Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

[nitesh]

excellent read:

A matter of security- A self-defeating controversy surrounds Pokhran-II

 

[Rama1943]

Please refer to India Today May 25th 1998, special issue and look at page 22 & 23.A photo clearly indicates that thermo nuclear test was a complete success. If you look at the circumference of the surface pattern of the shock wave, you will notice a right hand centrifugal force of the surface moving the earth in a wavy pattern. These clearly indicate that it was a successful mini thermo nuclear device and not a fission device or fusion boosted fission device. These clocks wise centrifugal forces (a combination of heat and power) occur in a thermo nuclear device and not a fission device.

 

[Pintu]

http://www.ptinews.com/news/328108_Indo-US-relations-will-suffer-if-India-tests-nuke-weapon--NYT

Indo-US relations will suffer if India tests nuke weapon: NYT

STAFF WRITER 21:46 HRS IST

Betwa Sharma

New York, Oct 12 (PTI) India should not give into the pressure from some of its nuclear scientists to carry out an atomic test and if it does it would be a huge setback to its relations with the US and for the battle against terrorists, the New York Times said today.

In an editorial 'Just say No', the influential US paper said Indian nuclear scientists are trying to bully their government into testing a nuclear weapon.

"That would be a huge setback ? for India's relations with Washington, for the battle against terrorists, and for global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons... Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is resisting. He must continue to resist," the newspaper said.

 

[Chota]

At a hingsight is it that the 98 test proved to be counter-productive? What did India achieve finally with doubts that still persist to the present day. Things would have been different if we had not tested and the world would have been curious. Aftleast if we contined our testing during the sanctions phase multiple times we could have tied over the problems. The present suituation is our own un-doing IMO.

So what next? Should we test now or should we wait. I think we should wait for the right moment to test again ;-)

 

[S.A.T.A]

At a hingsight is it that the 98 test proved to be counter-productive? What did India achieve finally with doubts that still persist to the present day. Things would have been different if we had not tested and the world would have been curious. Aftleast if we contined our testing during the sanctions phase multiple times we could have tied over the problems. The present suituation is our own un-doing IMO.

So what next? Should we test now or should we wait. I think we should wait for the right moment to test again ;-)

The so called controversy is only with regards to the actual total yield of the thermonuclear device that was tested in 1998.several other fission devices were also tested,which are indeed the very crux our nuclear deterrence.So the current controversy cannot be a call against the wisdom behind the 1998 nuclear tests.It was already along over due.

According to APJ Abdul Kalam, the file requesting permission for nuclear tests would be on the desk of every a anew prime minster took office and this had been the case since decades.So the number of nuclear devices tested and the total yield was left to the BARC to decide,Vajpayee govt merely gave the political go ahead.If the scientists decided that was enough,there must have valid reason for that,other wise there was no sense in just testing five devices.

I have mixed feelings about the controversy itself,The DRDO scientist may be right,but what does one make of the vehement denial by Abdul kalam and Dr Chidambaram against Santhanam's claim.

 

[Chota]

Sometimes I wonder why we keep imposing self defeating things like "Test moratorium", "No-First USe", "Minimum credible deterrence" etc.

Nobody asked for it. Then why do we strain ourselves. Our softy-softy approach and international policy sucks. It makes us feel insecure

 

[Soham]

Sometimes I wonder why we keep imposing self defeating things like "Test moratorium", "No-First USe", "Minimum credible deterrence" etc.

Nobody asked for it. Then why do we strain ourselves. Our softy-softy approach and international policy sucks. It makes us feel insecure

You can wonder about that, or you can read up and understand what the terms mentioned by you actually mean before calling them "imposing self defeating things".

 

[Chota]

You can wonder about that, or you can read up and understand what the terms mentioned by you actually mean before calling them "imposing self defeating things".

Well the title of this thread tells it all

For each of the word, the nuclear weapons we possess must be that much "credible". Those words look good for a country which test in reasonable number and assures that the aggressor(If it exists) never forget the mistake it has commited . With the news floating around I "wonder", "cannot understand" whats really going on..

 

[S.A.T.A]

@Chota

These are not self defeating terms,these are what international diplomacy would consider as taking the moral grand standing.You have to remember phrases like Minimum nuclear deterrence or test moratorium have no policy value until the context of those phrases are clearly defined by the respective govt.

For eg: when we say minimum nuclear deterrence,we have left the definition of minimum ambiguous and non-clarified.this allows the govt to reassure foreign govt's and friends on our intent to maintain restraint(minimum), but still ambiguous enough to allow us to explain away any future expansion.

These are not self defeating,quite the contrary they are self serving

 

[Chota]

Oh by the way looks like "Minimum credible deterrence" is a word coined by India (Correct me if I am wrong). We have a way with our ambiguous words and we can endlessly fight what is minimum and credible in it even after our enemy drops bombs on us. "Buddha smiles" is a teaser wonder why someone has not comeup with a term "Gandhian Bomb"

"Moral grand standing" cannot come in the way of one's National Security. I feel We are simply running away from our responsibilities and procrastinating

Strong nations give a damn of what others think in matters pertaining to security

 

