The Fascist Pakistan Army: Invaders of Their Own Country

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The role of General Zia-ul-Haq in the events of Black September (1970), involving killing of 25000 Palestinians in Jordan



During Black September the head of Pakistani training commission took command of the 2nd Division and helped kill and cleanse the Palestinians (est. 25,000 dead) from Jordan.

It was none other that Zia ul Haq.

So much for the Palestinian cause.


The butcher was awarded Jordan's highest honour for the services rendered.

Zia was stationed in Jordan from 1967 to 1970 as a Brigadier, helping in the training of Jordanian soldiers, as well as leading the training mission into battle during the Black September operations as commander of Jordanian 2nd Division, a strategy that proved crucial to King Hussein's remaining in power.



Zia remained posted in Jordan from 1967 till 1970, where he was involved in training and leading Jordon's military. He is still highly respected in Jordan for his role in the Black September operations in support of King Hussein, where he commanded Jordan's 2nd division. Zia's troops were heavily involved in street-to-street urban fighting and are credited with killing scores of Palestinians. Black September was a great example of how the Arab nations despise the Palestinians, and their support of them only goes as far as to encourage and help the Palestinians to kill Jews.

http://prophetofdoom.net/Good_Muslims_General_Muhammad_Zia-ul-Haq.Islam



Black September
September 1970 is known as the Black September in Arab history and sometimes is referred to as the "era of regrettable events." It was a month when Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan moved to quash the autonomy of Palestinian organizations and restore his monarchy's rule over the country. The violence resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people, the vast majority Palestinian. Armed conflict lasted until July 1971 with the expulsion of the PLO and thousands of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon.

"¦.

Jordanian army attacks
On September 15, King Hussein declared martial law. The next day, Jordanian tanks (the 60th Armored Brigade) attacked the headquarters of Palestinian organizations in Amman; the army also attacked camps in Irbid, Salt, Sweileh,Baq'aa, Wehdat and Zarqa. Then the head of Pakistani training mission to Jordan, Brigadier Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (later Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan), took command of the 2nd division. In addition, the Iraqi army in Jordan after 1967 war serving as a reserve forces supported the Jordanian army.

Arafat later claim that the Jordanian army killed between 10,000 and 25,000 Palestinians.

The armored troops were inefficient in narrow city streets and thus the Jordanian army conducted house to house sweeps for Palestinian fighters and got immersed in heavy urban warfare with the inexperienced and undisciplined Palestinian fighters.
Amman experienced the heaviest fighting in the Black September uprising. The American backed Jordanian army shelled the PLO headquarters in Amman and battled with Palestinian guerillas in the narrow streets of the capital. Syrian tanks rolled across the Yarmouk River into northern Jordan and began shelling Amman and other northern urban areas. Outdated missiles fired by the PLO struck Amman for more than a week. Jordanian infantry pushed the Palestinian Fedayeen out of Amman after weeks of bitter fighting.

"¦.

Muhammad Aamir Mughal writes:

To all jihadi and sectarian activists (i.e., Ziaists), look at your spiritual and political Godfather General Zia:

"QUOTE"

"The most promising comparison between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Jewish State of Israel came from Gen. Zia ul-Haq. Lacking a political constituency, he skillfully exploited Islam to legitimize and consolidate his military dictatorship. Presenting himself as a simple, pious and devoted Muslim, he institutionalized religious radicalism in Pakistan. In so doing, he found Israel to be his strange ally. Toward the end of 1981, he remarked:

"Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse." He likewise surprised many observers in March 1986, when he called on the PLO to recognize the Jewish state. As discussed elsewhere, he was actively involved both in the 1970 Black September massacre of the Palestinians in Jordan as well as in Egypt's re-entry into the Islamic fold more than a decade later. From 1967 to 1970 our Commander of the Faithful Late. General Muhammad Ziaul Haq was in Jordan in Official Militray Capacity and he helped late. King Hussain of Jordan in 'cleansing' the so-called Palestinian Insurgents, Zia and Hussain butchered many innocent Palestinians in the name of Operation against Black September {a militant organization of Palestinians}. The intensity of bloodletting by Zia ul Haq and King Hussain was such that one of the founder father of Israel Moshe Dayan said:

"King Hussein (with help from Zia-ul-Haq of the Pakistani army) sent in his Bedouin army on 27 September to clear out the Palestinian bases in Jordan. A massacre of innumerable proportions ensued. Moshe Dayan noted that Hussein "killed more Palestinians in eleven days than Israel could kill in twenty years." Dayan is right in spirit, but it is hardly the case that anyone can match the Sharonism in its brutality."

"UN-QUOTE"

As per a book: "Charlie Wilson's War by George Crile during the so-called Afghan Jihad following things did happen;

"He told Zia about his experience the previous year when the Israelis had shown him the vast stores of Soviet weapons they had captured from the PLO in Lebanon. The weapons were perfect for the Mujahideen, he told Zia. If Wilson could convince the CIA to buy them, would Zia have any problems passing them on to the Afghans? Zia, ever the pragmatist, smiled on the proposal, adding, "Just don't put any Stars of David on the boxes" {Page 131-132}.

For further reading:

P. R. Kumaraswamy
Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)

http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo55.pdf

Memories of Barbarity: Sharonism and September By Vijay Prashad

April 9, 2002 in COUNTERPUNCH.

Charlie Wilson's War by George Crile.

In 2005, the outgoing ambassador of Palestine to Pakistan Ahmed Abdul Razzaq stated that late president of Pakistan General Ziaul Haq's bombardment on Palestinians in 1970, was done without taking any permission from Pakistani people, who would never allow this to happen.


Background on the above statement:

The most promising comparison between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Jewish State of Israel came from Gen. Zia ul-Haq. Lacking a political constituency, he skillfully exploited Islam to legitimize and consolidate his military dictatorship. Presenting himself as a simple, pious and devoted Muslim, he institutionalized religious radicalism in Pakistan. In so doing, he found Israel to be his strange ally.

Toward the end of 1981, he remarked: "Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse." He likewise surprised many observers in March 1986, when he called on the PLO to recognize the Jewish state.

He was actively involved both in the 1970 Black September massacre of the Palestinians in Jordan as well as in Egypt's re-entry into the Islamic fold more than a decade later. From 1967 to 1970 our Commander of the Faithful Late. General Muhammad Ziaul Haq was in Jordan in Official Militray Capacity and he helped late. King Hussain of Jordan in 'cleansing' the so-called Palestinian Insurgents, Zia and Hussain butchered many innocent Palestinians in the name of Operation against Black September {a militant organization of Palestinians}.

The intensity of bloodletting by Zia ul Haq and King Hussain was such that one of the founder father of Israel Moshe Dayan said: "King Hussein (with help from Zia-ul-Haq of the Pakistani army) sent in his Bedouin army on 27 September to clear out the Palestinian bases in Jordan. A massacre of innumerable proportions ensued. Moshe Dayan noted that Hussein "killed more Palestinians in eleven days than Israel could kill in twenty years." Dayan is right in spirit, but it is hardly the case that anyone can match the Sharonism in its brutality."

Saleem writes:

Some authors are trying to change the history (or hoodwink his readers). What I have read and know about Black September and role of Zia-ul-Haq in that operation, is quite horrible. Actually, main character of that operation was Zia-ul-Haq under whose command operation took place. Whatever this writer wrote is very funny. Just imagine that even if a Jordanian General decided not to command the force than why Jordanian government would make Zia-ul-Haq commander of that force and not any of their own Jordanian Generals or officers?

On the other hand, one must reflect upon the reason behind Syrian army moving towards Jordanian border. What interest Syrian army would have at the border of Jordan? Was it that since Syria was pro-Palestinians, they came to pressurise Jordan not to act against Palestinian with force and Jordanian General (as any Jordanian officers would have done) agreed on Syrian stand, so he may have declined to oppose them, hence need for non-Jordanian officer like Zia-ul-Haq to replace him?

What I have read is that even though Jordanian force is small but it is most potent and professional amongst forces facing Israel. They always fought bravely against Israelis though are not big enough to really do much.

As for battle of Karameh, Israel attacked Palestinian camp with consent of Jordanian King. Anyhow, when attack took place (in March 1968), Jordanian government ordered Jordanian forces not to intervene or engage IDF. Anyhow, Jordanian General Haditha along with some Jordanian officers ignored King's order and engaged IDF. Palestinians were putting resistance but it was Jordanian army entering the battle turned the table and inflicted heavy casualties on IDF, forcing IDF to pull out. Comparatively, Jordanian army casualties were much less than IDF. Result was that, even though decisive role played by Jordanian armed forces, most credit of that defeat got attributed to Palestinians and they attracted a lot of volunteers to fight, not only against Israelis but King of Jordan too.

After battle of Karameh, several attempts were made to assassinate King Jordan. On 7th Sept, Palestinian hijacked many planes and landed them in Jordan. The area of desert they got the plane landed was almost under their control and Jordan was unable to do much to the disgust of King Jordan (probably, Jordanian army did not wanted to do much about it).

King of Jordan declared Martial law on 15th Sept and started operation against Palestinian on 16th. With background of 'Karameh battle' and knowing the sentiments of Jordanian Generals towards Palestinians, Jordanian King could not have trusted Jordanian Generals doing operation against Palestinians, killing them, crushing them, and expelling them out of Jordan. Actually, there is little difference between Jordanians and Palestinians. So it is obvious that to crush Palestinians under Jordanian General was impossible. Jordanian Generals in command of the forces would not have allowed that.

