The Taliban

[1.44]

Hakimullah Mehsud: Ruthless New Pakistan Taliban Leader Named

Hakimullah Mehsud: Ruthless New Pakistan Taliban Leader Named
​

MAKEEN, Pakistan — Pakistani Taliban fighters are committed to helping the fight in Afghanistan and consider Barack Obama their "No 1 enemy," a top commander said amid uncertainty Sunday about whether a new leader has been appointed to head the movement.

Waliur Rehman made the remarks in an interview with the Associated Press at a time of intense speculation over the next leader of the al-Qaida-allied group. A CIA missile strike on Aug. 5 is believed to have killed former chief Baitullah Mehsud. Rehman, a cousin of Baitullah, is seen as a strong candidate for the post.

Speaking Saturday – before aides to another Taliban commander said a second contender, Hakimullah Mehsud, had been appointed the next chief – Rehman said Baitullah had given him full control over the network and that a new leader "would be chosen within five days."

He did not refer to the claim that Hakimullah had become the leader – an omission that will add to doubts about whether that appointment had been agreed by all the top Taliban members. It will also likely be taken as a further sign the movement and its up to 25,000 fighters remain split over the succession.

Rehman met the AP in a forest near Makeen village in the heart of the semiautonomous lands close to the Afghan border where al-Qaida and the Taliban hold sway. Looking healthy and dressed in clean, ironed clothes, he was accompanied by five armed guards.

American officials are watching closely to see who succeeds Baitullah, in particular whether the new leader will direct more fighters across the border where U.S. and NATO forces are facing soaring attacks by insurgents. Baitullah was believed to have mainly concentrated on attacking Pakistani targets.

"We are with Afghan Taliban. We will keep on helping them until America and its allies are expelled," he said, adding this did not mean an end to attacks in Pakistan. "American President Obama and his allies are our enemy No 1," he said. "We will sacrifices our bodies, hearts and money to fight them."

Like most other members of the Taliban network, he insisted Baitullah was alive but sick, hence the need for a new chief. U.S. and Pakistani officials are almost certain he is dead, especially since the Taliban have provided no proof he is alive.
Two close aides to another commander, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, told The Associated Press on Saturday a 42-member Taliban council, or shura, had appointed Hakimullah their new leader in an unanimous decision on Friday.

"Now all these talks of differences should end," said one of the aides, Bakht Zada. "There have not been any differences ever."

Mohammed Amir Rana, an expert on Pakistani militant groups, said he believed the Taliban had not agreed on a replacement.

"Maulvi Faqir Mohammad is trying to manipulate the race by announcing to the press that Hakimullah is the head," he said. "Until now there is no consensus," he said, adding that supporters of Waliur Rehman, did not accept him.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik said the government had received intelligence reports about Hakimullah's appointment "as the chief terrorist" but there was no official confirmation. The Dawn newspaper quoted one unidentified intelligence officer as saying the announcement "was a ruse" as part of the ongoing power struggle.

Earlier this month, Malik had claimed Rehman and Hakimullah had been killed in a shootout between rival factions over who should take over the Taliban and its arms and cash.

"There was no truth in those claims of mine or his death," Rehman said. "It is futile propaganda by enemies."

Since Aug. 5, Pakistani officials have been eager to portray the Taliban as in disarray, saying commanders and the rank-and-file were fighting among themselves. At one point, Mohammad – who comes from a different part of the tribal region – claimed to have taken over the leadership.

Hakimullah comes from the same tribe as Baitullah and had been seen as a likely replacement.

As military chief of Baitullah's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban Movement, Hakimullah commanded three tribal regions and had a reputation as Baitullah's most ruthless deputy. He first appeared in public to journalists in November 2008, when he offered to take reporters on a ride in a U.S. Humvee taken from a supply truck heading to Afghanistan.

Authorities say he was behind threats to foreign embassies in Islamabad, and there was a 10 million rupee ($120,000) bounty on his head. Hakimullah claimed responsibility for the June 9 bombing of the Pearl Continental hotel in the northwestern city of Peshawar, and the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore earlier this year.

Rehamn was among Baitullah's closest advisers and deputies. Mehsud reportedly said during a shura that Rehman should be his successor if something happened to him.
Hakimullah Mehsud: Ruthless New Pakistan Taliban Leader Named

 

[Pintu]

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/world/asia/28afghan.html

Afghan Taliban Commander Is Captured in Raid

By ABDUL WAHEED WAFA and SHARON OTTERMAN
Published: August 27, 2009

KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghan security forces raided a medical clinic in eastern Afghanistan late Wednesday, capturing a Taliban commander who had been wounded in attacks during last week’s presidential election, Afghan officials said.

During the operation, which took place in the Sar Hawza district of Paktika Province, Afghan forces came under fire and called for assistance from American air and ground forces, said Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker, a NATO spokeswoman. After clearing the building of civilians, an American Apache helicopter fired on the clinic, ending the battle, the spokeswoman said.

“Once the troops were fired on from the clinic, it loses its protected status” as a civilian location where international forces may not fire, she said. “In addition, we made sure the building was cleared of civilians, and there were no civilian deaths.”

The commander, Mullah Muslim, had been wounded in a firefight on election day.

One American soldier was killed in the operation, NATO said. A second American soldier was killed in a separate attack Thursday in southern Afghanistan, bringing the total number of Americans killed in Afghanistan in August to 44, pushing August into a tie with July as the deadliest months of the eight-year war, The Associated Press reported.

Afghan officials said that one civilian — the watchman for the building — was wounded. In addition to Mullah Muslim, 5 other insurgents were captured, and 12 were killed, the office of the governor of Paktika said in a statement.

NATO did not confirm the reports of insurgent deaths and said that seven suspected militants had been detained.

Last Thursday’s election was marred by rocket attacks, firefights, and other violence, along with reports of fraud. The campaign of intimidation appeared to have had a serious impact on voting — figures extrapolated from early results suggest 30-35 percent of registered voters turned out, news agencies reported.

With votes from 17 percent of polling stations counted, President Hamid Karzai leads with 44.8 percent of the vote, and the top challenger Abdullah Abdullah, a former foreign minister, has 33.1 percent. No additional results will be released until Saturday, elections officials said Thursday, and official results are not expected until mid-September.

 

[Pintu]

Aftermath of Afghanistan blast , a report by AlJazeera English:

YouTube - Aftermath of Kandahar blast - 26 Aug 09

Regards

 

[Pintu]

The Associated Press: August tied for deadliest month in Afghanistan

August tied for deadliest month in Afghanistan

By AMIR SHAH (AP) – 2 hours ago

KABUL — A U.S. service member died Thursday in a militant attack involving a roadside bomb and gunfire, a death that pushed August into a tie with July as the deadliest months of the eight-year war.

The death brings to 44 the number of U.S. troops who have died in Afghanistan this month. But with four days left in the month, August could set a new record.

More than 60,000 U.S. troops are now in the country — a record number — to combat rising insurgent violence. The number of roadside bombs deployed by militants across the country has skyrocketed, and U.S. forces have moved into new and deadlier areas of the country this summer, in part to help secure the country's Aug. 20 presidential election.

Violence is on the rise in Afghanistan even as it falls in Iraq, where nearly twice as many U.S. troops are still based. Five U.S. troops have died in Iraq this month, three fewer than in July.

