Sheikh Mujib feared India could annex Bangladesh

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  1. rockey 71

    rockey 71 Regular Member

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    Sheikh Mujib feared India could annex Bangladesh

    June 11, 2013 1:55 pm



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    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman talks with journalists upon his arrival in London from Pakistan on Jan.8, 1972. TIME magazine correspondent Dan Coggin, who claimed he had interviewed Mujib in Dhaka, told State Department officials in mid-January 1972 that the Bengali leader wanted to “establish some sort of link between Bangladesh and Pakistan” in an attempt to forestall any possible move by India to annex Bangladesh. Mujib was suspicious about India’s ultimate intention.



    When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met the British Prime Minister in London on 9 January in 1972, the Bengali leader informed Edward Heath that Z. A. Bhutto, Pakistan’s prime minister, had appealed to him to keep a loose federation between Bangladesh and West Pakistan.

    Mujib wanted no formal link with Islamabad. He had told Bhutto the “time for this had passed.” He emphasized to Heath that “any political link with West Pakistan was impossible and would result in another guerrilla war in Bangladesh.”

    “In this, he has confirmed the position of the Bangladesh authorities in Dacca and our own assessment of the state of affairs in the East. However, although he spoke with understandable bitterness of the actions of the previous Pakistan regime, he showed no rancor towards Bhutto, and said that he wished to establish good relations with West Pakistan,” the British leader informed U.S. President Richard Nixon in a letter on Jan. 13, 1972.

    “The new partition should be, in his words, ‘a parting as of brothers,’ ” but Bhutto must acknowledge Pakistan’s division. Relations between “Bangladesh and India would, of course, be much closer,” Heath added, quoting Mujib, who had been in prison in West Pakistan during the nine-month Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.


    Confusion in Washington


    Despite Mujib’s expressed opposition to having any ties with West Pakistan, the Americans got confused when TIME magazine correspondent Dan Coggin informed them in mid-January 1972 that the Bengali leader did, in fact, want to “establish some sort of link between Bangladesh and Pakistan.” He wanted to do so in an attempt to forestall any possible attempt by India to annex Bangladesh. Mujib was suspicious about India’s ultimate intention. He feared that the domineering Hindu neighbor could someday seek to annex Muslim Bangladesh. State Department officials initially ignored Coggin’s assertion.

    But Coggin conveyed the same message again to the U.S. Consulate General in Kolkata on 19 February 1972. He claimed his information came directly from Mujib, whom he had interviewed in Dhaka, and Yusuf Haroon, former West Pakistan governor and once a Mujib ally, whom Coggin had met in New York. While he made his wish known to Coggin, Mujib feared an attempt on his life if his position became known to the public.

    He asked Coggin to tell the U.S. government that he wanted American economic aid to lessen Bangladesh’s dependence on India and the Soviet Union. He could get considerable aid from India and Russia. But he did not wish to do so because that would make Bangladesh too dependent on those nations. In passing, Mujib revealed that India was trying to convince him to sign a 100 million rupee contract to repair railway bridges in Bangladesh in an attempt to boost the Indian engineering industry.

    Coggin also reported to U.S. officials that Haroon, then vice president of Inter-Continental Hotels in New York, was responsible for Mujib’s decision to go to London from Pakistan after his release from prison. Haroon had flown to London and talked with Mujib about the future of Bangladesh and Pakistan. It was there that they first discussed the possibility of Mujib’s assassination. They decided that although the risk was great, the need for Mujib’s presence in Dhaka outweighed initial fears.

    Haroon belonged to one of the twenty-two wealthiest families of Pakistan whose assets had been confiscated by the Bhutto government. He had longstanding enmity with Bhutto. Still Mujib looked upon him as a reliable channel to Islamabad, possibly because of his credentials. Haroon worked closely with Pakistan’s founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah as his personal secretary. He was active in the movement against the British Raj to create the Muslim nation, as was Mujib.


    Yusuf Haroon advised Mujib?


    Coggin informed the consulate that both Mujib and Haroon were “interested in the re-establishment of some sort of link between Pakistan and Bangladesh.” They told Coggin of their plans to bring the people of Bangladesh in favor of their idea within six to twelve months. They also told him that the re-establishment of ties was necessary for Bangladesh’s survival as an independent country. But they knew there was considerable opposition from Tajuddin Ahmed, war-time prime minister of Bangladesh, and his supporters on the one hand and India on the other.