Since King of Jordan (and Jordanian Government) could not have trusted Jordanian Generals or commanders for such operation, Zia-ul-Haq was chosen for the job. Black September operation started on 16th September. Jordanian 2nd division under the command of Zia-ul-Haq (along with Iraqi army stationed in Jordan as reserve force) took part, killing Palestinians living in camps inhumanly, crushing them and then throwing them out of Jordan. Estimated 10 thousand Palestinians were killed within few days.
 

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Black September and Role of Pakistan

After the Six Days War, Israel proved itself a Strategic and Military Power in front of Arab nations and the world. Israel which was equipped with the latest equipment provided by USA outclassed the Arab attacking countries Jordan, Egypt and Syria who were further helped by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Algiers (Some Pakistani Air force Pilots also helped) who were mostly equipped with equipment provided by USSR. This conflict made Israel the Power House of Middle East making a downfall for Big Arab leaders like King Hussein, Nureddin Attassi and most importantly Jamal Abdul Nasser who resigned (and reconcile his decision) after this incident. Nasser lost his charismatic power over the Arab world. But at that time the newly created Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was gaining power.

After the war, PLO was the new emerging threat for Israel. Previously following the ideas of Nasser, the main aim of PLO was the liberation of Palestine. After the war, PLO started to gain fame and power. It was having small conflicts with Israel Defence Forces. Arabs were coming to join PLO for their cause. In 1969, during one of the conflict Israel Forces entered PLO bases in Jordon but were repelled back by PLO with the help of Jordanian Security Forces. That battle was named the Battle of Karameh. That was a huge success for PLO giving it a wider fame all over the Arab and Muslim World. Yaseer Arafat emerged as the new leader of PLO and the new saviour of the Arab People. Muslims all over the world were now coming to Jordan to join PLO. Yaseer was a phenomenon at that time with people comparing it with revolutionary leaders like Che Guevara who were not going to lean in front of the Imperial World. USA and Israel begins to seem PLO as the last remaining threat after the war.

The Six Days War not only ended the Arab Unity Dream of Arab leaders but it also completely changed the political scenario of the Arab World. Iran and Saudi Arabia were already in US control. Egypt and Jordon also started to negotiate with USA and especially Israel. The influence of USSR in middle east was now minimal after the collapse of its ammunition in front of USA superior battle machine and it give USA a relief as it was badly wounded by USSR in Vietnam at that time. Jordon especially which was previously negotiating with Israel secretly doubled its effort to get their support.

The growing power of PLO was also becoming a threat for King Hussein of Jordon. Due to his negotiations with Israel he was getting unpopular in his own country and PLO was gaining support in both general public and Security Forces. PLO has now taken the full charge of Ibrid, Jordon where they had their stations and training camps. From here, they were also making small attacks on Israel. For the King this was a growing threat which needed to be eliminated for the stability of his own Government and for his own credibility.

With this Jordanian Government started to take action against PLO. But this created a high rift between Jordon, PLO and Jordanian people as most of them were supporting PLO at that time creating more problems for the King authority. PLO has its own little state now within Jordon from where they were creating problems for Israel and now King Hussein too.

PLO on the other hand were also having very much trouble from King Hussein too. His efforts for deals with Israel and for the removal of PLO was creating a lot of problems for them. So they thought too that it will be one way or another. They made many unsuccessfull assassinations attempts on King Hussein which failed. So they started to execute a bigger action plan.

In September 1970, PLO hijacked three aeroplanes a Swissair and a TWA which was landed in Azraq and a Pan Am which was taken to Cairo. After emptying the planes from passengers they blew it up in front of cameras. Later they claim Ibrid in Jordon a liberal territory which make the King to take action against them. On 15th September he order the state of Martial Law in the Country and order a full crackdown against PLO.

Jordanian Security Forces along with a Pakistani Training mission headed by a Pakistani Brigadier and an Iraqi troop attacked Ibrid. The Pakistani Brigadier was heading the assault as they attacked Ibrid and started killing Palestinians. Arab Radio claimed it a genocide. Arafat claimed the loss of more than 10,000 people during the fighting. Ultimately Arafat withdraw from Ibrid signing a peace deal with Jordanian King under the influence of President Nasser but the death of Nasser on 28th September prove to be another blow for PLO and the King continue the crackdown giving the biggest setback to PLO at that time.

Syria tried to help Palestinians due to a plea by Arafat but withdraw its forces due to Israel and USA who threatened Syria of severe consequences. PLO received such a blow that for revenge a new organization named Black September came into existence which was than latter responsible for the Munich Killing of Israel's Athletes.

The Pakistani Brigadier, who was at that time heading the training mission to Jordon and headed the 2nd Jordanian Division, when came back to Pakistan his name was suggested for Court Martial due to his role in Black September and for the killings of Palestinians. There was anger among people regarding this act. But due to unknown reason than Chief of Army Staff General Gul Hassan removed his name from the list which was sent to then President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Instead of a Court Martial that Brigadier was promoted to the rank of Major General. He was than in next few years again get promoted to the ranks of Lt General by "special attention". He was latter made Chief of Army Staff ahead of seven other senior officials. All this top flight from Brigader to the Chief of Army Staff was completed in just 6 years after the Black September.

The name of the Chief of Army Staff and than Brigader at the time of Black September was "General Zia Ul Haq" who than overthrow the elected Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto due to his "doings" and later hanged him to "make him an example for the Free World".
 

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PAKISTAN: Dacca, City of the Dead


Within hours after launching a tank-led offensive in Dacca and other East Pakistani cities on the night of March 25, the Pakistan army imposed a virtual blackout on the brutal civil war in Bangla Desh (Bengal State) by expelling foreign newsmen. TIME Correspondent Dan Coggin, who was among them, recently trekked back from India by Honda, truck, bus and bicycle to become the first American journalist to visit Dacca since the fighting started. His report:
Dacca was always a fairly dreary city, offering slim pleasures beyond the Hotel Intercontinental and a dozen Chinese restaurants ^ that few of its 1,500,000 people could afford. Now, IP in many ways, it has become a city of the dead. A month after the army struck, unleashing tank guns and automatic weapons against largely unarmed civilians in 34 hours of wanton slaughter, Dacca is still shocked and shuttered, its remaining inhabitants living in terror under the grip of army control. The exact toll will never be known, but probably more than 10,000 were killed in Dacca alone.
Perhaps half the city's population has fled to outlying villages. With the lifting of army blockades at road and river ferry exits, the exodus is resuming. Those who remain venture outdoors only for urgent food shopping. Rice prices have risen 50% since the army reportedly started burning grain silos in some areas. In any case, 14 of the city's 18 food bazaars were destroyed. The usually jammed streets are practically empty, and no civil government is functioning.
"Kill the Bastards!" On every rooftop, Pakistan's green-and-white flags hang limply in the steamy stillness. "We all know that Pakistan is finished," said one Bengali, "but we hope the flags will keep the soldiers away." As another form of insurance, portraits of Pakistan's late founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and even the current President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, were displayed prominently. But there was no mistaking the fact that the East Pakistanis viewed the army's occupation of Dacca as a setback and not a surrender. "We will neither forgive nor forget," said one Bengali. On learning that I was a sangbadik (journalist), various townspeople led me to mass graves, to a stairwell where two professors were shot to death, and to scenes of other atrocities.
The most savage killing occurred in the Old City, where several sections were burned to the ground. Soldiers poured gasoline around entire blocks, igniting them with flamethrowers, then mowed down people trying to escape the cordons of fire. "They're coming out!" a Westerner heard soldiers cry. "Kill the bastards!"
One Bengali businessman told of losing his son, daughter-in-law and four grandchildren in the fire. Few apparently survived in the destroyed sections—25 square blocks—of the Old City. If they escaped the flames, they ran into gunfire. To frighten survivors, soldiers refused to allow the removal of decomposing bodies for three days, despite the Moslem belief in prompt burial, preferably within 24 hours, to free the soul.The dead of Dacca included some of East Pakistan's most prominent educators and businessmen, as well as some 500 students. Among at least seven University of Dacca professors who were executed without apparent reason was the head of the philosophy department, Govinda Chandra Dev, 65, a gentle Hindu who believed in unity in diversity. Another victim was Jo-gesh Chandra Ghosh, 86, the invalid millionaire chemist. Ghosh, who did not believe in banks, was dragged from his bed and shot to death by soldiers who looted more than $1 million in rupees from his home.
Looting was also the motive for the slaying of Ranada Prasad Saha, 80, one of East Pakistan's leading jute exporters and one of its few philanthropists; he had built a modern hospital offering free medical care at Mirzapur, 40 miles north of Dacca. Dev, Ghosh and Saha were all Hindus.

"Where are the maloun [cursed ones]?" rampaging soldiers often asked as they searched for Hindus. But the Hindus were by no means the only victims. Many soldiers arriving in East Pakistan were reportedly told the absurdity that it was all right to kill Bengali Moslems because they were Hindus in disguise. "We can kill anyone for anything," a Punjabi captain told a relative. "We are accountable to no one."
Next Prime Minister. The tales of brutality are seemingly endless. A young man whose house was being searched begged the soldiers to do anything, but to leave his 17-year-old sister alone; they spared him so he could watch them murder her with a bayonet. Colonel Abudl Hai, a Bengali physician attached to the East Bengal Regiment, was allowed to make a last phone call to his family; an hour later his body was delivered to his home. An old man who decided that Friday prayers were more important than the curfew was shot to death as he walked into a mosque.
About 1:30 on the morning of the attack, two armored personnel carriers arrived at the Dhanmandi home of Sheik Mujibur ("Mujib") Rahman, 51, the political leader behind the campaign for Bengali independence. Mujib first took refuge beneath a bed when the Special Security Group commandos began to spray his house with small-arms fire. Then, during a lull, he went to the downstairs veranda, raised his hands in surrender and shouted, "There is no need for shooting. Here I am. Take me."
Mujib was flown to West Pakistan, where he is reported held in Attock Fort near Peshawar. As an activist who had already spent nine years and eight months in jail, he may have reasoned at the time of his arrest that his political goals would be served by the martyrdom of further imprisonment. But he obviously did not expect to face a treason charge and possible execution. Only two months earlier, after all, President Yahya had referred to him as "the next Prime Minister of Pakistan."
No Choice. In Mujib's absence, the resistance movement is sorely lacking leadership, as well as arms, ammunition and communications gear. In late March, the mukti fauj (liberation forces) overwhelmed several company-size elements, as at Kushtia and Pabna, but bolt-action rifles cannot stop Sabre jets, artillery and army troops operating in battalion strength.Still, everywhere I visited on the journey to Dacca, I found astonishing unanimity on the Bengali desire for independence and a determination to resist the Pakistan army with whatever means available. "We will not be slaves," said one resistance officer, "so there is no choice but to fight until we win." The oncoming monsoon rains and the Islamabad government's financial problems will also work in favor of Bangla Desh. As the months pass and such hardships increase, Islamabad may have to face the fact that unity by force of arms is not exactly the Pakistan that Jinnah had in mind.
 