A statement from the NATO-led force in Kabul said the U.S. service member died in southern Afghanistan when the troop's patrol responded to the bombing and gunfire attack. No other details were released. Thousands of new American troops are operating for the first time in Helmand and Kandahar, two of the country's most dangerous provinces, in part to secure the country's Aug. 20 presidential vote.

Afghan election officials have released two batches of vote tallies that show President Hamid Karzai with 44.8 percent of the vote and top challenger Abdullah Abdullah with 35.1 percent, based on returns from 17 percent of polling stations. The next partial results are expected Saturday.

Meanwhile, U.S. and Afghan forces battled Taliban militants at a medical center in eastern Afghanistan after a Taliban commander sought treatment there, and a U.S. helicopter gunship fired on the clinic after militants put up resistance.

Reports of the militant death toll from Wednesday's firefight varied widely. The spokesman of the governor of Paktika province said 12 militants died, while police said two were killed. The U.S. military did not report any deaths. It wasn't clear why the tolls differed.

The fighting began after a wounded Taliban commander sought treatment at a clinic in the Sar Hawza district of Paktika. Afghan forces went to the center and got in a firefight with militants. U.S. forces later provided backup.

Hamidullah Zhwak, the governor's spokesman, said the Taliban commander was wounded Aug. 20, election day. Militants brought him and three other wounded Taliban to the clinic at noon Wednesday. Afghan forces were tipped off to their presence and soon arrived at the scene, he said.

Insurgent snipers fired from a tower near the clinic, and troops called in an airstrike from U.S. forces, Zhwak said. Fighting between some 20 militants and Afghan and U.S. forces lasted about five hours, and 12 Taliban were killed in the clash, he said.

"After ensuring the clinic was cleared of civilians, an AH-64 Apache helicopter fired rounds at the building ending the direct threat and injuring the targeted insurgent in the building," a U.S. military statement said.

A U.S. military spokeswoman, Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker, said the clinic's doctor gave U.S. troops permission to fire on the clinic. After the battle, Afghan and U.S. forces met with villagers and discussed rebuilding the clinic, a U.S. summary of the meeting said.

Villagers expressed "disgust" that militants used the medical center to fire from and that they understood that the action by Afghan and coalition forces was necessary, the summary said.

"The local villagers thanked the Afghanistan National Security Forces for ensuring all civilians were out of harms way before they were forced to use Coalition helicopters to engage the enemy," the summary said.

Seven insurgents — including the wounded commander — had been detained, the U.S. statement said.

Gen. Dawlat Khan, the provincial police chief, said two militants died in the encounter.

The Taliban have gained control of large segments of Afghanistan's south and east over the past few years, prompting the U.S. to send an additional 21,000 troops to the country this year.

The latest clash comes as the war-torn country awaits results from last week's election. The lengthy vote count, coupled with ongoing accusations of fraud, threatens to undermine hopes that Afghans can put together a united front against the insurgency.

 

[Pintu]

AFP: Afghan forces kill 12 Taliban in clinic siege: NATO

Afghan forces kill 12 Taliban in clinic siege: NATO

By Sardar Ahmad (AFP) – 3 hours ago

KABUL — A fierce gunfight backed by US helicopter fire paralysed a district in eastern Afghanistan after Taliban forced their way into a clinic seeking treatment for their leader, officials and NATO said Thursday.

An American soldier was killed in the violence, which broke out Wednesday as Afghan forces were trying to capture a suspected Taliban commander, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO said.

Twelve Taliban were killed in the fighting that raged for about six hours, and six others were captured, said Hamidullah Zhwak, the provincial spokesman, adding a clinic guard was also wounded.

Acting on a tip-off, Afghan security forces surrounded the clinic at around midday in the small Sar Hawza district of Paktika province, which borders Pakistan and is a hotbed of Taliban violence.

The ISAF statement said the "suspected insurgent leader" was being treated for injuries suffered during fighting on election day, August 20.

The Afghan soldiers "were clearing the clinic when they received direct fire attack," the statement said.

More troops, international and Afghan, arrived to provide backup, it said, and once all civilians had been brought safely out of the clinic, an Apache helicopter was called in to fire on the building.

The helicopter strafing ended the "the direct threat," ISAF said, "injuring the targeted insurgent in the building."

No civilians were killed, ISAF said.

"This clearly shows the disparity between coalition forces and anti-Afghan forces when it comes to concerns for civilians caught in the crossfire," said Major Matthew Gregory, a spokesman for ISAF.

In the neighbouring province of Khost, a roadside bomb killed four border police and wounded three others on Thursday in Gurbuz district, said police official Sher Ahmad Kochai, blaming the Taliban for the attack.

The Taliban have widening influence in eastern and southern Afghanistan and have been particularly active around the election, only the second in Afghanistan's history to choose a president.

In early counting, President Hamid Karzai is leading his main rival, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah 42.3 percent to 33.1 percent.

The campaign to instill enough fear in people to deter them from voting appears to have had a serious impact, as figures extrapolated from early results suggest 30-35 percent of registered voters turned out.

Violence peaked on election day, with reports from a variety of sources of rocket, grenade and suicide attacks, gunfights and afterwards beatings and even finger amputations of people who voted.

The Taliban have also stepped up their attacks on foreign soldiers -- who under NATO and US command number more than 100,000 -- in Afghanistan to wipe out the insurgency.

The Taliban's weapon of choice is the improvised explosive device, or IED, usually a concealed roadside bomb detonated remotely and, increasingly, linked to others to cause maximum damage, often killing civilians.

ISAF said Thursday an American soldier was killed in southern Afghanistan when his patrol was struck by an IED and then ambushed by insurgents.

"The patrol responded to the attack but a service member was killed in the engagement," an ISAF statement said.

After only nine months, 2009 has become the deadliest year for foreign troops in Afghanistan since the 2001 US-led invasion.

 

[RPK]

Suicide bomber, US drone attack kill 28 in Pakistan

Suicide bomber, US drone attack kill 28 in Pakistan


Islamabad: At least 28 people were killed on Thursday in a suicide bombing and a missile attack carried out by a US pilotless aircraft in Pakistan's troubled northwest region, government officials said.

A suicide bomber struck at a Pakistani security post on the border with Afghanistan when members of tribal police, known locally as the Khasadar force, gathered at the Torkham border checkpoint in the north-western tribal district of Khyber for an iftar, a meal to break the daily fast during the Muslim month of Ramadan.


'The initial reports show that a suicide bomber, apparently a young man, who was carrying bottles of mineral water, approached on foot and blew himself up,' said Tariq Hayat Khan, the top government official in the district

At least 22 people were killed. Security officials recovered the charred body of the suspected suicide attacker. The Torkham border crossing is on the main land route used to ferry almost 75 percent of the fuel, food and military supplies to NATO forces from Pakistan's port of Karachi to Afghanistan.



Taliban militants have attacked NATO supply convoys, disrupting supplies several times this year. Separately, a suspected US missile strike killed at least six Al Qaeda-linked militants in another tribal district.


The attack took place in the South Waziristan district, a stronghold of slain Pakistani Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud and a safe haven of militants conducting cross-border raids into Afghanistan on US-led international forces.



A US drone fired missiles on the house of Taliban-loyal tribesman Azam Mehmood in the Kani Guram area, killing six militants and wounding at least eight more, an intelligence official. Most of those killed were Uzbek fighters with close links to Al Qaeda.



