Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

[nitesh]

Is the question just about casualty figures?

Yes the question is about casualty figure.

TN weapons AFAIK require a lot less fissile material than a Fission device of a similar yield.
While developing SLBMs, the weight and size of the warhead that would eventually be mated to it would be a lot more important than for land based missiles. This is especially true in our case if we ever want the Arihant to become a credible second strike platform.
Considering the (relatively) small size of the submarine and the consequent reduction in both numbers and the size of the missiles carried we need the warheads to be as light as possible and still pack a punch if we want the missile to have the requisite range to reach deep inside china. And for that we need TN warheads, megaton or otherwise.

For god sake now, Arihant is not the end of nuke submarine for India this is the FIRST one and numbers are going to increase as well as the range of missiles is going to increase. So this argument does not hold any water

 

[nitesh]

This throws in some light

Splitting atoms, not hairs- Hindustan Times

After a long lull, doubts have once again been expressed about the efficacy of the Indian 1998 nuclear tests. In this context, many issues have been raised: How big a deterrent should India have? Should India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? While many of these questions do have some relevance for Indian strategic planning, they have been linked to the success of the 1998 tests and, in particular, whether the yield of the 1998 tests were in conformity with the planned yields.

There is no confusion about the design/planned yield of the 1998 thermonuclear test: it was 45 kiloton. This has not been disputed by anybody. According to the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the estimated yield of the test was in rough agreement with the design yield subject to the usual errors associated with such estimates. It must be stated at the outset that there is no unanimity among the Indian critics of the DAE about the yield of the tests.

P.K. Iyengar, former DAE chairman, and the only nuclear scientist among those critical of the 1998 test, does not question the DAE estimates and is on record saying, “If one goes by the numbers for the total nuclear yield put out by the Department of Atomic Energy, which I see no reason to dispute, the yield of the thermonuclear device detonated on May 11, 1998 was around 40 kilotons.”

The DAE estimates are, however, contested by some Indian non-scientists and non-nuclear scientists. Till very recently, they had relied solely on the estimates of some foreign scientists for their contention. These estimates had been contested by DAE scientists and Indian scientific journals had carried an extensive debate on the issue with both the foreign and DAE scientists presenting their case. However, none of the Indian critics of the DAE ever presented any scientific argument in support of their case.

There are a number of ways of estimating nuclear test yields. Some on-site, some off-site; some off-site estimates that require data on the geology of the test site, and some that do not. The on-site methods are a) radiochemical analysis; b) close-in ground motion; c) hydrodynamic-CORRTEX. The off-site methods are seismic estimates using a) surface wave characteristics; independent of test-site geology data; b) body wave characteristics requiring some on-site geological data and c) using Lg wave characteristics requiring some on-site geological data.

Each of the above methods has its own estimate error. In terms of accuracy, the radiochemical analysis offers the best estimates. This was the method used by the United States estimating the yield of their nuclear devices. The Hydrodynamic (CORRTEX) and ground-in motion estimates rank second in their accuracy. While negotiating on the test methodology before ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the US had insisted on the CORRTEX system for measuring the yield of an explosion, while the Soviets had favoured seismic monitoring. Seismic methods are the least reliable, especially when only one of the seismic methods is used.

The DAE had used all of the above methods in their estimates of the yields. The foreign experts who had disagreed with the DAE had employed only one method: the seismic method using body wave, which is the most unreliable of all of the above methods.

As mentioned earlier, till very recently the Indian critics of the DAE had based their criticism solely on the estimates of foreign scientists. Only very recently, former Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist K. Santhanam revealed that there was a disagreement between the DAE and the DRDO on the yield of the 1998 test based on one method used by both parties, namely the close-in ground motion characteristics of the test. The DRDO seemed to have used only this method for estimating the 1998 yields.

As in all experiments, the success of the effort depends much on the instruments used and the calibration of these instruments. While Santhanam is on record as stating that the DRDO’s calibrations “were acknowledged to [have met international standards] by the BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre]”, it’s a matter of record that much before the tests, the DAE had strongly questioned both the sensitivity of the DRDO instruments and their calibration and these had not been agreed to by the DAE. So, it’s not surprising to find the DAE and DRDO estimates not matching each other.

However, notwithstanding the fact that the DAE had used all six methods of estimation of nuclear yields, and that the DRDO had used only one method and that too under circumstances that were questioned by the DAE before the tests, it should be possible to resolve the issue by placing all the pre-test and post-test data before a group of Indian scientists qualified to judge all elements involved — the pre-test instrumentation sensitivity and calibration methods and the post-test data and charts — to come to the relative correctness of the two estimates.

It is interesting to compare the Indian and Pakistani reaction to the foreign estimates of the yields. As was the case with India, the foreign critics estimated the Pakistani yields to be far less than what was claimed by Pakistan. However, unlike in the case of India, there has not been, so far, any response from Pakistani scientists about the foreign estimates of their test yields. The Pakistani armed forces, of course, have kept quiet all along.

G. Balachandran is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Research Consultant, National Maritime Foundation (NMF).

