATLAS MARIDAN - Operational Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) Technology

MARIDAN was one of the first pioneers in developing Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) technology. MARIDAN, founded in 1993, started with AUV research projects supported by the European Union that stimulated innovation in this exciting new area of underwater technology.

After having successfully launched the Marius AUV and Martin AUV, the M600 series was introduced in 2001. At that point MARIDAN became active in the subsea survey market. Having build up this long-term and successful track record on AUV development, production and operations, MARIDAN has become a top level knowledge centre for AUV technology.

ATLAS MARIDAN will continue its AUV activities as part of the ATLAS Group. Its primary focus will be on the further development, engineering and prototyping of the military and non-military UUVs - fully integrated into the total ATLAS product family concept.

Diving Mission M600 AUV - ATLAS MARIDAN - Naval Technology

ATLAS MARIDAN AUV at the surface for a survey job.

A key element in the product concept is the application of a common technology baseline that makes the systems adaptable to both military and commercial standards. A modular design approach is introduced in order to accommodate a wide range of operational envelopes and payload configurations, depending on the customers needs.

ATLAS MARIDAN AUV prepared as an experimental platform for the test, evaluation and development of AUV operations and payloads for military applications (German Military Test Facility – WTD 71).


The currently available M600 series will now be marketed as the SeaOtter MK1 in coming projects and is the ideal payload sensor carrier for military and commercial purposes, adapted to modern requirements with navigation and mission management software.

The new ATLAS MARIDAN AUV products for future applications will enter the market very soon.

UNDERWATER SURVEY, INSPECTION AND EXPLORATION MISSIONS

The SeaOtter Mk1 AUV offers high quality data. The deployment sea state is 5 and the recovery sea state is 6. The vehicle is designed for a variety of applications, including:

* Offshore oil and gas field surveys
* Mineral field surveys
* Telecommunication cable route surveys
* Offshore pipeline pre-lay route surveys and post-lay inspections
* Military surveys
* Wind park construction surveys
* Search and recovery
* Oceanographic surveys
* Data collection (data taxi)

SEAOTTER MILITARY AUV - MINE DETECTION, RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE AND ASSESSMENT

The SeaOtter MkII is specially designed for various military purposes, such as mine-warfare missions and commercial purposes.


The advanced version, the SeaOtter AUV (Mk2) is specially designed for various military purposes, strictly adhering to a modular approach with regard to superstructure, propulsion, energy, communication, navigation and payload. Its main tasks include:

* Mine detection and countermeasures
* Covert intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
* Rapid environmental assessment

NEW CHALLENGES FOR LITTORAL MINESWEEPING

With the shift in threat from a comprehensive, global conflict to small-scale regional crises most navies are concentrating on increasing their capabilities in littoral warfare.

The requirement for expeditionary missions with a maximum degree of protection for involved military personnel and the need for fast, focussed and reliable intelligence information present new challenges that call for new solutions, especially in the underwater battle space.

One of the main threats in the littoral environment, the naval mine, has to be countered by all littoral combatants, not only the dedicated MCM forces.

The most promising solution for this is the evolving autonomous underwater vehicle technology. AUVs are rapidly gaining importance in all aspects of underwater warfare. Their numerous advantages, such as versatility, compact size, independence, unmanned operation and covertness, make them an ideal asset for underwater operations.

In all these aspects ATLAS MARIDAN and its parent company ATLAS ELEKTRONIK show their readiness to present solutions to the current and future challenges.





ATLAS MARIDAN - Operational Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) Technology - Naval Technology

 

[Patriot]

"Damn the torpedoes... full speed ahead!"

Undersea warfare has changed considerably since Admiral Farragut gave his famous battle order over a century ago. Human ingenuity and advancements in technology have taken underwater weapons from floating mines and spar torpedoes to the fast-moving, self-guided, homing torpedoes we have in the fleet today. From submarine warfare to warship design and tactics development, the modern torpedo is one of the fundamental drivers of 20th century naval warfare. Its ability to sink ships and submarines with one shot is always in the mind of naval commanders. For the U.S. Navy, the modern torpedo enables submarines to defeat surface and undersea threats and gives surface ships and aircraft the means to reach beneath the surface and attack submarines.

But what does the future of the torpedo hold? The challenge for the Navy's research and development community is not only to improve the current generation of torpedoes but also to exploit new technologies for the next generation of underwater weapons. Using speed, stealth, and new engagement concepts, the modern torpedo - and other weapons that evolve from it - will continue to provide the capabilities needed to maintain a distinct advantage over our enemies.

Building a Better Torpedo

The MK48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) Heavyweight Torpedo, along with the MK46 Mod 5 and the MK50 Lightweight Torpedoes, are currently the workhorses of the fleet. The heavyweight torpedo is the submarine's key multi-mission underwater weapon, capable of performing both anti-submarine and anti-surface roles. The MK48 Mod 5, with its improved guidance system, and the MK48 Mod 6 with low-noise propulsion, provide the fleet with torpedoes whose performance is unmatched in deep-water scenarios. The lightweight torpedo gives surface ships, airplanes, and helicopters the means to destroy threat submarines. The MK54 Lightweight Torpedo will bring considerably improved shallow water capabilities to the fleet in 2003. Building on the success of the ADCAP torpedo, new weapon technologies are being developed to tackle the challenging shallow-water littoral environment. These technologies will be common to both the heavyweight and lightweight torpedoes to keep costs down and maximize performance across the board.

Since the end of the Cold War, submarine missions have largely moved from deep water to shallow-water littoral areas. Acoustic reverberation, poor sound propagation, local ship traffic, false targets, and bottom clutter all make torpedo operations more difficult in this noisy operating environment, and the need for more capable guidance and control becomes critical. The Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS) upgrades to ADCAP will extend the current sonar array on the weapon into a broadband mode and improve the onboard signal processing to provide enhanced operation against countermeasures and diesel submarines operating in the littorals.