[nitesh]

cross posting:

only for information

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/physics/pdf/0401/0401110v3.pdf

from page 27

Most recently, this fact was confirmed by India: it exploded a twostage hydrogen
bomb in the series of five tests which was its second experimental campaign, 24 years after its first single experiment of 1974.13 According to an official Indian statement, the device worked as expected, providing a total fission fusion yield of about 43 kilotons, a value that was intentionally kept low “to meet stringent criteria like containment of the explosion and least possible damage to buildings and structures in the neighboring villages.” A sketch of a modern thermonuclear bomb is given in Fig.4. One recognizes the same elements as in Fig.3, which are found in all thermonuclear explosives, with a number of variations. For instance, while the secondaries of early H bombs were generally cylindrical, the most modern ones are probably of spherical shape. In that case, instead of being made of plutonium or U235, the spark plug could be a DT fuze which ignites the Li6D fuel when optimum compression is reached. Finally, by chosing for the pusher/tamper an appropriate heavy material it is possible to control the total yield of a thermonuclear weapon. This is because the high energy (i.e., 14MeV) neutrons produced by fusion have sufficient energy to fission any kind of transuranic material such as all isotopes of uranium and plutonium. Therefore, while the minimum yield of a given thermonuclear design will be provided by using a non fissionable heavy material such as lead or bismuth as the tamper, the use of depleted (i.e., mostly isotope 238), natural, or highly enriched (i.e., mostly isotope 235) uranium will provide a range of increasing yields because more and more fission reactions will be produced in the tamper. This is why the pusher/tamper is sometimes called the “third stage” of a thermonuclear weapon. For example, assuming as in Fig.4 that the yield is 150kt if the pusher/tamper ismade of U238, the yield will be 300kt if the pusher/tamper is made of U235. On the other hand, if the pusher/tamper is made of a lead or bismuth, the yield will be significantly lower, on the order of 50kt. This is most probably what the Indian scientists have done in 1998 in order to be able to detonate the device at a relatively low depth into the ground, and to minimize the background signals which may overload the measuring instrumentation. Finally, if plutonium is used for the pusher/tamper a yield somewhat higher than with enriched uranium is obtained. This is why using plutonium for the “third stage” is providing the highest possible yield for a given design. This option has been implemented in some of the French thermonuclear weapons, and was an important justification for the French fast breeder program,14 as it could be for the Indian plutonium reprocessing/recycling program [26]. Consequently, although plutonium has some environmental disadvantages because it is more radioactive than U235, it offers an attractive alternative to the large scale production of highly enriched uranium because plutonium of any grade can be used for the “third stage” of a thermonuclear weapon. Therefore, any country such as Japan which has a large stockpile of separated plutonium will not need access to large amounts of U235 should it decide to make high yield thermonuclear weapons

http://www.cat.gov.in/newsletter/NL/fday/fday2005/fday_cat.pdf

Laser Plasma Interaction Studies

The advent of compact, table top terawatt ( called T3 ) laser systems since the last decade has revolutionized the field of laser plasma interaction with many potential applications ranging from table top fusion reactions to development of compact plasma - based electron accelerators. At CAT we have designed, built and commissioned a
table top one terawatt, 1 picosecond duration Nd:glass laser system with focusable intensity exceeding 1017 W/cm2. The plasma produced at these intensities acts like a miniaturized ultrafast x-ray source of high energy photons ( up to MeV) and high energy charged particles ranging from protons to highly charged ions of heavy elements. These will have many applications in nuclear and material sciences. A high intensity pulsed laser beam of gigawatt to terawatt peak power can heat the matter to generate a high temperature plasma of hundreds of million degrees at several tens of megabar pressure,
mimicking the conditions existing in the core o f sun. We have set up a high power Nd:glass, 2-beam laser system which can provide 100 joule energy pulses of one nanosecond (10-9 s) duration. This is being used to heat hollow micro-spheres of gold ( called hohlraum ) to produce intense thermal x-ray radiation, and to study opacity enhancement in mixed element targets, and the various processes
involved in laser driven inertial confinement fusion.

and this facility is not under external review:

The Hindu : National : Nuclear separation plan seeks fine balance

The Centre for Advanced Technology, Indore, where research work on lasers and accelerators is conducted, has also not been placed in the civilian pool.

now you guys decide

also some more info:
http://pkiyengar.in/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/New_version_book_May_2009.124232514.pdf

 

[Sridhar]

National / Opinion Magazine | Oct 26, 2009

Ground reality: The site of the Pokhran-II blasts
opinion
Non-Fissile Doubts
One nuclear lie puts our entire strategic decision-making at stake
P.K. Iyengar
What DAE Says

• Combined yield of Pokhran-II tests was 57 kt: 12 kt for the fission device; 45 kt for the TN one
• International seismologists got yield wrong because of the geological nature of Pokhran-II site
• Claims Pokhran-II yield was 4.45 times Pokhran-I, so TN device worked
• Iyengar can’t be sure about his calculations because he doesn’t know the parameters of the device.
• The radiochemical test of the Pokhran-II site proves its yield measurements were as expected
• The ratio of Mn54 to Ce144 shows fusion took place in excess of fission.

***​

What Iyengar Says

• If so sure, why doesn’t DAE make public the video recording of the ground motion during the test?
• If international seismologists got Pokhran-I readings right, they wouldn’t get Pokhran II wrong, since site geology was more or less the same
• Pokhran-I yielded 8 kt. So, total yield at 4.45 times works to 36 kt. Since DAE assigned 12 kt for fission device, leaves only 24 kt for TN one.
• Says only 10 per cent of LiD fusion material burnt. His formula was confirmed by S.K. Sikka, then head of the BARC design team.
• Says error margins in the radiochemical residual analysis too large
• Both fission & fusion neutrons produce Mn 54, DAE ratio no confirmation

***​

Recent revelations by Dr K. Santhanam, who was the field director during Pokhran-II, have once again brought into focus doubts regarding the thermonuclear test of May 11, 1998. Thermonuclear weapons are crucial to a credible deterrent because they are much lighter than fission weapons and therefore more suitable for deployment on missiles. Thus, fission weapons are sufficient only if your deterrence is restricted to targets located close to you. By contrast, thermonuclear weapons are not only lighter but also have explosive powers ranging from tens of kilotons to megatons, all coming largely from Lithium (Li) which is much cheaper than the plutonium used in the fission process. True, a thermonuclear explosion has as its trigger a fission device, but here the quantity of plutonium required is much smaller than in a purely fission weapon of comparable yield.




