There is a rumour going on that PLA is gonna reduce the number of military regions from 7 to 5.
Among them Chengdu and Jinan. Still a rumour so far, but will be interesting if they really carry it through.
¶¦Ê¢ÂÛ̳ ¾üÊÂÌìµØ ³É¶¼¡¢¼ÃÄÏÁ½¾üÇø£¬¿´À´ÕæÒª¡°ÐêÐꡱÁË¡ª¡ª( only in chinese...)
It also means PLA is finally starting with the war zone doctrine that they have talked about since 90s....
WAR ZONE CAMPAIGN
Since the 1985 "strategic transition" of the PLA from preparing for "early, total, and
nuclear" war to local and limited war, there have been debates on what type of local
war the PLA should be prepared to fight.
The 1991 Gulf War and the 1996 Taiwan
Straits crisis have apparently convinced the PLA planners that a likely war scenario
for which the PLA should be prepared to deter or fight is a medium-sized local war
comparable to a PLA WZC. "In terms of scale and nature, possible future local wars
that involve large-scale sea-crossing and amphibious landing operations, counter-
offensive operations in the border regions, and repelling local foreign invasion all
belong to this category."
8
If WZC is a primary mode of operations that may shape
PLA war planning, the central issues that need to be addressed become: What are the
defining characteristics of WZC? How can such campaigns increase the chances to
turn PLA absolute inferiority to local and temporary superiority?
Defining Characteristics
Several major features have been advanced to define WZCs. First, the WZC is an
intermediate campaign mode between combined arms group army (CAGA)
campaign, CAGA group (jituanjun qun) campaign, and war zone front (zhanqu
fangxiang) campaign on the one hand, and a major or total war involving more than
one war zone, and partial or total national mobilization on the other. Unlike the
former three types of campaign where the ground forces dominate and other service
branches play only a supportive role, a WZC is a joint service campaign where each
service conducts relatively independent subcampaigns (zhi zhanyi). Since a war zone
usually has one strategic direction, several campaign fronts, and multidimensional
space, subcampaigns may include electronic warfare operations, conventional
strategic and campaign missile operations, air operations, sea operations, and front
army or CAGA operations. Therefore, unlike CAGA-level campaigns that emphasize
ground forces, the WZC gives equal weight to all four services (ground, navy, air, and
conventional strategic missile forces) in the war zone, which may be reinforced
through the national supreme command by forces outside the war zone. They "have
a system of unity between military region [MR, which encompasses several adjacent
provinces] and war zone. [This means that] the peacetime MR becomes a WZ during
the war time . . . and has jurisdiction over the ground, navy, and air forces within it."
Generally speaking, a WZC "is the total sum of several service-based subcampaigns,
while a CAGA-level campaign is the total sum of ground battles."
9
Furthermore, a WZC may last from several weeks to several months and involve
several phases. Even though "the trend is toward shorter duration, it is still longer
than CAGA, CAGA group and war zone front campaigns." On the other hand, unlike a
major war where a single campaign may affect but not directly decide the strategic
outcome, a WZC is limited and local in the sense that its outcome directly determines
whether national strategic objective is realized. Since WZC itself constitutes local war
10
Finally, a WZC is conducted by the unified, joint service command at the war zone
level under the guidance of the national supreme command. Also, some such
campaigns may be carried out under the threat and deterrence of nuclear, chemical
and biological warfare. Moreover, since the political stake of such campaign is high,
both sides may utilize their best forces, high-tech arms and advanced C4I, leading to
fierce battlespace competition that fuses defense with offense.
11
Advantages of WZC
How then can WZC help to transform the absolute PLA inferiority into local and
temporary superiority? First, a CAGA-level campaign is too short in time, too limited
in scope, and too dominated by regular ground forces to give full play to the PLA's
newly developed "pockets of excellence," particularly in naval, air, conventional
strategic missile, rapid reaction, and special operations capabilities. On the other
hand, total war may overwhelm and diminish the relevance of these "pockets of
excellence," since the technologically superior superpower(s) is likely to employ its
most advanced weapons simultaneously on all fronts and throughout the war
process, thus dwarfing PLA's "pockets of excellence." Compared to a CAGA-level
campaign, however, a WZC is sufficiently big and long for the PLA to concentrate its
"pockets of excellence" to a local and temporary situation to reverse its absolute
inferiority. On the other hand, a WZC is more limited and shorter than a total war,
because the PLA is more likely to deal with an adversary that is much less powerful
than a superpower in such a campaign, as long as the powerful adversary (qiangdi,
referring to the superpower) is denied sufficient reasons to intervene, or is deterred
from doing so. In this way, the WZC may work to the advantage of the PLA.