The Next Move: Toward a Smarter Torpedo

At a time when the capabilities of both threat weapons and platforms are developing rapidly, it is crucial to lay the technological groundwork that will facilitate major hardware and software improvements for our next-generation weapons systems. There are several new approaches under study to build "smarter" front-end guidance and control systems for the torpedo. In addition to improved signal and tactical data processing, progress is being made in connectivity between submarines and weapons, intelligent controllers, and ultra-broadband arrays. Acoustic and fiber-optic communications will provide the connectivity to allow fusion of torpedo sensor data with platform information to yield an improved tactical picture for combat control systems. An intelligent torpedo controller will enable the weapon to adapt to dynamic situations, using neural nets and fuzzy logic, and an ultra-broadband array will dramatically improve its sonar capabilities.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is supporting new, advanced technologies to solve emerging fleet problems by developing and delivering solutions to the operators in the shortest possible time. One new prototype torpedo, developed as part of their "Swamp Works" effort, will house an ultra-broadband, multi-beam array, which in conjunction with new waveforms, signal processing algorithms from the CBASS program - and improved torpedo tactics - will allow for greatly improved countermeasure rejection in shallow water, while maintaining current performance in deep water. Overall, by using transparent array technology in a new front end, with many more narrow beams to resolve closely spaced objects and countermeasures, this combination will provide a quantum improvement over today's torpedo effectiveness. This will be done initially by installing a new transducer array in front of the existing sonar system, to which it will be functionally transparent. The technology will be applicable to both lightweight and heavyweight torpedoes, and the half-length torpedo currently under evaluation will not only demonstrate this new array but will lead to a formidable new littoral weapon.

Pictured above is the ex-Jonas Ingram, sunk during an exercise in 1988 by a MK48 Mod 5 Advanced Capability torpedo. It was the first SINKEX using an ADCAP.

Quiet as a Mouse

Developing a truly stealthy torpedo will provide more approach-and-attack options for our submarines. A stealth weapon that cannot be heard until very late in the encounter will delay the threat's detection of the torpedo and impair its ability to respond effectively with either countermeasures or return fire. This will greatly increase the probability of killing the enemy and avoiding a potentially lethal counterattack.

The MK48 Mod 6, while a quiet weapon, still alerts a target when it begins active pinging at the "enable" point. To solve this problem, we are developing advanced passive homing techniques, covert active waveforms with LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) and LPR (Low Probability of Recognition) properties, and associated signal processing. To fully exploit these enhancements, however, a further reduction in radiated noise from the propulsion system is required. Under consideration for the stealth torpedo is a quiet electric or hybrid propulsion system employing the Integrated Motor Propulsor (IMP). The IMP incorporates a radial-field electric motor directly into the torpedo propulsor, thereby completely eliminating an internal motor, through-hull shafts and seals, and creating a single connection point to the hull, where advanced isolation can be utilized for increased stealth. This closed-cycle propulsion will be quiet, wakeless, and depth-independent. And, with a rechargeable energy source, it will help reduce exercise expenses to provide more training opportunities and/or lower total ownership cost. Additional quieting will be achieved using active noise-cancellation techniques.

The Need for Speed

As these new torpedo technologies take shape, they promise some dramatic departures from the configuration of our current weapons. Pushing the speed envelope, for example, will greatly affect torpedo performance and resulting effectiveness - the ability to kill a target before it can react provides a distinct advantage.

Some technical innovations have so significant an impact on our way of doing business that they are often described as "disruptive technologies," with the potential to change the future. One of these disruptive technology concepts in development within undersea warfare is an autonomous high-speed, highly-maneuverable homing torpedo capable of speeds up to five times that of the MK48. Using "supercavitation" techniques, the torpedo becomes an underwater missile, capable of reaching its target before the threat can respond. In this approach, the water near the tip of the projectile - or torpedo - literally vaporizes from the high speed, producing a pocket in which to "fly" the weapon underwater. Traveling in such a vapor pocket provides dramatic reductions in drag, which allows developing extremely high velocity for a given input power. Such a weapon would be well suited for close-range submarine encounters. With multi-purpose configurations, it could be used not only for anti-submarine warfare, but also as an anti-torpedo torpedo, or for defense against high-speed surface craft.

A Key to Survival

Maximizing the survivability of the warfighter is crucial, and self-defense systems are necessary to ensure that all platforms have the capability to protect themselves from attack. Anti-torpedo torpedoes will provide our future platforms with an additional defense capability. Their primary mission is to destroy incoming torpedo threats that may have gotten through a countermeasure field. Based on technology under development at ONR, a 6.25 inch-diameter self-protection weapon is under study for the defense of surface ships and submarines using supercavitation technology. The Advanced High Speed Underwater Munition (AHSUM) program has already demonstrated the effectiveness of such high-speed underwater bullets. Fired from an underwater gun, these projectiles have successfully broken the speed of sound in water (1,500 meters per second), bringing their future application much closer to reality. The Navy is already developing a mine-clearance system that uses supercavitating bullets fired from a helicopter. The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) targets mines at shallow depths and delivers bursts of armor-piercing rounds from the air, through the intervening water, and into the mines. Merging RAMICS with AHSUM could provide the Navy with a multi-purpose round capable of engaging a range of mine-like targets from above or beneath the ocean surface.

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center has developed a comprehensive vision that supports both current Navy needs and those well into the future. The technologies needed to support this vision are identified above. In today's limited funding environment, it is important to focus on the technologies that provide needed future capabilities.

The "Torpedo Vision" graphic illustrates the Naval Warfare Center's comprehensive vision for torpedo development for today, tomorrow, for the "Navy after Next", and beyond. It notes the following details concerning specific torpedo programs. Mk 48 MOD 6: Torpedo Propulsion Upgrade (TPU), Block 4 software upgrade, torpedo advance processing build, support warfighter; Mk 54: Operations in a net centric environment; Next Generation Torpedo: Significant Total Ownership Cost reduction, Multi-mission / Platform, Single shore infrastructure; SGT Stealth Torpedo: Ultra-wide Bandwidth Array, Integrated Motor Propulsor, Hybrid Propulsor, Smart Skins, Connectivity, Multi-sensor Homing; Applications of New and Yet-to-be Discovered technologies: Nano-technologies, Smart Skins, Energetics, Energy Density.

A Bigger Bang

Torpedo payloads will also see improvement in the future. Warheads will be capable of multi-mode detonation, offering both bulk-charge and directional alternatives. They will provide higher lethality and use increasingly energetic materials to create more powerful effects, while still meeting the requirement for insensitive munitions. This would provide the torpedo more "bang for the buck," and provide the potential for weapons to be smaller and lighter, with increased range capability or room for additional sensors and signal processing.

Using "supercavitation" techniques, the torpedo becomes an underwater missile"¦ the water near the tip of the projectile – or torpedo – literally vaporizes from the high speed, producing a pocket in which to "fly" the weapon underwater.

The Future

The operating environment for torpedoes continues to change. Undersea networks for communications, sensors, and tactical engagement continue to develop through advances in acoustic communications and fiber-optic links. Fusion of data from platform, weapon, and off-board sensors will require a next generation of torpedoes that can communicate with the network and benefit from intelligent control. They may be deployed not only from submarines, but also from unmanned undersea vehicles that become remote firing platforms and keep the submarine out of harm's way.