    “Both men [Mujib and Haroon], according to Coggin, feared that their efforts could result in the assassination of Mujib by an ‘Indian agent.’ Nonetheless, they believed the risk should be taken for the future of Bangladesh. Otherwise, it would soon end up as another Indian state,” the consulate reported to Washington on 24 February 1972.

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    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman speaks at the Brigade Parade Ground in Calcutta in 1972, with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi seated on the stage. During a secret meeting with Shaukat Hyat Khan, opposition leader in the Pakistan National Assembly, in Malaysia in 1973, Mujib denied he caused Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan. Rather, he insisted, Bangladesh was “pushed…away by a conspiracy.”

    The next day, on 25 February, the State Department advised the consulate general that it had received “very similar information” from Coggin in mid-January. “At that time, we discounted Coggin’s belief in Mujib’s support for a possible link since it ran counter to other available evidence, such as reports of meetings with Heath. We have subsequently received no information which would suggest the possibility that Mujib intends or would be able to bring the Bangladesh public to look with favor on the re-establishment of ties.”

    When the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi received this message, it also dismissed Coggin’s claim. On 28 February, the New Delhi mission informed the State Department that “we have no reason from our perspective to believe Mujib could or would seek to re-establish ties with Pakistan within six to twelve months.”

    The mission also questioned the authenticity of Coggin’s story. “While we can appreciate Mujib might wish to keep all options open, it is difficult to understand why he would air with an American newsman any such hypothetical as well as politically and, according to Coggin, personally dangerous notion.”

    The embassy further reported that the Yugoslav charge d’affaires told the U.S. deputy chief of mission that Mujib assured Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that he had no intention of establishing a Dhaka-Islamabad link of any kind. Gandhi responded that she had no desire to interfere in any Bangla-Pak talks to restore normal relations.

    The U.S. Consulate General in Dhaka went one step further in dismissing Coggin’s information. “Coggin has been absorbed, almost to the point of obsession in our opinion, with East Pakistan, Bangladesh affairs, for the past few months, and he has shown signs of loss of balance and critical judgment.”

    The consulate noted that neither Sydney Schanberg of The New York Times, nor Lee Lescaze of The Washington Post, who had equal or superior access to Mujib, found anything to indicate that the Bengali leader wanted a link with Pakistan. “Both their views and our own observations were diametrically opposed to Coggin’s views, and we were inclined to discount those,” Consul General Herb Spivack wrote on 28 February 1972.

    Mujib possibly sent out the feeler through Coggin to elicit reactions from different quarters. His secret talks with Bhutto and other Pakistani leaders, including Shaukat Hyat Khan, opposition leader of the Pakistan National Assembly, in subsequent years only indicate his earnest desire to keep close ties with Islamabad. Mujib secretly met Hyat in Malaysia in 1973. He told Hyat he did not cause the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Rather, Bangladesh was “pushed…away by a conspiracy.”

    Whatever his other failings, and there were many, Mujib was a master in the art of Bengali political maneuver. Mujib was never a devotee of Bangladesh’s independence, even as late as March 1971. Like his mentor, H. S. Suhrawardy, he knew an independent East Bengal would be completely overshadowed by India. The events of 1971 changed the situation and confronted him and his country with the fact of Indian power. So keen was Mujib’s sense of the immediacy of power that he consistently pursued a policy of close official friendship with Delhi. Simultaneously, India faced growing howls from many levels of Bengali society.

    India’s image in Bangladesh had worsened to a point within a short time after the new nation was born that even Delhi felt it would be wiser to let Mujib pursue a more openly independent course. Mujib never encouraged his countrymen’s antipathy toward India, but he had seen the advantages of greater flexibility it offered him. He had profited from the paradox. Mujib had always been a capable tactician, but he never got the chance to prove if he was as capable a strategist.

    This is an excerpt from B.Z. Khasru’s upcoming book, The Bangladesh Military Coup and the CIA Link, which will be published by Rupa & Co. in New Delhi in July.B.Z. Khasru’s first book, Myths and Facts Bangladesh Liberation War, published by Rupa & Co. in New Delhi in 2010, was a bestseller in India.

    http://www.clickitte...nex-bangladesh/
     
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  3. rockey 71

    rockey 71 Regular Member

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    IDR Blog
    1975 Bangladesh coup: What India knew
    B.Z. Khasru | Date:23 May , 2014 0 Comments
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    B.Z. Khasru
    B. Z. Khasru, an award-winning journalist, is editor of The Capital Express in New York. His first book, “Myths and Facts, Bangladesh Liberation War, How India, U.S., China and the USSR Shaped the Outcome” was a bestseller in 2010. He holds a master’s degree in journalism from Northeastern University in Boston.
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    Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman

    U.S. officials believed that given New Delhi’s intelligence resources, the “general coup plotting over the last eight months was certainly known to” the Indian government. Samar Sen, Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh when the new nation’s founding president was assassinated, disputed this notion. India’s foreign office, however, admitted having some vague knowledge of the August 1975 putsch in which President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated along with most of his family members.