Minor variations in the site geology of the ’98 tests couldn’t have accounted for reduction in yield by half compared to ’74.



The basic design of nuclear devices must be validated through underground explosions before weaponising, underlining the necessity of being absolutely sure that the test carried out is beyond any doubt. Therefore, considering the doubts over the Pokhran-II tests, what’s at stake is the credibility of our nuclear deterrence and, even more importantly, of our strategic decision-making process. No one understands this better than the armed forces, who will be the users of these weapons. Since it’s they who are responsible for national security, they must be convinced about the success of our nuclear tests and our nuclear deterrence—not politicians or bureaucrats. By all accounts, they don’t seem to be in the loop. At a press conference on September 24, 2009, the principal scientific advisor to the government, Dr R. Chidambaram, and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dr Anil Kakodkar, sought to address the ‘doubts’ raised by Dr Santhanam about the efficacy of the thermonuclear (TN) test. Were their clarifications adequate?
First, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) claims that the combined yield of the fission and TN devices tested simultaneously was around 57 kilotonnes (kt). Dr Santhanam, who was in charge of the measurements at the site, claims that the S2 (shaft-2) site in which the fission device was detonated gave a yield of 25 kt and the TN device in S1 gave much less. International seismologists, with rich experience in operating a sophisticated seismic array, all converge on a total yield not greater than 30 kt. The DAE claims that the fission device yielded 12 kt and the TN device 45 kt. It isn’t scientifically possible to reconcile these two claims even though the then NSA convened a meeting to resolve this issue.




The volume of the disturbed zone is assumed, not measured, thus resulting in an error of +/-20, not +/-10 per cent.



Santhanam’s revelations confirm that the fission device created, as expected, a crater similar to that of Pokhran-I. It’s clear that the shock intensity reaching the ground in the S1 shaft was certainly weaker and was due to the much lesser yield of the TN device compared to what is being claimed. Video recording of the ground motion could confirm the poorer upthrust of ground, but neither the DAE nor the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has released this for the public. Second, the teleseismic recordings and their analysis from a large number of stations can’t be ignored. They had reported 8 kt for Pokhran-I, which was conducted in 1974, and was close to our own measurements. It’s erroneous to argue that minor variations in the site geology of the 1998 tests could lower the signals to account for reduced yield by as much as half (the DAE’s 57 kt as against the 30 kt of others.)
Third, one of DAE’s estimates was made on the basis of a comparative study, giving the yield of Pokhran-II relative to that of Pokhran-I. The rationale for this is that since the location was almost the same, many of the uncertainties regarding the soil composition etc could be removed by such a calculation. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) calculated that the Pokhran-II yield was 4.45 times the Pokhran-I yield. (Others estimated it to be only 2-3 times.) Taking the Pokhran-I yield as close to 8 kt, as I know it as its project head, the total yield of Pokhran-II works to only 36 kt, leaving only 24 kt for the TN device (since the DAE claims 12 kt for the fission test). This is closer to the international evaluation, though slightly higher.




What was the depth the devices were kept at? After Pokhran-I, we declared it to be 107 m. Why is it a secret for Pokhran-II?



Fourth, the DAE concedes that the TN device consisted of a boosted-fission trigger and the secondary fusion core. There was also probably a fission ‘spark-plug’ in the core of the TN device (and I say this because this would be a sensible, conservative design for a first TN device; in which case some energy would come from it too. But this hasn’t been revealed). So, part of the TN yield would have come from the boosted-fission trigger and part from the fusion burn. In 2000, I had liberally estimated this ratio to be 1:1. This was later agreed to by Dr S.K. Sikka as well, who was the scientific head of the BARC design team. With this number for the thermonuclear burn—12 kt (the other 12 kt coming from the fission trigger in that 1:1 ratio)—I have calculated that only around 250 gm of the LiD (Lithium-6 Deuteride) fusion material would have burnt. I know for sure that the BARC has the means to make highly enriched Li-6 from 1970. This amount of LiD translates to a core size of around 4 cm in radius, too small for a realistic size of an LiD core. It’s more likely that around 2 kg of LiD (8 cm radius) was used, in which case the burn efficiency would be around 10 per cent. The core’s shape could have been different from spherical. Fifth, the DAE has quoted the radiochemical method as an accurate method of estimating the yield. However, it depends upon where the sample came from, and the methodology used. In an unreviewed paper by BARC published in the BARC Newsletter, where even scales are not marked on the graphs, they have claimed 50 kt as the yield (for the TN device), with an error of +/- 10 kt. This error range clearly shows that the methodology is suspect. In the case of atmospheric explosions, one could pick the samples from the very centre of the device and thus be more accurate. For the fusion device, one has to rely on the activity produced by fusion neutrons. This is difficult because a good part of the fission neutron spectrum also produces the same radioactive isotopes, thus complicating the problem. BARC scientists themselves agree that there are uncertainties regarding the volume of the disturbed zone which is assumed and not measured, thus resulting in an error of +/- 20 per cent. I have therefore very little faith in this radiochemical analysis, a view which is corroborated by senior retired radiochemists.
For the same amount of energy release, there would be 12 times more fusion than fission events. The fission product Ce144 (Cerium-144) is a small fraction of the fission fragments. The fast fission neutrons and the 14 MeV (million electronic volts) fusion neutrons both produce Mn54 (Manganese 54). The ratio of Mn54 to Ce144 therefore does not necessarily prove that fusion has occurred in excess of fission. The gamma ray spectrum does not prove anything. It only shows that the detector has good resolution irrespective of how the Mn54 was produced.
There are other questions to be asked. For example, what was the depth at which the devices were placed? After Pokhran-I, we immediately declared the depth to be 107 m, since this had nothing to do with the design of the device. Why is it that information about Pokhran-II being kept secret? Secondly, were any measurements made of the tritium concentration at the site? If the boosted-fission trigger worked, then the lithium in the LiD would have been converted to tritium by the neutrons. If the fusion worked as designed, the tritium would have fused with the deuterium and formed He-4 (helium-4). Therefore, a large tritium concentration left behind would suggest that the fission trigger worked, but the fusion part is suspect.
These grave doubts about the efficacy of the TN device should be cleared before any attempt at weaponisation. It’s imperative that the government responds to this crisis immediately, with a detailed, if necessary confidential, review by knowledgeable experts. It’s said that the AEC has already conducted this review. While the AEC comprises very distinguished bureaucrats and scientists, I’m sure that none of them, except Dr Kakodkar, would call himself an expert on nuclear devices or even nuclear physics. Others argue that it would be unwise to rake up the issue now, embarrassing as it is for India. Isn’t it worse to build a nuclear strategy on foundations that are suspect?