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Klashni-country: A brief history of the Kalashinkov culture in Pakistan – by Nadeem Paracha

January 11th, 2010Abdul NishapuriLeave a commentGo to comments


By late 1979, markets in the tribal regions of Pakistan were flooded with AK-47s, smuggled across by Afghan refugees. – File photo

The famous Russian assault rifle, the Kalashnikov, also called the AK-47, or Klashni in the street and campus lingo of urban Pakistan, has become a permanent feature of the Pakistani landscape. The weapon of choice during student movements, ethnic and sectarian clashes, kidnappings, government raids, and militant uprisings, the AK-47 continues to feature in most acts of violence committed in this country. It's almost hard to believe that the weapon was a scarce commodity in Pakistan until about 1977.

Before the storm

It is believed that some of the militant nationalists who were fighting an insurgency against the Pakistan Army in the remote mountains of the arid province of Balochistan (1973-77), had acquired a couple of AK-47s from Iraq, whose ruling Ba'ath Socialist Party was allegedly supporting the insurgency.

In 1973, the Pakistan government under the leadership of the popularly elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto claimed to have confiscated a cache of 350 AK-47s from the Iraqi attaché's house. The cache, the government claimed, was destined for Balochistan. In fact, some of the guns, it was believed, had already reached the Baloch militants.

Despite the government's claims, there were very few reported incidents where the fighters of the leading Baloch militant organisation of the time, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), or its youth wing the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO), were said to have used AK-47s in their battles against the heavily armed Pakistan Army.

Instead, the Kalashnikov is reported to first appear in Pakistan on university campuses in Karachi and Lahore. However, sophisticated weapons were hardly available to or used by the youth in the campus violence between various student parties during the 1960s and 1970s. The brawling students usually used bare fists, chains, knuckle-dusters, and knives.

For example, in all the reported cases of campus clashes between the left-wing National Students Federation (NSF) and the conservative Islami Jamiat Taleba (IJT) in the 1960s, there is no mention at all of students ever using any firearms.

Similarly in the 1970s as well, where NSF and BSO frequently clashed with right-wing student groups like IJT and Anjuman Taleba Islam (ATI), there are only two reported cases of firing, one at the University of Karachi (in 1974) and the other at Lahore's Punjab University (in 1975). On both occasions, however, old pistols were used, and that too for aerial firing only.

The AK-47 largely remained an elusive and somewhat unknown weapon on the campuses of Pakistan, even though some IJT militants who met future Afghan warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in Peshawar in 1975, brought back tails of this "amazing weapon that was easy to use and twice as effective."

Hekmatyar had been a leader of Afghanistan's radical Muslim Youth organisation at the Kabul University in the early 1970s. First arrested in 1970 after he had killed a Maoist student leader, Hekmatyar was released when the nationalist Pushtun leader, Daoud Khan, toppled the Afghan monarchy in 1974. Hekmatyar soon turned against Daoud as well and in 1975 escaped to Peshawar.

Here he was approached by the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime and Pakistan's intelligence agencies that financed and armed his group of Islamist renegades for an insurgency in Afghanistan against the Daoud regime, which had been calling for uniting Pakistan's NWFP province with Afghanistan as part of Daoud's plan for the creation of a 'Greater Pushtunistan.'

Hekmatyar also managed to get his hands on a couple of AK-47s, bought from Afghanistan's illegal weapons market with Pakistani money. Even though his group of insurgents comprised disgruntled young Afghan Islamists, some IJT members claim to have met him in Peshawar in 1975, and offered their services.

The insurgency was a complete failure and was easily crushed by Daoud. Hundreds of Hekmatyar's men were killed and arrested. Nevertheless, Hekmatyar escaped arrest and returned to Peshawar where under the patronage of the Bhutto regime he formed the Hizb-e-Islami and started planning another insurgency against the secular Daoud government.

The Klashnikov arrives

Things for the failed Islamic revolutionary changed dramatically when, in 1978, Daoud was toppled in a communist coup led by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and its supporters in the Afghan military. Soon after, when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, the American CIA showed interest in helping Islamist groups stationed in Peshawar.

At the start of the CIA-ISI backed anti-Soviet 'jihad' in Afghanistan in 1979, Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami was the biggest anti-Soviet group in Peshawar. It was also one of the first groups of Afghan jihadists to receive arms and aid from the CIA, ISI and Saudi Arabia.

When in 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the elected government of Bhutto and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), he invited the staunchly anti-PPP Jamat Islami (JI) to join his first 'civilian cabinet.'

By 1979, the JI was vowing to help Zia bolster public support for the 'Afghan jihad' and expunge all leftist and pro-Soviet elements in Pakistan's intelligentsia, journalistic circles and campuses. The JI also developed strong links with Hekmatyar opening up channels of regular contact between IJT and Hekmatyar.

As the first batches of Afghan refugees started to cross into Pakistan from war-torn Afghanistan, with them also came black marketers dealing in captured and smuggled AK-47s and heroin.

By late 1979, markets in the tribal regions of Pakistan were flooded with AK-47s and heroin. The Afghans trading in these items were profitably escorted by assorted Pakistanis looking to make a fast buck. These included Army personnel, tribal leaders, pro-Zia politicians and some enterprising civilians.

The AK-47 first made its proper introduction in urban Pakistan in mid-1979 when the then leader of the IJT in Karachi and president of the student union at the University of Karachi, Hussain Haqqani, appeared on the campus with 'bodyguards' armed with AK-47s.

The bodyguards were led by Rana Javed, the notorious leader of IJT's militant wing, the 'Thunder Squad' – a violent group formed in the 1960s (at the University of Karachi and Punjab University) to "curb immoral activities on campuses." NSF, BSO, the Peoples Students Federation (PSF), and the Liberal Students Organisation (LSO) had a history of regularly clashing with IJT and its moral squad.

During one such clash in Karachi in 1979, the Thunder Squad announced the first known usage of an AK-47 in urban Pakistan when it fired upon a gathering of progressive students. There were no deaths, but the incident left anti-IJT forces badly shaken and awake to the reality of an enemy that was fast changing its tactics.

Javed and his men had come into contact with a Pakistani middle-man who had gotten them in touch with an Afghan gun dealer in Peshawar. Funds were raised by the IJT in Karachi (accommodated by the JI and its connections with Hekmatyar), and a group of IJT men travelled to Peshawar to buy their first cache of AK-47s.

The guns were stashed under the beds of the hostel rooms occupied by IJT members at the University of Karachi and the NED University. These guns were once again used in mid-1980 during a clash between NSF and IJT in which one NSF student was killed. This is reported to be the first casualty witnessed in a clash at the university.

Alarmed by the rapid arming of the IJT – allegedly a part of Zia and JI's designs to push out 'pro-Soviet students' from campuses – the PPP's student-wing, the PSF, and the nationalist BSO, were the first two non-IJT organisations to acquire AK-47s. Already put under tremendous pressure by constant arrests, torture and jailing by the dictatorship, the PSF in Karachi grew a more militant wing, led by Salamullah Tipu.

Tipu, who belonged to a lower-middle-class Urdu-speaking family of Karachi, had been a member of NSF in 1974-75 and was considered to be 'a terror' by the IJT. He switched to the PSF sometime in 1977 and soon became the leading member of PSF's somewhat anarchic militant wing. This wing was not under the direct control of the PPP.

Soon after the death of the NSF member at the University of Karachi, Tipu and a few members of the BSO travelled to Peshawar There they got in touch with a Pakistani middle-man who drove them to the open weapons and drugs markets in the tribal areas of NWFP. These markets were now flush with smuggled AK-47s and drugs arriving from the war zones in Afghanistan. Many of the guns were also pinched away for private sale by administrators handling the arming of the Afghan jihadists.

There, Tipu and BSO activists bought themselves a couple of AK-47s and smuggled them via train back to Karachi. Tipu and members of the United Students Movement (USM) – a progressive students alliance at KU – also raided an IJT arms' 'warehouse' in Karachi's Shah Faisal Colony, and got away with a number of AK-47s.

In early 1981, Tipu, along with at least three more PSF members, entered the University of Karachi in a white Toyota Corolla with a PPP flag. He started shouting pro-Bhutto and anti-IJT slogans in front of an IJT camp on the campus. To the IJT members' surprise, he whipped out an AK-47 and started to fire at the camp. No one was hurt.

Tipu then sped forward in his car and looking at an IJT leader, Hafiz Shahid, strolling outside the university's library, he started to shout anti-Zia and anti-IJT slogans mixed with a barrage of choice Urdu abuses, all the while waving his brand new AK-47.