    Near the end of 1974, India started worrying that Bangladesh’s economic difficulty could lead to a gradual breakdown of political and administrative systems.

    Sen explained that India lacked foreknowledge of the coup because it had no intelligence agents in Bangladesh. India had stopped spying in Bangladesh at Mujib’s request. He wanted them out because RAW agents were monitoring his followers and keeping in touch with opposition politicians, at the same time.

    Near the end of 1974, India started worrying that Bangladesh’s economic difficulty could lead to a gradual breakdown of political and administrative systems. Indian officials could not identify an agent for change. They did not think Mujib faced serious threat from his party or the opposition. They also dismissed the military as a threat because it was too divided. Extremist groups were too small and isolated.

    On top of all this, the Bengalis were known for their proverbial ability to absorb great economic hardship. Thus, they were left with an inchoate concern that somehow things might begin to fall apart. India was directly concerned with two possible byproducts of turmoil in Bangladesh.

    First, anarchy in Bangladesh might ultimately throw up an anti-Indian regime or invite involvement of others. Second, the ten million Hindus in Bangladesh might be affected disproportionately. The Hindus would be squeezed hard and even physically threatened, forcing them flee to India as they did in 1971. Such an outcome would severely strain both Indo-Bangla relations as well as Hindu-Muslim relations in India.

    However, Indian officials as a whole were not yet overly concerned about the either situation. Officials willing to speculate predicted India would intervene at Mujib’s request to save him from a real threat. U.S. diplomats in New Delhi agreed with this assessment.

    During Mujib’s rule, according to the U.S. assessment, Indian policies in Bangladesh did not conflict much with those of the United States. “India has come to appreciate our stance of non-interference in subcontinental bilateral problems and the low profile we maintain in Bangladesh.”

    India was not concerned about Bangladesh having diplomatic relations with Pakistan and China. In fact, it had recommended this to Mujib. Its concern was that the new government would change its policy toward Islamic extremism.

    Things were, however, entirely different a year later. On 7 October 1975, Y.B. Chavan, India’s external affairs minister, expressed concern about the Bangladesh events when he met U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Washington.

    Mujib’s killing shocked India

    “India was shocked by the killing of Mujib and his family, although it was treating this as an internal matter,” he said. “The new government had assured India it was not changing its policy, but Delhi was concerned about the potential strength of ‘extreme Islamic’ elements and also revolutionary left Communists.”

    India was not concerned about Bangladesh having diplomatic relations with Pakistan and China. In fact, it had recommended this to Mujib. Its concern was that the new government would change its policy toward Islamic extremism. This would lead to trouble for the Hindu minority. Delhi also worried that China would try to stir up trouble with help of the pro-Chinese Communist groups in Bangladesh.

    Kissinger, on his part, assured that Chavan: “We saw a requirement for good relations between Bangladesh and India. We had no interest in trying to weave Bangladesh into some complicated power game. Bangladesh should concentrate on economic development. What influence we have there, we will use to encourage good relations with India.”

    Chavan was among those in Gandhi’s cabinet advocating a more cautious approach toward East Pakistan during the Bangladesh war. His position created lingering doubts about his goodwill toward Bangladesh. He reiterated that Indian concerns were that the radical groups were already active in Bangladesh and if the Pakistanis and the Chinese began meddling, there could be a new regional problem.

    Kissinger noted that the Chinese had been down on Bangladesh in the past. He reiterated that the United States favored good relations between Bangladesh and India. Kissinger then asked whether India had known about the plot against Mujib in advance.

    In India, the public in general widely believed the United States was involved in Mujib’s murder.

    Following Chavan’s trip, the State Department sent a note to the U.S. Embassy in Delhi, summing his discussions.

    “In response to the secretary’s query, Chavan said the Indians had no foreknowledge of the recent coup in Dacca,” the memo said. “He also agreed that the problem in Bangladesh for India was a potential one and that at present, relations with the new government were good.”

    At the end of the first week after Mujib, Bangladesh confronted much uncertainty. Fear of India was in the air. Mujib’s successor, Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed, found himself in a position that required a great deal of balancing act.