Did anyone measure the tritium concentration? A large concentration would mean the fission trigger worked, fusion was suspect.



The Pokhran-II controversy also raises issues about the nature of our policymaking. Plurality of opinions and inputs is essential to the democratic process and for correctly assessing situations and taking the right decisions. This ethos is present in most areas; that’s why we are a nation of committees! But when it comes to strategic matters, particularly in scientific matters, there’s a deplorable tendency, in the name of secrecy, to listen to only one opinion. The earlier statements of Brajesh Mishra, and even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, only reinforce this impression. The problem is exacerbated by the growing interference of politicians in scientific matters, and perhaps by the growing politicisation of science and scientists. Consequently, you have an impenetrable nexus, which makes scientific decision-making impossible.

Before the event: Vajpayee should have referred to experts​

Before Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared India as a weapon power and announced no first-use and a unilateral moratorium, he and his advisors should have satisfied themselves by referring to experts and not gone entirely by the claims of the two scientists, Chidambaram and A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, particularly after the DRDO raised doubts. Instead, those doubts were buried without being given a scientific hearing. The government also seems to have used those two scientists to bring about a softening of political opinion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Weapons design and testing is a specialised field, but it isn’t an exclusive club. Much of the information is available openly nowadays, in books and on the internet! Also, there exists sufficient expertise within the county to do a genuine peer review of the thermonuclear test, which will be in the best interest of the nation.
In the broader policymaking context, I propose that the government should immediately form a special advisory group of experts outside of the administration, and therefore uninfluenced by government, but having a central advisory role in decision-making in sensitive strategic areas—like the JASON committee in the US. Of course, it would be easy for the government to constitute this group in a manner that serves its own purposes, but it should realise that it is in the nation’s, and therefore ultimately in the government’s, best interests that such a group is genuinely expert, independent, and unafraid. Governments should realise that though they may have strong political compulsions to act in one manner or another, when it comes to science and technology, individual opinions and diktats don’t matter, and only objectivity and an open-minded approach can find the best way forward for the country. I can foresee that in the near future the government may have to take decisions on nuclear policies which will have grave consequences for India’s future.





www.outlookindia.com | Non-Fissile Doubts

 

[proud_hindustani]

If Abdul Kalam officially says that the tests were successful. Then you don't need to worry on useless craps created by those scientists. Kalam is highly respected and honest individual.

 

[bengalraider]

Pokhran-II: An H-bomb disaster​

Pokhran-II: An H-bomb disaster: Rediff.com India News
Last updated on: December 11, 2009 11:23 IST
The failure of India [ Images ]'s sole H-bomb is the latest in the Department of Atomic Energy and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre's long history of being economical with the truth.

Several articles have been written in recent weeks, on the Pokhran tests of 1998 and, in the wake of disclosures about the failure of the test of the thermo-nuclear (TN, or hydrogen bomb) device, the need for further testing. Some of these articles have argued that technical information published by the DAE and the BARC does not show that Pokhran-II was unsuccessful; and that there are compelling arguments against resuming H-bomb testing, even if the TN test was a failure.

BARC is quoted as saying that the TN device's yield was "consistent with" its original estimate of 50 + 10 kilotons (kT) for the two main tests conducted on May 11, 1998, viz. a 45 kT (TN) device and a 15 kT A-bomb which were exploded simultaneously.

BARC has also argued that it employed different techniques to estimate the device yield (power output), and that the post-shot Radio-Chemical Method (RCM) used to arrive at the above figure was considered the most accurate for measuring device yields. However, according to the former director of BARC's radio-chemistry division, he had measured the yield of India's first nuclear device in 1974 (P1) using the Mass Spectrometry method, internationally accepted as even more accurate than the officially tom-tommed RCM. It is also far less sensitive to the major weakness of the RCM method: If a sample is taken even slightly off the geometric centre of the core cavity (the heart of the nuclear weapon), the yield estimate can be way out from correct value. That was the principal reason why Raja Ramanna, the 'Father of our Nuclear Weapon Programme,' insisted on using the MS method for yield estimation in 1974. If the MS method was used in P-2 also, the results should be made public. If it was not used, why not?