Since the Navy's entry into torpedo research and development in the 1860s, the success of our modern torpedoes has been one of our proudest accomplishments. This has been a joint effort, working with Navy sponsors, academic and industrial partners, allies, and the fleet. The community leverages the efforts of all the participants and brings new technology to the fleet sooner and cheaper. As we build the bridge to the future, we will continue these efforts to make the best of our technology a reality and to provide the U.S. Navy with the underwater weapons capability it needs to be first in the world.

This illustration shows the weapon envelope for today's heavyweight and lightweight torpedoes, as well as potential future weapons designed for greater stealth and speed, and in support of defensive weapons concepts.

To take advantage of new Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS) technology, an advanced acoustic array will form multiple narrow beams, capable of discriminating spatially between targets and countermeasures. The resulting ultra-broadband, low-noise sonar will provide significantly improved homing performance in littoral environments, and new array fabrication techniques will make these advances affordable.

The heart of the Integrated Motor Propulsor is a radial-field, rim-driven electric motor integrated directly into the tail-cone propulsor assembly. This eliminates the need for a separate internal electric motor, facilitates a simpler interface with the rest of the torpedo, and creates opportunities for reduced length, greater reliability, and lower noise.


Bernard Myers is the Deputy Technical Director at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC); Frederick Cancilliere is the Program Manager for Torpedo, Countermeasure, and UUV Science and Technology at NUWCDIVNPT; Kenneth LaPointe is the Undersea Warfare Analyst for NUWCDIVNPT. Other contributors to this article include Jontay Jeong, from the Torpedo, Countermeasure, and UUV Science and Technology Staff; and Candida Desjardins, a member of the NUWCDIVNPT Communications/Customer Relationship Management Staff.





Torpedoes and the Next Generation of Undersea Weapons

 

[Patriot]

Jiaolong - An Underwater Dragon

Some time in end August 2010 the Chinese heralded their entry into an elite band of nations that have deep diving capability. On 27 August 2010 the Chinese authorities announced that a domestic submersible called Jiaolong had reached a depth of 3,759 meters. The dive took place in the South China Sea and a Chinese flag was planted on the seabed using a robotic arm. This earmarked China as the fifth country in the world to acquire deep diving technology surpassing the 3,500 meter depth mark. As per reports the Chinese submersible is 8.2 meters long, weighs nearly 22 tons, can carry a crew of three (one driver and two researchers) and is designed to reach a depth of 7,000 meters. Jiaolong is considered to be the world's only deep-sea vessel that can theoretically reach that depth. Japan's submersible Shinkai has a depth capability of 6,500 meters. The other three nations with deep diving technology are USA, France and Russia. Jiaolong in Chinese folklore is a mythical shape-shifting water dragon.

This would give the Chinese access to 99.8 per cent of the world's ocean floor and the capability of harnessing the lode of mineral wealth, especially oil. It would also give them the capability of viewing and examining submarine cables that carry other nations communications and objects of intelligence value that were hitherto not reachable. These include lost nuclear arms, sunken submarines and ships, and also the many warheads that have been fired for missile testing.

Chinese officials say that this submersible development (still under further testing) is aimed at scientific research to aid peaceful exploration and utilization of natural resources. Presently the submersible operates with a mother ship as do most of the submersibles in the world.

Development of submersible technology commenced around half a century ago and China has developed a deep sea capability in eight years. Considering that China is a new entrant in this field this fast track development has far reaching implications. A question that arises is: how did China achieve so much in so little time? There has been, perhaps, a take off point for the Chinese Navy. According to experts the development of China's submarine arm has been more incremental than radical. In 2003 an entire Ming class crew died due to asphyxiation. In 2004 a Han class submarine was successfully detected and tracked by Japanese anti-submarine forces. A publicly released US Office of Naval Intelligence assessment dated August 2009 hinted that China was not moving aggressively to build beyond the two initial nuclear platforms envisaged. In addition, the forces the Chinese submarine arm faces are formidable and experienced. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the present gap in underwater capabilities has led to an emphasis on unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). According to a researcher from the Beijing Academy of Naval Armaments, Chinese naval strategists are emphasizing the development of unmanned systems as they place the mission at the core rather than the human element, they have relatively simple construction, are highly flexible and are impervious to the most arduous combat conditions.

UUV research in China has been on for almost three decades. Since the 1980s a number of UUVs have been constructed. One such UUV, CR-01, co-developed with Russia, has apparently been successfully used as an exclusive economic zone platform. It is believed that research for using UUVs as nodes for information networks using acoustic communication methods is being conducted.

Very little is known about the stages of research and success rates of the UUVs built. However, if one were to couple this research with the procurement of remotely-operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) for commercial purposes from European companies, then we are looking at a steadfast approach for design and construction of UUVs meant for military purposes. This would include a number of strategic and tactical purposes.

* Intelligence gathering
* Mine laying and clearance
* Laying and monitoring of sensor chains in areas of interest, with UUVs themselves used as sensor chains
* Disruption and monitoring of communications carried by submarine cables
* Striking at strategic and tactical targets by remote launched weapons or expendable UUVs
* Communication link especially in mid-ocean areas not under human surveillance
* Monitoring of shipping especially choke points

The futuristic implications for India are tremendous. Once the Chinese achieve the capability of producing UUVs with deep depth capability, they could surround India by placing these submersibles at strategic places. Apart from Chinese ports these submersibles could also be loaded on both merchant and naval ships at friendly foreign ports in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal and launched mid-ocean and near choke points. This would achieve a dual objective: firstly, monitor all merchant shipping and thereby enhance protection of ships flying the Chinese flag; and secondly, monitor movements of Indian Naval and Coast Guard ships and assess exercises conducted by them. This would vastly erode the advantage of intrinsic mobility of naval operations in a fluid medium. All this adds up to increasing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) to a great extent and MDA is vital for a nation's maritime security and economic health.




Jiaolong - An Underwater Dragon | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

 

[Patriot]

Conventional Submarines: Their new found role

BY: Dinakar Peri security Editorial Panel FOR SECURITY MAGAZINE

The strategic role submarines play in a conflict is an often repeated statement and in the larger sense it is nuclear powered submarines (SSN) that have long overshadowed the conventional submarines (SSK) in their size, endurance, range and every other aspect. But, with recent advances in technology conventional diesel electric submarines have evolved into potent platforms on par with their nuclear counterparts and even exceeding them in some abilities. The increased threat to coastal security, recently expanded exclusive economic zones of all states and changing nature of maritime roles have also contributed to the renewed demand for SSKs which are the ideal platforms because of the ease with which they can operate in littoral waters for patrolling or protecting off shore oil rigs, preventing piracy etc. The recent spurt in ocean piracy and also the tentacles of terrorism extending to the sea have forced . They also come at a fraction of the cost of SSNs which are too expensive to maintain and operate for such roles.