The Taliban leadership this week confirmed the death of Mehsud, who was hit Aug 5 in a similar aerial assault on the house of his father-in-law in the district's Makeen area. Hakimullah Mehsud, the new Taliban chief and no relation to his predecessor, said the warlord was seriously wounded in the attack and died last weekend.

 

[Vinod2070]

Taliban flee as mysterious executions continue in Swat

Omer Farooq Khan | TNN



Mingora: Amid reports that Taliban are on the run and operation against them is wrapping up in the Swat valley, the mysterious executions of militants continue in the region even as Swat Taliban chief ordered his fighters to vacate the region.

According to residents of Swat, these executions are carried out by the security forces and lashkars (local militias formed to counter militants), respectively.

Taliban have asked its fighters to vacate Swat, the one-time tourist retreat they controlled till April in Pakistan’s troubled northwest, amid fears of continued reprisal from the Pakistan military. To avoid further damage to the movement, Swat Taliban chief, Fazlullah, reportedly, asked his fighters to vacate Swat. TV stations reported on Wednesday that Fazlullah’s close aide, Abu Turab ordered militants to leave the Swat region, immediately.

Local residents in Swat are saying that security forces may have been carrying out these extra-judicial killings of militants. A top civilian official in Swat said that soon after the return of people, security officials killed one militant in Barikot while dragging him with a jeep. During the ongoing military offensive in Swat, the military claims to have killed hundreds of militants and apprehended scores of others. Corpses of some Taliban militants which were found recently in different parts of Swat reveal that they were killed ruthlessly.

Welcome - Times Of India ePaper

 

[Vinod2070]

Taliban flee as mysterious executions continue in Swat

Omer Farooq Khan | TNN



Mingora: Amid reports that Taliban are on the run and operation against them is wrapping up in the Swat valley, the mysterious executions of militants continue in the region even as Swat Taliban chief ordered his fighters to vacate the region.

According to residents of Swat, these executions are carried out by the security forces and lashkars (local militias formed to counter militants), respectively.

Taliban have asked its fighters to vacate Swat, the one-time tourist retreat they controlled till April in Pakistan’s troubled northwest, amid fears of continued reprisal from the Pakistan military. To avoid further damage to the movement, Swat Taliban chief, Fazlullah, reportedly, asked his fighters to vacate Swat. TV stations reported on Wednesday that Fazlullah’s close aide, Abu Turab ordered militants to leave the Swat region, immediately.

Local residents in Swat are saying that security forces may have been carrying out these extra-judicial killings of militants. A top civilian official in Swat said that soon after the return of people, security officials killed one militant in Barikot while dragging him with a jeep. During the ongoing military offensive in Swat, the military claims to have killed hundreds of militants and apprehended scores of others. Corpses of some Taliban militants which were found recently in different parts of Swat reveal that they were killed ruthlessly.

Welcome - Times Of India ePaper

 

[1.44]

Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban
​

KARACHI, Pakistan — Taliban fighters have long used this city of 17 million as a place to regroup, smuggle weapons and even work seasonal jobs. But recently they have discovered another way to make fast money: organized crime.


Notes from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and other areas of conflict in the post-9/11 era. Go to the Blog »
Enlarge This Image

Michael Kamber for The New York Times
Pashtuns fleeing violence have flocked to Karachi areas like Sorabgoth, where poverty may bolster crime and militancy.

The police here say the Taliban, working with criminal groups, are using Mafia-style networks to kidnap, rob banks and extort, generating millions of dollars for the militant insurgency in northwestern Pakistan.

“There is overwhelming evidence that it’s an organized policy,” said Dost Ali Baloch, assistant inspector general of the Karachi police.

Jihadi-linked crime has surfaced in other Pakistani cities, like Lahore. But Karachi, the central nervous system of Pakistan’s economy, and home to its richest businessmen, is the hub. It has been free of the bombings that have tormented Pakistan’s other major cities this year, and some officials believe that is the result of a calculated strategy.

“This is where they come to hide, where they raise their finances,” said a counterterrorism official in Karachi. “They don’t want to disturb that.”

The danger is not of a Taliban takeover — Karachi is run by a powerful secular party that despises the Taliban — but of an urban sanctuary for financing and equipping the insurgency from this southern port.

These criminal syndicates helped drive kidnappings in Pakistan last year to their highest numbers in a decade, according to the police, and they have also generated a spike in bank robberies. Eighty percent of bank heists are now believed to be related to the insurgency and other militant groups, authorities say.

“The Taliban are a group of thieves,” said a currency exchange owner here who was robbed of nearly $2 million last year and who did not want to be identified for fear of further trouble. “If it was God, they’d steal from him, too.”

Pakistani counterterrorism officials say they believe that kidnapping for ransom may have been the single largest revenue source for the Taliban’s top commander in the country, Baitullah Mehsud, before he was killed this month in an American drone strike.

Last year, Mr. Mehsud’s network may have held as many as 70 hostages, said a Pakistani counterterrorism official who did not speak for attribution for reasons of protocol. Control over these criminal networks and the money they generate may have been at the center of what seemed to be the struggle over who would succeed Mr. Mehsud.

“The world thinks this is about religion, but that’s a mistake,” said Sharfuddin Memon, director in Karachi of the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, a crime watch group run by members of the business community. “It’s about money and power. Faith has nothing to do with it.”

The kidnappers who took Shawkat Afridi, a prominent businessman, last year, did not make a single mistake, the family said. A caller breathed his demands into the phone in a bewildering array of accents. First he sounded like an Afghan. Then like a Mehsud tribesman. After more than 50 phone calls over five months, Mr. Afridi’s family finally agreed to pay $2.5 million for his release.

“We understood he was not an ordinary kidnapper,” said Gul Afridi, the victim’s brother. “There was no way out.”

Typical of such cases, the group, which the police said was Taliban-related, had chosen its target carefully: the Afridis are rich businessmen who supply fuel to NATO forces in Afghanistan. Other recent cases include a prominent film distributor, the owner of a textile mill and a personnel manager at a pipe manufacturer.

Though just 10 percent of kidnappings are connected to the Taliban, according to the police, the ransoms they generate — generally $60,000 to $250,000 each — collect more money than all the other cases combined.

“They’re real professionals,” said Ahmed Chinoy, a textile manufacturer who is the deputy head of the citizens committee, which was established in 1989 by the business community to protect against encroaching crime. “They know for sure that whoever they take can afford to pay.”

The same goes for bank robberies. Raja Umer Khattab, a senior police officer in Karachi’s Special Investigations Unit, noticed something strange early last year. The robbers had beards and bigger than usual guns, and, unlike ordinary thieves, they tended to kill the security guards. They were taking the banks’ surveillance systems, along with the cash.

“We started seeing a different kind of crime — more professional, more aggressive,” he said in an interview. “We realized these criminals were linked to jihadis.”
Mr. Khattab dug further. These criminals switched cellphone SIM cards like bus tickets, and had a code word for every neighborhood. Last August he made a series of arrests and a bomb exploded under his car. Shrapnel scars still mark his neck.

is neck.

Enlarge This Image

Michael Kamber for The New York Times
A laborer built a wall to protect a textile factory in Karachi, Pakistan, a southern port city where kidnappings and robberies are used to finance the insurgency.