Incensed by the commotion, Shahid pulled out a pistol and fired at Tipu's car. He is reported to have fired at least three shots that missed the target. Tipu jumped out from his car and fired a burst from his AK-47 at Shahid, who was hit in the chest and head. He soon succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.

After the killing, Tipu and his group of PSF militants escaped to Peshawar, and with the help of some members of a small pro-Soviet party in the Frontier province, tracked across the tribal areas into Kabul, where he joined Murtaza Bhutto's anti-Zia guerrilla outfit, the Al-Zulfikar Organisation (AZO).

Three alliances emerged in the wake of IJT's attacks and the PSF's counter-attack. At the University of Karachi, BSO, PSF, the Pakhtun Students Federation (PkSF), Punjabi Students Association (PSA), and the newly formed All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) further shaped the USM. NSF got together with a militant faction of PSF to form the Jamhoori Mehaz (Democratic Front). At the NED University, the progressives formed the Progressive Students Front.

With temperatures rising, IJT members now started distributing AK-47s to Thunder Squad personnel at Punjab University as well. Distressed by IJT's violent growth there, breakaway militants from PSF, NSF and Tehrik -e-Istaqlal's student-wing, the Istaqlal Students Federation (ISF), formed the Black Eagles. Outside the IJT, the Eagles were the first student group to acquire AK-47s in Lahore.

In mid-1981, the AK-47 claimed its third victim at the University of Karachi when IJT members allegedly mowed down Shaukat Cheema, a member of the USM. USM responded by asking its BSO members to deliver the alliance the connections that had supplied BSO and PSF militants AK-47s.

To avenge Cheema's murder, during the 1981 student union elections, USM militants led by BSO's Boro and PSF's Shirin Khan, entered the University of Karachi from the NED University with AK-47s and long-range rifles. They attacked IJT militants standing outside the Chemistry Department, and soon an intense gun fight ensued in which at least one IJT member, Danish, was killed.

By 1982, IJT, PSF, PkSF, BSO, USM and Black Eagles all had caches of AK-47s stashed in their hostel rooms. Universities and colleges in Karachi and Lahore were now sitting on a volcano. Adding to the violent environment was the arming of the separatist Jeeay Sindh Party's student-wing, Jeeay Sindh Students Federation (JSSF) – allegedly by Zia's intelligence agencies "to neutralise PSF's influence on Sindh campuses."

Hell breaks loose

The AK-47 was also instrumental in Pakistan's first-ever case of hijacking. In mid-1981, Tipu had re-entered Pakistan from Kabul (as a card-carrying member of Al-Zulfikar), and along with at least three to four more PSF militants, hijacked a Peshawar-bound PIA flight and forced it to land at the Kabul Airport.

The hijackers demanded an end to Zia's military rule and the release of some 50 students loitering in various Pakistani jails. The list included arrested members of the PPP, PSF, BSO, NSF, some radical journalists as well as some members of small communist and regional parties, all picked up by the police between 1977 and 1980.

Tipu shot dead one of the passengers when the Zia regime stalled its response to the hijackers' demands. The passengers were finally released when most of the prisoners were let out from the cramped jails of Sindh and Punjab by the regime.

It is interesting to note that until 1982, the AK-47 was only used by pro-Zia student organisations such as the IJT, and subsequently by anti-Zia student militants. It had yet to fall in the hands of organised gangs involved in theft, kidnapping and other crimes.

However, it is believed that the first time the AK-47 was used in a robbery in Pakistan was in 1981, during a bank heist in Karachi. But this heist too was planned and executed by Al-Zulfikar men, to raise money for their anti-Zia operations. These men used the same AK-47s to assassinate at least three pro-Zia politicians.

In 1983, a movement against the Zia dictatorship in Sindh – headed by the PPP-led Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) – was crushed by army personnel using force. Scores of young PPP, PSF and JSSF activists managed to escape death and arrest, and disappeared into the thick forests near the dusty towns of Dadu and Moro. These forests were already infested with Sindhi dacoits.

After the MRD action subsided, leaving behind a trail of death, destruction and thousands of arrests, many of the dacoits and their new comrades came into contact with separatist Sindhi elements who had direct links with Afghans and Pakistanis involved in the booming gun-running trade in the Frontier. By early 1984, most of these dacoits had armed themselves with AK-47s, using them for murder, highway robberies and kidnappings.

Meanwhile, in 1984, the Zia dictatorship used the growing violence in student politics as a pretext to ban student unions across the country. The same year, a major battle in which the AK-47 was prominent took place between USM militants and the police – sent to clear hostels after the student union ban – at the University of Karachi.

The battle lasted for over 10 hours, during which time USM students armed with pistols and AK-47s fought the police from the rooftop and windows of the hostel building. The police responded with pistol and rifle fire and teargas. Scores of policemen and students were injured before the hostel was finally taken by the cops.

By 1985, AK-47s were easily available in Karachi and their usage extended beyond university and college campuses; organised criminal gangs were now armed with Klashnis as well.

The major reason behind the weapon's widespread availability was the influx of Afghan refugees, who in the early 1980s had started moving into the shanty towns of Karachi. With them came gun and drug runners and supplies of the AK-47 and heroin. Compared to the 1970s, crime in Karachi almost quadrupled in the eighties, and Karachi soon had the second-biggest population of heroin addicts in the world.

Mohajir anger towards Afghan gun-runners and drug peddlers (most of whom were Pashto-speaking) metamorphosed into agitation against the city's Pashtuns, who had migrated from the NWFP in the 1960s. The tension between the two communities erupted in deadly riots and pitched battles. This violence eventually saw the APMSO give rise to the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).

In the bloody 1986 riots between the mohajirs and the Pashtuns – the latter had used AK-47s, while the former had to make do with crude homemade weapons, especially those prepared by the Biharis from Karachi's poverty-stricken Orangi area. These Biharis had migrated to former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during Partition, where they saw militant Bengali separatists make home-made weapons to use against the Pakistan Army in 1971.

Baptised by fire and bloodied by the AK-47s of the enraged Pashtuns and Afghans of the city, the MQM became desperate for modern weaponry. An APMSO delegation met with PSF militants and asked to buy AK-47s from them. But on the behest of the PPP, the PSF refused. However, in late 1986, another group of APMSO leaders was advised by a PSF member in Karachi to travel to Hyderabad and meet with the leaders of the JSSF at Sindh University, who would be interested in selling them arms. APMSO bought three AK-47s from the JSSF and managed to secure a link with Sindhi militants also operating as middle-men for Afghan gun-runners.

By 1987, the APMSO was flush with AK-47s as it began supplying the MQM with street-fighters. At this point, a separate militant wing of the party called 'Black Tigers' was also formed.

It was also sometime in 1987 that the AK-47 started to be called 'Klashni' (a word coined by APMSO militants) and the phrase "Kalashnikov culture" started to appear in the press.

In the Punjab, too, the AK-47 became the weapon of choice for criminals. Most of these deadly rifles were now brought into the city by members of Afghan jihad outfits and sold to nascent sectarian outfits that had started to appear in the Punjab and the Frontier during the peak of the Zia regime. Many of these organisations, which also became involved in various crimes, started to stockpile AK-47s and other weapons.

One of the most violent sectarian organisations was the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), formed in 1985 in the city of Jhang in the Punjab. The SSP's first action was fomenting anti-Shia riots in Lahore in 1986.

Back for more

By the time Zia's C-130 military aircraft crashed just outside Bahawalpur on August 18, 1988, the Kalashnikov culture had been ingrained in Pakistani society. This culture was defined by violence, corruption and intolerance, and caused the bullet to replace the ballot in the national political arena as well as on campuses.

It was not surprising, then, that within a year of Benazir Bhutto's election in November 1988, violence erupted in Karachi, especially between APMSO and PSF. Both organisations now had strong militant tendencies and were well equipped with AK-47s.

MQM had swept the polls in Karachi and was part of the PPP coalition government at the centre and in Sindh. However, there were some radical elements in PPP and PSF who had opposed an alliance with the MQM, terming it "an anti-Sindhi party created by General Zia-ul-Haq." While friction grew between the two parties, its student-wings clashed on university and collage campuses of Karachi.

The APMSO had become an important player in the student politics of Karachi, successfully sidelining the IJT. PSF too was a resurgent force on Karachi campuses after years of harassment and repression by the Zia regime and IJT violence. The PSF was being led in Karachi by Najib Ahmed, who was a leading voice to oppose an alliance with the MQM.

After the gun battles between the two student organisations at the University of Karachi, Urdu College and Sindh Medical College killed activists from both sides, an ugly round of kidnappings began in which both organisations kidnapped, tortured and then killed their opponents.

In late 1989, when Ahmed and his army of AK-47 brandishing PSF men seemed to be getting the upper hand in the gory violence, the most tragic moment of the battle arrived. After a deadly gun fight at the NED University in which brand new AK-47s were used by both the sides, some six PSF men ran out of ammunition and were apprehended by their APMSO opponents. They were then marched towards the neighbouring University of Karachi and taken inside the university's gymnasium. Surrounded by APMSO gunmen, the PSF boys were asked to gather at the centre of the gymnasium. They were then asked to make a run for the exit doors. As they ran, they were brutally sprayed with bullets and cut to pieces.

PSF avenged the killing by kidnapping and killing a number of MQM and APMSO activists in Karachi's Korangi area. The violence between the two became so intense that the PPP and MQM parted company, with MQM joining the Nawaz Sharif-led opposition cluster, the Coalition of Opposition Parties (COP).

