Ryan is the only one saying it is so. The guy is no authority unless he worked for Roscosmos or the KVR.
Yeh, and what authority are you?
I have a tendency to believe that website because of the quality of discussions I've read there over the years, and because of the stellar coterie of its patrons.
No, it isn't. It is 10km from the DC border and only 4km from the Beltway. It is a suburb of DC as stated everywhere.
DC suburb rockville - Google Search
No, it ain't.
Your google search provides no indication anywhere that Rockville is "10 km" from Washington, nor do any of the links in it.
Here let me help you out:
http://www.findlocalweather.com/for...2x=Rockville,+MD&Find+distance=How+far+is+it?
WikiAnswers - What is the distance between Rockville MD and Washington DC
You just proved the point, if you live in a suburb of a city, you will mention the city since no one will have heard of the suburb. :stinker:
You have a problem with your logic. I said: "nobody in New York says they live in Stamford, and vice versa." Let me make this simple for you: if you live in New York, you don't say you live in Stamford. And if you live in Stamford, you don't say you live in New York. Living in this side of the world, I would know. Just as, if you live in D.C., you don't say you live in Rockville, and if you live in Rockville, you don't say you live in D.C.
Point proven.
No, just good for you.
According to the photographs provided by badguy, it was accomplished with a nuclear warhead.
ROFLMAO. so that doesn't make China the "second country to have successfully accomplished a mid-course interception, using KKV technologies, does it?
China has been working on this programme since the 1960s. Russia quit in 1982 and has only begun to work on the problem with S-500. When China has dumped billions and decades into it using modern computers and Russia nothing, yes they are going to achieve what Russia cannot. What they have achieved is a rigged intercept that was used as a propoganda piece for Taiwan arm sales. The S-500 isn't for propoganda but a real application system. The Gorgon launches were for propoganda after the ABM withdrawal, it has little utility in modern warfare the same as the Chinese tests.
Give me a link that says they stopped working on the system in 1982- specifically, the KKV system.
You found something that makes no reference to a KKV intercept, just that they worked on it.
My link from the 1985 FAS article says:
"The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilometers per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum.
Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid 1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are adequate for effective kinetic energy weapons for use against some objects in space. "
That directly disproves your point above about them "having quit in 1982".
A History of Anti-satellite (ASAT) Programs | Union of Concerned Scientists
Those old reports were exaggerated according to the UCS. There is ZERO evidence to show they actually achieved a KKV intercept regardless of what they are claimed to have worked on. The Soviets worked on alot of things that never achieved results.
Your link says:
The Soviets resumed testing of the Co-Orbital system in 1976. At the time, the aerospace trade press was reporting a renewed US interest in anti-satellite technology, an interest that was largely generated by exaggerated reports of Soviet laser and particle beam ASAT/ABM technology. In addition, the Space Shuttle, which also had intrinsic anti-satellite capability, was in advanced development. The Soviets reportedly showed some success at extending the range of the Co-Orbital system to as low as 160 km and as high as 1,600 km, and at minimizing attack time by enabling the interceptor to maneuver to its target in a single orbit. Systems using optical and infrared sensor systems instead of onboard radar are thought to have had problems. At that time, the system was considered ready to operate.
What do you take me for, a smoking crack? The 1970's is not the 1980's.
Your link also says this:
The Soviets did honor their moratorium [on ASAT testing], although they continued pursuit of some missile defense technologies.
If Ryan knows the Moskva defences were upgraded with KKV, then he has access to priviledged information and shouldn't be talking about it. Which leads me to know he is talking out of his arse.
Seeing as virtually all of the 'commentators' on that website have access to "priviledged information", including those who claim privileged access to the White House, I don't see why they wouldn't have access to information you would not.
Here is further evidence to suggest that the Russians had developed
atleast a rudimentary KEI capability as early as the 1980's. The report is from 1997, so you can't claim those 80's reports were exaggerated even though your site states 1976
Space battle stations
The third major industrial organisation involved in these programmes was NPO Energia based in Kaliningrad. As the Soviet Union's foremost space development centre, Energia was given the task in 1976 of developing space-based platforms for novel weapon technologies. Energia co-ordinated the efforts of the other weapon design bureaux to make certain that their weapons were compatible with Energia's 'space strike systems'. In contrast to the US SDI programme, which was primarily oriented toward destroying re-entry vehicles in their boost phase, the Energia programme had a much broader range of space-based military missions. This was driven in part by the Soviet assessment of the military nature of the US space shuttle. The Soviets feared that the space shuttle was the central element in a new generation of space strike weapons and was viewed as a suitable platform for delivering weapons from space against targets on earth. Its second military role was assessed as being the delivery and support of combat spacecraft. It is not clear if this Soviet perception of the shuttle was due to a mistaken and paranoid assessment of actual US intentions for the space shuttle, or whether this view was a conscious ruse on the part of the Soviet Defence Ministry to win support for its own space strike systems, mirroring the imagined US space strike systems. In either case, the defence ministry remained the strongest backer of the Buran space shuttle effort in spite of reservations within the Russian civil space community, which feared that the Soviet Buran space shuttle would eat up too much of the civil space budget.