Both the A-bomb 'trigger' and the main H-bomb produce neutrons. However, H-bombs produce more neutrons than A-bombs. This leads to considerably larger amounts of two artificially created radio-isotopes--Manganese 54 and Sodium 22--being produced by the TN device than the A-bomb. This higher ratio of Manganese 54 to Sodium 22 in the H-bomb explosion gives an 'idea' of the A-vs H-bomb/device yields (no numbers, only an "idea"), it has been argued.

The absolute values of this higher ratio have been withheld for 'obvious' reasons, says BARC conveniently. However, a 'fizzled' TN device also produces 'copious amounts' of these isotopes. Moreover, the mere presence of these isotopes is not a quantitative yield measure; at best it is only a qualitative indicator. The source of many of the assertions is an article in the July 1999 issue of BARC's in-house newsletter — not a peer-reviewed scientific journal. How many people in India, let alone internationally, are even aware of such a newsletter, or read it, even sporadically?

But there are more serious problems with BARC's assertions. Crucially, BARC claims the A-bomb yield was only 15 kT when its collaborator in P-2, the Defence Research and Development Organisation, and leading nuclear weapons laboratories worldwide, have rated it at 20–25 kT. Moreover, the hi-tech ARC — which is totally independent of both BARC and DRDO—with its very large seismic array that is 10-15 per cent more sensitive and accurate than DRDO's, (and far superior to the 30-year-old BARC array at Gauribidanur in Karnataka [ Images ]) measured all seismic signals from all P-2 tests. The highly sophisticated measurements and calculations of ARC scientists indicated a maximum TN device yield at only 20 kT. It is no wonder that the failed TN device has not been weaponised, 11 years after P-2, and India is absolutely naked today before China's H-bombs!

A 15 kT device could not have produced a 25-metre diameter crater as had occurred. What's more interesting is that, what BARC claims was a 45 kT H-bomb—that is supposedly thrice as powerful—produced no crater at all! Commonsensically, a genuine 45 kT TN device should have produced a gigantic crater. To get around this difficulty, BARC argues that if the shaft (in which the TN device is placed) is deep "enough", there will only be upheaval within the shaft, but no crater will be created. However, the shaft containing the TN device was only 20 metres deeper than the shaft for the A-bomb. Such a small difference cannot "explain" the fact that there was no crater at all.

Had the TN test really worked, the 120-metre deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was placed would have been totally destroyed, and its deepest portions even vapourised. There would, in addition, have been enormous surface damage. Most tellingly, the massive two-tonne, eight-meter high tripod ("A-frame") astride the shaft's mouth with a complex set of winches and pullies connected to a lift-like container to lower and raise personnel, equipment and materials to and from the shaft's bottom, would have been totally destroyed. But the A-frame was totally intact after the TN device test. How can this hard, visual evidence be ignored?

Some experts have argued that the damage that even a 25 kT A-bomb can cause to enemy city targets with large populations would be unacceptable to any adversary, and so, such A-bombs would be enough for us to deter even China, which has already deployed 200 H- bombs of 3.3-5 megaton yields each--200 times more powerful than what we have. Around 50 of these are in Tibet [ Images ] targeting us. It is astonishing to see the same people who argued vociferously for decades that H-bombs were central to our Credible Minimum Deterrent, suddenly do a volte-face and say A-bombs (which, for technical reasons, cannot be made to have yields more than 80 kT) are enough! Why?

China would be undeterred by our A-bomb arsenal of the yields indicated above. So we reiterate our considered view-- shared by the majority of our nuclear scientists, strategic analysts and, above all, our military--that a solely A-bomb arsenal is inadequate as a deterrent against China. Otherwise, why did four prime ministers want a TN device (H-bomb) and why did the then Prime Minister Vajpayee and his National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra direct and insist with the BARC-DRDO leadership — Kalam, Chidambaram, Santhanam and Kakodkar--that at least one P-2 test must be of a TN device?

The current controversy over the failure of India's sole H-bomb test of P-2 is only the latest case in a long history of DAE and BARC being "highly economical" with the truth, and using such "economy" to protect themselves from public criticism of major failures in large numbers of programmes and projects. Failures have been screened from the public gaze on the grounds of 'nwarranted secrecy; worse, DAE has made a huge effort to hide the facts from not only successive Parliaments and the people but even from successive governments, causing incalculable damage to our nuclear weapon and power programmes and to national security.

K Santhanam is a former chief adviser (Technologies), DRDO, and programme director, Pokhran II.

Ashok Parthasarathi is a former S&T adviser to late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi [ Images ] and Secretary of several scientific departments.

K Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi in New Delhi

 

[NSG_Blackcats]

Use plural, India has thermonuclear bombs​

After weeks of doubt, it is time to ask the question: how credible is India's thermonuclear deterrent? That is the key issue Karan Thapar discussed in this week's Devil's Advocate with the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar.

Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists--Dr K Santhanam, Dr P K Iyengar, Dr H Sethna and Dr A N Prasad--have raised serious doubts about India's thermonuclear tests of 1998.Dr Santhanam says we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermonuclear device far below the design production, but that it actually failed. Do you have a problem on your hands?

Anil Kakodkar: No, I think this is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and in fact I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.


Karan Thapar: I am glad that you began talking by the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How confident are you of the 45-kilotonne yield?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first of all say that that DAE and DRDO we both work together as a team. DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.

Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam says that the Bhabha Atomic Energy Center accepted the DRDO's instruments and their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the fusion or the thermonuclear. He says how can it be that the instruments worked in one case and not the others?

Anil Kakodkar: Well that's not true because the instrument measure and the ground motion at the place where the instrument is located - we had to separate out the information which was coming out from the thermonuclear and which was coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that the seismic instruments did not work.So there is no question of the yield of the fission test being right and the thermonuclear test being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments either ways.