The foremost thing is SSKs are small in size displacing few thousand tons whereas SSNs are over 10,000 tons. This is their biggest limitation and in turn affecting all other parameters like range, armament and so on. While nuclear propulsion gives virtually unlimited endurance to SSNs, their only limitation being the endurance of the crew, diesel electric submarines have lot of shortfalls with their diesel generators and fuel cells. They have to surface periodically for oxygen for the crew and to recharge their batteries and release the exhaust from their diesel engines which makes them vulnerable to anti submarine platforms. Even the armament of SSK's was very limited but modern ones have a diverse array

Traditionally, the SSKs single biggest disadvantage was their frequent need to surface to recharge batteries. The invention of the snorkel greatly reduced this problem, because with it the sub can recharge batteries while sailing at periscope depth. Apart from that the greatest development is the air-independent propulsion system (AIP), which allows increased submerged endurance. Thereby it enhances survivability during transit to the operating area or when moving to attack. The top submerged speed of most modern SSKs is not more than 20 knots, but they can sail at that speed for only few hours. Long range and endurance are not as important for submarines operating in the littorals as for those deployed on the open ocean or needing to transit long distances. Nevertheless, modern SSKs are capable of transiting long distances at relatively low speed and on the surface. Their submerged range is measured in several hundred nautical miles (nm). For example, the German Type 212A's have a range of 8,000 nm at 8 knots on the surface, or 420 nm at 8 knots submerged. Their endurance is about 30 days. Type 214s have a maximum range of 12,000 nm at a speed of 9 knots. They can sail at the submerged speed between 16 and 20-plus knots for a few hours several times during a 50-day mission. An SSK can transit to the prospective operating area by using batteries or snorkeling. Once there it can use AIP for long, submerged, quiet patrols at low speed. Type 212A submarines can sail submerged by using AIP for about 15 days. However, an AIP SSK still has the need, from time to time, to come to snorkel depth to take on oxygen for its crew. Nevertheless, AIP technology is evolving rapidly, and some experts predict, for example, that the power output of a typical fuel cell module could well double or triple in the next several years, allowing an even more advantageous trade-off between underwater speed and endurance.

In this context, the Indian Navy wants the last 3 scorpion submarines to include DCN's MESMA air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems, changing them from CM-2000 to AM-2000 Scorpion designation. The MESMA anaerobic system will change the Scorpion's ability to operate underwater for sustained periods without having to surface. An AM-2000 is still not in the same league as SSN nuclear subs which can do this indefinitely, but it is a substantial improvement that reduces the need to surface frequently. A CM-2000 Scorpion can operate underwater for 4-6 days without surfacing or snorkeling to get oxygen to recharge its batteries. An AM-2000 Scorpion, in contrast, will be able to operate for up to 18 days, depending on variables like speed, etc. Incidentally, the Indian navy has shelved plans for BrahMos vertical launchers and instead opted for AIP modules to be incorporated in the last three scorpions.

Conventional diesel-electric submarines have definitely evolved as potent platforms rivaling their nuclear peers and can be devastating in well trained and experienced hands.










Conventional Submarines: Their new found role

 

[Patriot]

defence.professionals | defpro.com

SeaOtter underway and about to dive at the start of a survey mission.

Demonstration to potential customers from all over the world

15:34 GMT, October 1, 2010 Winfrith/Bremen | ATLAS ELEKTRONIK has successfully delivered a series of technology demonstra-tions of the SeaOtter MkII and Vision600 Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS). The SAS equipped AUV conducted over 10 hours of survey runs mapping various sea bed features in the shallow waters of Portland Harbour. The Vision600 SAS provides 1 inch resolution across the 200m wide swath covered by the system.

The Vision SAS system is the result of a dedicated research effort by Atlas Elektronik UK in collabora-tion with Atlas Elektronik in Germany. The Vision600 SAS is a demonstration of the continual evolution of sonar technology, which Atlas Elektronik Group is committed to pursue. The Vision family of sonar is designed in a modular manner and by adding additional transducer arrays in different configurations can be adapted to produce wider swath coverage, higher rates of coverage or inferometric bathymetry.

The system is designed for AUV use with low power consumption, and can be directly interfaced with the MARPOS positioning system on the AUV. Furthermore, the system is controlled through the use of the payload manager in the SeaOtter MK II where it can be co-located and acoustically interfaced with other sensors.

A joint Atlas team from Germany, UK and Denmark (ATLAS MARIDAN) held the demonstrations to UK and foreign military, as well as offshore survey and exploration organisations and companies over the course of three days.

Potential Customers from as far afield as Singapore, USA, Nigeria and all around the EU witnessed smooth deployment, flawless mission execution and easy recovery of the AUV in and out of the Atlas Bincleaves waterside facilities. In addition to the overseas visitors, Dorset Police and UK MOD showed great interest in the demonstration with representatives from DE&S, RN hydrographic unit and RN Fleet UUV team.

The demonstration showed the great flexibility of both systems, with the installation of the sonar on the AUV taking just 2 weeks from start and to acceptance test; this being the third different AUV Vision600 has been successfully integrated on. The sonar payload was under-slung on the AUV with no effect to its stability or operational performance, conducting all the survey mission legs at a speed of 3 knots. During the various survey tasks the AUV was set it recorded sonar data from a dummy minefield, con-ducted a route survey operation, and collected data from a number well known wreck within the harbour, including the "Countess of Erne" and the "Himalaya".

The work, conducted under internal Atlas R&D funding, has generated an excellent survey data set of both civil and military data and imagery which Atlas will now use to further its research into Automatic Target Recognition (ATR). The quality of the imagery is amongst the best seen from a SAS system anywhere in the world with a 25mm resolution in both long and cross track data.

 

[Patriot]

Lincoln Strike Group Trains With Silent Partner

For Shoup's anti-submarine warfare team, the exercise presented a welcome opportunity to prove their abilities against a live submarine 'adversary' of considerable skill

USS Shoup, At Sea - The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, with the assistance of fast attack submarine USS Hawaii (SSN 776), conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise off the coast of Guam Sept. 30-Oct. 1.

The 30-hour exercise encompassed four unique back-to-back training events, with Rear Adm. Mark Guadagnini, commander of the carrier strike group, observing the events on board USS Shoup (DDG 86).

"It's great to be here today to see Shoup's professional warriors at work," said Guadagnini while addressing Shoup's crew.

For Shoup's anti-submarine warfare team, the exercise presented a welcome opportunity to prove their abilities against a live submarine "adversary" of considerable skill. Ensign Greg Emry, anti-submarine warfare officer on Shoup, was very pleased with the division's performance.