    In India, the public in general widely believed the United States was involved in Mujib’s murder. On 19 August 1975, Ananda Bazar Patrika published a story, quoting the West Bengal Congress Party youth movement chief, Priyoranjan Das Munshi. He said the assassination once again proved how active the CIA and China were in the subcontinent. Mujib’s assassination sparked a flurry of protests rallies in India. The All-India Peace and Solidarity Organization held a meeting in New Delhi. Communist MP Bhupesh Gupta accused the CIA of backing the Mujib killers. Mujib’s death, he fumed, was part of a rightist conspiracy supported by U.S. imperialism. Ramesh Chandra, general secretary of the CPI front World Peace Council, claimed he had learned when he visited Dhaka in April 1975 that several CIA agents worked in Bangladesh as volunteers in aid-giving societies. He had mentioned this to Mujib, who said he knew it.

    Indians blame CIA

    These allegations enraged America. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi was livid by an article in the Congress Party newspaper Jugantar, implicating Davis Boster, U.S. ambassador in Dhaka, in the coup. The public affairs officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Kolkata protested to Jugantar editor. The editor claimed he was unaware of the article or how it got in the paper.

    The Chinese were trying to isolate India. There was already Hindu repression before the coup; India was now very concerned over the possibility of increased repression and the refugee migration that might cause.

    The editor, D.R. Bose, explained that he had left his office early in the evening on 17 November – the day before the article appeared. The story was brought to Jugantar by an Indian who had just returned from Dhaka. He was not a correspondent. But the editor did not identify him. Subeditor Deb Kumar Gosh had the story prepared and approved by the censor about midnight.

    The editor tried to pacify the irate American official, saying he had a “stack of material” on America and Bangladesh, but would not “print anything without checking with” the consulate. “In particular, he said, he had a story about large-scale demonstrations in front of the American embassy in Dacca calling for Ambassador Boster’s withdrawal.” He apologized and agreed to “run anything you want” in Jugantar.

    The embassy decided to take up the editor on his offer. It decided to ask Bose to print a rejoinder on the front page as was the article along following lines: An article carried in the 18 November issue of this paper concerning the U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh was unauthorized for publication and did not represent Jugantar’s views. Jugantar regretted and disavowed any implication of improper activities on the part of the American ambassador to Bangladesh.

    The State Department supported the consulate’s efforts to obtain retraction from Jugantar. It told the embassy to express America’s displeasure at a high level in New Delhi. The public affairs officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Kolkata spoke to Bose in the morning of 19 November 1975. Bose agreed to run a retraction, but in the body of an editorial or news comment on the Bangladesh situation in the next few days.

    The same, the deputy chief of mission in New Delhi protested newspaper articles blaming the CIA for the coup when he met J.S. Teja, joint secretary for Americas at the foreign office. “We would take the strongest exception to continued allegations in the Indian press of the U.S. government involvement in the Bangladesh coup. This was a slanderous and totally false accusation.” Teja first attempted to brush off the press reports as matters the government could not control. He later agreed to inform authorities.
     
  4. rockey 71

    rockey 71 Regular Member

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    IDR Blog
    Why Bangladesh feared Indian invasion after 1975 coup
    B.Z. Khasru | Date:28 Apr , 2014 7 Comments
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    B.Z. Khasru
    B. Z. Khasru, an award-winning journalist, is editor of The Capital Express in New York. His first book, “Myths and Facts, Bangladesh Liberation War, How India, U.S., China and the USSR Shaped the Outcome” was a bestseller in 2010. He holds a master’s degree in journalism from Northeastern University in Boston.
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    Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman with U.S. President Jimmy Carter on the White House grounds in August 1980. On 26 November 1975, Zia told U.S envoy Irving G. Cheslaw that he feared an Indian military invasion in a few days and asked that America put pressure on India to stop this madness. India “should be made to realize that this is not 1971. This is 1975 and they will find a military force of sixty thousand and a population of seventy-five million that will present enormous problems for” for New Delhi.

    When Gen. Ziaur Rahman became Bangladesh’s virtual ruler following several bloody military coups in 1975, he told the United States that India intended to invade its small neighbor to install a puppet regime.

    Fearing a direct Indian intervention, the new regime instructed Nazrul Islam, acting foreign secretary of Bangladesh, to seek U.S. support to discourage New Delhi.

    So intense was Zia’s fear of an Indian invasion that on 7 November 1975 he made a call on the radio for national unity to face the attack. His call triggered more processions in Dhaka, initially sparked by the news of his release from detention by the officers who had mounted a failed coup earlier. The processions were laced with anti-Indian slogans.

