Sri Lanka snubs India opens port to Chinese submarine again

[LETHALFORCE]

Avoid personal attacks

 

[ezsasa]

If we know anything about chinese they are will continue to do whatever they have planned no matter who says anything.

Best thing to do is plan and rehearse counter measures.

 

[Ray]

India is a super-power but it can't handle Lanka, lol.

I think we as Indians need a reality check. We have a history of being conquered and ruled. We can't just ignore all that and pretend we're strong and free now. We aren't. We are not Europe or Arabia - they've had heroic conquerors in the past. We've had ... well, not much. The present is always shaped by the past. And our past is what exactly ... slavery?

I am afraid that you are not boned up on history.

Are you aware the the original inhabitants of England are not the ones who rule the country and hence are slaves (by your index of slavery)?

Apart from the various Houses that ruled Britain, it might interest you that Edward VII and, in turn, his son, George V, were members of the German ducal House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha by virtue of their descent from Albert, Prince Consort, husband of Queen Victoria.

Are you aware that the recorded history of Scotland begins with the arrival of the Roman Empire in the 1st century and then some more 'colourful' history and hence, by your index are slaves?

I could go on, but then I am sure you are not well conversant with what you claim to know.

Are the Chinese, Chinese? They are products of various invasions. However, they have less losers in their country who feel that they are products that are slaves.

The contention that Indian are slave is applicable to all races since invasions have visited most countries and the invaders in many cases stayed back to rule and genetically intermix resulting in the emergence of a new identity.

Likewise in India, there are no British folks or Mughals. All remnants and residues of such people are called Indians. It is people with acute insecurity who raise issues of being slaves.

Grow up.

Read up and get educated.

 

[Android]

It isn't such a dangerous incident to have alarm bells ringing,more than 200 ships and subs dock at colombo port every from various countries,but what concerns India is the frequency at which chinese nuke subs are docking at colombo port. Sri lanka is trying to play a nutral game over here ,sounds like some more investment would flow into SL soon.Though even they wouldn't like to give chinese a safe heaven right next to India,cos it wouldn't take India much time in turning SL into another cuba.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Interesting point @andtoid. What would india do if nukes were given to Sri Lanka
By china? Already know not much done when Pakistan received them.

 

[Hari Sud]

Chinese scored an upper hand in Sri Lanka. Nor that it has suddenly emerged a great threat, but definitely a pin prick at India by both China and Sri Lanka.

Let Sri Lanka run amock as much as they want. How long; sooner or later they would be asking of one or the other kind of help I.e. A cyclone or Sunami has struck, Tamil Elaam is raising its head again or Sri Lanka made in products have no market. They will be back to ask for one favor or the other. Had they invited an American Submarine to dock at Trincomalea sea port for a week, India would have cautioned but not taken strict note of it. It is the Chinese submarine which is giving India bad case of headache. As I said above, it has no military significance. A lone submarine with a tender is nothing. But if it is going to be armada, it is different. But remember an threatening armada crossing western approaches Straits of Malacca would face an Indian Armada positioned at Andaman & Nicobar. Tough luck for the Chinese sailors. They should their last prayers before they board their ships in China.

For China, getting less and less successful with confrontation in the Himalayas with every bunch of Chinese soldiers facing an equal number of determined Indian soldier when they crossed over to the indian controlled territory. Hence, they decided to play the game at sea. Indian Navy is expanding fast but today weaker with its nuclear submarine still undergoing trials, aircraft carrier is slowly easing itself into deep water service away from shores (Chinese are worst off in this area), it's battle class ships are awaiting Barak and Barak 8 missiles, Chinese saw a chance and exert its itself at sea. They forgot that India has the most potent submarine hunter in P-8I in the area. This cat and mouse game would continue.

Enter Vietnam into the picture. Chinese do not like one bit that India would go to explore for oil in South China Sea. Vietnam and China had been arguing about oil in that area for decades. They hate the proposal of India selling four patrol boats and Brahmos, ship killer missiles. These missiles will keep Chinese navy away from the area where the oil exploration is going on.

Hence overall it has become an interplay of three events which are happening in last few years.

First, Chinese are unable to make a headway in the Himalayas, because Indian troops are vigilant and India in next five years would have a much better infrastructure in the area. Hence sea is the only place open for them to make a point.

Second, Sri Lanka has been promised money or something or plain simple their dislike for their big brother next door is asking for influence from China. Silly, but bad judgement on their part.

Vietnam is an equalizer of all the above in a big way, which Sri Lanka cannot match. Vietnamese is a formidable foe for the Chinese. They tested it in 1979. With Indian naval aid, they can keep Chinese at bay and deny the Chinese the dominance they seek in South China Sea.

In this interplay, Chinese turned out to be loser. They have given India an excuse to supply the greatest ship killer missile to Vietnam. Sri Lanka has lost India's goodwill. Sooner than later they will knocking at India's door. Hence Sri Lanka has gained nothing.

It is premature to celebrate advantage India. In five years time, that could be case but today India's naval expansion plans are moving slowly, hence celebrate not today but in five years be ready to feel good about yourself.

To top it all, there is a new Sherrif in town. Nations in the neighbourhood, watch out and try not to cross him.

 

[CCP]

Chinese scored an upper hand in Sri Lanka. Nor that it has suddenly emerged a great threat, but definitely a pin prick at India by both China and Sri Lanka.

Let Sri Lanka run amock as much as they want. How long; sooner or later they would be asking of one or the other kind of help I.e. A cyclone or Sunami has struck, Tamil Elaam is raising its head again or Sri Lanka made in products have no market. They will be back to ask for one favor or the other. Had they invited an American Submarine to dock at Trincomalea sea port for a week, India would have cautioned but not taken strict note of it. It is the Chinese submarine which is giving India bad case of headache. As I said above, it has no military significance. A lone submarine with a tender is nothing. But if it is going to be armada, it is different. But remember an threatening armada crossing western approaches Straits of Malacca would face an Indian Armada positioned at Andaman & Nicobar. Tough luck for the Chinese sailors. They should their last prayers before they board their ships in China.

For China, getting less and less successful with confrontation in the Himalayas with every bunch of Chinese soldiers facing an equal number of determined Indian soldier when they crossed over to the indian controlled territory. Hence, they decided to play the game at sea. Indian Navy is expanding fast but today weaker with its nuclear submarine still undergoing trials, aircraft carrier is slowly easing itself into deep water service away from shores (Chinese are worst off in this area), it's battle class ships are awaiting Barak and Barak 8 missiles, Chinese saw a chance and exert its itself at sea. They forgot that India has the most potent submarine hunter in P-8I in the area. This cat and mouse game would continue.

Enter Vietnam into the picture. Chinese do not like one bit that India would go to explore for oil in South China Sea. Vietnam and China had been arguing about oil in that area for decades. They hate the proposal of India selling four patrol boats and Brahmos, ship killer missiles. These missiles will keep Chinese navy away from the area where the oil exploration is going on.

Hence overall it has become an interplay of three events which are happening in last few years.

First, Chinese are unable to make a headway in the Himalayas, because Indian troops are vigilant and India in next five years would have a much better infrastructure in the area. Hence sea is the only place open for them to make a point.

Second, Sri Lanka has been promised money or something or plain simple their dislike for their big brother next door is asking for influence from China. Silly, but bad judgement on their part.