Notes from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and other areas of conflict in the post-9/11 era. Go to the Blog »

A recent influx of people in Karachi displaced by the military’s offensive in the northwest has expanded opportunities for the Taliban. Many are Pashtuns, the ethnic group most closely associated with the Taliban. Fanned by local politicians, ethnic tensions erupted in clashes that killed dozens this spring in Karachi. The authorities say Taliban-related crime has dropped greatly since then, with the arrests of the crime leaders breaking networks, among them, the gang that kidnapped Mr. Afridi.

But many of the networks are still in place, crisscrossing the city like a web, with strong links to Taliban sanctuaries in the northwest.

In the case of the heist at the money exchange last year, two security guards, who were from the Mehsud tribe, carried out the robbery. The exchange’s owners believed the men were working directly for Mr. Mehsud. They were uneducated and had been told that the exchange was taking money from the C.I.A. and that its dollars were the proof.

“They were brainwashed,” said one of the owners, who asked not to be identified for fear of retribution. “They were told, if you do this, it’s good for Islam.”

In many ways, it is the Pashtuns who suffer most. Militants extort money from the biggest oil traders to the smallest house servants, and Pashtuns can do little to resist, because their families remain in areas that the militants control.

Shahid, 22, a shy servant in Karachi, squirms when he describes how half of his $100 monthly salary goes to the local militant commander in his village, near the Afghan border. He did not want his full name used for fear of Taliban retribution. The commander was once a bus conductor, but has grown rich in his position, hoarding more than 200 sport utility vehicles, Shahid said.

Refusing has consequences: Four who recently fought the extortion turned up dead, Shahid said. Their bodies were not allowed a burial in the village, a sign of shame.

“If we give, we’re in trouble, and if we don’t give, we’re in trouble,” said Abzal Khan Mehsud, a member of the Oil Tanker Owners Association, who said he had not been able to go to his village for years out of fear of the militants who control it. “We’re being ground down in between.”

In a gritty industrial area of north Karachi, businessmen have taken matters into their own hands. Idrees Gigi, a textile manufacturer, is building a tall cement wall along the edge of his property. On the other side is Sorabgoth, a bone-poor Pashtun neighborhood.

The hope is that the wall will help shield his factory from crime, but security precautions do nothing to address the real problem, which Mr. Gigi believes is poverty. Parts of Sorabgoth lack roads and running water.

On a recent Saturday, young men scrambled past the wall over a river of red wastewater across a footbridge made of drainage chutes. Mr. Gigi employs thousands of residents, and has built four schools, but it is not enough.

“The worse the economy is, the more jihadis it will create,” he said. “This is a money war.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/world/asia/29karachi.html?pagewanted=1&ref=world

 

[Pintu]

AFP: Europe 'big three' call for Afghanistan conference

Europe 'big three' call for Afghanistan conference

By Simon Sturdee (AFP) – 12 hours ago

BERLIN — Britain, France and Germany have unveiled proposals for an international conference on Afghanistan later this year in order to press Afghans to take more responsibility for their own country.

"What is important, and this is our joint view, is to apply pressure in order to find a way to get the Afghans to appreciate that they have to take responsibility step by step," Chancellor Angela Merkel told a joint press briefing with Prime Minister Gordon Brown on Sunday.

The conference, the location of which is yet to be decided, "is to create some momentum and to say that we are now coming to a transitional phase following the second presidential election" in Afghanistan, she said.

With the help of an upcoming review by the new US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, it will make clear to countries involved in Afghanistan "what job they have to do and what our common aim is", Merkel said.

"The Afghan government will then know what growing responsibilities are going to be coming their way," she said, "and of course so that the international engagement ... can be reduced."

"We believe that with the presidential election, the time has come."

"It is right in my view," Brown said, "that eight years since September 11, and after many achievements in Afghanistan ... that we look at how we can get the Afghans themselves more involved in taking responsibililty for their own affairs."

The conference, which Merkel said had been "informally agreed upon" with the United States and which would include the United Nations, would be focused on three areas: security, government and development, Brown said.

The proposal comes as the international mission grows increasingly unpopular in many of the 42 countries that make up the 100,000-strong international force in Afghanistan, 65,000 of whom form the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.

A CNN poll last week showed 57 percent of people in the United States, which provides around two-thirds of the foreign troops, now oppose the war in Afghanistan and 40 percent believe it cannot be won. In France, 64 percent are opposed to the mission, according to a survey last month.

The Taliban insurgency has proved to be tenacious, with militants seeking refuge and destabilising neighbouring Pakistan, and Western countries have grown frustrated about widespread corruption in President Hamid Karzai's government.

The presidential election held on August 20, likely to result in another term for the Western-backed Karzai, has been overshadowed by allegations of widespread fraud and vote-rigging.

As uncertainty continues to hang over the election outcome, the New York Times has reported that Afghans loyal to Karzai set up ahead of last month's elections hundreds of fictitious polling sites, where no one voted but hundreds of thousands of ballots were still recorded toward the president?s re-election.

Citing unnamed senior Western and Afghan officials, the newspaper said late Sunday there were as many as 800 such fake sites that existed only on paper.

Civilian casualties have also made international troops unpopular in Afghanistan.

An air strike on Friday in the north of the country ordered by a German commander after the Taliban hijacked fuel tankers killed scores.

On Saturday McChrystal promised a full investigation into the strike in which Karzai's office said 90 people were killed and wounded.

McChrystal submitted on August 31 his much-anticipated classified review of America's strategy there that is widely expected to lead to a request for more troops.

It has been forwarded to President Barack Obama and is being evaluated by senior military officials.

 

[nitesh]

Terror’s Training Ground

A few years ago, I met some young boys from my village near Bahawalpur who were preparing to go on jihad. They smirked politely when I asked them to close their eyes and imagine their future. “We can tell you without closing our eyes that we don’t see anything.”

It was not entirely surprising. South Punjab is a region mired in poverty and underdevelopment. There are few job prospects for the youth. While the government has built airports and a few hospitals, these projects are symbolic and barely meet the needs of the area. It’s in areas like this, amid economic stagnation and hopelessness, that religious extremists find fertile ground to plant and spread their ideology.

The first step is recruitment – and the methodology is straightforward. Young children, or even men, are taken to madrassas in nearby towns. They are fed well and kept in living conditions considerably better than what they are used to. This is a simple psychological strategy meant to help them compare their homes with the alternatives offered by militant organisations. The returning children, like the boys I met, then undergo ideological indoctrination in a madrassa. Those who are indoctrinated always bring more friends and family with them. It is a swelling cycle.

Madrassas nurturing armies of young Islamic militants ready to embrace martyrdom have been on the rise for years in the Punjab. In fact, South Punjab has become the hub of jihadism. Yet, somehow, there are still many people in Pakistan who refuse to acknowledge this threat.

Four major militant outfits, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), are all comfortably ensconced in South Punjab (see article “Brothers in Arms”). Sources claim that there are about 5,000 to 9,000 youth from South Punjab fighting in Afghanistan and Waziristan. A renowned Pakistani researcher, Hassan Abbas cites a figure of 2,000 youth engaged in Waziristan. The area has become critical to planning, recruitment and logistical support for terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, in his study on the Punjabi Taliban, Abbas has quoted Tariq Pervez, the chief of a new government outfit named the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NCTA), as saying that the jihad veterans in South Punjab are instrumental in providing the foot soldiers and implementing terror plans conceived and funded mainly by Al-Qaeda operatives. This shouldn’t come as a surprise considering that the force that conquered Khost in 1988-89 comprised numerous South Punjabi commanders who fought for the armies of various Afghan warlords such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani. Even now, all the four major organisations are involved in Afghanistan.