    This public mood in Dhaka reflected a total reversal of the sentiment at the end of the Bangladesh war in 1971 when the sentiment was explicitly anti-Pakistani and secular. Following the November 1975 events, the attitude turned explicitly pro-Pakistani, pro-Islamic, pro-American and pro-West.

    Fearing a direct Indian intervention, the new regime instructed Nazrul Islam, acting foreign secretary of Bangladesh, to seek U.S. support to discourage New Delhi. He was to request that America convey Bangladesh’s feelings regarding the possible Indian move to China and Pakistan so that they could mobilize support from the Muslim countries. Accordingly, Islam asked Irving G. Cheslaw, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Dhaka, for support to checkmate any Indian invasion.

    As Islam talked with Cheslaw in Dhaka, the U.S. consul general in Kolkata discussed the events in Bangladesh with Ashok Gupta, West Bengal chief secretary, and Gen. J.F. R. Jacob, Eastern Command deputy chief, at a Soviet reception. Gupta described the Bangladesh situation as worrisome. Fighting was still going on there, and Dhaka’s air was thick with anti-Indian slogans.

    Indian general predicts Zia’s peril

    Jacob spent at least an hour at the reception. He was evidently in high spirits, obviously enjoying the host’s vodka. He told Consul General David Korn that the Bangladesh situation was “very bad.” He predicted Zia would not last very long.

    The Bangladesh deputy high commissioner in Kolkata told O’Neill that he did not expect “outside interference,” because the current leadership in Dhaka was very reasonable and intelligent.

    When Korn asked if the fighting had ended, Jacob said it was continuing. Jacob knew this from monitoring of the Bangladesh army internal network. Korn asked what Jacob was going to do. Jacob replied, with a smile, “Nothing. I don’t give a damn about Bangladesh.”

    Meanwhile, U.S. Consular Officer Joseph O’Neill spoke with a senior Indian Air Force officer and a Navy officer. He found both relaxed and unconcerned. A senior police officer told him the West Bengal-Bangladesh land border remained open.

    The Bangladesh deputy high commissioner in Kolkata told O’Neill that he did not expect “outside interference,” because the current leadership in Dhaka was very reasonable and intelligent. However, his deputy, in a separate conversation, told Korn he was quite worried about the possibility of an Indian military intervention.

    Indeed, Bangladesh was worried.

    Mahbubul Alam Chashi, principal secretary to Bangladesh President A. M. Sayem, telephoned Davis E. Boster, U.S. ambassador in Dhaka, to seek assurance from the United States with respect to any external threat.

    Boster informed the State Department that “although Chashi’s formulation was vague, what he clearly had in mind was assurance from us that we would help deter India from intervening in the current situation.”

    U.S. pledges support for Bangladesh

    Responding to Bangladesh’s request, the State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka on 8 November 1975 to deliver a message pledging American support. The message said the Bangladesh government’s “requests for our support during this unsettled period have received urgent and careful attention in Washington. We support the independence of Bangladesh and want to carry on the close and cooperative relations we have had with previous governments in Dacca. We will continue to be sympathetic to Bangladesh’s needs and concerns.”

    However, the United States faced “the practical question of how best to proceed in order to achieve what both our governments desire – to stabilize the present situation and avoid the possibility of outside intervention.”

    To calm the situation down, America urged Bangladesh to “take immediate steps to reassure” India that Dhaka intended to pursue good relations with New Delhi and to live up to its obligations to protect the foreign community and the Hindu minority.

    America was worried that any external pressure on India, particularly if it appeared to be organized by the United States, as suggested by Bangladesh, would only serve to confirm Delhi’s suspicions and might well increase the possibility of Indian intervention. However, in line with Bangladesh’s requests, Washington decided to keep in close touch with Pakistan to exchange views and to make clear America’s “support for the restoration of stability in Bangladesh free from outside interference.”

    To calm the situation down, America urged Bangladesh to “take immediate steps to reassure” India that Dhaka intended to pursue good relations with New Delhi and to live up to its obligations to protect the foreign community and the Hindu minority. “In our judgment, this is the best way for the new regime to support our efforts in New Delhi to reduce the likelihood of Indian intervention.”

    On 8 November, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi to meet with External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan or Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh to seek a high-level Indian assessment of the situation in Bangladesh and convey the message that the United States supported an independent Bangladesh.

    Singh assured the American that New Delhi had no intention of interfering in Bangladesh affairs. How Bangladesh ran its government was its affair. But if its policies created problems or hurt Indian interests, then “India must express its concern.”