Vietnam is an equalizer of all the above in a big way, which Sri Lanka cannot match. Vietnamese is a formidable foe for the Chinese. They tested it in 1979. With Indian naval aid, they can keep Chinese at bay and deny the Chinese the dominance they seek in South China Sea.

In this interplay, Chinese turned out to be loser. They have given India an excuse to supply the greatest ship killer missile to Vietnam. Sri Lanka has lost India's goodwill. Sooner than later they will knocking at India's door. Hence Sri Lanka has gained nothing.

It is premature to celebrate advantage India. In five years time, that could be case but today India's naval expansion plans are moving slowly, hence celebrate not today but in five years be ready to feel good about yourself.

To top it all, there is a new Sherrif in town. Nations in the neighbourhood, watch out and try not to cross him.

Ok, China and Lanka are losers. So, don't worry.

 

[Ray]

This is going to attract a greater presence of the US Navy in the Indian Ocean.

The US is very wary of Chinese design.

In the bargain, it will affect the strategic balance of the region.

 

[Ray]

CHINA'S UNFOLDING INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY – ANALYSIS

By D. S. Rajan

" The Greater Indian Ocean region stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, will be the centre of global conflicts, because most international business supply will be conducted through this route. Most important of all, it is in this region the interests and influence of India, China and the United States are beginning to overlap and intersect. It is here the 21st century's global power dynamics will be revealed"¦"¦. two key players in this region are India and China- India moving east and west while China to the South"- Robert Kaplan, in "Monsoon- the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power", 21 November 2010.

2. The quote above undoubtedly leads to a pertinent question – in what way the policy makers in the three potentially big players in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), are now preparing to meet the long term projections made in Kaplan's obviously accurate prognosis? In other words, what is the nature of current IOR strategies of these powers and what will be their geo-strategic implications?

3. Taking the case of People's Republic of China (PRC) , it cannot be denied that the PRC's strategic focus till now continues to be on the Pacific and not on the Indian Ocean region. It would however be a folly to ignore the gradually unfolding changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the IOR's strategic importance; they are indeed pointers to the future. As for now, Beijing's principal interest seems to lie in the need to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) along the Indian Ocean, vital for the country's energy imports. While this is being so, official-level articulations on China's IOR views are gradually gaining intensity, which may culminate in China's coming out with a comprehensive Indian Ocean doctrine ultimately.

4. It is not difficult to trace the connection between the changing Chinese perceptions on the IOR and the steady emergence of maritime security interests, marking a new trend since the end of cold war, as a key element of China's overall national security strategy. To help achieving the declared goal of turning the country as a fully modernised one by middle of the century, the PRC has evolved an overall strategic approach enmeshing the requirements of land, maritime, economy and energy security. Out of these, the criticality of maritime aspect has risen as a result of the compulsions which China began to experience for getting access to all strategic resources and protecting critical sea lanes transporting energy supplies from abroad, in the overall interest of its development. As corollary, the PRC's naval objectives have undergone a shift – from that of conducting coastal defence activities to offshore defence and ultimately to far sea defence. A case in point is the stress noticed in China's latest Defence White Paper (2013) on "protecting national maritime rights and interests" and "armed forces providing reliable support for China's interests overseas". It is clear that the PRC intends to expand the capabilities of its Navy, especially to operate abroad; this indeed marks a new stage in China's development which has come into being due to the increasing needs being felt by a rising China to secure its growing global interests.

5. China is now turning its security policies into action. The PRC's ongoing naval modernisation efforts are gaining momentum which confirm Beijing's intentions to expand the country's naval capabilities so as to operate in waters far beyond its borders. Against the roles allotted to it to defeat invasion from sea, defend territorial sovereignty and protect maritime rights, the PLA Navy is upgrading its destroyers and frigates to range further. Testing of 056 stealth frigate and the entry into service of China's first air craft carrier, need to be seen in this context. In a nutshell, China's naval capabilities are increasing day by day thanks to its ongoing modernization programme in developing Anti- Ship Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ship cruise missiles, submarines, both conventional and nuclear, amphibious ships, land based air craft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Electro-magnetic pulse weapons and maritime surveillance. It is believed that naval modernization can lead to China's projection of power into the first island chain (Taiwan) and even upto the second island chain (Guam) , hurting American interests. The establishment of Yalong naval base near Sanya may have strategic implications for military balance in Asia-Pacific region ( Carlyle A. Thayer, paper to international workshop on South China Sea , Ho Chi Minh city, 18-21 November 2012).

6.The Chinese Navy's field activities now include its participation in the joint anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia in 2011 and its ship to ship replenishment exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean in December 2013 as well as the 'counter-piracy, search, rescue and damage control drill', carried out in January 2014 by a three-ship Chinese navy squadron. In the last mentioned, the largest amphibious Chinese landing ship – Changbaishan – along with two destroyers took part. The choice of Lombok Strait near Indonesia, as drill location has been significant as by doing so, Beijing seems to have opened up a new route from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, other than the usual one used for drills through the Malacca Strait. Interesting are Chinese official observations being noticed that the drill is a part of 'annually held naval combat exercises in the South China Sea, the West Pacific Ocean and the East Indian Ocean to test the combat ability of naval ships'.

7. China's actions in deploying attack submarines in the Indian Ocean, is receiving India's attention. Noting this development, an Indian official document, titled 'Indian Navy: Perceived Threats to Subsurface Deterrent Capability and Preparedness', prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff in New Delhi predicted intense rivalry between the Indian and Chinese navies in the next three years as the "implicit focus" of the Chinese Navy appears to be on undermining the Indian Navy's edge "to control highly sensitive sea lines of communication (" China's submarines in Indian Ocean worry Indian Navy", Alfred Wilhelm Meier, China Daily Mail , 7 April 2013, http://chinadailymail.com/2013/04/07/chinas-submarines-in-indian-ocean-w"¦).

8. The first firm signal that maritime security interests dominate China's thinking on the IOR came through a statement (Galle, Sri Lanka, 13 December 2012) made by Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, Commander of the East China Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy. It laid stress on the 'freedom and safety of the navigation in the Indian Ocean' acting as a crucial factor in global economy and declared that the Chinese navy will actively maintain the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean through carrying out 'maritime security cooperation' with the navies of various countries, especially seeking to establish a maritime security 'code of conduct' between them under the 'premise of respect for each country's sovereignty and maritime interests' ( "Chinese Navy to Actively Maintain Peace and Stability of Indian Ocean", China Military Online, 15 December 2012).

9. One can see the next signal in the Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) released in June 2013. It had chapters on India's "Look East Policy" and the "U.S-India axis of relation in Indian Ocean region". As a document of an authoritative Chinese think tank, it appears as policy indicators. The Blue Book observed that "In the past, China's Indian Ocean strategy was based on 'moderation' and 'maintaining the status quo', but the changing dynamics of international relations necessitates China play a more proactive role in affairs of the region". It frankly admitted that Beijing presently is not having any Indian Ocean strategy unlike U.S. and India who were following a well-defined "Look East" policy and the "pivot" or "rebalancing" strategy respectively. Adding that In absence of a strategy , China's development prospects would severely be hit, it observed, "With changes in the relations among countries in the Indian Ocean Region and in the international situation, China's diplomacy should also change , but Beijing's interests will be driven only by commercial, and not military, objectives". The document asked China to deepen economic ties with the nations in the IOR while cautioning that if China, United States and India do not constructively engage each other, the Indian Ocean can end up as an ocean of conflict and trouble. As the CASS publication predicted, no single or regional power including Russia, China, Australia and India, can control the Indian Ocean by itself in the future and after jostling among powers, a fragile balance of power might be reached in the region. It acknowledged that the rise of China was worrying the littoral states of IOR, particularly India. "The 'China threat theory' proposed by Western countries and the illusory 'string of pearls strategy was being projected as a new assertiveness of Beijing, it pointed out.