Karan Thapar: But do you have proof that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 kilotonnes?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes. In fact we have within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum possible clarity.

Karan Thapar: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the thermonuclear tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public. Does it not worry you that these doubts continue--now both abroad and at home--and that they have continued for 11 years?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, it's unfortunate but it doesn't worry me because facts are facts and there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that the measurements which have been done, they have been done--as I mentioned earlier--by different groups. People who carry out the measurements on seismic instruments is a different group. People who carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a different group. There are other methods that you can use, for example the simulation of ground motion. That's another group and all these groups have come to their own conclusions which match with each other.

Karan Thapar: And all these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45 kilotonnes for the thermonuclear device?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right.

Karan Thapar: So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever?

Anil Kakodkar: Absolutely not.

Karan Thapar: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons to believe that the thermonuclear device failed. He said that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter then the fusion bomb which produced a yield of 45 kilotonnes should have created a crater of around 70 metres in diameter. He says that that didn't happen and there was in fact no crater at all.


Anil Kakodkar: That's a layman’s way of looking at it. The fact of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25 kilotonnes.

Karan Thapar: So he's wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right and secondly although the two devices were about 1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance has changed quite a bit partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more importantly because their depths have been different.
So the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the placement of the device of the thermonuclear kind is in another medium.

Karan Thapar: So in fact what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately.First of all he's exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement of the fusion was very different.

Anil Kakodkar: That's right

Karan Thapar: And both of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion?

Anil Kakodkar: And in fact we have gone through detailed simulation. For example in simulation you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.

Karan Thapar: This is a very important point that you are making.

Anil Kakodkar: Yes. And the fission device which is now placed in the thermo-heat pit now produces much less ground displacement.

Karan Thapar: So if in simulation you place the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much bigger crater--much closer to the 70 meters in diameter that Dr Santhanam would like to see.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, I don't remember how much it was but this is actually true. This has been verified by calculations

Karan Thapar: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for believing that the thermonuclear device failed. He says if it had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally destroyed. Instead, writing in ‘The Hindu’, he says the shaft remained totally undamaged and as for the a-frame, he says, it remained completely intact.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, I think you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface. You could get a crater and there are different kinds of craters that one could see. You can just get a mound - the ground rises and remains there and on the other extreme it can vent out. So in case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock—granite--and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.

Karan Thapar: And not a crater?

Anil Kakodkar: And not a crater.

Karan Thapar: What about the shaft and the a-frame?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, if the ground simply rises - and in fact you can see a lot of fracture on the ground around that for a fairly large distance so it's clear that there was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance, but the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So there is no question of damage to the a-frame.

Karan Thapar: So in fact the fact that the shaft and the a-frame survived intact can be quite easily explained. It's not proof that the thermonuclear device failed?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes, yes, it has been seen in detailed simulations and by the way I must tell you that this simulation, which I am telling you about, is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated and these have been published in international journals.

Karan Thapar: So you have had multiple validations of these.

Anil Kakodkar: That's right.

Karan Thapar: Clearly you are dismissive of Dr Santhanam's doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your predecessors, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr P K Iyenger, said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009. He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected, that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the thermonuclear test."
Does it worry you that your predecessors seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was of course a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also, the fact is that before the 1990 and 1998 tests, all work was done under cover - we were not in the open - and we required a lot of logistical support and all and that all was being provided by DRDO. But things were still being done on a need to know basis. So to assume that Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.

Karan Thapar: You are making two important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam did not know everything - the fact that he was DRDO team leader does not mean that he knew everything that was happening.

Anil Kakodkar: He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.


Karan Thapar: Everything that he needed to know but not more?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right.

Karan Thapar: You are also saying that Dr Iyenger isn't fully in the picture and therefore his opinion is not necessarily valid.


Anil Kakodkar: He is not in the picture as far as the 1998 tests are concerned.

Karan Thapar: So he doesn't really know about the 1998 tests.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, he knows only as much as has been published and nothing more.

Karan Thapar: His comment therefore is not backed by knowledge and insight.

Anil Kakodkar: Well, that's for you to judge.

Karan Thapar: Let's purse the credibility and the doubts surrounding India's thermonuclear deterrent in a somewhat different way.
Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the Government as far back as in 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote.

Anil Kakodkar: Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present: BARC team as well as the DRDO team. We looked at the measurements done by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review, it was clear that what basis we could go by and what conclusions we could draw. Now, the question is that if the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions which are based on ... what is the basis of any assertions?

Karan Thapar: So when Dr Santhanam says that the DRDO's doubts were brushed aside lightly, then that is wrong. They were considered and they were evaluated?

Anil Kakodkar: I think yes. I think they were evaluated, that's right.

Karan Thapar: And they were dismissed because they were found to be faulty. They were not just brushed aside.

Anil Kakodkar: No, they were not brushed aside.

Karan Thapar: In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently on November 15, 2009 for ‘The Tribune’, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy--the department to which you were ex-officio secretary--is in fact hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the maximum information and that too very promptly - immediately after the tests.

Karan Thapar: There is no hiding?

Anil Kakodkar: There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission in not one but four meetings after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So where is the hiding?

Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this: you may not be hiding facts as Dr Santhanam alleges but a controversy has arisen and it grows and it won't disappear. Many people believe that the only way to resolve this issue is to now organise a peer group of scientists to review the results of the 1998 thermonuclear tests. Would you agree?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, let me first repeat what I said earlier. There are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups, not just individuals but groups, which have looked at these. The fact is that this is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by and large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?

Karan Thapar: So there is no need for a peer group review yet again?

Anil Kakodkar: That's what I would say.