    He believed Zia knew of India’s views.

    Zia panics again

    Zia panicked for the second time on the night of 23 November when he feared India was about to attack Bangladesh. At 0:30 a.m., he went on the radio appealing for the nation’s unity in “this fateful hour.”

    The military regime took the threat so seriously that it sent a secret envoy to Pakistan to seek Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto’s help to fend off the Indian attack.

    The military regime took the threat so seriously that it sent a secret envoy to Pakistan to seek Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto’s help to fend off the Indian attack.

    Immediately after receiving the news from Bangladesh, on 25 November Bhutto ordered Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s foreign secretary, to ask the U.S. ambassador to see him, saying he was doing so at the prime minister’s order.

    Shahi had received a message hours earlier from the Pakistani ambassador in Rangoon, who had just had a meeting with Bangladesh Ambassador K.M. Kaiser. Kaiser was in Bangkok when he received telephonic instructions from the Bangladesh president to proceed immediately to Pakistan on a secret visit as a special presidential envoy.

    He was to inform Bhutto of an alarming situation that had arisen for the security and independence of Bangladesh by actions of the Indians, who had already marched in and occupied certain areas of Bangladesh, an assertion the Americans later disputed.

    Pakistan was less than pleased with Kaiser’s proposed visit. The Pakistan foreign office preferred a “somewhat more reliable emissary.” Kaiser asked for Pakistani visas for himself and an assistant.

    As things grew tense, India sent its foreign secretary to Moscow for consultation.

    Dhaka sends secret envoy to Islamabad

    Henry Byroade, the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad, questioned Shahi on the timing of the reported Indian movement into Bangladesh, and specifically whether this might relate to reports a few days ago, which mentioned trench diggings along the border inside Bangladesh, or whether this was a new event. Shahi did not know. Byroade asked if he was concerned that India might try to make something big out of such a visit. Shahi said Bhutto had carefully considered that factor in deciding to go along with Kaiser’s urgent plea to visit Pakistan.

    Byroade in a cable to Washington downplayed Bangladesh’s plea. He said “Kaiser is a bit of a self-starter, who gets involved in many, many things.” Shahi described the visit as a “top secret.” Bhutto agreed to see Kaiser because he feared that if he refused and his refusal became public there would be a strong negative public reaction against him for refusing to receive an envoy of the Bangladesh president.

    Meanwhile, on 26 November, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Tabarak Husain called Irving Cheslaw, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Dhaka, at home at 8 p.m. for a discussion, especially with Zia on Bangladesh’s concern that India could invade Bangladesh. Husain asked Cheslaw to go at once to the presidential palace.

    Husain’s meeting with Cheslaw took place after an attack on Samar Sen, India’s high commissioner in Dhaka, by some armed elements of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, a militant political group. An Indian aircraft was coming to take him back to India for medical treatment. Husain believed that the high commissioner’s departure under dramatic circumstances would only further heat up the existing situation, whereas his agreement to remain would help cool it down. Sen agreed and the Indian aircraft was turned around without landing in Dhaka.

    After briefing Cheslaw of the situation, the foreign secretary called in Zia and Navy chief Admiral M.H. Khan, who wanted to pursue the discussion in greater detail. Zia described India’s possible military invasion as an attempt to create instability in Bangladesh to bring into power a government completely under New Delhi’s control.

    India funded JSD?

    Zia claimed that Bangladesh had evidence of military movements on the border. India also established training centers and even refugee camps in many of the same locations used in 1971. He felt that the incident at the Indian High Commission compound was no coincidence. The two men caught in connection with the incident were Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal members. JSD had been receiving money from the Indian government – directly from the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, Zia told Cheslaw.

    Zia described India’s possible military invasion as an attempt to create instability in Bangladesh to bring into power a government completely under New Delhi’s control.

    He expected the Indians to move into Bangladesh very soon, even possibly in the next few days. Zia asked that America put pressure on India not to follow through with this madness. He said India “should be made to realize that this is not 1971. This is 1975 and they will find a military force of sixty thousand and a population of seventy-five million that will present enormous problems for” for New Delhi. Zia believed that the Indian military needed to control the area – Bangladesh – that stood between India’s eastern territories and the rest of the country. He inferred that the Indians believed this would be an easier move to carry out because they could hold off the Pakistanis and the Himalayan passes were snowbound.

    Both Zia and Husain requested that the American envoy immediately convey their tremendous anxiety to Washington – and particularly their request that the U.S. government provide all possible assistance in making India realize that this situation must be cooled down immediately.