10. Further signals include observations on the US role in the IOR being made by Chinese academicians close to the official hierarchy. A study said that after the end of the cold war, the US became the leading force in the Indian Ocean and began its military forward deployment there. In recent years, with the rising of the strategic position of the Indian Ocean, the US put forward the "Indo-Pacific" concept and strengthened its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, such as maintaining its dominant position, protecting the safety of sea lines of communication and continuing to control strategic chokepoints, etc. Driven by ideology and economic factors, the US has obtained hegemony in the Indian Ocean via military deployment and institutional arrangements, ("U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy", Pacific Journal, June 2013, Sun Xianpu, Yunnan University, Kunming).

11. Other Influential Chinese scholars have assessed that at present, in the Indian Ocean region, there is a 'no alliance, no adversary' situation of 'flexible balance; this may however change and China should respond by seeking 'greater space' for it in the Indian Ocean region (Chen lijun and Xu Juan, "Flexible Balance and Economic Strategies of China, the US and India in Indian ocean", South Asia Studies, Volume 4/12, 15 July 2013).

12. Chinese analysts have also commented in the IOR strategy of India. The launch of India's first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant on 12 August 2013 has been viewed them as reflecting India's "ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean" and heralding a greater Indian presence in the Pacific. The experts alleged that the US wants to push India to integrate into its system to contain China and encourages India to intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs under the "Indo-Pacific" concept, but India prefers balancing China naturally by ensuring peaceful and fruitful competition and has no intention of becoming a regional test balloon by going against China ( Fu Xiaoqiang, a scholar at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations – CICIR, China Daily, 12 August 2013).

13. Among subsequent commentaries on the IOR made by influential Chinese academicians, an article of a leading state-controlled Chinese think tank, look very significant. The write-up declared that China's strategic focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean and the PRC lags far behind the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy India's geographic advantages. It asserted that China follows a naval strategy aimed at ensuring a 'harmonious sea' through capacity building and international cooperation, viewing the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle. China's seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world, particularly the Indian Ocean.

14. The article added that Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region littorals is part of the PRC's economy-oriented 'Going Global' strategy. Interpreting India's views on the Indian Ocean region as a sum-up of senses of crisis and destiny, it says that as for crisis, Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages between Indian Ocean and India's national security and as for destiny, India's unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of India's aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform Indian Ocean into India's Ocean. Contrasting India's position with that of the US , the article found that the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power that is not only dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. Although it stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy, the US is still trying to maintain its status as a pre-eminent maritime power. In accordance with the shift of the world power balance, the US will seek to sustain its strong presence in the Indian Ocean.

15. In conclusion, the article said that although confrontations and conflicts between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly with the rise of China's maritime power, their different strategic goals may lead to different results. It added that given the China's policy aims, intent and capability, the PRC cannot afford to challenge either the United States or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India is likely to adopt a more assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an India–US potential power struggle in the Indian Ocean is more likely to characterize the Indian Ocean region landscape than the 'China threat' ( "Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Don't Exaggerate the China Threat", 24 October 2013, Chun Hao Lou, Assistant Director at the Institute of Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations –CICIR, Power politics in the Indian Ocean: don't exaggerate the China threat | East Asia Forum ).

16. The data given above, give enough hints to the likely shape of China's future Indian Ocean Region (IOR) strategy. Given below is an estimate of the same and possible regional consequences of responses of other two important involved powers like the US and India.

(a) China's priority will always be on protecting its energy security interests, by way of securing the Sea Lanes of Communications, spreading from the Gulf to the South China Sea. In the short and middle terms, realising its existing inferior position compared to US maritime power and India's strategic advantage in the IOR, China may persist with its 'harmonious sea' approach. It will shun a military approach and push for 'constructive engagement' in the IOR between three powers – the US, China and India, and concentrate on achieving 'greater space' in the IOR by way of promoting maritime security cooperation with the Indian Ocean littorals. In long terms, China, under perceived conditions of continuance of India's domination and the US strong presence in the IOR, may intend to project its own power into the region to bring about a balance to the situation. Beijing may actively work for creating alternative energy supply routes, safe from the US and Indian challenges.

(b) China's current fears that the US is trying to contain the PRC by roping in Indian Ocean littorals, under an 'Indo-Pacific' framework, may always influence Chinese strategic thinking. In this context, one can expect China's increased efforts to woo these littorals through economic and other means so as to keep them away from the US influence. Its drive to build infrastructure in IOR littorals as part of its 'going global' strategy, is already setting the trend in this regard.

(c ) On India, influencing China's strategy in a long term, will be the thought figuring in the Chinese analyses so far noticed- India , with its regional economic and political power rising, may become more assertive in the IOR. At the same time, China tends to believe that India will always maintain its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis other nations and will not gang up with the latter, particularly the US, against the PRC's interests. Wooing India will therefore be China's long term endeavour; the PRC's "Look west" strategy accords primacy to and rebalance ties with India (being publicised through highly placed Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi).

17. Indian response to China's Indian Ocean strategy is manifesting in its stepped up efforts to improve bilateral ties with Indian Ocean littorals. Significant is New Delhi's participation in the multilateral fora like the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Indian Ocean Naval symposium. The US is reportedly under invitation to join the IOR-ARC.

18. Washington's interest in the IOR centres round three imperatives for the US- Securing Indian Ocean for international commerce, avoiding regional conflict on issues of strategic choke points in the IOR- Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca strait, and dealing with Sino-Indian competition in the IOR ("Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy" , The Washington Quarterly, published by Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington). The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) 2010 of the US Department of Defence had the goals of ensuring open access to the IOR to be achieved through a more integrated approach across civil and military organisations. The Department's document " Strategic Choices and Management Review" ( July 2013) stressed the need for US to develop an Indian Ocean policy on the basis of building coalitions with regional allies like Australia, Japan and the Philippines and partners like Vietnam and India. The QDR for 2014 is yet to be made public. The US is currently promoting an "Indo-Pacific" concept as part of its approach towards the IOR; this means differently to each of the countries concerned. New Delhi views the concept in the background of India's 'geographical, historical and political 'necessity. It displays wariness to China's expanding engagement in the region. For China, the concept marks creation of a highway connecting Indian and Pacific Oceans which can play a role in transporting much-needed resources. But it is suspicious of US intentions to use the concept for containing China. On its part, Washington aims to achieve through implementing the concept, the freedom of navigation and reassurance to allies and partners. Australia sees the concept as benevolent one to improve ties with regional nations (- Page not found)

19. To sum up, the geo-strategic conditions in the IOR are still developing. The current trends being seen indicating that the three main powers involved – India, China and the US, have their own priorities, with potentials for clash, may not be conducive to the establishment of regional peace and prosperity , a dream of all concerned nations.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: [email protected])
China's Unfolding Indian Ocean Strategy - Analysis - Eurasia Review

 

[Ray]

CHINA'S UNFOLDING INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY – ANALYSIS

By D. S. Rajan

" The Greater Indian Ocean region stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, will be the centre of global conflicts, because most international business supply will be conducted through this route. Most important of all, it is in this region the interests and influence of India, China and the United States are beginning to overlap and intersect. It is here the 21st century's global power dynamics will be revealed"¦"¦. two key players in this region are India and China- India moving east and west while China to the South"- Robert Kaplan, in "Monsoon- the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power", 21 November 2010.