The above facts are not unknown to the provincial and federal governments or the army. It was not too long ago that the federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik equated South Punjab with Swat. The statement was negated by the IG Punjab. Perhaps, the senior police officer was not refuting his superior but challenging the story by Sabrina Tavernese of The New York Times (NYT). The story had highlighted jihadism in South Punjab, especially in Dera Ghazi Khan. The NYT story even drew a reaction from media outlets across the country. No one understood that South Punjab is being rightly equated with Swat, not because of violence but due to the presence of elements that aim at taking the society and state in another direction.

An English-language daily newspaper reacted to the NYT story by dispatching a journalist to South Punjab who wrote a series of articles that attempted to analyse the existing problem. One of the stories highlighted comments by the Bahawalpur Regional Police Officer (RPO) Mushtaq Sukhera, in which he denied that there was a threat of Talibanisation in South Punjab. He said that all such reports pertaining to South Punjab were nothing more than a figment of the western press’s imagination. Many others express a similar opinion. There are five explanations for this.

Firstly, opinion makers and policy makers are in a state of denial regarding the gravity of the problem. Additionally, they believe an overemphasis on this region might draw excessive US attention to South Punjab – an area epitomising mainstream Pakistan. Thus, it is difficult even to find anecdotal evidence regarding the activities of jihadis in this sub-region. We only gain some knowledge about the happenings from coincidental accidents like the blast that took place in a madrassa in Mian Chunoon, exposing the stockpile of arms its owner had stored on the premises.

Secondly, officer Sukhera and others like him do not see any threat because the Punjab-based outfits are “home-grown” and are not seen as directly connected to the war in Afghanistan. This is contestable on two counts: South Punjabi jihadists have been connected with the Afghan jihad since the 1980s and the majority is still engaged in fighting in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, since all these outfits were created by the ISI to support General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation process, in essence to fight a proxy war for Saudi Arabia against Iran by targeting the Shia community, and later the Kashmir war, the officials feel comfortable that they will never spin out of control. Those that become uncontrollable, such as Al-Furqan, are then abandoned. This outfit was involved in the second assassination attempt on Musharraf and had initially broken away from the JeM after the leadership developed differences over assets, power and ideology. Thus, the district officials and intelligence agencies turned a blind eye to the killing of the district amir of Al-Furqan in Bahawalpur in May 2009. As far as the JeM is concerned, it continues its engagement with the establishment. In any case, groups that are partly committed to the Kashmir cause and confrontation with India continue to survive. This is certainly the perception about the LeT. But in reality, the Wahhabi outfit has also been engaged in other regions, such as the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Badakhshan since 2004.

Fourthly, there is confusion at the operational level in the government regarding the definition of Talibanisation, which is then reflected in the larger debate on the issue. Many, including the RPO, define the process as an effort by an armed group to use force to change the social conditioning in an area. Ostensibly, the militant outfits in the Punjab continue to coexist with the pirs, prostitutes and the drug mafia, and there is no reason that they will follow in the footsteps of Sufi Mohammad and Maulana Fazlullah, or Baitullah Mehsud. Since the authorities only recognise the pattern followed by the Afghan warlords or those in Pakistan’s tribal areas, they tend not to understand that what is happening in the Punjab may not be Talibanisation but could eventually prove to be as lethal as what they call Talibanisation.

Finally, many believe that Talibanisation cannot take place in a region known for practicing the Sufi version of Islam. There are many, besides the Bahawalpur RPO, who subscribe to the above theory. A year ago in an interview with an American channel, Farahnaz Ispahani, an MNA and wife of Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, stated that extremism couldn’t flourish in South Punjab because it was a land of Sufi shrines. This is partially true. The Sufi influence would work as a bulwark against this Talibanisation of society. However, Sufi Islam cannot fight poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance – all key factors that encourage Talibanisation.

South Punjab boasts names such as the Mazaris, Legharis and Gilanis, most of whom are not just politicians and big landowners but also belong to significant pir families. But they have done little to alleviate the sufferings of their constituents. A visit to Dera Ghazi Khan is depressing. Despite the fact that the division produced a president, Farooq Khan Leghari, the state of underdevelopment there is shocking. Reportedly, people living in the area in the immediate vicinity of the Leghari tribe could not sell their land without permission from the head of the tribe, the former president, who has been the tribal chief for many years. Under the circumstances, the poor and the dispossessed became attractive targets for militant outfits offering money. The country’s current economic downturn could raise the popularity of militant outfits.

In recent history, the gap created due to the non-performance of Sufi shrines and Barelvi Islam, or the exploitative nature of these institutions, has been filled partly by the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa conversion teams and groups, such as the Tableeghi Jamaat, and militant outfits. This alternative, unfortunately, is equally exploitative in nature. Sadly, today the shrines and Barelvi Islam have little to offer in terms of “marketing” to counter the package deal offered by the Salafists for the life hereafter, especially to a shaheed: 70 hoors (virgins), a queen hoor (virgin queen), a crown of jewels and forgiveness for 70 additional people. This promise means a lot for the poor youth who cannot hope for any change in a pre-capitalist socio-economic and political environment, where power is hard to re-negotiate. Furthermore, as stated by the former information minister Mohammad Ali Durrani, who had been a jihadi from 1984-90, a poor youth suddenly turning into a jihadi commander is a tremendous story of social mobility and recognition that he would never get in his existing socio-economic system. More importantly, the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith offer a textual basis for their package, which is difficult for the pirs to refute due to the lack of an internal religious discourse in the Islamic world. The modern generation of pirs has not engaged in an internal discourse to counter this ideological onslaught by the Salafis. The main belief of Salafism is that all Muslims should practice Islam as it was during the time of Prophet Muhammad. The religion at that time, according to them, was perfect. Salafism – which pre-dates Wahhabism – is often used interchangeably with Wahhabism, which is actually an extension of Salafism.

Punjab offers a different pattern of extremism and jihadism. The pattern is closer to what one saw in Swat, where Sufi Mohammad and his TNSM spent quite a few years indoctrinating the society and building up a social movement before they got embroiled in a conflict with the state. South Punjab’s story is, in a sense, like Swat’s in that there is a gradual strengthening of Salafism and a build-up of militancy in the area. The procedure of conversion though, dates back to pre-1947. Still, the 1980s were clearly a watershed, when both rabid ideology and jihad were introduced to the area. Zia-ul-Haq encouraged the opening up of religious seminaries that, unlike the more traditional madrassas that were usually attached with Sufi shrines, subscribed to Salafi ideology. In later years, South Punjab became critical to inducting people for the Kashmir jihad. The ascendancy of the Tableeghi Jamaat and such madrassas that presented a more rabid version of religion gradually prepared the ground for later invasion by the militant groups. Two reports prepared around 1994, firstly by the district collector Bahawalpur and later by the Punjab government, highlighted the exponential rise in the number of madrassas and how these fanned sectarian and ideological hatred in the province. These reports also stated that all of these seminaries were provided funding by the government through the zakat fund.