"They did outstanding work," said Emry. "All operators were focused and performed like pros."

Hawaii was a formidable opponent. The newest of the Navy's Virginia-class submarines, Hawaii uses a vast network of fiber optics, digital cameras, and high definition video for surveillance, and can carry more torpedoes than previous submarine classes.

The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group is currently on a routine deployment to the U.S. 7th and 5th Fleet areas of responsibility. Hawaii's deployment to the Pacific marks the first to the region by a Virginia-class submarine.

Source : US Navy





Lincoln Strike Group Trains With Silent Partner - ASDNews

 

[Patriot]

Fish, Birds and Bats Inspire Navy's Next-Gen Drones


The Pentagon wants robots that can maneuver through pretty much any environment, from dense forests to towering city skyscrapers. So the Navy is trying to learn from creatures that can already do it all, by funding a consortium of researchers to study the travel patterns of fish, bats, birds and insects.

And it's hardly the first time the Pentagon's expressed interest in applying the talents of the animal kingdom to unmanned air travel. They've already invested in research to create handheld drones that mimic the "echolocation" abilities of bats and mini-drones inspired by hummingbirds.

Now, researchers led by a team at the University of Washington have received a five-year, $7.5 million grant from the Office of Naval Research, to evaluate other animal features that would make for better autonomous aerial vehicles. One major focus of the project will be to eliminate or minimize the need for a human operator, whose own instincts aren't always enough to guide rapid travel.

"For vehicles operating at high speeds in highly complex and dynamic environments (like windy forests for example), a wireless connection back to a human operator might not be fast enough to keep the vehicle from crashing or allow it to be as maneuverable as it could be," UW researcher Kristi Morgansan tells Danger Room.

Morgansan imagines that drones of the future might have features like "flapping wings, flexible surfaces, and sensors that are lighter, lower power and use less energy"¦than what is used currently in engineered systems." By accumulating data from flight studies, researchers will create mathematical models that are transferable to engineered systems.

Her own team is zeroing in on underwater movement patterns. Studying a school of robotic fish, they're looking to develop bio-inspired propeller replacements, that would offer less drag and better maneuverability at low speeds, and use less power.

"We also study how schooling fish interact with one another in various settings," she says, "to come up with more effective ways of operating groups of underwater vehicles for tasks such as tracking, searching [and] map-building."

Combined, the consortium's work could also give drones the skills to sense obstacles and travel safely even in tough weather. Other researchers are investigating how moths detect and respond to their surroundings, and how bees adapt to fly in windy conditions.

Photo: National Marine Sanctuary





Danger Room

 

[Patriot]

UK-led anti-submarine warfare exercise concludes in Oman

GULF OF OMAN (BNS): The naval forces of UK, US, France and Australia have concluded a key international anti-submarine warfare exercise off the coast of Oman recently.

Royal Navy's HMS Tireless submarine surfaces in the Gulf of Oman during the anti-submarine warfare exercise with French, Australian and US navies. A Royal Australian Navy photo

The exercise, led by Bahrain-based United Kingdom Maritime Component Command (UKMCC), was aimed at enhancing anti-submarine warfare capability in warm water environments and promoting inter-operability between ships and aircraft from a variety of nations, the UK Navy said.

The centerpiece of the "cat and mouse style" exercise was the UK Navy's Trafalgar class submarine HMS Tireless. While it played the role 'mouse', the duties of 'cat' were shared between the Australian frigate HMAS Melbourne and the French frigate FS Dupleix.

UK Navy's Merlin helicopters and US's P3 Orion maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft acted as "eyes in the sky" during the wargame.

The UKMCC controls all Royal Navy warships, aircraft and personnel in the Middle East maritime region.





UK-led anti-submarine warfare exercise concludes in Oman :: Brahmand.com

 

[Patriot]

Underwater Test for MBDA's Scalp Booster Missile

The underwater ignition of the booster was intended to prepare for a full test-fire launch of the missile from a submarine, MBDA said. ( David Monniaux )

PARIS - MBDA in September conducted a first underwater ignition of the booster for the submarine version of the Scalp Naval cruise missile, in preparation for a full test-fire launch in 2011, the European missile company said Oct. 25.

"The underwater test, which set the booster in operation for several seconds, was carried out at a significant depth in a Norwegian fjord using an instrumented model of a Scalp Naval rear section secured in a submerged structure," the company said in a statement released at the Euronaval trade show.

The ignition of the booster was intended to prepare for a full test-fire launch of the missile from a submarine, a company spokesman said.

In June, the company executed the first testfire of the missile's frigate-launched version.

The two models of the Scalp naval cruise missile are intended to arm the antisubmarine warfare version of the FREMM multimission frigate from 2013 and the Barracuda nuclear-powered attack submarine from 2017.




http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4969478&c=EUR&s=AIR

 

[SHASH2K2]

Why India needs to opt in for Nuclear Submarines?​

India's nuclear legend Dr Homi Nusserwanji Sethna (1924-2010) passed away on 5th September in Mumbai aged 86. In May 1974 Dr Sethna as Chairman of India's Atomic Commission(AEC) which was set up in then Bombay, had ordered preparations for India's plutonium Pu-239 based, peaceful nuclear explosion(PNE) at Pokhran and was camping in New Delhi. Dr Raja Ramanna Director BARC was on site immersing the cores in the deep tunnels constructed by Indian Army engineers and with some help from an NRI company, and connecting the detonating cables with DRDO help. The bomb's architect Dr Sethna reportedly briefed Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi on the preparations, "I am pushing in the device (bomb) tomorrow and after that, do not say remove it because I cannot. You cannot tell me to stop."

"Go ahead", Indira replied, " Are you frightened ?," she asked. "I am not. I am only telling you there is no going back now. That is all," Homi answered in his no nonsense manner, that he was known for..

Homi Sethna a nuclear legend of India, was educated as a chemical engineer in Ann Arbour Michigan and took over in times when Dr Homi Bhabha and Dr Vikram Sarabhai had passed away and left a void. Earlier in his career, he was responsible for setting up of the thorium extraction plant at Alwaye in Kerala for separation of rare earth from Monazite sands, and came in to contact with naval officers in Cochin, including then Commodore SG Karmarkar Commodore in Charge Cochin (COMCHIN). Later Sethna set up the plant for the production of nuclear grade uranium metal at Trombay, and also set up the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant(PRP) there itself in 1959. India Strategic is proud to recount Dr Sethna's support to the Indian Navy and what is now Indian Navy's ambitions to build and operate nuclear submarines. The story of Indian Navy's quest for nuclear submarines needs recounting.