2. The quote above undoubtedly leads to a pertinent question – in what way the policy makers in the three potentially big players in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), are now preparing to meet the long term projections made in Kaplan's obviously accurate prognosis? In other words, what is the nature of current IOR strategies of these powers and what will be their geo-strategic implications?

3. Taking the case of People's Republic of China (PRC) , it cannot be denied that the PRC's strategic focus till now continues to be on the Pacific and not on the Indian Ocean region. It would however be a folly to ignore the gradually unfolding changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the IOR's strategic importance; they are indeed pointers to the future. As for now, Beijing's principal interest seems to lie in the need to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) along the Indian Ocean, vital for the country's energy imports. While this is being so, official-level articulations on China's IOR views are gradually gaining intensity, which may culminate in China's coming out with a comprehensive Indian Ocean doctrine ultimately.

4. It is not difficult to trace the connection between the changing Chinese perceptions on the IOR and the steady emergence of maritime security interests, marking a new trend since the end of cold war, as a key element of China's overall national security strategy. To help achieving the declared goal of turning the country as a fully modernised one by middle of the century, the PRC has evolved an overall strategic approach enmeshing the requirements of land, maritime, economy and energy security. Out of these, the criticality of maritime aspect has risen as a result of the compulsions which China began to experience for getting access to all strategic resources and protecting critical sea lanes transporting energy supplies from abroad, in the overall interest of its development. As corollary, the PRC's naval objectives have undergone a shift – from that of conducting coastal defence activities to offshore defence and ultimately to far sea defence. A case in point is the stress noticed in China's latest Defence White Paper (2013) on "protecting national maritime rights and interests" and "armed forces providing reliable support for China's interests overseas". It is clear that the PRC intends to expand the capabilities of its Navy, especially to operate abroad; this indeed marks a new stage in China's development which has come into being due to the increasing needs being felt by a rising China to secure its growing global interests.

5. China is now turning its security policies into action. The PRC's ongoing naval modernisation efforts are gaining momentum which confirm Beijing's intentions to expand the country's naval capabilities so as to operate in waters far beyond its borders. Against the roles allotted to it to defeat invasion from sea, defend territorial sovereignty and protect maritime rights, the PLA Navy is upgrading its destroyers and frigates to range further. Testing of 056 stealth frigate and the entry into service of China's first air craft carrier, need to be seen in this context. In a nutshell, China's naval capabilities are increasing day by day thanks to its ongoing modernization programme in developing Anti- Ship Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ship cruise missiles, submarines, both conventional and nuclear, amphibious ships, land based air craft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Electro-magnetic pulse weapons and maritime surveillance. It is believed that naval modernization can lead to China's projection of power into the first island chain (Taiwan) and even upto the second island chain (Guam) , hurting American interests. The establishment of Yalong naval base near Sanya may have strategic implications for military balance in Asia-Pacific region ( Carlyle A. Thayer, paper to international workshop on South China Sea , Ho Chi Minh city, 18-21 November 2012).

6.The Chinese Navy's field activities now include its participation in the joint anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia in 2011 and its ship to ship replenishment exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean in December 2013 as well as the 'counter-piracy, search, rescue and damage control drill', carried out in January 2014 by a three-ship Chinese navy squadron. In the last mentioned, the largest amphibious Chinese landing ship – Changbaishan – along with two destroyers took part. The choice of Lombok Strait near Indonesia, as drill location has been significant as by doing so, Beijing seems to have opened up a new route from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, other than the usual one used for drills through the Malacca Strait. Interesting are Chinese official observations being noticed that the drill is a part of 'annually held naval combat exercises in the South China Sea, the West Pacific Ocean and the East Indian Ocean to test the combat ability of naval ships'.

7. China's actions in deploying attack submarines in the Indian Ocean, is receiving India's attention. Noting this development, an Indian official document, titled 'Indian Navy: Perceived Threats to Subsurface Deterrent Capability and Preparedness', prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff in New Delhi predicted intense rivalry between the Indian and Chinese navies in the next three years as the "implicit focus" of the Chinese Navy appears to be on undermining the Indian Navy's edge "to control highly sensitive sea lines of communication (" China's submarines in Indian Ocean worry Indian Navy", Alfred Wilhelm Meier, China Daily Mail , 7 April 2013, http://chinadailymail.com/2013/04/07/chinas-submarines-in-indian-ocean-w"¦).

8. The first firm signal that maritime security interests dominate China's thinking on the IOR came through a statement (Galle, Sri Lanka, 13 December 2012) made by Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, Commander of the East China Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy. It laid stress on the 'freedom and safety of the navigation in the Indian Ocean' acting as a crucial factor in global economy and declared that the Chinese navy will actively maintain the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean through carrying out 'maritime security cooperation' with the navies of various countries, especially seeking to establish a maritime security 'code of conduct' between them under the 'premise of respect for each country's sovereignty and maritime interests' ( "Chinese Navy to Actively Maintain Peace and Stability of Indian Ocean", China Military Online, 15 December 2012).

9. One can see the next signal in the Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) released in June 2013. It had chapters on India's "Look East Policy" and the "U.S-India axis of relation in Indian Ocean region". As a document of an authoritative Chinese think tank, it appears as policy indicators. The Blue Book observed that "In the past, China's Indian Ocean strategy was based on 'moderation' and 'maintaining the status quo', but the changing dynamics of international relations necessitates China play a more proactive role in affairs of the region". It frankly admitted that Beijing presently is not having any Indian Ocean strategy unlike U.S. and India who were following a well-defined "Look East" policy and the "pivot" or "rebalancing" strategy respectively. Adding that In absence of a strategy , China's development prospects would severely be hit, it observed, "With changes in the relations among countries in the Indian Ocean Region and in the international situation, China's diplomacy should also change , but Beijing's interests will be driven only by commercial, and not military, objectives". The document asked China to deepen economic ties with the nations in the IOR while cautioning that if China, United States and India do not constructively engage each other, the Indian Ocean can end up as an ocean of conflict and trouble. As the CASS publication predicted, no single or regional power including Russia, China, Australia and India, can control the Indian Ocean by itself in the future and after jostling among powers, a fragile balance of power might be reached in the region. It acknowledged that the rise of China was worrying the littoral states of IOR, particularly India. "The 'China threat theory' proposed by Western countries and the illusory 'string of pearls strategy was being projected as a new assertiveness of Beijing, it pointed out.

10. Further signals include observations on the US role in the IOR being made by Chinese academicians close to the official hierarchy. A study said that after the end of the cold war, the US became the leading force in the Indian Ocean and began its military forward deployment there. In recent years, with the rising of the strategic position of the Indian Ocean, the US put forward the "Indo-Pacific" concept and strengthened its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, such as maintaining its dominant position, protecting the safety of sea lines of communication and continuing to control strategic chokepoints, etc. Driven by ideology and economic factors, the US has obtained hegemony in the Indian Ocean via military deployment and institutional arrangements, ("U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy", Pacific Journal, June 2013, Sun Xianpu, Yunnan University, Kunming).

