The Modi government realises that ignoring Pakistan and hoping for it to sue for peace has not worked. The joint statement is more a face-saver to allow course correction of Mr Modi’s Pakistan policy than any major climbdown by Pakistan.
The India-Pakistan Prime Minister-level meeting on July 10, 2015, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Ufa, Russia, produced an interesting joint statement. The two foreign secretaries read it out half-and-half. The Bharatiya Janata Party spokesmen immediately pronounced it as path breaking. However, by evening, they were on backfoot as closer analysis of the text and government’s defence left many issues unanswered.
The perennial difficulty in sustaining India-Pakistan dialogue, since the 1997 conception of “composite dialogue”, has been periodic terrorist attacks of mounting severity and boldness in India. This cycle of dialogue-terror has troubled the governments, both of the BJP and the Congress, over the last decade and a half. The reaction of India has varied from military deployment after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 to mounting an international anti-Pakistan campaign to force Pakistan to bring perpetrators to justice, as after 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. But mostly, India just walked away from the table in disgust and frustration.
Both major political parties preached and practised differently when in Opposition and in power. The Congress ridiculed BJP’s military deployment in 2002 arguing dialogue was unavoidable. Congress leader and former diplomat, Mani Shankar Aiyar, sought it to be “uninterruptable”. When in power, Congress discovered i.e. post-2006 Mumbai train bombings, that when the monstrosity saturates television screens with blood and gore, the Aiyar principle collapses.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power with an unprecedented mandate and tough talk on terror. His invite to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) leaders for his swearing-in, including to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in May 2014, raised hope that despite his election rhetoric he was a statesman at heart. The announcement of foreign secretary-level talks hinted at possible kickstarting of a stalled relationship. However in summer, not only the Nawaz government was besieged by combined followers of Messrs Imran Khan and Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri but Pakistani military began unravelling the ceasefire agreement of November 26, 2003, that had largely held. While either event could have been used to postpone Indian foreign secretary’s visit, the Modi government chose a third and more intractable issue i.e. meeting of Hurriyat leaders with Pakistan’s high commissioner.
Though popular, it drew a new public red line that Pakistan would find difficult to openly accept. The ensuing stalemate cast a shadow over India-Pakistan summitry. Mr Modi avoided his Pakistani counterpart at the UN General Assembly in September 2014, dodged him on the first day of Kathmandu Saarc Summit, only exchanging words out of sight at the retreat. Pakistan ratcheted up its rhetoric at the UN. The explanation perhaps lay in domestic politics as two important elections in Maharashtra and Jammu and Kashmir were approaching. Pakistan-bashing played well with the electorate.
However, since then the geopolitics of the region has altered to Pakistan’s advantage. President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, with US and Chinese blessings, has accepted Pakistani primacy, amongst regional players, for brokering talks with Taliban, which his predecessor had resisted. The meeting in Muree on July 7 — with US and Chinese officials as observers — seems to modify the old Taliban refrain that all discussions will be through their representatives in Qatar. There has, however, been speculation whether the Taliban delegates had Quetta Shura’s blessing.
Secondly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan has unfurled a $46 billion infrastructure initiative to link the Gwadar Port and Xinjiang. This would give fillip to a recovering Pakistani economy. Thirdly, Pakistan by refusing to send troops sought by Saudi Arabia for their Yemen operation has moved into the China-Iran corner. Fourthly, the US has diminishing stake and leverage in Pakistan, which India has employed since 2001 to contain Pakistan-sponsored terror, not necessarily successfully. Fifthly, China has moved from indirect propping of Pakistan as counter to India in South Asia to directly stabilising its economy, boosting its military machine and locating it in its “one road one belt” connectivity vision.
Perhaps, the Modi government realises that ignoring Pakistan and hoping for it to sue for peace has not worked. The Ufa joint statement, thus, is more a face-saver to allow course correction of Mr Modi’s Pakistan policy than major climbdown by Pakistan. The anti-terror mechanism, set-up in 2006 for overcoming public ire over 2006 Mumbai train bombings, has been ramped up to the level of national security advisers. However, Pakistan’s NSA has little influence over the ISI, which godfathers the India specific jihadis. Restoring ceasefire is also via existing mechanisms i.e. DGMOs. The most curious formulation is about 26/11 perpetrators, of whom the most notorious, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, is now out on bail. Pakistani plea has been that their law does not permit obtaining voice samples of accused for corroboration. The joint statement suggests discussing “ways and means” to expedite the trial, including through voice samples. This hardly sounds like a concrete commitment.
The joint statement’s loose wording appears deliberate as it allows each side to convince their domestic audiences that their core concerns have been addressed. Pakistan agreeing to drop the “K” word is cosmetic as reference to “all outstanding issues”, a phrase embedded in the Simla Agreement, includes Kashmir.
The re-engagement, however, is welcome as both nations need to delink confidence-building measures (CBMs) like people-to-people contacts and commerce and connectivity from dispute resolution as it needs patience and time. Historically, increasing the CBMs creates the environment for easier dispute resolution. Pakistan has, in the past, insisted on dispute resolution first or simultaneously, thereby standing logic on its head. The new thaw can dissipate quickly were there to be another major terror attack or Pakistani adventurism at or across the LoC/border. Past, unfortunately, does not augur well for the future.