NUCLEAR SUBMARINES ARE INESCAPABLE FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The Indian Navy has always looked ahead, and its ambitious horizons have always included plans to acquire, build and operate nuclear submarines. Sethna supported that, and it is essential to appreciate why India needs expensive home built nuclear submarines like the 6,500 ton INS Arihant (ATV) which is being readied for sea trials and deep diving trials at the Ship Building Center(SBC) at Vishakapatnam. The DRDO-Navy project is being directed by Director General ATV Vice Admiral DSP Verma, a former Chief of Material of the Indian Navy, from the offices of Akshanka( means Hope) in New Delhi, under the control of a board in PMO with the Prime Minister as its head. Another large classified establishment under Akshanka, the Directorate of Marine Engineering Technology (DMET) at Hyderabad has pioneered and tested all engineering equipment inducted from Indian industry for the INS Arihant, and continues to seek suppliers for sea going machinery that goes in to a submarine but its activities are classified, despite all suppliers having all the details. It's a dichotomy.

A large 8,500 ton nuclear Akula class submarine of Project 971, the Nerpa is also being taken on lease from Russia for training and the Indian crew is likely to commission the boat later this year, if all is equal. The boat had suffered a fire and explosion and the damage has been repaired at Vladivostok. The nuclear submarines are planned to augment the Navy's long grey line of 32 warships and 6 diesel propelled Scorpene submarines including two aircraft carriers that are under construction, and on order in India and abroad. A nuclear boat with its organic under water launched nuclear missiles, is stealth at its best and is the most proven form of deterrence against another nuclear armed adversary. India has two nuclear neighbors.

The world's five nuclear weapon NPT states USA, Russia, France, UK and China, continue to maintain and design nuclear submarines capable of launching nuclear tipped missiles besides, air and land launched nuclear missiles. UK and France have admittedly reduced their land and air launched nuclear assets, but they are on course to build newer nuclear submarines despite the burden on their defence budgets, that this class of nuclear boats impose. A nuclear submarine costs around $2 bill a piece, is expensive to maintain, but it is an essential and vital strategic asset of a nation.

India has yet to achieve a credible 'Triad' deterrence capability to protect its national interests which includes its growing economy slated to grow faster in the coming decades. The Chinese PLA Navy has been pursuing a vigorous programme to build up its Han, Xia(093), 094 and 095 class of nuclear submarines which can launch short range missiles from SSNs, and long range 5000km ICBMs like the JL-1 derived from the DF-31 from SSBMs, and if India is to join the big league which is now on the cards, then it has little option but to have a line of SSN and SSBM nuclear submarines to ensure deterrence, akin to insurance against nuclear states. One however hopes, the use of nuclear weapons is never resorted to.

Politicians, the public at large and even business leaders in India have to appreciate that if you do not have security, then you will have no governance or business in a growing economy. National security is a national pre-requisite, and this is what late Dr HN Sethna who when he was working as Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Center Bombay in the 1960s producing weapon grade plutonium(P-239) from waste from nuclear reactors, always emphasized in conversations with naval officers in Bombay. His education in USA had fired his imagination on security and nuclear issues. He often visited the USO club's golf course which was close to the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research(TIFR) in Colaba. TIFR was constructed on naval land adjacent to Navy Nagar, and a number of 'hush hush research projects' were conducted there and a few technical naval officers took short courses at TIFR.

Rear Admiral SG Karmarkar, the first Indian officer who had commanded British officers on INS Kistna had by then become Flag Officer Bombay(1963-65). Dr Sethna was known to him from his Cochin days and hosted him at Northbrooke House next to the Atomic Energy Commission Office in the Old Yacht Club premises at Apollo Bunder near the Taj Mahal Hotel. Sethna took the Admiral to visits to Tarapur Nuclear Power project and BARC, and this writer as Flag Lt accompanied the Admiral on one visit to Tarapur when a reactor was being commissioned. Dr Sethna who had served under Dr Homi Bhabha is acknowledged is as being the prime architect of India's nuclear weapons programme with Dr Raja Ramanna. They both successfully demonstrated capability to build indegenious nuclear bombs in May 1974 and 'Smiling Buddha' took under his stewardship when he was the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, but he was a modest person and never hogged the lime light and diligently pursued his tasks and interests.

NUCLEAR PROPULSION AND WARFARE

Many naval officers recall Sethna tell young naval officers in Mumbai to dream of nuclear propulsion. He did this in times when officially Indian Armed Forces were not taught offensive nuclear doctrines. Nuclear and nuclear warfare in India's context was not in India's toxilogy or lexicon as a subject in Indian staff colleges, but it is less known that all major Indian Naval ships have always been fitted to fight through and defend themselves against a nuclear explosion. All major naval ships have 'citadel capability' to button up the ship and re-circulate internal air and generate oxygen like a submarine does. Every major warship can pre- wet the whole ship structure to cleanse nuclear fallout. A warship's raison d'etre is "To Float, To Move, To Fight' even thorough a nuclear explosion at sea.

Every IN navigator is taught to steer the ship away from the centre of a nuclear bomb explosion at sea. The Fleet regularly exercises nuclear explosion drill and ships are required to calculate a moving geographic position called 'Roaming Romeo'(the centre of explosion and fallout) depending on the direction of the wind, and steer a safe course to evade the nuclear fallout at high speed, with the ship's company sealed breathing circulated and re-oxidised air.

Nuclear warfare drill has been taught to every naval officer since the 50s, and officials from Bharat Atomic Energy Centre(BARC) at Mumbai where India's plutonium nuclear bombs(cores) are currently stored, regularly gave lectures on board ships on how to check radiation levels, apply radiation cleansing techniques and calibrate the naval ships fixed and portable electromagnetic Rontogen X-radiation meters. Nuclear bomb effects and methods of delivery is bread and butter to the youngest of Indian naval officer at sea, as it forms a part of the inspection routine by the Fleet Commander. It is a legacy of the British ships Indian Navy acquired after partition.

It is to Dr Sethna's credit that he as AEC Chairman he opened the secret portals of India's nuclear establishment BARC in 1976 which was under Dr Raja Ramanna then and accepted a team of four naval officers led by then Capts PN Agarwala and Bharat Bhusan both very bright engineer officers trained at the Royal Naval Engineering College at Manaden Plymouth, to form a Diesel Propulsion Research Team(DPRT) at BARC. DPRT was a subterfuge for designing a nuclear propulsion plant. Cdrs Gurmit Singh and Cdr BK Subbarao were also in the team, and in later years Subbarao designed a submarine nuclear power plant but crossed swords with Dr Raja Ramanna. Bhusan later headed the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) nuclear project and subsequently many naval officers were trained in nuclear engineering at BARC and transferred to the the DRDO-Navy classified ATV project, which fructified in the launching of INS Arihant by PM's wife Mrs Gursharan Kaur on 22nd August,2009 at Vishakapatnam.