11. Other Influential Chinese scholars have assessed that at present, in the Indian Ocean region, there is a 'no alliance, no adversary' situation of 'flexible balance; this may however change and China should respond by seeking 'greater space' for it in the Indian Ocean region (Chen lijun and Xu Juan, "Flexible Balance and Economic Strategies of China, the US and India in Indian ocean", South Asia Studies, Volume 4/12, 15 July 2013).

12. Chinese analysts have also commented in the IOR strategy of India. The launch of India's first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant on 12 August 2013 has been viewed them as reflecting India's "ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean" and heralding a greater Indian presence in the Pacific. The experts alleged that the US wants to push India to integrate into its system to contain China and encourages India to intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs under the "Indo-Pacific" concept, but India prefers balancing China naturally by ensuring peaceful and fruitful competition and has no intention of becoming a regional test balloon by going against China ( Fu Xiaoqiang, a scholar at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations – CICIR, China Daily, 12 August 2013).

13. Among subsequent commentaries on the IOR made by influential Chinese academicians, an article of a leading state-controlled Chinese think tank, look very significant. The write-up declared that China's strategic focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean and the PRC lags far behind the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy India's geographic advantages. It asserted that China follows a naval strategy aimed at ensuring a 'harmonious sea' through capacity building and international cooperation, viewing the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle. China's seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world, particularly the Indian Ocean.

14. The article added that Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region littorals is part of the PRC's economy-oriented 'Going Global' strategy. Interpreting India's views on the Indian Ocean region as a sum-up of senses of crisis and destiny, it says that as for crisis, Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages between Indian Ocean and India's national security and as for destiny, India's unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of India's aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform Indian Ocean into India's Ocean. Contrasting India's position with that of the US , the article found that the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power that is not only dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. Although it stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy, the US is still trying to maintain its status as a pre-eminent maritime power. In accordance with the shift of the world power balance, the US will seek to sustain its strong presence in the Indian Ocean.

15. In conclusion, the article said that although confrontations and conflicts between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly with the rise of China's maritime power, their different strategic goals may lead to different results. It added that given the China's policy aims, intent and capability, the PRC cannot afford to challenge either the United States or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India is likely to adopt a more assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an India–US potential power struggle in the Indian Ocean is more likely to characterize the Indian Ocean region landscape than the 'China threat' ( "Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Don't Exaggerate the China Threat", 24 October 2013, Chun Hao Lou, Assistant Director at the Institute of Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations –CICIR, Power politics in the Indian Ocean: don't exaggerate the China threat | East Asia Forum ).

16. The data given above, give enough hints to the likely shape of China's future Indian Ocean Region (IOR) strategy. Given below is an estimate of the same and possible regional consequences of responses of other two important involved powers like the US and India.

(a) China's priority will always be on protecting its energy security interests, by way of securing the Sea Lanes of Communications, spreading from the Gulf to the South China Sea. In the short and middle terms, realising its existing inferior position compared to US maritime power and India's strategic advantage in the IOR, China may persist with its 'harmonious sea' approach. It will shun a military approach and push for 'constructive engagement' in the IOR between three powers – the US, China and India, and concentrate on achieving 'greater space' in the IOR by way of promoting maritime security cooperation with the Indian Ocean littorals. In long terms, China, under perceived conditions of continuance of India's domination and the US strong presence in the IOR, may intend to project its own power into the region to bring about a balance to the situation. Beijing may actively work for creating alternative energy supply routes, safe from the US and Indian challenges.

(b) China's current fears that the US is trying to contain the PRC by roping in Indian Ocean littorals, under an 'Indo-Pacific' framework, may always influence Chinese strategic thinking. In this context, one can expect China's increased efforts to woo these littorals through economic and other means so as to keep them away from the US influence. Its drive to build infrastructure in IOR littorals as part of its 'going global' strategy, is already setting the trend in this regard.

(c ) On India, influencing China's strategy in a long term, will be the thought figuring in the Chinese analyses so far noticed- India , with its regional economic and political power rising, may become more assertive in the IOR. At the same time, China tends to believe that India will always maintain its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis other nations and will not gang up with the latter, particularly the US, against the PRC's interests. Wooing India will therefore be China's long term endeavour; the PRC's "Look west" strategy accords primacy to and rebalance ties with India (being publicised through highly placed Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi).

17. Indian response to China's Indian Ocean strategy is manifesting in its stepped up efforts to improve bilateral ties with Indian Ocean littorals. Significant is New Delhi's participation in the multilateral fora like the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Indian Ocean Naval symposium. The US is reportedly under invitation to join the IOR-ARC.

18. Washington's interest in the IOR centres round three imperatives for the US- Securing Indian Ocean for international commerce, avoiding regional conflict on issues of strategic choke points in the IOR- Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca strait, and dealing with Sino-Indian competition in the IOR ("Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy" , The Washington Quarterly, published by Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington). The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) 2010 of the US Department of Defence had the goals of ensuring open access to the IOR to be achieved through a more integrated approach across civil and military organisations. The Department's document " Strategic Choices and Management Review" ( July 2013) stressed the need for US to develop an Indian Ocean policy on the basis of building coalitions with regional allies like Australia, Japan and the Philippines and partners like Vietnam and India. The QDR for 2014 is yet to be made public. The US is currently promoting an "Indo-Pacific" concept as part of its approach towards the IOR; this means differently to each of the countries concerned. New Delhi views the concept in the background of India's 'geographical, historical and political 'necessity. It displays wariness to China's expanding engagement in the region. For China, the concept marks creation of a highway connecting Indian and Pacific Oceans which can play a role in transporting much-needed resources. But it is suspicious of US intentions to use the concept for containing China. On its part, Washington aims to achieve through implementing the concept, the freedom of navigation and reassurance to allies and partners. Australia sees the concept as benevolent one to improve ties with regional nations (- Page not found)

19. To sum up, the geo-strategic conditions in the IOR are still developing. The current trends being seen indicating that the three main powers involved – India, China and the US, have their own priorities, with potentials for clash, may not be conducive to the establishment of regional peace and prosperity , a dream of all concerned nations.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies. Email: [email protected])
China's Unfolding Indian Ocean Strategy - Analysis - Eurasia Review

 

[Ray]

Review of "Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy"

Dr. Satoru Nagao, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation

In spring 2012, Michael J. Green (Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and Associate Professor at Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) and Andrew Shearer (Director of Studies and a Senior Research Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia) published a 15-page article titled "Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy" in The Washington Quarterly published by Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.[1]

The authors have analyzed and defined the Indian Ocean strategy of the U.S. as there is, now, a growing awareness of the Indian Ocean in the US, Australia and Japan. In this article, there are three focuses of US interest as listed below. Firstly, the Indian Ocean is important to maintain as a secure highway for international commerce. Secondly, there are strategic choke points of the Indian Ocean highway in the Strait of Holms on one end and the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea on the other. Considering there is crisis with Iran and China, these areas are of more immediate concern for the US. Thirdly, the Indian Ocean is likely to remain the main arena of Sino-Indian Competition in the long run or at least in near future.

The authors have also analyzed how these three US interests should be dealt with while at the same time analyzing their seriousness. In this review, I will first summarize the main points of the article, followed by expressing my opinion about why Japan and U.S. are presently interested in the Indian Ocean.