Energia worked on two other space-based weapon systems. The first development was a small missile interceptor similar to the US Brilliant Pebbles concept. This small autonomous device was designed to intercept re-entry vehicles and destroy them using the kinetic energy of impact. It is not clear how these devices were to be deployed, whether by satellites, the Buran shuttle or by some form of earth-launched booster.
The final Energia project was the most elaborate space strike system envisioned. It consisted of a central battle station based around a DOS-7K space station module. To this was added a command module and a targeting module. The central battle station core played host to four or more 'combat modules'. These were derivatives of the Buran space shuttle, minus their wings. The combat modules could operate alone or in combat groups, could dock at the central station and would receive targeting data from the central control module. Their armament was expected to be ballistic missiles or unpowered nuclear glide bombs. The primary mission of the battle station was to attack high-value targets on earth. This system, which violated prevailing treaties on the militarisation of space, apparently did not proceed beyond design studies.
Jane's
The title of the thread is Russian KKV capability. It really doesn't have anything to do with it. Cooling off a warhead is unrealistic and redundant is my point.
You're running around in circles.
Let me bring to your attention what you said:
"BMD is several layers. If the mid-course interceptors fail there is a backup which makes the idea of warheads with a freezer system redundant. It is already hard enough to minaturise payloads to carry multiple MIRVs. Making MIRV payloads with their own freezer units would take up too much space to be practical when they would be easily detectable entering the atmosphere anyway."
You're talking about the "several layers of a BMD system". When, as you just pointed out, the topic of this thread is about Russia's "KKV capabilities". I'm telling you that your telling me about the 'several layers' of a BMD system is irrelevant to this discussion, for if an exo-atmospheric KKV interceptor is defeated, then a country has to rely on nuclear directional explosive warheads/endoatmospheric interceptors to meet the missile, putting them in the realm of other countries that have not perfected 'KKV' technologies, and making the concept and development of 'KKV' redundant in that defeat.
This entire chain of conversation started with me saying that I found KKV 'not as great' as it was touted, because of the several countermeasures that could defeat it.
What?
How do you stick a warhead in a balloon? You going to run a ship in a bottle too?
You don't stick the warhead in all the balloons, you dimwit. Now, you're just beginning to tick me off.
I explained to you in detail the whole concept of how anti-simulation
decoy balloons work. Warheads are put in only a limited number of balloons, with the other balloons- the vast majority of them- configured with shells to resemble the radar reflections, motions and shapes of the
real balloons. They contain no fissile material. These are then deployed simultaneously in a co-axial relationship with the few or even
a real warhead, in the same trajectory, because of the atmospheric pressures at that altitude.
Again, Refer to the above.
S-300V was upgraded to S-300VM, its role is for high altitude and missile defence. None of the PMU series have the engagement altitude of the V series.
What ? Are you trippin'? The problem wit you is that you're separating my paragraphs into disjunct lines so you that can be cocky. Don't. Even though the S-300V is upgraded to the Antey VM
now, I just gave you a link saying that: "Russia is currently working on integrating the Russian made Tor M-1 and S-300 PMU-1 systems into a unified air defense system."
Read the last line of this:
Antey-2500 (S-300V / SA-12 / SA-23)
Let me also tell you that the difference between the the engagement altitudes of the S-300VM vis-a-vis the PMU are far less than you've imagined. The S-300 VM has an engagement altitude for ballistic targets of "upto 30 km".
http://en.allexperts.com/e/s/s/s-300vm.htm
The S-300 PMU-1 'can engage targets at ranges of 5-150km, and at altitudes between 10m and 27,000m'.
http://cns.miis.edu/cyprus/s300tdms.htm
We are discussing Russia's modern ABM capabilities, S-300V(M) is the best they have and it is nowhere close to mid-course intercept or KKV.
You understand that the guidance system can be applied to other missiles? You understand that by incorporating a seeker into the missile and electronics to amplify, demodulate and analyse the direction of the target, the S-300V(M) can be modified into Track Via Missile active radar homing, and is in all likelihood, already being worked on, as any rational, self-seeking country would do, if not already. Furthermore you understand, that this is not a difficult process? See:
ACTIVE AND SEMIACTIVE RADAR MISSILE GUIDANCE. The fact is that the technology is developed, and therefore exists. End of discussion.
Redundant to the point there was no KKV intercept.
No. Redundant to this discussion, and redundant to your contribution to my information.