A.V.
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http://www.heritage.org/Research/Rep...y-on-East-Asia
What Should the U.S. Do?
The U.S. should continue to look out for its interests and those of its allies in East Asia independent of its involvement with ASEAN.
Protect freedom of the seas. America's principal interest in the South China Sea is freedom of navigation, and its most effective instrument in this regard is the U.S. Navy. Under its Freedom of Navigation Program, the United States regularly asserts its rights in international waters. It also carries out necessary exercises, military survey activities, and intelligence gathering in waters seaward of China's 12-mile territorial limit. It should continue to do so, undeterred by complaints and threats from the Chinese. It should also bear in mind that several members of ASEAN and India are officially sympathetic to China's legal position on military activities in nearby waters.
Protect allies. The U.S. has one treaty ally involved in this dispute: The Republic of the Philippines. The U.S. may very well find itself in a position where it cares more about the security of the Philippines than ASEAN. As chair of ASEAN in 2010, Vietnam stiffened ASEAN's spine. The discomfort some members exhibited over its assertiveness, however, does not bode well for the organization's staying power with regard to the Philippines, especially as the ASEAN chair is due to rotate through a number of cautious and/or China-deferential countries, such as Cambodia, Brunei, Burma, and Laos.
Strengthen and create partnerships. America should keep its alliance network front and center, help provide the Philippines the military wherewithal to withstand PRC pressure, and continue to look for ways to expand bilateral strategic partnerships, with Vietnam and India in particular. Recent events obscure the fact that ASEAN is deeply ambivalent about China's rise. Its consensus-based diplomatic culture means that the members most averse to offending China discourage bold initiative. Any time real action is required, the U.S. must rely, as it has for decades, directly on its hub-and-spokes system of allies and partnerships.
What Should the U.S. Do?
The U.S. should continue to look out for its interests and those of its allies in East Asia independent of its involvement with ASEAN.
Protect freedom of the seas. America's principal interest in the South China Sea is freedom of navigation, and its most effective instrument in this regard is the U.S. Navy. Under its Freedom of Navigation Program, the United States regularly asserts its rights in international waters. It also carries out necessary exercises, military survey activities, and intelligence gathering in waters seaward of China's 12-mile territorial limit. It should continue to do so, undeterred by complaints and threats from the Chinese. It should also bear in mind that several members of ASEAN and India are officially sympathetic to China's legal position on military activities in nearby waters.
Protect allies. The U.S. has one treaty ally involved in this dispute: The Republic of the Philippines. The U.S. may very well find itself in a position where it cares more about the security of the Philippines than ASEAN. As chair of ASEAN in 2010, Vietnam stiffened ASEAN's spine. The discomfort some members exhibited over its assertiveness, however, does not bode well for the organization's staying power with regard to the Philippines, especially as the ASEAN chair is due to rotate through a number of cautious and/or China-deferential countries, such as Cambodia, Brunei, Burma, and Laos.
Strengthen and create partnerships. America should keep its alliance network front and center, help provide the Philippines the military wherewithal to withstand PRC pressure, and continue to look for ways to expand bilateral strategic partnerships, with Vietnam and India in particular. Recent events obscure the fact that ASEAN is deeply ambivalent about China's rise. Its consensus-based diplomatic culture means that the members most averse to offending China discourage bold initiative. Any time real action is required, the U.S. must rely, as it has for decades, directly on its hub-and-spokes system of allies and partnerships.
What makes you think we ordered billions worth of weapons both indigenous and foreign to arm our Navy for? Why do they fancy we conducted 60 wargames (60% of them Naval related) with US, ASEAN, Japan, Australia, Singapore etc? Why do you think that India has been increasing its military infrastructure in Andaman and Nicobar Island union territories as well as ramping up military road and railway projects in northeast India? Did the author clearly miss the last year's diplomatic pants-down that CCP did by threatening Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and India at the same time over South China Sea? Did he clearly miss the recent indications that how Vietnamese Navy has almost instantly requested Russians for attack submarines and cruise missiles? How it has purchased the lethal Su-30MKV series of fighters or helicopters or for that matter how it invited Russia and India to have regular military port visits and avail Vietnamese military facilities at Nha Thang? 