INS Arihant a 7,000 ton medium sized nuclear propulsion technology demonstrator submarine and is being readied to go to sea and will be fitted with the 700km Sagarika K-15 solid fuel nuclear tipped missile, and it will possess India's first underwater launched deterrent, if all is equal. India already has air and land launched nuclear arsenals, and two of Navy's four off shore patrol vessels (OPVs) INS Subhadra and Suvarna can launch one 350km liquid fuelled nuclear tipped Dhanush missile each. These launch platforms operate on surface and can be located from visual and radar observations and from satellites and are vulnerable.

ADMIRAL SERGIE GORSHKOV SUPPORTED LEASE OF INS CHAKRA

It needs recall that at a nuclear session at India International Center three years ago, when India's nuclear deal was being pursued with USA, the speakers included India's doyen nuclear analyst K Subrahmanyam, Raja Mohan of the Indian Express and others. Former PM I K Gujral shared an anecdote which holds relevance for the Indian Navy's plans and ambitions to possess nuclear submarines with under water launched long range missiles. IK Gujral unveiled how in 1979 when he was Ambassador in Russia and C Subramaniam and K Subrahmanyam were the Defence Minister and Defence Secretary (Production) respectively in MOD, he was tasked to meet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov and seek help and guidance on India's quest for nuclear submarines, which were prompted by the Indian Navy, and supported by Dr Raja Ramanna. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov known to be a supporter of the Indian Navy and officially acknowledged as the 'Benefactor of the modern Indian Navy' was one of the finest naval minds of the last century. When Shri Gujral met him he made him look at the chart/map of the Indian Ocean and went on to explain to Gujral how India was hemmed in by the Straits on both sides and said China has nuclear submarines and so India must also have nuclear submarines. That was the time when relations between Russia and China had soured. That led to the birth of the ATV and later the lease of INS Chakra.

From 1983 under the guidance of late Dr Raja Ramanna who worked under Dr HN Sethna , the ATV project took off and a former roommate of Dr Raja Rammana, Vice Admiral M K Roy, when they were living together in digs in London was made the first DG. The rest is history, and INS Chakra was given by Russia on lease to the Indian Navy from 1987 to 1991 despite rumblings in the West, and the IN cut its teeth in nuclear submarine operations and handling with the full support of BARC which opened its portals and a large number of naval officers hold M(Tech) degrees in nuclear engineering from BARC. The nuclear reactor in INS Chakra was maintained by Russians on board and all activities kept secret, including those of the ATV even from other service chiefs, and senior officers of the Indian Navy.

It was only six years ago that then Defence Ministers of India Pranab Mukherjee and Sergei Ivanov of Russia, jointly acknowledged the ATV project in pubic in Moscow for the first time and wowed to complete it. India also secretly clinched the deal to take Akula nulcear submarines on lease on the lines of the INS Chakra, but with full control. Many feel Russia readily agreed, as the funding for rejuvenating the Akulas, Nerpa and Jaguar came through the advances for the 1000X 2 Kundankulam nuclear power projects, and they needed the business. A few thousand of crores has also been spent on INS Arihant which has Russian assistance and equipment makes it the next most expensive DRDO project along with the LCA. Possibly the most expensive.

NUCLEAR SUBMARINES AND DIESEL SUBMARINES A COMPARISION

A nuclear Submarine force is the right option for countries with large oceans to patrol and though this issue has never been debated in India, it must be stated that nuclear submarines are very expensive technological toys. The cost of buying or building nuclear submarines is approximately 50 % to 75% higher per unit than diesel- electric powered boats but has greater capabilities. Nuke boats cruise three times faster , have a greater sustained speed underwater, and an unlimited range. For this reason larger number of diesel units are required for the same duty. Higher speeds by diesel propelled boats for very short period deplete their underwater batteries in few hours, and without resorting to recharge they then become incapable and vulnerable to the point of helplessness. PNS Hangor under then Cdr Tasneem of Pakistan almost suffered this fate in 1971, after attacking INS Kuthar which Hangor's torpedoes missed, but sunk INS Khukri with the loss of 168 souls. However the Captain of Hangor made an ingenious get away by daring to navigate in shallow waters, to escape the Indian Navy ships and submarines that were deployed off Diu. Nuclear submarines cannot do that in shallow waters.

Diesel submarines are warships of position, whereas nuclear submarines are vehicles of maneuver. Diesel subs are suited for small shallow seas with straits to block like the Malacca Straits and the Baltic hence Singapore has opted for small submarines, but when rapid movements over long ocean distances are required, nuclear propulsion is the desired choice and India must afford it. A conventional boat needs to be in the vicinity of its target . A nuclear boat can be dispatched to intercept or can track and attack when ordered. The sinking of the Argentinean's cruiser General Belgrano in the Falklands war is the most recent demonstration of the capability when HMS Conqueror which was dispatched at full speed for 8000miles submerged all the way. Went and intercepted the Argentinean Navy's cruiser. No conventional submarines could have achieved this feat and bottled up the whole Argentinean fleet. Unlike the diesel electric boats, which have to surface to recharge batteries about 20 percent of their time at sea, the nuclear submarine does not have to come up and surface and then effectively broadcast its position with noisy engines for sonars to detect it. The motto of nuclear submarines is 'Run Deep, Run Silent, Run Long'.

The diesel–electric submarine can be a useful weapon provided it can get to the right place at the right time. Conversely a nuclear powered boat, which can stay submerged indefinitely run at high speeds indefinitely, has enormous flexibility. A nuclear powered boat running silent , fast and deep can be switched very quickly from, for example , a wartime role of barrier patrol against hostile submarine in a specific area to convoy escort ships across an ocean, or land saboteurs secretly.

In its frequent surfacing, the diesel- electric submarine is highly vulnerable to visual, acoustic and radar detection and thus open to attack by other submarines, aircraft and surface ships. The nuclear boat's reactor also produces much more electrical power than diesel electric submarines and makes its 'pear shaped hull' possible to operate at much higher speeds for its highly powered sonar detection systems , provide more oxygen re-generation and unlimited water supply. The mere threat of a nuclear powered submarine in an area inhibits an opponent and acts as a powerful deterrent. Very rigorous safety standards have to be followed by navies building and operating nuclear submarines and most have ensured nuclear accident free operations. The US Navy for example has used nuclear propulsion for more than 40 years and accumulated more than 3600 reactor years of operation.