The number of seminaries had increased during and after the 1980s. According to a 1996 report, there were 883 madrassas in Bahawalpur, 361 in Dera Ghazi Khan, 325 in Multan and 149 in Sargodha district. The madrassas in Bahawalpur outnumbered all other cities, including Lahore. These numbers relate to Deobandi madrassas only and do not include the Ahl-e-Hadith, Barelvi and other sects. Newer estimates from the intelligence bureau for 2008 show approximately 1,383 madrassas in the Bahawalpur division that house 84,000 students. Although the highest number of madrassas is in Rahim Yar Khan district (559) followed by Bahawalpur (481) and Bahawalnagar (310), it is Bahawalpur in which the highest number of students (36,000) is enlisted. The total number of madrassa students in Pakistan has reached about one million.

 

[nitesh]

continued from above:

Everyone has been so focused on FATA and the NWFP that they failed to notice the huge increase in religious seminaries in these districts of South Punjab. According to a study conducted by historian Tahir Kamran, the total number of madrassas in the Punjab rose from 1,320 in 1988 to 3,153 in 2000, an increase of almost 140%. These madrassas were meant to provide a rapid supply of jihadis to the Afghan war of the 1980s. At the time of 9/11, the Bahawalpur division alone could boast of approximately 15,000-20,000 trained militants, some of whom had resettled in their areas during the period that Musharraf claimed to have clamped down on the jihad industry. Many went into the education sector, opened private schools and even joined the media.

These madrassas play three essential roles. First, they convert people to Salafism and neutralise resistance to a more rabid interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah in society. Consequently, the majority of the Barelvis cannot present a logical resistance to the opposing ideology. In many instances, the Barelvis themselves get converted to the idea of jihad. Secondly, these madrassas are used to train youth, who are then inducted into jihad. Most of the foot soldiers come from the religious seminaries. One of the principles taught to the students pertains to the concept of jihad as being a sacred duty that has to continue until the end of a Muslim’s life or the end of the world. Lastly, madrassas are an essential transit point for the youth, who are recruited from government schools. They are usually put through the conversion process after they have attended a 21-day initial training programme in the Frontier province or Kashmir (see box “A Different Breed”).

State support, which follows two distinct tracks, is also instrumental in the growth of jihadism in this region. On the one hand, there has generally been a link or understanding between political parties and militant groups. Since political parties are unable to eliminate militants or most politicians are sympathetic towards the militants, they tend to curb their activities through political deal-making. The understanding between the SSP and Benazir Bhutto after the 1993 elections, or the alleged deal between the PML-N and the SSP during the 2008 elections, denote the relationship between major political parties and the jihadis. Currently, the SSP in South Punjab is more supportive of the PML-N.

The second track involves operational links between the outfits and the state’s intelligence apparatus. As mentioned earlier, as some of the outfits claim to have received training from the country’s intelligence agencies. Even now, local people talk of truckloads of weapons arriving at the doorstep of the JeM headquarters and other sites in the middle of the night. While official sources continue to claim that the outfit was banned and does not exist, or that Masood Azhar is on the run from his hometown of Bahawalpur, the facts prove otherwise. For instance, the outfit continues to acquire real estate in the area, such as a new site near Chowk Azam in Bahawalpur, which many believe is being used a training site. Although the new police chief has put restraints on the JeM and disallowed it from constructing on the site, the outfit continues to appropriate more land around the area. Junior police officials even claim seeing tunnels being dug inside the premises. The new facility is on the bank of the Lahore-Karachi national highway, which means that in the event of a crisis, the JeM could block the road as has happened in Kohat and elsewhere. Furthermore, the outfit’s main headquarters in the city is guarded by AK-47-armed men who harass any journalist trying to take a photograph of the building. In one instance, even a police official was shooed away and later intimidated by spooks of an intelligence agency for spying on the outfit. Despite the claim that the SSP, the LeJ and the JeM have broken ties with intelligence agencies and are now fighting the army in Waziristan, the fact remains that their presence in the towns of South Punjab continues unhindered.

Is it naivety and inefficiency on the part of officialdom or a deliberate effort to withhold information? The government claims that Maulana Masood Azhar has not visited his hometown in the last three years. But he held a massive book launch of his new publication Fatah-ul-Jawad: Quranic Verses on Jihad, on April 28, 2008, in Bahawalpur. Moreover, JeM’s armed men manned all entrances and exits to the city that day – and there was no police force in sight. The ISI is said to have severed its links with the JeM for assisting the Pashtoon Taliban in inciting violence in the country. Sources from FATA claim, however, that the JeM, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and LeT are suspected by the Taliban for their links with state agencies.

In addition, intelligence agencies reportedly ward off anyone attempting to probe into the affairs of these outfits. In one case, a local in Bahawalpur city invoked daily visits from a certain agency after he assisted a foreign journalist. Similarly, only six months back, a BBC team was chased out of the area by agency officials. In fact, intelligence officials, who had forgotten about my existence since my last book was published, revisited my village in South Punjab soon after I began writing on militancy in the area and have gone to the extent of planting a story in one of the Urdu newspapers to malign me in my own area. In any case, no serious operation was conducted against these outfits after the Mumbai attacks and the recent spate of violence in the country. Hence, all of them continue to survive.

The Deobandi outfits are not the only ones popular in South Punjab. Ahl-e-Hadith/Wahhabi organisations such as the Tehreek-ul-Mujahidden (TuM) and the LeT also have a following in the region. While TuM, which is relatively a smaller organisation, has support in Dera Ghazi Khan, the LeT is popular in Bahawalpur, Multan and the areas bordering Central Punjab. Headquartered in Muridke, the LeT is popular among the Punjabi and Urdu-speaking Mohajir settlers.

There are obvious sociological reasons for LeT’s relative popularity among these people. The majority of this population represents either the lower-middle-class farmers or middle-class trader-merchants. The middle class is instrumental in providing funding to these outfits. And the support is not confined to South Punjab alone. In fact, middle-class trader-merchants from other parts of the Punjab also feed jihad through their funding. This does not mean that there are no Seraiki speakers in Wahhabi organisations but just that the dominant influence is that of the Punjabis and Mohajirs. The Seraiki-speaking population is mostly associated with the SSP, LeJ and JeM, not to mention the freelancing jihadis that have direct links with the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP).

The LeT’s presence in South Punjab is far more obvious than others courtesy of the wall chalkings and social work by its sister outfit, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Despite the rumours of friction between the LeT and the JuD leadership, the two segments operate in unison in South Punjab. Three of the favourite areas of recruitment in South Punjab for all outfits are Cholistan in Bahawalpur, the Rekh in Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Kacha area in Rajanpur. The first two are desert areas known for their poverty and underdevelopment, while the third is known for dacoits. However, another known feature of Kacha in Rajanpur is that the clerics of the Lal Masjid come from this area and have partly managed to push back the dacoits. Local sources claim that the influence of the clerics has increased since they started receiving cooperation from the police to jointly fight the dacoits.

Organisations such as the LeT have even begun to recruit women in the Punjab. These women undergo 21 days of ideological and military training. The goal is to ensure that these women will be able to fight if their menfolk are out on jihad and an enemy attacks Pakistan.