In early 1990, PSF's leader Ahmed too died when he was ambushed by APMSO and MQM militants on a busy Karachi street. His jeep was fired on by AK-47s from all sides. As Ahmed stumbled out of the bullet-ridden vehicle, bleeding from multiple bullet wounds, he tried reaching for his own AK-47. He eventually died at the hospital.

Meanwhile, the Punjab was facing political challenges as well. The province was being run by the staunchly anti-PPP (and 'Ziaist') Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The PML's student-wing, the Muslim Students Federation (MSF), had heavily armed itself and tried to dislodge the IJT from various universities and colleges in the Punjab. Meanwhile, in Jhang, regular riots and clashes between the SSP and various Shia groups exploded in which both sides used sophisticated firearms.

And the beat goes on

If the 1980s was a violent decade in Pakistan, the 1990s were even worse.
During Sharif's reign in 1991, violence between student groups shifted from Karachi to Punjab's campuses, where the MSF and IJT fought deadly gun battles, enough for IJT's mother party, the JI, to quit Sharif's coalition government at the centre. The JI also accused Sharif of not implementing the Shariah law promised by him before the 1990 elections.
Back in Sindh, Sharif's Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali courted support for the Sharif government from the MQM. In the process Ali also used MQM and APMSO's militant muscle in his egoistical battle against the PPP.

Jam had been a PPP man until the mid-1980s, when he had a falling out with Benazir Bhutto and was expelled from the party. He further armed MQM and APMSO to tackle 'terrorists' whom he claimed belonged to the Al-Zulfikar Organisation and were "disturbing peace in Sindh."

However, during the summer of 1991, two high-ranking members of the MQM, Afaq Ahmad and Amir Khan, were expelled by the party chief, Altaf Hussain, on charges of corruption. Both were also leading members of MQM's militant wing, the Black Tigers. They at once formed the breakaway MQM-Haqiqi (MQM-H), allegedly patronised by the Pakistani security agencies. Then, in June 1992, the Pakistani army intervened in a government-initiated military crackdown code-named Operation Clean-up, in order to quell the chronic ethnic unrest and rising cases of kidnapping and murder in the province.

It soon became obvious, though, that MQM militants were the main target of the military operation.

Jam's tactics had become increasingly controversial and the way he was using the MQM started to alarm the intelligence agencies and the army, both of whom advised Sharif to take action. Hundreds of MQM and APMSO militants were killed and arrested in the operation. A large number of AK-47s and pistols too were recovered from the militants.

In 1994, the second Bhutto government began a fresh operation against the MQM, convinced that the first operation had failed to break the party's back. Clashes and gun fights between MQM and MQM-H too increased, as MQM tried to retake the areas snatched from them by MQM-H.

Hundreds of MQM, APMSO, MQM (H) activists and members of paramilitary forces and policemen fell in violent battles during the three-year operation. It saw the infrastructure and the economy of Karachi collapse and dozens of businessmen and industrialists moving their families, money and businesses to the Punjab. The operation and violence continued until the fall of the second Sharif government in 1999.

While violence between MQM, MQM (H) and paramilitary forces was taking place, it created an opening for various Islamist and sectarian organisations to eventually move from the Frontier and Punjab and set up shop in Karachi. Some of these Islamists posing as 'scholars' and clerics moved openly with bodyguards armed with the now ubiquitous AK-47s.

With the government busy in trying to reign in the MQM by force, many of the Islamist groups in Karachi started taking over mosques and madrassahs. Many of these Karachi-based Islamists were instrumental in helping the Pakistani government and intelligence agencies in the indoctrination, support and creation of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Abruptly, and as if out of nowhere, with the coming of Pakistan's fourth military dictator General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, ethnic violence in Sindh came to a sudden and surprising halt. The operation against the MQM was stopped, Sharif and the PML (N)'s vendetta against the PPP was suspended, and it was expected that the new military man would also reign in the Islamists. But as it turned out, Musharraf was not the man for the job.

Heavenly fire

The Kalashnikov culture was well ingrained by the time Pakistan entered the new millennium. By now, the AK-47 was also pulled out in times of celebration. This tradition began in the mid-1980s, but became widespread in the early 1990s. Since then, the sound of the AK-47 stands out when thousands of guns are let loose on New Year's Eve. The AK-47 is also fired during weddings.

During the Musharraf regime, gun battles on campuses and in urban areas decreased, and the AK-47 was primarily seen in the hands of private security guards and bodyguards. That said militants belonging to various Islamist organisations also began to carry arms openly, especially as a reaction to the Musharraf regime's operation against them after September 11, 2001. Unlike the student militants of yore, none of these organisations had to struggle for their share of AK-47s.

A number of anti-Wahabi clerics and scholars assassinated in the last 10 years have been gunned down by AK-47s. During the Lal Masjid debacle in 2007, most of the militants operating in the radical mosque and madrassah in Islamabad could be seen brandishing AK-47s long before the government decided to take its haphazard and much-delayed action. AK-47s were also seen during a gun battle in Karachi on May 12, 2007.

Protests against Musharraf's decision to depose Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry had not gone down well with the general's allies in Karachi, the MQM. And when Chaudhry and his supporters in the PPP, PML(N), ANP, JI and the lawyers' community brought their movement to Karachi, mayhem ensued. Shortly before Chaudhry landed in Karachi, militants belonging to the PSF, APMSO, PkSF, and IJT could be seen with AK-47s taking up positions along Shara-e-Faisal, Bundar Road, Guru Mandir and Golimar. The truth behind the clashes that took the life of dozens of men was drowned in accusations and counter-accusations that the involved parties pitted against each another.

That incident, one of the deadliest battles on the streets of Karachi, shows that the AK-47 has remained the weapon of choice. Of course, since 2005, gun battles involving the ubiquitous Klashni have seemed small fry events compared to the rising number of suicide attacks, bomb blasts and insurgencies perpetuated by the Islamist terrorist networks in Pakistan.
 

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Beyond the Veil:Israel-Pakistan Relations


When I first made the comparison between Israel and Pakistan in the
first sentence of Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power? in 1970, rightwing
Pakistanis as well as many leftists were shocked. The contrast was
supposedly outrageous.
-Tariq Ali, 19831

*
One of the accidental and unintended results of the May 1998 nuclear
tests in the Indian subcontinent was a noticeable desire and willingness
in Israel to discuss its relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
With two notable exceptions, Pakistan has rarely figured in the Israeli
discourse. In the first place, for a long time Pakistan was held primarily
responsible for the prolonged Indian refusal to establish diplomatic
relations with the Jewish state. In the 1950s, veteran Israeli diplomat
Walter Eytan observed that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
"may have feared at one time that if he established relations with Israel,
he would throw the Arab states into the arms of Pakistan, their sister in
Islam."2 Secondly, Pakistan is often accused of being the only country
apart from the United Kingdom to have recognized Jordan's annexation
of the West Bank in 1950. Even though there is no historical evidence to
support this assertion, a number of Israeli scholars and commentators
have repeatedly accused Pakistan of endorsing Jordan's former claims
to the West Bank.3 Otherwise, Pakistan has drawn public attention
primarily during internal political violence or natural calamities.
This indifference was facilitated by Pakistan's prolonged public
criticism of Israel and its policies. Since the early part of the twentieth
century, Pakistan vociferously opposed the demand for a Jewish national
home in Palestine. In 1947 it became the most boisterous and articulate
opponent of the partition plan for Palestine. As a state conceived as the
homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, Islamic solidarity
has been the primary vehicle of Pakistan's foreign and Middle East
policies. This, coupled with the desire to ingratiate itself with the Islamic
world, compelled Pakistan to unconditionally support the Arab countries
in their conflict with Israel. Like many Third World countries, Pakistan
10 P. R. Kumaraswamy
often played the "Israel card" to discredit neighboring India. On occasion,
Pakistani leaders have painted their domestic critics and opponents as
"conspirators" with Israel or Zionism. And suggestions for a reevaluation
of Pakistan's policy toward Israel have been routinely denied,
or viewed as Indian, Israeli or Zionist conspiracies.
For its part, Israel has been reluctant to discuss its relations with
countries with whom it does not have formal diplomatic ties. Prolonged
diplomatic isolation compelled Israel to master the art of clandestine or
back-channel diplomacy.4 Its relations with a number of countries were
preceded by protracted political interactions, diplomatic contacts or
military contracts. The absence of formal relations has often caused Israel
to seek unconventional approaches to promote and safeguard its vital
interests.
Even within the context of Israel's clandestine diplomacy, Pakistan
is unique. In a number of cases, the absence of diplomatic relations did
not inhibit Israel from selectively or partially disclosing the nature and
extent of its diplomatic contacts. For instance, its "secret contacts" with
Jordan became public long before formal ties were established in 1994,
and strict censorship regulations did not inhibit Israel from discussing
Morocco's role in its peace agreement with Egypt. Until the nuclear tests,
however, contacts with Pakistan rarely figured in academic or media
discussions in Israel.
It suited both countries to keep their contacts and exchanges under
wraps. For Pakistan, this secrecy enabled its rulers to maintain regular
contacts with Israel, even while maintaining public opposition to the
Jewish state. Because of Pakistan's failure to engage in public diplomacy
and its reluctance to normalize relations, Israel had to approach the
subject cautiously. Any leaks or premature disclosures were detrimental
to the existing channels of communication. As a result, in contrast to the
case of India, the Pakistani refusal to establish diplomatic relations never
figured prominently in Israel's diplomatic offensive.
Contrary to popular belief in both countries, contacts between the
two date back to the late 1940s, when the Pakistani leadership was
officially hostile to the idea of a Jewish state. These contacts were not
an aberration, nor were they confined to a particular leader or period. A
careful perusal of available archival and other materials indicates that
Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations 11
from the beginning, both countries have been quietly pursuing one
another.5 Their contacts were more than diplomatic niceties or polite
conversations; they have often involved a degree of convergence of Israeli
and Pakistani interests.
At one time or another, important Pakistani leaders, such as the
articulate Foreign Minister Sir Zafrulla Khan (1947-54), military dictators
Ayub Khan (1958-69), Yayha Khan (1969-71) and Zia ul-Haq (1977-88)
and Prime Ministers Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972-77), Benazir Bhutto (1988-
90 and 1994-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93 and 1997-99) were
sympathetic toward Israel or facilitated interactions with Israeli leaders,
diplomats or officials. They were not alone. A host of Pakistani officials
and diplomats have met, discussed and at times dined with their Israeli
counterparts. Such contacts were held primarily in Washington, London
or at the United Nations headquarters in New York. At the same time, a
number of other locations, such as Rangoon, Kathmandu and Tokyo in
Asia, Lagos in Africa, Ankara and Tehran in the Middle East, Caracas
and Ottawa in the Americas and Brussels and Rome in Europe also
functioned as meeting points for Israeli and Pakistani diplomats.
Some of these meetings were private and bilateral, while others took
place at functions organized by the host countries, or by foreign missions
accredited to the host countries. Israeli diplomats regularly monitored
and reported the movements of their Pakistani counterparts. Media
reports on the biographical details of Pakistani envoys were regularly
sent to Jerusalem for further contacts or future reference. Pakistani
missions have regularly sent various informative and publicity materials
to Israeli missions in the host countries. Some of these have been sent on
official Pakistani stationary and include Pakistani claims vis-à-vis India
and its request for Israel's understanding and support. A number of
semi-official and unofficial organizations, as well as prominent, not-soprominent
and ordinary Pakistani citizens have been in contact with
Israeli missions abroad for information or technical assistance. Because
of the absence of direct postal connections between the two countries,
such requests have been sent to third countries, including Israeli missions
in New York or London.6 Influential Jewish leaders like Edmund de
Rothschild have privately operated, and at times funded, efforts to
further Israeli-Pakistani normalization.
 