    “Walking with me to my car, the foreign secretary said he would have no objection if I conveyed the general sense of this discussion to other missions in Dacca, such as the British, even the Australians, in hope they could also be of assistance,” Cheslaw informed Washington.

    As things grew tense, India sent its foreign secretary to Moscow for consultation. On 26 November, the Soviet political counselor in New Delhi told an American diplomat that he had just heard on All India Radio that Kewal Singh, India’s foreign secretary, had been received by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet officer expressed some surprise at this development. Singh’s meeting with Premier Alexi Kosygin had only been arranged at the strong urging of the Indian government. The Soviet Embassy had recommended appointments with Defense Minister Andrei Grechko and Kosygin.

    In Washington, the State Department did not consider Kaiser credible. It advised the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to tell the Pakistanis that the Bangladesh situation was not exactly what Kaiser told them. Accordingly, the U.S. political counselor told Hyat Mehdi, director general for South Asia at the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, “that contrary to Kaiser’s allegation in Rangoon, we had no evidence that Indian forces have occupied any portions of Bangladesh territory.”

    This is an excerpt from B.Z. Khasru’s new book, The Bangladesh Military Coup and the CIA Link, which will be published shortly by Rupa & Co. in New Delhi.
     
  5. Bornubus

    Bornubus Senior Member Senior Member

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    We would've revolted against govt of India if they tried or try to annex Bangladesh (except land after cleansing the native population)

    Why would we endanger our demography 82% Hindu/Sikh for a land which has no natural resources and 87% Muslim population.

    We would've better off with a future agreement with Buddhist Myanmar on the lines of Nepal for connectivity with Buddhist South east Asia and Vietnam emerging economic block.


    On a serious note, we (younger generation) are thankful to Jinnah for partition of India which was a great step to correct our demography,which is now a overwhelmingly Hindu/Sikh/Jain/Buddhist.

    Imagine a scenario if partitioned didn't happened a pashtun and rohingya filth in his salwar kameez would've have roamed the streets of Delhi and enjoying our Metro trains.
     
    Last edited: Dec 9, 2015
  6. Alien

    Alien Regular Member

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    Well said.

    How can you even think that, we would have Metro Trains by this time if we had Bakis and Lungis in an undivided India? :D
     
  7. angeldude13

    angeldude13 Lestat De Lioncourt Senior Member

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    Article mentions a lots of things but doesn't mention a single reason why India would annex an overpopulated peace of land.....
    Dunno which kind of lala land Bangladeshis live.
     
  8. Bornubus

    Bornubus Senior Member Senior Member

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    Good point duly noted :D

    ...............................................................................................
     
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  9. bose

    bose Senior Member Senior Member

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    The most important part of the article above --

    "When Korn asked if the fighting had ended, Jacob said it was continuing. Jacob knew this from monitoring of the Bangladesh army internal network. Korn asked what Jacob was going to do. Jacob replied, with a smile, “Nothing. I don’t give a damn about Bangladesh.”
     
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  10. bose

    bose Senior Member Senior Member

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    General Zia hated India !! this intense hate for India was taken forward by his wife Begam Khalida ...

    India will never forget those who hate India !! You will get back whatever time it takes to give you back !!
     
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  11. asingh10

    asingh10 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Mujib was not exactly a saint either. He was the right hand man of Suhrawardy when Calcutta and Noakhali riots happened. Mujib had eyes on Indian Assam and WB.
     
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  12. bose

    bose Senior Member Senior Member

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    In the last years of Mujib, he was distancing himself from India & Soviet influence.. some say that he was killed by Soviet plot...

    Yes Mujib was the person who took a bicycle ride from Calcutta to Delhi in mid 40's for support of Pakistan's creation... If I would have been in Indira Gandhi's position I would have left East Pakistan to bleed & bleed ... and taken a part of Bangladesh to settle their Hindu population ...
     
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  13. Compersion

    Compersion Senior Member Senior Member

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    We ought to have annexed some parts of Bangladesh for example make that stupid chicken neck wider and also the east to be also accessible by sea. These areas I am sure can have non Muslim populations. Would Bangladesh have objected to thanking India ... Why not and most certainly yes. But international geo politics and the confused American policy was fogging it all up.

    Further Bangladesh talk like sovereign nation and people must thank India every morning. It was brilliant and outstanding what India did and text book international law and customs example .

    Further Bangladesh only needs to look at Baluchistan and giglit Kashmir to see what they would in a Pakistan ... Backward and ignored and humiliation.
     