The militant outfits are rich, both ideologically and materially. They have ample financial resources that flow from four distinct sources: official sources (in some cases); Middle Eastern and Gulf states (not necessarily official channels); donations; and the Punjabi middle class, which is predominantly engaged in funding both madrassas and jihad for social, moral and political ends. With regard to donations, the militant outfits are extremely responsive to the changing environment and have adapted their money-collection tactics. Gone are the days of money-collection boxes. Now, especially in villages, followers are asked to raise money by selling harvested crops. And in terms of the Punjabi middle class, there are traders in Islamabad and other smaller urban centres that contribute regularly to the cause. These trader-merchants and upcoming entrepreneurs see donations to these outfits as a source of atonement for their sins. In Tahir Kamran’s study “Deobandiism in the Punjab,” Deobandiism (and Wahhabiism) is an urban phenomenon. If so, then the existence of these militant outfits in rural Punjab indicates a new social trend. Perhaps, due to greater access to technology (mobiles, television sets, satellite receivers, etc), the landscape (and rustic lifestyles) of Punjab’s rural areas has changed. There is an unplanned urbanisation of the rural areas due to the emergence of small towns with no social development, health and education infrastructure. Socially and politically, there is a gap that is filled by these militant outfits or related ideological institutions.

Fortunately, they have not succeeded in changing the lifestyles of the ordinary people. This is perhaps because there are multiple cultural strands that do not allow the jihadis to impose their norms the way they have in the tribal areas or the Frontier province. This is not to say that there is no threat from them in South Punjab: the liberalism and multi-polarity of society is certainly at risk. The threat is posed by the religious seminaries and the new recruits for jihad, who change social norms slowly and gradually. Sadly nothing, including the powerful political system of the area, which in any case is extremely warped, helps ward off the threat of extremism and jihadism. Ultimately, South Punjab could fall prey to the myopia of its ruling elite.

So how does the state and society deal with this issue?

Deploying the military is not an option. In the Punjab this will create a division within the powerful army because of regional loyalty. The foremost task is to examine the nature of the state’s relationship with the militants as strategic partners: should this relationship continue to exist to the detriment of the state? Once this mystifying question is resolved, all militant forces can be dealt with through an integrated police-intelligence operation.

This, however, amounts to winning only half the battle. The other half deals with the basic problems faced by the likes of those young jihadis-in-training from Bahawalpur who said, “We don’t see anything” in our futures. Presently, there is hardly any industrialisation in South Punjab and the mainstay of the area, agriculture, is faltering. The region requires economic strengthening: new ideas in agriculture, capital investment and new, relevant industries. This is the time that the government must plan beyond the usual textile and sugar industries that have arguably turned into huge mafias that are draining the local economy rather than feeding it.

Investment in social development is desperately needed. A larger social infrastructure that provides jobs and an educational system that is responsive to the needs of the population can contribute to filling the gaps. The message of militancy is quite potent, especially in terms of the dreams it sells to the youth, such as those disillusioned boys from my village. Jihad elevates youngsters from a state of being dispossessed to an imagined exalted status. They visualise themselves taking their places among great historical figures such as Mohammad bin Qasim and Khalid bin Waleed. It is these dreams for which the state must provide an alternative.

 

[Pintu]

Parts of ISI supporting Taliban, protecting Mullah Omar: Report - Pakistan - World - NEWS - The Times of India

Parts of ISI supporting Taliban, protecting Mullah Omar: Report
PTI 27 September 2009, 11:29am IST

LONDON: Parts of ISI are supporting Taliban and protecting their chief Mullah Omar and other militant leaders in Pakistan's Quetta city, where US officials have discussed sending commandos to capture or kill the terrorists, a media report said on Sunday.

The US is threatening to launch air strikes against Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership in Quetta as frustration mounts about the ease with which they find sanctuary across the border from Afghanistan, 'The Sunday Times' reported.

The threat comes amid growing divisions in Washington about whether to deal with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan by sending more troops or by reducing them and targeting the terrorists.

According to the report, US vice-president Joe Biden has suggested reducing the number of troops in Afghanistan and focusing on the Taliban and al-Qaida in Pakistan.

Quoting western intelligence officers, the report said Taliban leaders are being moved to the volatile city of Karachi, where it would be impossible to strike. It said US officials have even discussed sending commandos to Quetta to capture or kill the Taliban leaders before they are moved.

It said while the government of President Asif Ali Zardari is committed to wiping out terrorism, Pakistan's powerful military does not entirely share the view.

There has been tacit cooperation over the use of US drones. Some are even stationed inside Pakistan, although publicly the government denounces their use, the report said.

 

[nitesh]

The Taliban and Salarzais

I was in Pakistan in August and had the opportunity to meet the leaders of the anti-Taliban lashkar (volunteer army) of Bajaur’s Salarzai tribe. I am honoured that upon my request they travelled from Bajaur to meet me in Nowshehra and shared with me information about their anti-Taliban struggle. I am not mentioning their names for reasons of their security.

The area of the Salarzai tribe is on the border with Afghanistan. The tribe have collectively decided that there won’t be any Taliban on their soil. The Taliban have been driven out of the Salarzai area. The Salarzai lashkar, mostly made up of labourers and peasants, has successfully kept the Salazai area free of the Taliban.

Tens of Salarzail lashkar leaders have been target-killed. The Salarzai leaders informed me they hold the ISI responsible for the targeted killings. “The Taliban are just a façade. The real force is the ISI punishing us for our anti-Taliban struggle,” said one of the leaders.

The leaders said that Mamond Taliban headquarters used to be in Damadola, which is a few kilometres from the FC fort in Bajaur. The Mamond Taliban used to bomb Salarzai villages. The Salarzai tribal elders requested the Political Agent, the authorities of the FC and the Pakistani army to stop the Mamond Taliban. None of these offered any help. Finally the Salarzai lashkar took positions on the mountains and for two hours heavily bombarded the surrounding villages of the Mamond Taliban. At that point the political agent and a colonel of the army asked the Salarzai lashkar to stop the bombing. They gave the same old logic: who will fight the NATO forces from across the Afghan border if you eliminate the Taliban?

Following such encounters with the state authorities, the Salarzais decided to fire at any forces entering their area: be it the Taliban, Al Qaida, the army or the US or NATO. The Salarzais have taken up positions all over the area and are always on guard. The tribesmen take turns to defend those positions. Unlike the bombed out schools in the Taliban-controlled areas, all schools in the Salarzai region are functioning. The tribesmen are performing security duties in both girls’ and boys’ schools in the area.

The leaders informed me that there is a set pattern of target-killing of anti-Taliban Salarzai leader. Before each targeted killing all telephone links with the far-flung Salarzai area are cut off. The targeted killing takes place in 24 to 48 hours later. The telephone links are restored a couple of days after the assassinated leader has been buried. A day or so later a news item of a few lines appears in the newspapers about the killing. “No one in Pakistan seems to be bothered about the state-sponsored targeted killing of anti-Taliban Salarzai leaders. Our area is too far from the rest of Pakistan and our agony means nothing to fellow-Pakistanis. The Pakistani media never ever tries to probe into the targeted killings,” said one of the Salarzai leaders.

All telephone lines to the Salarzia area were dead the day I was meeting with the leaders. They said they were deeply worried whose turn it might be to be targeted for killing. Two days later the telephone links were restored. The same day they informed me on telephone that Malik Munasib Khan, the spokesman of the Salarzai lashkar, had been killed. They held the ISI responsible for his killing.