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The roads to terrorism: From General Zia-ul-Haq to Faisal Shahzad – by Kamila Hyat​

May 13th, 2010Sarah KhanLeave a commentGo to comments
What could possibly have possessed Faisal Shahzad, a wealthy, happily married college graduate with two children and everything in life apparently working in his favour, to set out to Times Square and attempt to leave a bomb behind?

His bizarre adventure opens up questions as to the nature of terrorism in our country. It is widely held that militancy is essentially the product of deprivation and the despondency it brings with it. Ajmal Kasab fits classically into this mould. A school drop-out and labourer, with few hopes of moving up in life, Kasab was the ideal target for recruitment by a militant organisation. Such organisations watch out for vulnerable young men everywhere. Smaller towns are a favourite recruitment ground; unemployment aids them immensely in their task. The prospect of possessing a gun is a big temptation for the average, down-and-out 19-year-old. The psychology of this is not hard to understand. But Faisal Shahzad came from the opposite end of the social spectrum. His motives then are something of a mystery and militancy as a phenomenon much harder to understand because of the involvement of young men such as Faisal.

There is, it appears, something within the mindset of Pakistanis – the young in particular – that favours violence and the ideas that are a factor behind militant actions. The years under the late General Ziaul Haq and the disastrous involvement in the Afghan war are of course key factors in creating this mode of thinking. It explains why there is so much support for Aafia Siddiqui and even for the Taliban. While a small number of young people, in the two-decade time span since Zia was killed in the skies over Bahawalpur, have succeeded in breaking out of this mode and are moving towards the more relaxed, more liberal style of life we knew till the 1970s, most have remained trapped in the past and the flawed notions created through the 1980s.

These ideas present a threat. The US secretary of state has made quite clear what the consequences of a terror plot would be for Pakistan. Students fear that obtaining visas will become harder; those already in the US report an increase in hostility from Americans. This is of course hardly surprising. The fact is that the world associates Pakistan firmly with terrorism. Terrorist plots of all kinds seem to emanate in the country and news with an Islamabad dateline frequently features reports about militant activity. The consequences of this have been extremely adverse.

The entrenched mindset that backs militancy is much harder to defeat than the militants themselves. It is possible, in theory at least, that the war against the Taliban may eventually, in purely physical terms, be won. Territory has indeed been wrested back from them in many places in the north-west – even though local people continue to talk of militants finding it easy to escape as little effort is being made to capture key leaders. This of course is alarming. If the nexus between the establishment and the Taliban is not broken now, there is a danger it will never be. After all if attacks on GHQ and the mosque frequented by top army officers in Rawalpindi are not enough to demonstrate what the risks of the current situation are, nothing will achieve this. But even if we assume that the operation that continues in the north-west is indeed intended to eliminate the Taliban we must ask what is being done to erase the trends that lead to individuals such as Faisal Shahzad taking up the Taliban cause.

For now, some debate continues over whether Shahzad acted alone or he had been a part of one of the many militant organisations based in various parts of the country. There are so many of them, with splinters and sub-splinters constantly emerging, that like the Pakistan Muslim League which now features groups with increasingly complex alphabetical equations attached with a hyphen to their names, it has become all but impossible to keep track. The fact that a number of these groups simply changed their names in the wake of bans after 9/11 makes the task still harder. Even veteran journalists keep the acronyms taped to desktops to enable them to identify potential culprits after each new bombing or act of terror. But the question of whether Faisal Shahazad was in some way linked to one of them is largely immaterial. The fact is that he acted along militant lines, evidently because he believed in what they espoused, and this is what is significant.

We need to find ways to alter the mindset that gives rise to acts of the kind seen in New York. It is a fallacy to believe that things have changed since Zia. It is true that we have seen some opening up of society, but with this has come also a hardening of lines. The parallels that can be drawn with Iran in the pre-revolution period are terrifying. It is also a fact that there is much that is deceptive about the new face of Pakistan. Many who would seem to favour liberal values hold views on key issues that fall in line with those of the extremists. Some surveys indicate almost 80 per cent of people believe religion should have a place in political life – even though, encouragingly, such views do not translate into votes for religious or pseudo-religious parties. Obscurantist religious groups, encouraged to establish a hold under Zia, have begun to elbow out the traditional, more relaxed religious orders that emerged in the subcontinent. In practical terms these trends translate into a pattern which leads to tiny schoolgirls and boys being rigged out in scarves or skullcaps and into a religious dimension appearing in the rhymes chanted by children on playgrounds even at elite institutions.

It will take very real political will, indeed a sense of mission, to alter this. At present there seems to be no force capable of undertaking such a task with the required level of commitment or good sense. Even our understanding of quite why we have become the world`s centre for militancy is somewhat obscure – and this leaves open the risk that one day a Pakistani citizen – in Mumbai, in New York, London or elsewhere — will succeed in carrying out some act of terror, plunging us all into still deeper crisis.

The writer is a freelance columnist and former newspaper editor
 

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What is the ideology of Pakistan's military?

September 26th, 2009Abdul NishapuriLeave a commentGo to comments

The military's ideology
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 25 Sep, 2009 (Dawn)

PAKISTAN observers often wonder what the Pakistan military's primary ideology is. Is it a secular institution or one which is high on religious values? Since the military is considered the strongest institution of the Pakistani state, the question becomes critical in determining what direction the country will take or how its armed forces will fight the war on terror.

One particular perspective is that the military is essentially a secular institution which got transformed temporarily under Gen Ziaul Haq, who made sure that his officers had a religious grounding. He had allowed the tableeghi jamaat to penetrate the armed forces and introduced a religiously conservative current in society. Subsequently, the Zia era was blamed for the continued links between certain military personnel and the Taliban post-9/11.

Later, it was argued that Gen Pervez Musharraf put the military back on the secular track by weeding out religious-minded, senior officers replacing them with others who were socially acceptable to the international community. In fact, senior officers now claim that the military is highly professional and secular. This is correct in that 'secular' in this case means that the army is not driven purely by religious instincts in pursuing its goals. But then 'religious' or 'secular' are not the right terms to describe the organisation.

Indeed, if one is searching for the correct term, it would be pragmatic-nationalist. This means that instead of sticking to one ideology the institution can shift between a couple or more ideologies at the same time. So, when it was convenient to turn religiously ideological during the 1980s it could do so. Even Gen Zia was not solely driven by his personal inclination to support the Afghan 'jihad'; the geo-strategic and geopolitical environment was important in the framing of decisions. There was no dichotomy between pursuing jihad and having a strategic alignment with the US even then.

Zia also found religious ideology handy in pursuing other military-strategic goals. Deploying non-state actors was financially, politically and militarily cost-effective. Hence, all generals maintained links with the jihadis despite the fact that they were different from Zia.

The pragmatist-nationalist character of the military also explains why it was able to swiftly shift between ideologies, especially after it had to undergo a change in the wake of 9/11. This also means that maintaining links with the different jihadi organisations, as explained by Arif Jamal in Shadow War: the Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, does not necessarily depend on having a religious ideology.

The author's interesting conclusion is that even seemingly 'secular' generals like the present chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, could pursue the same policy as the generals during the 1990s. Jamal claims that a lot of jihadi organisations were thrilled to hear of the appointment of Gen Kayani as the new chief and many reopened their offices in 2008. He also argues that several meetings were arranged between the various Afghan Taliban groups and the Kashmiri jihadis in 2007 by the ISI to help them with a strategy to stop Indian help from reaching Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul and placing more sleeper cells in India for possible activation at later dates.

This argument explains the character of the Pakistan Army and its use of religion or at least one aspect of it, namely jihad, for its strategic advantage. There is nothing odd in the argument since the military was part of what was described by Hamza Alavi as the Muslim salariat class, which used religion to motivate a movement for an independent state.