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  14. bose

    bose Senior Member Senior Member

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    There used to be a guy called Jogendra Nath Mandal who help Pakistan then in 47's in getting sylhet on Plebiscite as he had considerable influence on certain section of Hindus [SC/ST] who voted for Pakistan...

    That man was booted out from Pakistan on being Hindu and had his last days in West Bengal...
     
    Last edited: Dec 10, 2015
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  15. spikey360

    spikey360 Crusader Senior Member

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    Mujib feared too much it seems. In any case, Bangladesh has to improve a lot to be annexation material. Only being a cheap labour source is not enough. On top of that BD is majority Muzzi.
     
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  16. Sakal Gharelu Ustad

    Sakal Gharelu Ustad Detests Jholawalas Moderator

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    India should have extracted its pound of flesh from this useless war. Although, India achieved broad goals but it could have easily broadened the chicken neck and taken back Chittagong.
     
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  17. asingh10

    asingh10 Senior Member Senior Member

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    We didn't do a wrong thing by intervening, it was a humanitarian crisis. But Manekshaw made a huge mistake too by letting the Pakistani POW's go. There's a video out there of General Kader Siddique of Mukti Bahini publicly killing Razakars in front of a cheering crowd. That's pretty much what would've happened to West Pak army if they didn't have Indian army to surrender to. And yes, looking at the plight of BD Hindus today, we should have annexed a part of BD.

    Once again, our suicidal altruism got the best of us. Things only got worse for BD Hindus, BD Muslims are still anti-India, infiltration problems & Pakistan is stronger than ever. IMO, the most important lesson one can learn from resurgence of populist Islamism in BD, Turkey & erst while Ba'athist Arab states is that flimsy ideologies like secularism, even if imposed on a military footing, fail spectacularly when confronted with Islamism.
     
    Last edited: Dec 10, 2015
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  18. asingh10

    asingh10 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Imran Khan once pointed out in an interview that during a match between India & Pakistan in BD, people in Dhaka stadium were cheering for Pakistan and chanting "Pakistan Zindabad".

     
    Last edited: Dec 10, 2015
  19. asingh10

    asingh10 Senior Member Senior Member

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    There were many such people (Hindus, Christians and Muslims) who supported Pakistan and then regretted it later. There was a Prof Brij Narain of Lahore who was murdered by Muslim mobs even as he continued to plead in vein that he was a supporter of Pakistan and Jinnah.

    "Professor Brij Narain was a famous Lahore-born academic whose books on economics were on the required reading list of the curricula of pre-partition universities. Enamoured by Jinnah’s English lifestyle and mannerism and himself strongly secular and idealistic, Brij Narain underestimated the morbid impact of the rabidly anti-Hindu and anti-Sikh rhetoric of the 1945-46 election campaign in Punjab.

    He developed a strong set of arguments to prove that Pakistan was economically feasible and viable. When partition took place in mid-August 1947 and Lahore was burning, he continued to believe that Hindus like him could be Pakistanis like any other community. A mob arrived at his door and mercilessly killed him notwithstanding his pleas that he supported Pakistan."

    http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/e...he-dehumanisation-of-minorities-ishtiaq-ahmed

    Christians, Shias, Ahmadiyyas, Bengalis, Muhajirs, Sindhis all backed Pakistan, now look at their plight.

    Some of our Hindu liberals are fanning similar sentiments among Islamists even today. Nobody trusts a turn coat traitor to his own people. Eventual fate of Aiyars and Barkhas.
     
    Last edited: Dec 10, 2015
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  20. anoop_mig25

    anoop_mig25 Senior Member Senior Member

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    Well why are indian PM/leader always appears to have high moral ground.

    I mean they always lack foresight starting from nehrun till ABP and now it seems to continue with modi.

    which kind of leaders stop syping activity on request of other nation leader

    look america i am sure they had not stooped spying on leaders/countries which are friendlier to america

    our leaders continue to snatch defeat from jaws of vicitory .

    Indra gandhi should have extended the region around chicken corridor and chittagaon aera where hindu polpulation was high so that we would had alternate route avaliable for transport
     
  21. I_PLAY_BAD

    I_PLAY_BAD Regular Member

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    Many Bangladeshis abuse India for trivial reasons.
    They feel insecure about a Hindu majority country engulfing them from three sides....
    And, many feel jealous though India is not a great place to live yet !!!! Think how Bangladesh is ......
    Whether friend or enemy, Islam-insecurity and radicalization to prevent hallucinated-consequences will always prevail....
     
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