12
Moreover, unlike CAGA-level campaigns that have limited space, the joint service
campaign associated with the multidimensional space and deeper depth of a war
zone "allows sufficient leeway for asymmetrical strikes (buduideng daji) through
flexible assembling of diverse means and innovative combination of versatile styles."
The joint service campaign may provide the conditions for the PLA to "use its
strength against enemy's weakness (yiqiang jiruo)," and avoid matching PLA's
weakness with the enemy's strength. It, for instance, may lead to situations where
"we can use our air power to strike enemy ground and naval targets, use our ground
forces to deal with enemy air and naval operations, use our navy to fight enemy
ground forces, and use our combat forces to strike enemy non-combat aspects such
as C4I and logistics." If "it is inevitable that we fight a service-matching war of
symmetry with the enemy, it is still necessary that in comparative capabilities we
13
This articulation of
the WZC illustrates conditions that may increase the chances for the PLA to achieve
a measure of local and temporary superiority. But for the probability of such chances
to be enhanced, more concrete strategies have to be systematically articulated.
ELITE FORCES AND SHARP ARMS
One new PLA campaign strategy is "elite forces and sharp arms (EFSA)." Several
major reasons have been advanced to justify EFSA. First, unlike total war, the limited
nature of local war makes it possible to achieve local and temporary superiority
through the concentrated use of EFSA. According to one PLA author, "after many
years of army building, we have acquired a certain number of high-tech elite forces
and sharp arms, and they are capable of competing with a powerful enemy." Finally,
operations in areas close to the homeland provide the favorable base, logistics, and
battlefield conditions for utilizing EFSA.
14
If the PLA is endowed with the necessary
"material conditions" (the PLA expression for "pockets of excellence"), the key
question to be addressed is: how does the PLA optimize the use of such forces and
arms to achieve local and temporary superiority? The answer to the question lies in
the PLA articulation of several major concepts associated with deployment,
coordination and command.
The rest of the article here:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap8.pdf
Among them Chengdu and Jinan. Still a rumour so far, but will be interesting if they really carry it through.
¶¦Ê¢ÂÛ̳ ¾üÊÂÌìµØ ³É¶¼¡¢¼ÃÄÏÁ½¾üÇø£¬¿´À´ÕæÒª¡°ÐêÐꡱÁË¡ª¡ª( only in chinese...)
It also means PLA is finally starting with the war zone doctrine that they have talked about since 90s....
WAR ZONE CAMPAIGN
Since the 1985 "strategic transition" of the PLA from preparing for "early, total, and
nuclear" war to local and limited war, there have been debates on what type of local
war the PLA should be prepared to fight.
The 1991 Gulf War and the 1996 Taiwan
Straits crisis have apparently convinced the PLA planners that a likely war scenario
for which the PLA should be prepared to deter or fight is a medium-sized local war
comparable to a PLA WZC. "In terms of scale and nature, possible future local wars
that involve large-scale sea-crossing and amphibious landing operations, counter-
offensive operations in the border regions, and repelling local foreign invasion all
belong to this category."
8
If WZC is a primary mode of operations that may shape
PLA war planning, the central issues that need to be addressed become: What are the
defining characteristics of WZC? How can such campaigns increase the chances to
turn PLA absolute inferiority to local and temporary superiority?
Defining Characteristics
Several major features have been advanced to define WZCs. First, the WZC is an
intermediate campaign mode between combined arms group army (CAGA)
campaign, CAGA group (jituanjun qun) campaign, and war zone front (zhanqu
fangxiang) campaign on the one hand, and a major or total war involving more than
one war zone, and partial or total national mobilization on the other. Unlike the
former three types of campaign where the ground forces dominate and other service
branches play only a supportive role, a WZC is a joint service campaign where each
service conducts relatively independent subcampaigns (zhi zhanyi). Since a war zone
usually has one strategic direction, several campaign fronts, and multidimensional
space, subcampaigns may include electronic warfare operations, conventional
strategic and campaign missile operations, air operations, sea operations, and front
army or CAGA operations. Therefore, unlike CAGA-level campaigns that emphasize
ground forces, the WZC gives equal weight to all four services (ground, navy, air, and
conventional strategic missile forces) in the war zone, which may be reinforced
through the national supreme command by forces outside the war zone. They "have
a system of unity between military region [MR, which encompasses several adjacent
provinces] and war zone. [This means that] the peacetime MR becomes a WZ during
the war time . . . and has jurisdiction over the ground, navy, and air forces within it."