The fact is that this class was always linked to the use of religious ideology. It might not want to adopt a Saudi model for state-making, though the Pakistani state has gradually moved closer to Saudi Arabia, but religion has always remained central to the fulfilment of the strategic goals of the salariat, which later evolved into the ruling elite.

This basically meant that while the Islamic norms of social justice might not be adopted, religious identity would be used in some form to meet political and military-strategic objectives. Jamal's argument is that like all such plans that generate opportunity costs, the jihadis of today, who seem to be challenging the Pakistani state, are inadvertently a product of a specific plan to fight the war in Kashmir.

The camps where Ajmal Qasab and others were trained by the Lashkar-i-Taiba to carry out the Mumbai attacks, the author claims, were set up by the ISI to win the war in Kashmir. Even if the attack was not ordered by the intelligence agency, it indicates a situation where the jihadis trained for a particular purpose might have used their training to carry out attacks on their own or gone beyond the brief.

Obviously, the military always had to use religion as a motivating factor from the time when Col Akhtar Malik planned the first offensive to capture Kashmir in 1947/48 to the 1980s and 1990s when, according to Jamal, a lot of new jihadi organisations were established. Gen Ayub Khan adopted a similar approach while planning the historic but failed Operation Gibraltar in 1965. However, the military was not the only force which used the above-mentioned approach.

Even seemingly liberal-secular leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto favoured the policy of using non-state actors to the country's perceived military advantage. For instance, Bhutto personally came to congratulate the hijackers of an Indian Airlines flight in January 1971. It is important to remember that the use of non-state actors was part of a larger package of mixing religion with state strategy.

In adopting this approach Bhutto might have not been too far off from Ziaul Haq who, as Jamal argues, developed an alignment with the Jamaat-i-Islami to support the Afghan jihad and to use that as a cover for strengthening the army's war in Kashmir.

The country's ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. While they can conveniently claim to have retained their secularism and saved one organisation from turning ideological, a similar claim might not be made for society at large. The proliferation of 'jihad' in mainland Pakistan is but the opportunity cost of strategy.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

[email protected]

Tailpiece: Daily Times Editorial

Musharraf changes tack on NATO forces

Talking to ABC new in the United States, former president General Pervez Musharraf (Retd) has said that "Pakistan and India will face great danger from Al Qaeda if the United States pulls out of Afghanistan". In other words if the Americans leave Afghanistan it will fall to Al Qaeda which will then extend "its influence into Pakistan and possibly even India".

He wants more troops in Afghanistan and has accused Nawaz Sharif of never speaking out against terrorism and of being "a closet Taliban". Tragically no one in Pakistan is going to believe a word of what he says. In fact, his defence of the staying on of the NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan will further solidify the growing opinion in Pakistan carried in the slogan "go, America, go".

The rise of the Taliban terror happened on Musharraf's watch. He kept the army on a tight leash as the population went under the control of Baitullah Mehsud in FATA and Fazlullah in Swat. He is generally accused of keeping the Taliban as his "option" for Afghanistan if another power vacuum occurred there after the exit from there of a "reluctant" NATO and a "defeated" United Sates.

It is clear that Musharraf had no clue about the Frankenstein created by his procrastination. He looked the other way while the Taliban attacked across the Durand Line into Afghanistan, demonstrating that he not only "anticipated" the exit of NATO from there but also wanted to "facilitate" it. Now of course his "reverse advocacy" of NATO is not going to benefit Pakistan. In fact, due to an irrational hatred of him, the Pakistani view will go in the opposition direction simply to spite him. There is a time for all soldiers to fade away.

Dawn Editorial (27 Sep 2009)

Let us not suffer from any delusions: the nation is in for a long-drawn-out battle, and it is time the democratic government prepared the nation and the security apparatus for it. There is no quick-fix solution and a pacification of the Taliban-infested areas is nowhere in sight. How things have come to such a pass need not be retold. For more than a decade the security establishment, with help from our cold-war allies, trained, funded and armed the mujahideen for the anti-Soviet 'jihad'. Even when the Soviets had gone home, Islamabad chose the Taliban as favourites when the victorious mujahideen fell out. No wonder this country became a big recruiting and training ground for the Taliban. The tragedy was that even when Pakistan became a 'front-line state' following 9/11, Islamabad still did not take on the Taliban with the kind of single-minded devotion that was needed. We have no choice now but to take the war against the rebels to its logical conclusion. What is at stake is our way of life. A microscopic minority of bigots cannot be allowed to destroy the values on which Jinnah founded Pakistan.
 

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Is the military cheating Orakzais?
—Farhat Taj

The returning Orakzai IDPs might be trapped in the same vicious circle in which the Mehsud IDPs have already been entangled. Several times the army sent the Mehsuds back to their native area. Each time they suffered more violence at the hands of both the Taliban and the military

A potentially dangerous development is afoot in Orakzai and no one in Pakistan seems to care. The military authorities and the Orakzai political agent (PA) have ordered the internally displaced persons (IDP) from the Lower Orakzai to go back to their region. The authorities claim that their areas have been 'cleared' of the Taliban. Many IDPs from Utman Khel, Mando Khel, Syed Khalil Baba, Astori Khel have gone back. The IDPs from the Bezot area are going back this week. While the IDPs from Feroz Khel, Mishti Khel and Shikhan have also been ordered to be prepared for return in March.

The returning IDPs would be responsible for the security in their villages. They would have to make supervisory committees to report any suspicious individuals to the authorities. The army would be responsible for security on the surrounding mountains. The army is holding positions on the mountains. The returning IDPs, who have their houses destroyed in the military operation, would be given tents.

These people were first rendered homeless and then abandoned by the state in pursuit of its strategic depth. These poorest of the poor IDPs have been living in the most pathetic conditions in cities and towns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Many of them have not been registered as IDPs, and so they could not even obtain the meagre help that the Red Cross or other international aid agencies provide. Some of them were literally living on roads. Some were living in the Afghan refugee camps.

Most of those who have the means to survive as IDPs in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are not going back. They do not trust the claims of the military authorities regarding security in their native villages. The military have not killed even a signal Taliban commander. As long as the commanders like Nabi Mullah, Aslam Farooq, Tufan Mullah and Hakeemullah Mehsud are alive and well, there can never be permanent peace in Orakzai. The IDPs ask why these commanders are still at large and how could there be peace in Orakzai without the commanders' elimination. The authorities are tight-lipped about this most important issue. They do not provide any guarantees for security in the area.

Moreover, upper Orakzai is still mainly under the control of the Taliban. The army has not even reached Mamozai, the centre of the Orakzai Taliban. Furthermore, sporadic acts of terrorism are still occurring in the 'cleared' areas. Only during the last week, a blast damaged the house of a local tribal leader in Feroz Khel.

In this situation all those IDPs who could barely afford to survive outside Orakzai would not return. However, they are afraid of the possibility of a forced repatriation. They are afraid that the army would put pressure on them through the political agent of Orakzai to return to boast to the media, both national and international, that like the Swat IDPs, the Orakzai IDPs have also been sent back. They are apprehensive that the authorities have all the power to bully the IDPs, because the tribesmen and women are not entitled to any human rights under the Constitution of Pakistan. Orakzai, like most parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), is closed for independent journalistic investigation. The outside world and even wider society in Pakistan would never come to know about the ground security situation in the area.

The returning Orakzai IDPs might be trapped in the same vicious circle in which the Mehsud IDPs have already been entangled. Several times the army sent the Mehsuds back to their native area. Each time they suffered more violence at the hands of both the Taliban and the military. The latest position is that the Mehsud tribe is resisting the army's pressure to go back. In a recent meeting between the Mehsud tribal leaders and the military authorities in Tank the latter threatened the former to go back to South Waziristan supposedly cleared by the army and make lashkars ready to fight the Taliban in the future. FATA tribal leaders have never been known for asking tough questions from the authorities, thanks to the brutal Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). But still at least one Mehsud tribal leader confronted the military authorities head on. He categorically told that the Mehsud tribe is not convinced that the intelligence agencies have changed their mind and now consider the Taliban as enemies of the state.

Actually, the Mehsud tribe is afraid that they are being trapped by the authorities, i.e. all internally displaced tribesmen and women who have spoken against the Taliban would be targeted and killed upon their return and others would be overpowered by the Taliban in collusion with the intelligence agencies. The net result would be that the Mehsuds would have to become IDPs once more. Waziristan would continue to be unstable and the game of the intelligence agencies in collusion with the Islamists would go on.

The Orakzai IDPs' apprehension is that a similar stage might be prepared through the return of the IDPs in Orakzai. The Taliban would slaughter the supervisory committees constituted by the returning IDPs. The army on the mountains would ignore the carnage. The Taliban would overpower the returned IDPs. Terrorism and harassment would be the order of the day. Orakzai would continue to be marred with violence. Amid the violence, the Taliban and the intelligence agencies would pursue their strategic depth goals in Afghanistan. Helpless civilians of Orakzai would pay with their blood.

The question is: who in Pakistan has the power to grill the military generals over their constant failure to kill or arrest the Taliban commanders from FATA? Who has the audacity to make the generals provide some reliable security mechanism for the returning IDPs in their native areas?