CONCLUSION

The importance of nuclear propulsion and nuclear submarines needs publicity. Once the importance and inescapable need for nuclear submarines is accepted by India and the Indian Navy becomes confident and masters nuclear propulsion along the way, the nation's Navy should be encouraged to think of nuclear propulsion for all its major naval warships of the future especially aircraft carriers that the Indian Navy is planning for the second decade of the 21st century. This will be a tribute to Drs Homi Bhabha, Homi Sethna and Raja Ramanna who showed the way. The cost of fossil fuel is set to rise exponentially and India which is a net importer of hydro carbons has to plan for alternate fuels and savings. Navies are large consumers of oil. The Government has maintained overt secrecy over all the equipment fitted in INS Arihant and kept a veil over the Indian designed and Indian built small nuclear reactor in the boat, which was a joint effort by BARC and Indian industry. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh admitted that Indian industry has largely contributed to the building of INS Arihant and names of companies like Larsen& Toubro Ltd, Walchandnagar Industries Ltd, Bharat Heavy Elecriclas Ltd, Bharat Electronics Ltd, Tata Group and pump makers like Khosla and Kirloskar Pumps Ltd and some small suppliers and fabricators are known, but not their deeds. These need to be made public as it is reported two more larger Arihant class with modifications to take additional missiles is on the cards.

Note by Author: The writer Cmde (Retd) Ranjit B Rai had opportunity whilst at RN Staff College Greenwich London in 1974 to witness the operation and the fuel change procedure of Royal Navy's mini training reactor called "Jason", while undertaking a thesis on nuclear weapons. Such access needs to be provided to service officers at Kalpakam where AEC has set up a 40MW training reactor for the Indian Navy.

 

[Patriot]

Super-Silent Jimmy Carter Ready to Spy on North Korea

It's not the diplomacy-minded former president who is ready to spy, it's the secretive nuclear submarine named for him. The surveillance and attack capabilities it's supposed to have could keep the tense situation on the Korean peninsula from spiraling out of control.

In the wake of yesterday's North Korean artillery barrage against a South Korean island, the U.S.S. George Washington is sailing to South Korea to participate in joint exercises.

A statement from the Navy's Seventh Fleet, which patrols the western Pacific, says the drill was planned before the "unprovoked" North Korean attack, but will demonstrate "the strength of the [South Korea]-U.S. Alliance and our commitment to regional stability through deterrence." In other words: to stave off another attack, not to initiate a retaliation.

The George Washington aircraft carrier is equipped with 75 planes and around 6,000 sailors. But it's not coming alone. It's got the destroyers Lassen, Stethem and Fitzgerald with it, and the missile cruiser Cowpens in tow. Rumor also has it that the carrier strike group will link up with another asset in area: The undersea spy known as the Jimmy Carter, which can monitor and potentially thwart North Korean subs that might shadow the American-South Korea exercises.

According to plugged-in naval blogger Raymond Pritchett, word's going around Navy circles that the first surveillance assets that the United States had in the air over yesterday's Korean island battle were drones launched from the Jimmy Carter.

"North Korea couldn't detect the USS Jimmy Carter short of using a minefield, even if they used every sonar in their entire inventory," Galrahn writes. That'll matter in case North Korea decides to launch another torpedo attack from a submarine, as it did in March to sink the South Korean corvette Cheonan.

The Navy doesn't say much about what the Jimmy Carter can do, but the consensus is that it's used for "highly classified missions." Reportedly, it can tap undersea fiber-optic cables, potentially intercepting North Korean commands.

It carries Navy SEALs to slip into enemy ports undetected. And its class of subs have 26-and-a-half-inch-diameter torpedo tubes, wider than the rest of the submarine fleet, in case the Carter has to take out rival ships. "That's a Seawolf, the most powerful attack sub in the world," says Robert Farley, a maritime and international-relations scholar at the University of Kentucky.

All that might be intended to keep the North Koreans from trying something during the exercises, scheduled to run from December 3 through 10. As bellicose as they've been this year, they'd be up against a carrier strike group on the lookout for North Korean aggression.

The North's 10 Yeono-class midget submarines — tiny subs with a crew of only a few sailors designed mostly for firing torpedoes — is "only mildly more capable than the submarines the Nazis were using in 1945," Farley says, but "if there's a nervous or adventurous North Korean sub skipper out there, we could have a real problem."

The real role of the George Washington's carrier strike group is floating diplomacy and deterrence, signaling "the close security cooperation between our two countries, and to underscore the strength of our Alliance and commitment to peace and security in the region," as the White House's account of a phone call between the U.S. and South Korean presidents last night put it.

And the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association's influential NightWatch newsletter doubts that North Korea is really preparing for war: It doesn't appear to have issued new military alerts, and it's competing in the Chinese-sponsored Asian Games.

But should its submarines get ready to harass the United States during next month's exercises, chances are the Jimmy Carter will see it first.






http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/jimmy-carter-is-nearly-invisible-and-ready-to-spy-on-north-korea/

 

[Patriot]

Now a submarine that will delve deep into world's oceans

NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA (AP): Billionaire adventurer Richard Branson has announced that he plans to travel to the deepest parts of the world's oceans in a single-person submarine.

Branson and fellow explorer Chris Welsh will take turns over the next two years piloting the solo craft to the bottom of the Mariana Trench in the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic's Puerto Rico Trench and South Sandwich Trench, the Diamantina Trench in the Indian Ocean and the Molloy Deep in the Arctic Ocean.

Welsh plans to make the first descent later this year to the Mariana Trench, which at 36,000 feet is deeper than Mount Everest is high. Branson then plans to explore the Puerto Rico Trench.

"Man has not explored our ocean," the Virgin Atlantic founder said in an interview at the Newport Harbor Yacht Club.

A news release said there was only one frontier left for Branson's Virgin brand, which has reached "the seven continents of the earth, up into the jet stream and soon, even into space."

"If someone says something is impossible we like to prove it's possible," Branson said. "I love learning and I'm just very fortunate to participate in these kinds of adventures."

Branson unveiled the submarine, a nearly 18-foot long, white-and-blue airplane-like craft with stubby wings and a cockpit.

The carbon fibre and titanium craft will be capable of cruising for about 6.2 miles and can stay down unaided for 24 hours.

Branson said his so-called Virgin Oceanic adventure will have a scientific purpose as well and he is working with various ocean research groups.

The submarine originally was commissioned by Branson's close friend and fellow adventurer Steve Fossett, who died in 2007 while flying a plane over the Sierra Nevada.

Fossett had intended to complete the first solo dive to the Mariana Trench, Branson said.