Karan Thapar: The matter is conclusively sorted out?

Anil Kakodkar: That's right. And this has been after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.

Karan Thapar: Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that you have concluded several reviews, including one recently after the doubts were raised, the doubts continue. And given that there are doubts about India's one and only thermonuclear test do we need more tests?

Anil Kakodkar: Well, I would say no because the important point to note is that the thermo nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse. In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. And so we think that the design which has been done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested one can build devices ranging from low kilotonne all the way to 200 kilotonnes. And that kind of fully assures the deterrence.

Karan Thapar: You are saying that India doesn't need more thermonuclear tests but the truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?

Anil Kakodkar: Well if you go by Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes.

Karan Thapar: I want to pick up on that last point that you have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any need for further tests - can you say India has a credible thermonuclear bomb?

Anil Kakodkar: Of course.

Karan Thapar: We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?

Anil Kakodkar: Why are you using singular? Make that plural.

Karan Thapar: The reason I ask is because Dr Santhanam writing in ‘The Hindu’ says that the thermonuclear device has not been weaponsied even 11 years after the tests.

Anil Kakodkar: How does he know? He is not involved.

Karan Thapar: So you are saying to me that we have thermonuclear bombs--in the plural?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes.

Karan Thapar: With a yield of at least 45 kilotonnes each.

Anil Kakodkar: Much more than that.

Karan Thapar: Much more than that?

Anil Kakodkar: Yes. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kilotonne to 200 kilotonnes.

Karan Thapar: So when people like former Army chief, General Malik say, that because of the doubts in the public arena, the Army wants assurance of the yield and the efficacy of India's thermonuclear bomb, what is your answer to them?

Anil Kakodkar: I think that is guaranteed. The Army should be fully confident and defend the country. There is no issue about the arsenal at their command.

Karan Thapar: Dr Kakodkar, a pleasure talking to you.

Anil Kakodkar: Thank you.

IBN Live

 

[NSG_Blackcats]

Video of Dr Anil Kakodkar's Interview with Karan Thapar on Devil's Advocate

Part1

Part2

Part3

Part4

Part5

 

[Sridhar]

Kakodkar a liar, says Santhanam

Sachin Parashar, TNN 14 December 2009, 02:19am IST

NEW DELHI: One of the key figures in India's 1998 thermonuclear test, scientist K Santhanam, has accused former Atomic Energy Commission chairman

http://twitterapps.indiatimes.com/feedtweet/tweet?link=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kakodkar-a-liar-says-Santhanam-/articleshow/5334658.cms&title=Kakodkar%20a%20liar,%20says%20Santhanam%20-%20India%20-%20The%20Times%20of%20IndiaAnil Kakodkar of bluffing the armed forces for stating that the country has a credible hydrogen bomb deterrent. Santhanam made the remarks in a conversation with TOI after Kakodkar assured the armed forces that “there is no issue about the arsenal at their command” when it came to thermonuclear deterrent.

In a TV interview, Kakodkar also said that Santhanam did not know because he was not involved. Kakodkar’s assertion is strange because Santhanam, as the project director, was responsible for test site preparations. “I can only describe what he is saying as an absolute lie. As the programme coordinator, I was responsible for not just the entire management but also site instrumentation meant to measure the yields,” the former DRDO scientist told TOI.

As for Kakodkar’s assertion that India had more than one thermonuclear bomb, Santhanam said the scientific truth would not change. Kakodkar also said in the interview that because of the expansion of knowledge base and capabilities, one could carry out a design and on the basis of that design and test, build a range of systems right up to 200 kilotonnes. Santhanam responded by stating India was far behind the claims being made officially.

“There is a difference between confidence in a design and assured performance of the design to meet the services’ requirements. These are just airy-fairy claims. The services were initially kept in the dark, maybe for valid reasons. It is great to know that they are now waking up to the need for proven designs,” said Santhanam. Taking a dig at BARC, the scientist said that it wouldn’t be possible for “the Bombaywallahs to pull the wool over the eyes of the armed forces, government and people for long”.

In his TV interview, Kakodkar also said that Dr P K Iyengar, eminent scientist who has supported Santhanam all along, had no idea about the 1998 tests and that DRDO was responsible for only logistical support, another assertion which was described as a lie by Santhanam. Kakodkar described as erroneous Santhanam’s conclusion that the yield for the thermonuclear device was much lower than claimed.

“The yield of thermonuclear tests was verified, not by one method but several methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail and, in fact, I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that,” said Kakodkar.

Kakodkar a liar, says Santhanam - India - The Times of India

 

[nitesh]

The Telegraph - Calcutta (Kolkata) | Opinion | Science and the layman

Scientists are also short changed by decision-makers. The Indian Neutrino Observatory — by Indian standards, a mega project with a projected investment of Rs 900 crore — was to be situated in a tunnel, already dug by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in the Nilgiris, near Masinagudi. Ecological implications were thoroughly studied. The ministry of environment commissioned a thorough study by a top Indian scientist well-known for his work on elephants who has worked in the area for nearly three decades. In spite of this, the ministry has stopped the project without giving any reasons. Scientists in Canada, Italy and Japan have a head start of almost a decade.

 

[A chauhan]

India's H-bomb failed, say top scientists

Sorry if re-posted:

Posted On: 21-Dec-2009 12:30:51 By: Edwin



Soon after the Pokhran-II tests on 11 May 1998, the scientists of the two organizations concerned - the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defense R&D Organization (DRDO), had jointly evaluated the success of the two tests – the fission device (A – bomb) and the fusion device (H - bomb).