I. Summary of the main points of the article

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a major center of geostrategic interest in the past few years. U.S. and key U.S. allies have also mentioned the Indian Ocean in their official documents such as The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper and Japan's 2011 National Defense Policy Guidelines.

Such official focus on the Indian Ocean, by way of these documents, has been fueled by Robert Kaplan's 2010 book Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power and documents written in the Naval War College, the American Enterprise Institute, the Lowy Institute (Australia), and the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (Japan) etc. All of these strategic researches have made a long list of security issues.

According to the view from U.S., the Indian Ocean region is not a region that resembles the 19th-century strategic vulnerability of the Caribbean under threat from Europe or the 20th-century Western Pacific from Japan. This is because India is likely to be a "net exporter of security" in the Indian Ocean region in the future. If so, what vital U.S. interests really are at stake today? What strategy is required to protect and advance those interests?

1. U.S. Interests

While deliberating upon the focal points of U.S. strategy, to maintain the Indian Ocean as a secure highway for international commerce is the most important. To maintain freedom of navigation through the strategic chokepoints of the Indian Ocean highway – the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, around southern Africa and the Mozambique Channel – is second. Thirdly, the Indian Ocean region could become an arena for great power strategic competition between India and China.

(1) Thinking through Sino-Indian Competition

It is important to assess these trends cautiously and carefully. Even if China develops effective power-projection forces (20 or 30 years later) including an effective carrier-borne strike forces and military support facilities in the Indian Ocean, this would still operate at some disadvantage. Long distances from ports in southern China would make for their supply lines vulnerable around the Strait of Malacca and other chokepoints. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would face challenges very similar to the situation the imperial Japanese navy faced in the Indian Ocean during 1942 ~ 1943 when they could not dominate in the region.

However, there is another example from history that suggests being cautious. Though the Soviets never had the ability to dominate the Indian Ocean region, but one cannot deny the possibility of them transferring what are now called anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities to the Indian Ocean. This possibility could have been a serious threat during Cold War. A similar threat by China has to be considered in the long run.

In any case, there is a distinct possibility that Beijing would face significant counter-balancing among maritime powers in the Indian Ocean.

(2) Nearer-Term Risks?

In the meantime, there is a growing pressure in the eastern gateway of the Indian Ocean. Beijing has upped the ante in the South China Sea (particularly Vietnam and the Philippines) diplomatically and militarily. In the absence of the United States, China would be on track to become the dominant maritime power in that sub-region.

However, the more immediate challenge is actually from Iran but in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States will need to keep two things in place, first, defense-in-depth and deterrence to respond from the Indian Ocean region to any Iranian activities against the Strait of Hormuz an immediate strategy, and second, dissuasion vis-a`-vis Chinese pressures from the South China Sea on chokepoints at that end of the Indian Ocean as a longer-term strategy.

2. Components of a U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy

The three U.S. geostrategic interests at stake, i.e. "maintaining a secure highway", "sanitizing great power rivalry in Asia", and "defending chokepoints" are going to be on top priority for the U.S. In this context, listed below are the five interlocking principles for the U.S. National Security Council.

(1) Resources Matter

The Obama administration sent a signal by promising not to take defense cuts out of the Pacific Command. However, even the current plans would decrease U.S. defense spending by the size of Japan's defense budget each year. This is of considerable significance as Japan is the largest U.S. ally in the region and the sixth largest defense spender in the world. The Pacific Command's ability to execute its mission could seriously degrade. Japan or other homeports in Australia and Singapore could be based to engage exercises and demonstrate presence in the vast region, but deep budget cuts would affect how much the Pacific Command could actually engage and demonstrate its presence in the vast region. It is a fact that a crisis with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz will draw capabilities out from the Pacific Command's area of responsibility (AOR) because there will be less capability based in Europe.

(2) Diego Garcia and Australia Matter

Although the United States does not need a major new military presence in the Indian Ocean except for Diego Garcia, HMAS Stirling, a major Australian Naval base in Western Australia, and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. HMAS Stirling offers deep-water port facilities which are capable of expansion to accommodate aircraft carriers, support facilities for surface vessels and submarines, and ready access to extensive naval exercising areas. In World War II, up to 30 U.S. submarines were based in the same area. A relatively modest investment in upgrading the existing Cocos Islands runway and facilities which are located in Australian territory 3,000 kilometers northwest of Perth, roughly midway between the Australian mainland and Sri Lanka would provide a valuable staging point for long-range U.S. aircraft operating into the Bay of Bengal and beyond.

(3) Balance of Power Matters

The United States does not need to plan for significant increases in its permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean except for Diego Garcia, HMAS Stirling and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. U.S. strategy should focus on supporting Indian preeminence in the Indian Ocean and closer U.S.—India strategic cooperation, recognizing that there are realistic limits to this that stop well short of a full-fledged alliance. In addition, U.S. strategy should encourage closer alignment among the maritime democracies. Enhanced strategic consultations would be useful in time for return to the U.S.—Japan—Australia—India ''Quad'' concept. A strategy of gradual alignment among maritime powers in the Indian Ocean has three advantages: first, it helps to dissuade China from seeking parity over India alone, thus securing the highway; second, it provides an arena outside of Beijing's most sensitive areas of ''core interest'' to demonstrate that Chinese assertiveness will make counter-alignment strategies by other states in the region; and third, it creates capacity and norms for security cooperation that will discourage unilateral power plays in response to piracy, terrorism, or other littoral challenges in the Indian Ocean by China.

(4) Regional Architecture Matters Less"¦In This Case

It remains doubtable whether there is another architectural solution to the problem comparable to the U.S. approach to ASEAN or the Western Pacific. The U.S. government should be careful about broad U.S.-led Indian Ocean initiatives for four reasons as listed below. Firstly, if the most important U.S. strategic interest in the region is supporting Indian leadership then it should not undermine or challenge that leadership. Secondly, the areas where U.S. and Indian definitions of national interest often diverge such as the issues of seabed exploitation or climate change, suggesting that these should be handled quietly in bilateral or global forums rather than as centerpieces of an Indian Ocean regional initiative. Thirdly, India's residual non-alignment pathologies tend to come out often in multilateral forums. India's strategic culture is changing in the direction that will underpin U.S. strategic interests. Thus, U.S. strategy should reinforce the changing bilateral cooperation or mini-lateral efforts such as the Quad or the new U.S.—Japan—India trilateral dialogue. Fourthly, because the challenges facing the Indian Ocean region are simply too diverse, one-size-fits-all architectural solution is needed.

(5) Taiwan Matters

If U.S. policy shifts toward active promotion of Taiwan's independence from the mainland it would invite direct Chinese confrontation and produce little positive results in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. However, strong and sustained U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and opposing unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is critical. Chinese coercion of Taiwan through economic or military means would weaken U.S. and Japanese strategic influence in the Western Pacific and encourage the PLAN to focus on the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean eventually. In contrast, if democratic Taiwan, for the sake of security concerns, suggests positive changes in China's own political and strategic culture, it makes a positive contribution to a broader Asia including the Indian Ocean region.