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book Taliban and Anti-Taliban
 

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Rumours of change
—Mohammad Jamil

In Pakistan the question is often raised about whether the military leadership has the right to give its assessment of threats to internal and external security

In a democracy, it is quite normal for the government to be changed through a successful vote of no confidence against it. However, there is the perception that the opposition and detractors of the present government would go to any length to get rid of the government through fair or foul means. At the same time, the PPP has to realise that even though the mandate is for five years, it has to ensure good governance and must avoid the appointment of NRO beneficiaries or unqualified people like Adnan Khawaja, an act that shows utter disregard for merit. There could be a difference in opinion over the interpretation of that clause of the constitution that gives immunity to President Zardari — and the PPP may have a point there — but other verdicts of the apex court should be implemented. The present position is that the PML-N — the second largest political party — lacks the numbers necessary to remove the government, and it is unlikely that it can woo the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) to vote against their coalition partners. Even if one presumes that Mian Nawaz Sharif can succeed in getting the support of these parties to bring about a change in the government, he would still need the support of at least one faction of the PML-Q.

Rumours abound that the present democratic set-up may be wrapped up but, besides the MQM chief Altaf Hussain, no other leader has openly demanded that honest generals come forward to cleanse the system. The PPP leaders have reacted to the rumours about the change of their government. The federal cabinet reiterated on Tuesday its resolve to defend and ensure the supremacy of parliament and rule of law, and resist any move to change the government by unconstitutional means. Prime Minister Gilani said on the floor of the national assembly that the government would implement the verdicts of the apex court provided they are according to the law and constitution, implying that the president, having been given immunity in the constitution, cannot be tried in the court of law. Last but not least, the law ministry reportedly stated that the Swiss cases against President Zardari could not be reopened, as doing so would endanger the country's sovereignty. Meanwhile, some elements are trying to drag the military into the fray by suggesting that the apex court invoke Article 190 of the constitution to force the government to implement the court's decisions.

However, ineptness and failure of civilian governments and three martial laws are responsible for the trust deficit between the elected government and top military brass. If the elected government can ensure good governance, and solves the problems faced by the people, no organ or pillar of the state can remove it. But, in addition to the conflict between parliament and the judiciary, there seems to be unease between the government and the military establishment. True enough, in a democratic dispensation, the military leadership has to obey the orders of the elected government, but it has to be borne in mind that, throughout the world, governments act on the advice of the military as far as matters relating to national security are concerned. In Pakistan the question is often raised about whether the military leadership has the right to give its assessment of threats to internal and external security. There is no denying that all countries of the world have professional armies to protect their borders, and also to ensure law and order internally, as it is the responsibility of the government to establish the writ of the state and protect the lives and properties of the people.

In the US, Britain and even in India, political leaderships take decisions on the basis of the information provided by intelligence agencies and advice of the military leadership. It is a matter of record that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had in principle agreed to withdraw from Siachen and the agreement to that effect was about to be inked when the army prevailed upon the prime minister and convinced him that India would lose strategic advantage, and Indian forces would be vulnerable if India withdrew from Siachen. In 2006, the then Indian Army Chief of Army Staff, General J J Singh had expressed concern stating: "We have conveyed our concerns and views to the government and we expect that the composite dialogue between the two countries will take care of all these concerns." The US and NATO's admirals and generals often address press conferences, issue statements and warn their governments of the consequences of flawed decisions.

Last year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen wrote an essay, in which he was critical of the US government's efforts regarding strategic communication with the Muslim world, stating that no amount of public relations will establish credibility, if American behaviour overseas is perceived as arrogant, uncaring or insulting. He wrote: "The Muslim community is a subtle world we do not fully — and do not always attempt to — understand. Only through a shared appreciation of the people's culture, needs and hopes for the future can we hope ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative." There was yet another example of former Commander NATO/ISAF Stanley McChrystal criticising his leadership, though he was sacked when he and his subordinates passed derogatory remarks against the military top brass and top civilian leadership.

McChrystal's disagreement with the government did not evoke much furore, but he was criticised when he delivered a speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London giving detailed account of events and reasons for the failure in Afghanistan. He had rejected calls for the war effort to be scaled down from defeating the Taliban insurgency to a narrower focus on hunting down al Qaeda, as suggested by Vice President Joseph Biden as part of the White House strategy review. In his speech, he rejected proposals to switch to a strategy more reliant on drone missile strikes and Special Forces operations against al Qaeda. But, in Pakistan, there has been at least one incidence whereby the then Chief of Army Staff Jehangir Karamat was asked to resign by the elected prime minister for having suggested the formation of the National Security Council. To avoid crisis and to solve the problems faced by the people, the members of parliament, judiciary and military leaders should have a working relationship and the debate about who is supreme should end.

The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at [email protected]
 

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After Pakistani Journalist Speaks Out About an Attack, Eyes Turn to the Military


ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — An investigative reporter for a major Pakistani newspaper was on his way home from dinner here on a recent night when men in black commando garb stopped his car, blindfolded him and drove him to a house on the outskirts of town.There, he says, he was beaten and stripped naked. His head and eyebrows were shaved, and he was videotaped in humiliating positions by assailants who he and other journalists believe were affiliated with the country's powerful spy agency.

At one point, while he lay face down on the floor with his hands cuffed behind him, his captors made clear why he had been singled out for punishment: for writing against the government. "If you can't avoid rape," one taunted him, "enjoy it."

The reporter, Umar Cheema, 34, had written several articles for The News that were critical of the Pakistani Army in the months preceding the attack.

His ordeal was not uncommon for a journalist or politician who crossed the interests of the military and intelligence agencies, the centers of power even in the current era of civilian government, reporters and politicians said.

What makes his case different is that Mr. Cheema has spoken out about it, describing in graphic detail what happened in the early hours of Sept. 4, something rare in a country where victims who suspect that their brutal treatment was at the hands of government agents often choose, out of fear, to keep quiet.

"I have suspicions and every journalist has suspicions that all fingers point to the ISI," Mr. Cheema said, using the acronym for the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, the institution that the C.I.A. works with closely in Pakistan to hunt militants. The ISI is an integral part of the Pakistani Army; its head, Gen. Shuja Ahmed Pasha, reports to the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

Officials at the American Embassy said they interviewed Mr. Cheema this week, and sent a report of his account to the State Department. In response to an e-mail for comment, a spokesman for the ISI said, "They are nothing but allegations with no substance or truth."

Mr. Cheema had won a Daniel Pearl Journalism Fellowship to train foreign journalists in 2007 and worked in The New York Times newsroom for six months at that time. He has worked at The News since 2007.

In interviews, he said his car was stopped near his home in the capital by men with the words "no fear" inscribed on their clothes. Once he was blindfolded and driven to the safe house, he was handed over to another group of men who carried out the abuse, he said. After six hours, he was dumped on a road 100 miles from the capital, Islamabad.

Mr. Cheema says he wrote more than 50 articles this year that questioned various aspects of the conduct of the military and the government, including corruption accusations against the president, Asif Ali Zardari.

But it was three articles in particular, in June, July and August, on delicate internal army problems that appear to have angered the military.

One article reported on the sensitive issue of the courts-martial of two army commandos who refused to obey orders and join the assault on a radical mosque and school in Islamabad in 2007.

The attack was believed at the time to be unpopular in the army ranks because many soldiers were reluctant to fire on fellow Muslims. Moreover, courts-martial are rarely mentioned in the Pakistani news media, and reporters have been warned not to write about them.

In his article, Mr. Cheema reported that two members of the Special Services Group, an elite commando squad, were being denied fair justice during the court-martial proceedings.

In another article, Mr. Cheema wrote that the suspects in a major terrorist attack against a bus carrying ISI employees were acquitted because of the "mishandling" of the court case by the intelligence agency.

In an article in early August, the reporter described how Army House, the residence of the chief of army staff, was protected by 400 city police officers and not by soldiers, as required by law.

In its political coverage, The News is vociferously against the civilian government of Mr. Zardari, but the opinion pages publish a cross section of views, including pro-military columnists.

While Mr. Cheema has chosen to publicize his case, he is not the only journalist or politician to come under the apparent harassment of the security services.

The law minister in Punjab Province, Rana Sanullah Khan, said that in 2003, when he was an opposition politician and had criticized the army during the presidency of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, he was kidnapped and brutalized in a similar manner.

In January, in Islamabad, the home of Azaz Syed, a reporter for Dawn, the main English-language daily, was attacked by unknown assailants days after he was threatened by supposed ISI agents over an investigative article he was researching related to the military.

Kamran Shafi, a leading columnist and himself a former army officer who writes critically of the military, was harassed and his house was attacked last December by "elements linked to the security establishment," according to his own account.

In the last several years, journalists in the tribal areas, where the army is fighting the Taliban, have faced special risks and found it increasingly difficult to work for fear of offending either side. In September two journalists were killed in or near the tribal areas, under circumstances that remain unclear.

Pakistan has developed a rambunctious news media spearheaded by round the clock television news channels in the last decade. The military and the ISI are treated with respect by the powerful television anchors, and by newspaper reporters who extol the deeds of the army in battling the Taliban. The ISI is rarely mentioned by name but referred to as "intelligence agencies."

One reason for the deference, according to a Pakistani intelligence official who has worked with the media cell of the ISI, is that the agency keeps many journalists on its payroll.

Unspoken rules about covering the military and its intelligence branches are eagerly enforced, Babar Sattar, a Harvard-trained lawyer, said. A journalist who trespasses over the line is told to behave, Mr. Sattar said.

Earlier this year, Mr. Cheema said he was called to a coffee shop in Islamabad by an ISI officer and warned to fall into line.

At a journalists' seminar in Lahore, the editor of a weekly newspaper, Najam Sethi, said it was up to the ISI to declare who had attacked Mr. Cheema.

"If the ISI hasn't done it, they should tell us who did it because they're supposed to know," Mr. Sethi said. "If they don't tell, the presumption remains they did it."

But in a column titled "Surprise Surprise" in Dawn, Mr. Shafi said, "We will never find out what happened to poor Umar Cheema because the Deep State does not want us to find out."
 

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