Generally speaking, a WZC "is the total sum of several service-based subcampaigns,
while a CAGA-level campaign is the total sum of ground battles."
9
Furthermore, a WZC may last from several weeks to several months and involve
several phases. Even though "the trend is toward shorter duration, it is still longer
than CAGA, CAGA group and war zone front campaigns." On the other hand, unlike a
major war where a single campaign may affect but not directly decide the strategic
outcome, a WZC is limited and local in the sense that its outcome directly determines
whether national strategic objective is realized. Since WZC itself constitutes local war
10
Finally, a WZC is conducted by the unified, joint service command at the war zone
level under the guidance of the national supreme command. Also, some such
campaigns may be carried out under the threat and deterrence of nuclear, chemical
and biological warfare. Moreover, since the political stake of such campaign is high,
both sides may utilize their best forces, high-tech arms and advanced C4I, leading to
fierce battlespace competition that fuses defense with offense.
11
Advantages of WZC
How then can WZC help to transform the absolute PLA inferiority into local and
temporary superiority? First, a CAGA-level campaign is too short in time, too limited
in scope, and too dominated by regular ground forces to give full play to the PLA's
newly developed "pockets of excellence," particularly in naval, air, conventional
strategic missile, rapid reaction, and special operations capabilities. On the other
hand, total war may overwhelm and diminish the relevance of these "pockets of
excellence," since the technologically superior superpower(s) is likely to employ its
most advanced weapons simultaneously on all fronts and throughout the war
process, thus dwarfing PLA's "pockets of excellence." Compared to a CAGA-level
campaign, however, a WZC is sufficiently big and long for the PLA to concentrate its
"pockets of excellence" to a local and temporary situation to reverse its absolute
inferiority. On the other hand, a WZC is more limited and shorter than a total war,
because the PLA is more likely to deal with an adversary that is much less powerful
than a superpower in such a campaign, as long as the powerful adversary (qiangdi,
referring to the superpower) is denied sufficient reasons to intervene, or is deterred
from doing so. In this way, the WZC may work to the advantage of the PLA.
12
Moreover, unlike CAGA-level campaigns that have limited space, the joint service
campaign associated with the multidimensional space and deeper depth of a war
zone "allows sufficient leeway for asymmetrical strikes (buduideng daji) through
flexible assembling of diverse means and innovative combination of versatile styles."
The joint service campaign may provide the conditions for the PLA to "use its
strength against enemy's weakness (yiqiang jiruo)," and avoid matching PLA's
weakness with the enemy's strength. It, for instance, may lead to situations where
"we can use our air power to strike enemy ground and naval targets, use our ground
forces to deal with enemy air and naval operations, use our navy to fight enemy
ground forces, and use our combat forces to strike enemy non-combat aspects such
as C4I and logistics." If "it is inevitable that we fight a service-matching war of
symmetry with the enemy, it is still necessary that in comparative capabilities we
13
This articulation of
the WZC illustrates conditions that may increase the chances for the PLA to achieve
a measure of local and temporary superiority. But for the probability of such chances
to be enhanced, more concrete strategies have to be systematically articulated.
ELITE FORCES AND SHARP ARMS
One new PLA campaign strategy is "elite forces and sharp arms (EFSA)." Several
major reasons have been advanced to justify EFSA. First, unlike total war, the limited
nature of local war makes it possible to achieve local and temporary superiority
through the concentrated use of EFSA. According to one PLA author, "after many
years of army building, we have acquired a certain number of high-tech elite forces
and sharp arms, and they are capable of competing with a powerful enemy." Finally,
operations in areas close to the homeland provide the favorable base, logistics, and
battlefield conditions for utilizing EFSA.
14
If the PLA is endowed with the necessary
"material conditions" (the PLA expression for "pockets of excellence"), the key
question to be addressed is: how does the PLA optimize the use of such forces and
arms to achieve local and temporary superiority? The answer to the question lies in
the PLA articulation of several major concepts associated with deployment,
coordination and command.
The rest of the article here:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap8.pdf