3. A Strategic Problem: Not a Crisis

"Despite all the recent attention, there is no immediate or looming crisis in the security of the Indian Ocean." Hence, it is important to preserve these interests by old-fashioned alliance management, maintaining naval power in the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea and the highway (supported from Diego Garcia and Australia), maintaining vibrant alliances in East Asia, clear commitments to Taiwan, and developing a strategic partnership with a rising India.

II. Comments −India is Rising as a Naval Power-

What kind of interests Japan and U.S. have in the Indian Ocean? How vital are these interests? It is to these important questions that I now turn. Military operations in the Indian Ocean have been not been discussed exhaustively either by Japan or U.S. However, both have implemented certain military operations in the region. Many examples may be cited from the past. For example, in World War I, Japan escorted the Allies ships in the Indian Ocean. In the Battle of Ceylon in 1942, it sent five aircraft carriers for the battle. Further, in World War II, Japan's submarines attacked sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean region. Similar examples may also be cited from the post war era. As a peaceful country, Japan participated in the mission of minesweepers after the Gulf War in 1991. Since then, cases of Japan's involvement in the region have only grown with time. Several examples will substantiate this claim. The refueling mission after 9/11 from 2001 to 2009, the disaster relief operation for the large earthquake offshore Sumatra in Indonesia and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, the disaster relief Operation in Pakistan in 2007, the measures against piracy in the Indian Ocean Region since 2009 etc. However, there remains a gap. Despite Japan implementing these military operations in the Indian Ocean for a long time now, there are few sufficient systematic researches and discussions that explore the various dimensions of the connections between the security of Japan and the security of the Indian Ocean.

Compared to Japan, United States has implemented bigger and more aggressive military activities in the Indian Ocean. Again, we could illustrate with examples from the past. In the Sino-Indian war in 1962, US dispatched aircraft carrier to support India. In the Indo-Pak war of 1971, after the British decided to withdraw from bases "East of Suez", US dispatched an aircraft carrier to support Pakistan in constructing base in Diego Garcia. Naval ship visited for refueling and planned to set up the transmission facilities of Voice of America in Trincomalee in Sri Lanka. These activities compelled India to send Sri Lanka more than 60,000 troopers to Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990. Further, in 1972, U.S. added the India Ocean region as the area of responsibility of US Pacific Command. After the 1973 Arab Israeli War, U.S. became far more concerned with their interests in the Indian Ocean. The Chief of U.S. Naval Operations explained to the Senate that the Indian Ocean was the key area where the balance of power changed on 20 March 1974.

However, despite such kind of military activities, there are certain other factors that better explain US military activities in the Indian Ocean. For example, in 1970s, the main driving force behind US military activities in the Indian Ocean came as a response to the naval activities of USSR. This was typically the Cold War power politics as USSR was concerned with U.S. submarine based ballistic missiles in the Indian Ocean that had most part of USSR within their reach. It would be insightful to compare that U.S. naval activities in the Indian Ocean was one fourth or fifth of the naval activities of USSR. Some scholars would argue that the reason behind US activities in Trincomalee in Sri Lanka had also come as a response to USSR invasion in Afghanistan. Locating this situation in the context of the Cold War, it can be understood that Pakistan was vital for U.S. as a support base for anti-Soviet guerrilla in Afghanistan and that U.S. wanted to divert India's attention from Pakistan to Sri Lanka[2] .

These historical examples indicate that the most important part of the Indian Ocean as highway of international commerce for Japan and US is not the Indian Ocean itself, but the sides of the Indian Ocean like the Strait of Holms and the Strait of Malacca. In the present times, China is constructing ports, setting up military facilities, exporting naval weapons and surveying by using disguised fishing boats in the countries around India. Further, there are also reports about China's nuclear submarine's activities in the Indian Ocean. If China integrates Taiwan and sets up bases in the countries around India, PLAN will expand the area of assertive activities. Logically enough, under such circumstances, the sense of crises is rising and we want a more detailed analysis about China's such activities in this article. Although this information indicates that Indian Ocean will be the more important area in near future, a review of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea (West Philippines Sea) would assert that the situation there is far more serious than in the Indian Ocean.

Here comes an interesting analysis. It could be asked why the commentators and strategists in Japan and U.S. focus more on the security problem in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, for U.S., how different is the security situation in the Indian Ocean now than that during the Cold War.

One of the major differences is the comparative scale of the Indian Navy. The government of India has not altered the officially sanctioned force level for the Indian Navy, which comprises of two aircraft carriers, twenty eight destroyers and frigates, twenty submarines since 1964. If we count small ships, the Indian Navy nearly achieved the number in 1990. However, the force level of Indian Navy in 1990 was still not big when compared with the Navy of US and USSR.

In 2012, despite India maintaining the same force level, the comparative scale of the Indian Navy is growing because the number of US Navy has decreased. In addition, having newer and bigger warships as compared to the older ones also indicates that the Indian Navy is improving its capability as a "Blue Water Navy". Further, the fact that the Indian Navy has trained other navies like submarine forces in Vietnam and Iran and aircraft carrier crews of Thailand Navy is reason enough why the U.S cannot ignore it.

Chart I : The number of warships

*surface combatant: cruiser, destroyer, frigate, corvette (load displacement more than 3000t)
*International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance"; Tohru Kizu eds,. "World's Navies 2012-2013 Ship of the World", Kaijin-sya.

As a result, there is a genuine possibility that the sense of presence of the Indian Navy has influenced the debate of policy makers and academics in U.S. which, in turn, has influenced the debate in other democratic countries like Japan. The reason why American commentators and strategists focus more on Sino-Indian competition is caused not only because of Sino-Indian competition itself, but also because of the Indian debate which have frankly expressed their sense of rivalry against China. Last but not the least, because the world cannot ignore India as an emerging naval power, Japan and U.S. need to focus on the various dimensions discussed in the preceding sections of the paper. They need to understand the Indian debate on the issue and let India join in the friendly naval powers.

From "Intelligence Analysis (April 2012)"

1.Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, "Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy", The Washington Quarterly Spring 2012 Volume 35 Number.
2, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. This paper is available at following URL; https://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springgreenshearer.pdf [↩]
G D Bakshi, "The Rise of Indian Military Power: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture", Knowledge World, 2010, New Delhi, pp168-184. [↩]

Review of "Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy" ｜ 海洋情報 FROM THE OCEANS

 

[brational]

Chinese nuclear subs are roaming freely across IOR, is a greater concern than berthing in srilanka. I wonder whether we have the capability to detect them if they sneak into our waters. Since these Nuclear Subs have a very long endurance and they are docking in Sri Lanka means they are conducting recon missions in Indian waters for a pretty long time. Their presence would have been unknown if they were not docking in Srilanka.

 

[Ray]

The moot point is that nuclear submarines have long endurance and have no need to dock for any reason in foreign shores.

The reason to dock in SL is possibly to indicate to the Sri Lankans how deep is their commitment to SL, as also to indicate to others of this phenomenon on the world scene.

India should deploy the Coast Guard to ensure that SL does not have a free run to harass Indian fishermen and should also pick up some of them.

India should also deploy Naval vessels as a routine around the Sri Lankan waters to indicate Indian resolve to surveil waters in India's backyard.

It should also increase Indian Navy presence in the South China Sea and its vicinity.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Chinese nuclear subs are roaming freely across IOR, is a greater concern than berthing in srilanka. I wonder whether we have the capability to detect them if they sneak into our waters. Since these Nuclear Subs have a very long endurance and they are docking in Sri Lanka means they are conducting recon missions in Indian waters for a pretty long time. Their presence would have been unknown if they were not docking in Srilanka.

