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We should destabilize POK. So that their population moves interior Pakistan, It's good that Kashmiri Pandits don't live there, as the counter will be less effective in Jammu from their side.
The government might think what if Pakistan retaliates with a nuke.Nope, it indicates lack of will/cajones/balls. And also the dhimmitude of Indians /Hindus in general.
How long is our impotency going to last and allows pakis to use terrorism? We have to take a stand sooner or later.The government might think what if Pakistan retaliates with a nuke.
But I second your question. What were our babus plucking back in 1990s and 2000s when Pakistan was literally begging.
Denying any third party intervention has put us in a very suitable position to use force and snatch PoK.How long is our impotency going to last and allows pakis to use terrorism? We have to take a stand sooner or later.
The correct question is, do we have the correct people inhabiting in India who can vote in a govt which can take back PoK?Do we have the Government to do that ?
Whatever USSR did in the past, PoK is ours and we should have taken it back if USSR was in support, we don't need someone else's push for that.India was never in full support of USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. India took right decision.
This is one of the several little nuggets I found in an essay on Soviet-Indian relations in the last decade of the Cold War. It was published as a chapter in 2011 by Sergey Radchenko in a book he co-edited with Artemy M. Kalinovsky, The End of the Cold War and the Third World:New Perspectives on Regional Conflict based on declassified East bloc archives. [I had not seen this earlier; it was bought to my attention by Yogesh Joshi, one of my PhD students]. I have little doubt that the documentary evidence Radchenko presents is credible, even if I might quibble with some interpretations. The broad argument that Radchenko makes is that both Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi were somewhat naïve not only about international politics but also about Soviet-Indian relations. It also shows both sides maneuvering around each other in a manner that reveals somewhat greater crudity (in the best Realist sense of the word!) than I would have imagined. But it also reveals a lot of other things, including India’s unhealthy obsession with Pakistan and – despite Indira Gandhi’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s successful state visits to the US and generally improving US-India ties – deep and abiding Indian suspicions about the US.
Now to the juicy bits:
P. 175: The Soviets reportedly shared with the Hungarians India’s plans to attack Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility, according to documents in the Hungarian archives. It is not clear though if the Soviets were only reporting widespread rumours or whether they actually had access to any Indian plans. The rumours were indeed widespread, and K. Subrahmanyam suggests that the Indian proposal for non-attack on nuclear facilities, which he suggested to Rajiv Gandhi, was the consequence of such rumours in the Western media (K. Subrahmanyam, “India’s Nuclear Policy -1964-98: A Personal Recollection,” in Jasjit Singh (ed.) Nuclear India (New Delhi: IDSA/Knowledge World, 1998 [2006 reprint]), pp. 40-42).
Pp. 176-77: In 1982, the Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan proposed to the Indian Ambassador in Kabul that India should take advantage of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to retake all of Kashmir, again according to the same document from the Hungarian archives. The Indian leadership apparently shot down this proposal.
P. 181: In a July 1987 meeting, PM Rajiv Gandhi tells Soviet leader Gorbachev that India has been able to apply sufficient pressure on Sri Lanka to prevent it from giving a base in ‘Trinkomali’ to the US.
P. 183: Rajiv Gandhi also discusses the Operation Brasstacks crisis with Gorbachev and tells him that the Indian Army was “itching” to take advantage of the situation and cut Sindh from Pakistan. Though the Brasstacks crisis is well-known, this provides an unusual inside look at Indian thinking, as also an indication of a civil-military rift during the crisis, which has until now been a hypothesis.
P. 186: On 7 March 1989, according to documents from the Mongolian Foreign Ministry archives, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tells the Mongolian President Jambyn Batmunkh that India was ready to launch a joint Afghan-Indian war on Pakistan if Pakistan attempted to topple the Najibullah regime. The Mongolian President is so surprised “that he even asked the Prime Minister to repeat himself, for fear that something had been lost in translation. Rajiv Gandhi reiterated his readiness to intervene to save Najibullah from Pakistani aggression.” Assuming the documents in the Mongolian archives are accurate, how serious would such a comment be? I would think, not very. I doubt if India had made any serious military preparations, let alone joint military planning or preparations with Afghanistan. At least four divisions of the Indian Army were still bogged down in Sri Lanka, Punjab was still simmering and Kashmir was beginning to boil too. I suspect this was merely some empty bravado, or as Radchenkmo suggests, ‘fantazising’. Nevertheless, some fascinating accounts, which we will not be able to fully corroborate until Indian files are opened.
http://rajesh622.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/did-rajiv-gandhi-really-plan-to-go-to.html?spref=tw&m=1
The pro pakistanis are the mirpuris and the pakjabis in their so called azad kashmir, GB is relatively sparsely populated and not very pro paki. Even if not entire POK, we should have got the strategic GB part connecting with Afghanistan, it would have cut land access of pak to china.Taking back POK means, making Pro Pakistanis and citizens of Pakistan, Indian citizens.
If POK becomes like KPK, inhabitable due to instability and war so that people migrate inwards in Pak. Then it looks feasible and productive to take it back. More over there is more population along LOC at the Paki side, where as in our region it's rare.
And for that , GB needs to be destabilized. Most of them are Shias.The pro pakistanis are the mirpuris and the pakjabis in their so called azad kashmir, GB is relatively sparsely populated and not very pro paki. Even if not entire POK, we should have got the strategic GB part connecting with Afghanistan, it would have cut land access of pak to china.
There maybe 2 reasons:The government might think what if Pakistan retaliates with a nuke.
But I second your question. What were our babus plucking back in 1990s and 2000s when Pakistan was literally begging.
Pakistan had nuclear weapons at that time ?Totally ignorant statement.There maybe 2 reasons:
1. Pakistan nuclear weapons. The number was not big enough to defeat India but surely capable of costing heavy loss on Indian army;
2. At the time, India was focusing on the reform of her economy, the last thing India wanted was an expensive war.
How long is our impotency going to last and allows pakis to use terrorism? We have to take a stand sooner or later.
You have to read more.There maybe 2 reasons:
1. Pakistan nuclear weapons. The number was not big enough to defeat India but surely capable of costing heavy loss on Indian army;
2. At the time, India was focusing on the reform of her economy, the last thing India wanted was an expensive war.
Well most of them did it in 2014.The correct question is, do we have the correct people inhabiting in India who can vote in a govt which can take back PoK?
To be frank RSS and BJP are incompetent as fuck. We voted for a marginally better party in 2014, not the party which we should ideally haveWell most of them did it in 2014.
This is the time for my question