The Salarzai leaders also informed me that last year the army deliberately fired at those villages in Bajaur that were known to be staunchly anti-Taliban. They said one of their colleagues called Maj Gen Alam Khattak to ask him to stop the bombing of his village. “Major General Sahib! I will start a vendetta with you if you did not halt the bombing of my village immediately. I will make sure to kill you and your family at the first available opportunity,” they quoted one of their colleagues as saying. The major general asked him to meet Col Sajjad who was bombing the anti-Taliban villages from his base in Timergara. That colleague saw a big Bajaur map affixed on the wall in the office of Col Sajjad. The map had several encircled villages. Col Sajjad informed him that the map had been handed over to him by his commanders with the order to bomb all the encircled villages. “Our colleague’s blood boiled with anger: none of the villages had Taliban in them,” said the Salarzai leaders. The villages included Butmali, Danqul, Attkay, Matasha, Baro, Raghjan and Nazkai.

On the other hand, those Salarzai villages that had Taliban were not marked on the map or bombed by the army. Such villages are Pashat, Banda, Malasyed, Darra and Gundai. Now the Salarzai lashkar has cleared these villages from Taliban control, without any state support.

The leaders also made the accusation that the Salarzais are discriminated against by the state in allocation of developmental funds due to their hostility to the Taliban. The FATA Rural Development Project (FRDP) is working in Bajaur Agency but entire Salarzai area of the agency has been deliberately excluded by from the project. “A wilful under-development has been imposed on us as punishment for our anti-Taliban stance. The Salazai area would be included in FRDP if we allowed the Taliban to take control of our area. Without this, we Salarzais can beg as much as we can for development, but the state will never budge,” said the Salarzai tribal leaders.

The reason I write this piece is not to defame the institution of the Pakistani army, which I hold in high esteem. I just wish to request the President of Pakistan, the Chief of Army Staff and the DG of the ISI to pay attention to the complaints of the Salarzais and resolve their problems to the satisfaction of the tribe. The Salarzai leaders categorically told me they are loyal Pakistanis, but they are not ready to let the peace of their area be destroyed for the power games of the intelligence agencies. All they want from the state is peaceful and development.

I would request fellow-Pakistanis all over the country to support the Salarzais. I wonder why the civil society of Pakistan is so silent over the heroic anti-Taliban struggle of the Salarzais. Salarzais are the natural allies of all those who are against the Taliban and civil society should forcefully support them. I would request the Pakistani media to keep a close watch on the Salarzai area to discourage targeted killings there.

The Taliban are anti-civilisation. The Salarzais are the embodiment of civilisation because they are so oppose to the Taliban. I would request all civilised people in the world to morally support the Salarzais in the name of human civilisation.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy.

 

[Pintu]

The Associated Press: Attack on remote Afghan outposts kills 8 US troops

Attack on remote Afghan outposts kills 8 US troops

By LORI HINNANT (AP) – 1 hour ago

KABUL — Militant fighters streaming from an Afghan village and a mosque attacked a pair of remote outposts near the Pakistani border, killing eight U.S. soldiers and as many as seven Afghan forces in one of the fiercest battles of the eight-year war.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the deadliest attack for coalition forces since a similar raid in July 2008 killed nine American soldiers in the same mountainous region known as an al-Qaida haven. The U.S. has already said it plans to pull its soldiers from the isolated area to focus on Afghan population centers.

Fighting began around dawn Saturday and lasted several hours, said Jamaludin Badar, governor of Nuristan province. Badar said the two outposts were on a hill — one near the top and one at the foot of the slope — flanked by the village on one side and the mosque on the other.

Nearly 300 militant fighters flooded the lower, Afghan outpost then swept around it to reach the American station on higher ground from both directions, said Mohammad Qasim Jangulbagh, the provincial police chief. The U.S. military statement said the Americans and Afghans repelled the attack by tribal fighters and "inflicted heavy enemy casualties."

Jangulbagh said that the gunbattle was punctuated by U.S. airstrikes and that 15 Afghan police were captured by the Taliban, including the local police chief and his deputy. A Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, said a council would decide the fates of the police, confirming the capture of the two top local officers.

Badar said five or six Afghan soldiers died, as did one policeman.

Afghan forces were sent as reinforcements, but Jangulbagh said all communications to the district, Kamdesh, were severed and he had no way of knowing how they were faring Sunday. The area is just 20 miles (30 kilometers) from the Pakistani border and 150 miles (230 kilometers) from Kabul.

"This was a complex attack in a difficult area," U.S. Col. Randy George, the area commander, said in the American statement. "Both the U.S. and Afghan soldiers fought bravely together."

Jangulbagh said the bodies of five enemy fighters were found after the battle.

Nuristan, bordering Pakistan, was where a militant raid on another outpost in July 2008 claimed the lives of nine American soldiers and led to allegations of negligence by their senior commanders. Army Gen. David Petraeus last week ordered a new investigation into that fighting, in which some 200 militants armed with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars pushed their way into the base, which is no longer operating.

Badar said he had sought more security forces for Kamdesh district. He said Taliban fighters had fled to Nuristan and neighboring Kunar province after Pakistani forces drove many extremists from the Swat Valley earlier this year.

"When there are few security forces, this is what happens," he said.

He also complained about a lack of coordination between international forces and Afghans.

The U.S. statement said the attack would not change previously announced plans to leave the area.

Afghanistan's northeastern Nuristan and Kunar provinces are home to al-Qaida bases as well as those of wanted terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose military chief Kashmir Khan has been unsuccessfully targeted by U.S. missiles over the past eight years. Kamdesh district has no regular cell phone or landline contact and few roads, dirt or paved. Local security forces communicate by handheld radio.

The region was key for Arab militants who battled alongside Afghan warriors during the 1980s U.S.-backed war against invading Russians because it is a rare place in South Asia where the Wahabi sect of Islam is practiced — the same sect followed by Osama bin Laden and most Saudis.

Many Arabs remained in Afghanistan, marrying Afghans and integrating themselves into local society. Many also belonged to Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami group, now sought as terrorists by the U.S.-led coalition.

Bin Laden also considered the region a useful hiding ground, his former bodyguard, Naseer Ahmed Al-Bahri, told The Associated Press in a 2006 interview in Yemen.

It sits directly across the border from Pakistan's Bajaur Agency, where bin Laden's No. 2, Ayman al Zawahri, was last seen.

Associated Press writers Rahim Faiez and Noor Khan contributed to this report.

 

[Pintu]

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/10/world/asia/10brfs-afghan-village.html?_r=1

World Briefing | Asia
Afghanistan: Taliban Claim Village

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: October 10, 2009

After American forces abandoned a mountain redoubt that was attacked by the Taliban last weekend, Taliban fighters said Friday that they had victoriously raised their flag over the village. The United States withdrawal from the remote base in Kamdesh, in eastern Afghanistan, was planned well before an attack last Saturday, in which eight Americans and four Afghans were killed. The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has begun a shift away from isolated and difficult-to-defend outposts toward larger population areas, as a way to protect more citizens.

 

[nitesh]

In the Pakistani mountains of Waziristan, young jihadis wait for martyrdom - Telegraph

 

[gokulakannan]

^^^ welcome to india. graveward is waiting here for u... hahaha

 

[mehwish92]

self delete.................

 

[thakur_ritesh]

mehwish, please check you pm, i have moved it and created it as a thread.

http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/cu...threatens-dispatch-militants-fight-india.html