P8-I were acquired to detect, hunt and kill these subs.

 

[sorcerer]

Following Indian Objections, Sri Lanka Not To Let Chinese Submarines To Dock In Its Ports

Recently Sri Lanka, which is maintaining a steady relationship with China, said it would not allow Chinese submarines to dock in its ports, a move apparently aimed at allaying its sea neighbor India's concerns.

Colombo acknowledged that such a docking did take place coinciding with the Japanese Prime Minister's visit last year, reports Asian Tribune.

A Chinese submarine had visited Colombo port twice last year which had raised concerns in India. India raised the issue repeatedly with Sri Lankan government. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean region has opened a new area of rivalry for the two Asian countries.

Days after Vietnam PM Nguyen Tan Dung's visit to India, a Chinese submarine, Changzheng 2, has again docked in last November at the Colombo port, sparking "enormous concerns" within the government about the intentions of then Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa. It was the second time a Chinese submarine docked at a Sri Lankan port – after the first arrived seven weeks ago, India quickly warned the island nation on its southern tip that their presence was unacceptable to New Delhi.

India expressed strong concerns to Sri Lanka for allowing Chinese submarines to dock at its port this month. When the Chinese submarine Changzheng-2 and warship Chang Xing Daodocked at Colombo harbor for five days this month, alarm bells rang in New Delhi. India sees this as a violation of the July 1987 agreement which says that "Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests". The agreement also calls upon the two countries to not allow their respective territories to be used for "activities prejudicial to each other's unity, integrity and security".

Analysts say that the timing of the Chinese submarines could be significant considering volatile relations between China and Japan especially over the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Abe visited Colombo on September 7 last year when President Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power.

Both China and Sri Lanka dismissed Indian concerns. China had defended their docking, stating that there was "nothing unusual" as it is common international practice for warships to stop for refueling at ports abroad. It had said the submarines were part of the fleet of warships deployed in anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean Gulf of Aden. A navy spokesperson in Colombo pointed out that in the last four years, more than 230 warships had called at Colombo port for goodwill visits or refueling. However, that has failed to allay India, where worries are rising about China's expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean.

India claims the Chinese naval reach is increasing very fast, and that obviously creates some concern in India, because most of this area, particularly Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean has been a kind of strategic turf for India. Particularly submarine movement is a cause of main concern. Submarines are considered to be a more potent attack vehicle.

While India and China, the two Asian giants' territorial disputes in the high Himalayas, have grabbed the most attention, their rivalry in the Indian Ocean is steadily building up. An Indian Defense Ministry report last year warned of the "grave threat" posed by the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean. It suggested that China is widening its orbit of patrols beyond Chinese waters to jockey for control of highly sensitive sea lanes. The reason being much of China's booming economy is fueled by oil shipped through the Indian Ocean from the Middle East. Resources from Africa and trade with Europe ply through the same waters.

In recent years, China has helped to build a network of ports or facilities in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Myanmar and secured docking rights in Seychelles. China is also developing key ports in Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa.

While many security experts worry about the "undue Chinese presence" in South Asia, some see no reason for alarm. They point out that ports cannot be quickly converted into naval facilities. Indian security experts claim China's efforts to find a toehold in the Indian Ocean are the result of its growing global presence. While it seeks to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean and China also internally believes that it is vulnerable as far as the sea lines of communication are concerned from Asia and Africa. So China has been methodically trying to increase its political linkages and access in the Indian Ocean

In Sri Lanka, political observers say that the maritime rivalry between India and China has provided an opportunity for the small country to play off both rivals against each other. They say Colombo is increasingly relying on Beijing for both military and development support as the Asian giant invests billions of dollars to develop infrastructure.

For the time being, India has responded to China's growing forays in the Indian Ocean by shoring up its own partnerships with South East Asian nations and taking steps to modernize its navy.

The balance of power game Sri Lanka is playing, India suggests, could also be quite dangerous, for a small island country to do that, because as the old saying goes, when elephants make love or war, it is the grass that gets trampled on

Sri Lanka feels the Indian pinch and its Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera said addressing a press conference here in Colombo: "I really don't know under what sort of circumstances the submarines came to Colombo on the same day when Japanese Prime Minister (Shinzo Abe) visited Sri Lanka but we will ensure such incidents from which ever quarter do not happen during our tenure."

Samarweera, who held talks with Premier Li Keqiang and Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his two-day visit to Beijing recently, said Sri Lanka has some concerns over $5 billion of Chinese investments obtained during former president Mahinda Rajapaksa's regime. Significantly, Samaraweera also said Sri Lanka is concerned about the high interest rates for Chinese loans to build various projects which amounted to US $5 billion, including the US $1.5 billion for the Colombo Port City project. During his talks with Li and Wang, Samaraweera discussed a host of issues including concerns over high interest rate on the about USD five billion Chinese loans as well as his government's aim to pursue a balanced foreign policy.

A high-level Sri Lankan team will visit China later to discuss the issues with the Chinese government, Samaraweera said. Samaraweera is the first Sri Lankan official to visit Beijing, preparing for the forthcoming visit of his president to Beijing, since President Sirisena assumed power in Colombo after Rajapaksa's defeat in the January polls. Samaraweera's visit to China will be followed by new Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena's trip next month.

Indian objections to China presence in Indian Ocean could be an issue on the Sri Lanka-China agenda. Meanwhile USA with its Asia pivot policy is pushing India to deny China any chance to control the Indian Ocean.



Read more: http://hindi.sputniknews.com/south_asia/20150302/1013626229.html#ixzz3TKh6VYEi


@pmaitra , @sgarg , @Ray , @roma @Kunal Biswas, @Free Karma @TrueSpirit, @brational, @LETHALFORCE, @Hari Sud, @ezsasa @Free Karma @DingDong @sayareakd @Razor @Dovahand all others.
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Well seems like Indias diplomatic push earned what it desired.

 

[Ray]

India seems to be on the move.

 

[Anikastha]

India seems to be on the move.

Rajapaksa blames RAW for situation in srilanka and pakistan...
Rajapaksa blames RAW for situation in SL, Pak

 

[karn]

Rajapaksa blames RAW for situation in srilanka and pakistan...
Rajapaksa blames RAW for situation in SL, Pak

Lel if you listen to these tryhards one gets the impression that RAW is one of the most efficient spy agencies in the world . Besides he is talking to a Pakistani journalist ..... the context is pretty clear.

 

[Anikastha]

Lel if you listen to these tryhards one gets the impression that RAW is one of the most efficient spy agencies in the world . Besides he is talking to a Pakistani journalist ..... the context is pretty clear.

Oh yeah .He is speaking to pakistani journalist. Then he should speak pro-pakistani dialoges:thumb:

 

[ezsasa]

If we want a permanent solution to this problem, we need to link Lanka economically to India much more than before. For this relation ship to become sustainable we need to make long term deals. Last time i visited Lanka i had a feeling we are so close yet so far, mind you this was before 2009 and i stayed near colombo so it was obvious. Other than Maruti i could not see other vehicles from india.
But now since LTTE issue has been resolved, we need to take it further.

we need to make long term deals like buying their rubber so that we can them put them in our roads or something.

Their current stand on chinese submarines will be temporary, unless we offer a better substantial long term economic deal compared to chinese.