While the former device performed perfectly including creating a crater of the expected size, the fusion device failed on many counts – very low yield, no crater etc. International monitoring centres also recorded low intensity of shock waves, resulting in low yield estimates – estimates that were more in consonance with the DRDO numbers. This was discussed among the BARC and DRDO scientists involved – and resulted in a dispute between them.

A detailed report submitted by DRDO to the Government fully corroborated its original assessment viz. that, while the fission device worked successfully as expected, the fusion device did not. The recent revelations by Dr. K. Santhanam, who was in charge of all of DRDO’s activities at the site, testify to this.

By all accounts - geological, radiochemical as well as seismic - it is now quite clear that the fusion device yielded a very low value of explosive power. The articles by K. Santhanam and Prof. Ashok Parthasarathi in The Hindu (17 September 2009) and P. K. Iyengar in Outlook (26 October 2009) attached, (Appendices I and II) go into considerable technical detail and present a credible case, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the H – bomb tested on May 11, 1998 failed.

These findings are extremely serious for the security of the nation, particularly in the context of our pronouncement of being a nuclear weapon power, along with our enunciated doctrine of ‘no first use’ and our ‘unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing’. They strike at the root of our weaponisation capability and compromise our strategy of Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence.

Soon after the Pokhran-II Tests, the then government almost succumbed to Western pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), backing off only at the last moment due to an outcry in the country against doing so. The refusal of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT then released the pressure onthe government . The renewed pressure from President Obama on us in recent months to sign the CTBT is causing the issue of our signing the CTBT to be raised again. We strongly urge the present government to remain firm in its opposition to our doing so as the Prime Minister has publicly assured the nation more than once in recent months.

Obama has actually gone further than trying to secure universal adherence to the CTBT, and secured a UN Security Council Resolution urging such adherence to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also. Not signing the highly discriminatory NPT has been an article of faith of all our governments – irrespective of hues – since the Treaty was drawn up in 1968. The present government, we strongly urge again, should continue that policy steadfastly, despite whatever threats and blandishments are applied to it. Even the slightest succumbing would convert our ‘voluntary moratorium’ into an involuntary, permanent, cessation of nuclear weapon testing and so forever deny us our legitimate place in the great powers’ league.

The international political and diplomatic aspects as set out in the previous para apart, the grave situation we are in regarding our Thermonuclear (H-bomb) capability it demands resolute, speedy and comprehensive corrective action. We are well aware of the nature, sources and scales of nuclear threats the nation faces. To meet that threat effectively, an in-depth analysis of our real capabilities in terms of: Command & Control Systems, Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems and the types, character and numbers of nuclear weapons needing to constitute our nuclear arsenal and the keeping of that arsenal up-to-date, is essential - indeed acutely pressing. To address these issues and take well informed competent and speedy decisions instead of depending entirely on the existing bureaucracy, administrative, military and scientific, it is essential to have the involvement, on a continuing basis, of a wide variety of opinions and assessments from scientists, strategic analysts and defense & diplomatic personnel with a deep understanding of the many complex issues involved, including the technologies needed to be developed, and the minimum time-scale in which this can be achieved. While secrecy is crucial, an open mind and willingness to learn are equally important.

We therefore, strongly urge the government to immediately set up a High Level, Independent, Broad-Based Panel of Experts to define and monitor the implementation, on a continuing basis, of an effective course of action, in the realm of thermonuclear weapons, so central to our national security.

All of us have worked on different aspects of this problem with a sound understanding of the harsh ground realities and the immense magnitude of what is at stake. It is now forthe government to Take the Call – and without losing a minute more – as its counterparts in our adversaries have and are continuing to do so.

Signatories to the statement

Dr. P.K. Iyengar, former Chairman Atomic Energy Commission, Director BARC and a key architect of the Pokhran I nuclear test of May 18, 1974 and internationally acknowledged as India’s top nuclear weapons expert

Professor Ashok Parthasarathi, former Science Adviser to Late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for many years and Secretary of many major Scientific Departments of Government of India.

Dr. A.N. Prasad, former Director, BARC and Member (R&D) of the Atomic Energy Commission, a former Senior Adviser to the IAEA, Vienna for many years on nuclear safeguards, and a key member of India’s original weapons grade plutonium extraction technology development since inception in 1960 and a former Commissioner of UN MOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) for disarming Iraq of Weapons of Mass Destruction)

Mr. K. Santhanam, Chief Adviser (Technologies), DRDO and Project Coordinator of Pokhran II Series of Nuclear Weapon Tests

Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan one of the key Technology Directors of our Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) project for several years, which developed the indigenous nuclear submarine Arihant and former Chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board

Dr. C.K. Mathews, former Head, Radio Chemistry Division, BARC and Director Chemistry Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam

Dr. Jaipal Mittal, Raja Ramana Fellow and former Director, Chemistry Group, BARC

Dr. A.D. Damodaran, former Director, Special Materials Plant, Nuclear Fuel Complex and former Director, Regional Research Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram

Dr. S.R. Valluri, former Director, National Aerospace Laboratory and first Director General of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the Organization specially set up to design and develop the Light Combat Aircraft – Tejas

Captain S. Prabhala, Indian Navy former Chairman & Managing Director Bharat Electronics Ltd.

Rear Admiral J.J. Baxi, former Director, Weapons and Electronics Systems Organization, Ministry of Defense and Chairman & Managing Director Bharat Electronics Ltd.

Brigadier M.R. Narayanan former Director, Army Radio Engineering Network, Ministry of Defense

Dr. K.S. Jayaraman, formerly Nuclear Physics Division, BARC, Science Correspondent of the PTI for many years, Science Correspondent for South Asia for leading international journal ‘Nature’ and President Indian Science Writers Association.