 

[Officer of Engineers]

Nitesh, there is no dispute about P-I numbers. If that is a given, then foreign estimates about P-II is about on par.

Can't have your cake and eat it too.

 

[nitesh]

Sir the problem is the dispute is based on some scientists claiming the yields based on wrong estimates done by them (not to there fault, they were not having site specific details first hand). The best possible method is radio chem analysis whose details are and will not be shared hence the saga continues.

My feeling is this outburst is a controlled salvo from GoI side before prime minister lands in USA and anticipated presure to sign CTBT. I don't think such a scientiest can just shoot off his mouth. Nothing more then that.

 

[Yusuf]

I have a feeling Shantanam is coming up with a book. Good marketing salvo from him right now.

 

[mattster]

Sir the problem is the dispute is based on some scientists claiming the yields based on wrong estimates done by them (not to there fault, they were not having site specific details first hand). The best possible method is radio chem analysis whose details are and will not be shared hence the saga continues.

My feeling is this outburst is a controlled salvo from GoI side before prime minister lands in USA and anticipated presure to sign CTBT. I don't think such a scientiest can just shoot off his mouth. Nothing more then that.

He is retired. He is a civilian now, and he can darn well say whatever he pleases as long as he is not revealing state secrets. Now if it was China, they would have sent him to the "Gulag" for re-indoctrination, or put a cap in his head.

Thankfully, we Indians are a bit more tolerant of dissent.

 

[nitesh]

He is retired. He is a civilian now, and he can darn well say whatever he pleases as long as he is not revealing state secrets. Now if it was China, they would have sent him to the "Gulag" for re-indoctrination, or put a cap in his head.

Thankfully, we Indians are a bit more tolerant of dissent.

WHat makes you so sure that he has said "whatever he wanted". People who retires from such high posts can't just shoot off from mouth. It's a well calculated outburst

 

[RPK]

domain-b.com : India needs to conduct at least two more nuclear tests: Santhanam

New Delhi: Brushing aside some comments from National Security Advisor MK Narayanan, former DRDO scientist and the co-ordinator of the Pokhran-II nuclear tests tests, K Santhanam, said Monday that he hoped for at least two more nuclear tests as the country was yet to acquire minimum deterrence. Santhanam's assertion, that the thermo-nuclear test conducted in 1998 was a 'fizzle,' have sparked off a lively controversy in the country.

On Monday Narayanan got a bit theatrical describing Santhanam's claims as being ''horrific.''

In response Santhanam hit back, saying that Narayanan was ''barking up the wrong tree.''

So far, the current prime minister, Dr Manmohan Singh and ex-president Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, amongst other luminaries, have tried to dampen the controversy by asserting that the H-bomb test was indeed a success.

Santhanam has dismissed Kalam's assertions as being 'uninformed' as he was not a phycisist.

Kalam, in his capacity as DRDO chief, was Santhanam's boss at the time of the tests.

Maintaining his assertions, Santhanam has now asked for the setting up of an independent panel to probe the results of Pokhran II.

The controversy has reared up at a time when India is already coming under pressure from the current US administration to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), both of which, would legally bind it from testing a nuclear weapon.

Santhanam's arguments that India still lacks minimum deterrence against China, and that there is a need to carry out further nuclear tests, would obviously put the current government under pressure not to sign either of these treaties.

Contesting 'official' BARC data, according to which the H-bomb test was a success, Santhanam said that there was a need to reanalyse the test data.

''The trouble lies in what data was included in the BARC analysis and what was not...There is a wealth of seismic and other data, which reveal that the thermonuclear device underperformed,'' Santhanam said. ''There is a large body of evidence in seismology circles around the world and India, which raised doubts about the yield, immediately after the test,'' he added.

This was by way of a counter to Narayanan who was asserting on Monday that nobody could contest the proven data of the Pokhran tests.

According to Santhanam, the hydrogen bomb test, which was the most powerful of the three tests conducted on 11 May 1998, did not produce the desired yield. He also claimed that the physical evidence at the site was also another proof of the failure of the thermo-nuclear device.

According to Santhanam, the Atomic Energy Commission and BARC could not be 'judge and jury' on the claims of the thermo-nuclear yield. ''There is a strong and clear need to form a group of stalwarts and give them access to all relevant data. Only then will credibility increase,'' he said.

Addressing a persistent query, as to why it took him 11 years to raise the Pokhran issue, he responded saying that he had already told the government about the failure of the test in 50-page classified report submitted in 1998.

 

[anoop_mig25]

i think whole exercise has been started by government or by some one in it so debate continues and we don`t sign ctbt or ntp . i mean what`s point in raising question on nuclear test carried out that was carried out 10 years back.it may gov`s strategy to arose public feeling and then saying that since people of India are against any deal like ctbt or other so tey are not going to sign it.or if not so can any one explain why bjp is quiet on this issue even when one the scientist claimed that test were carried out in haste.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

i think whole exercise has been started by government or by some one in it so debate continues and we don`t sign ctbt or ntp . i mean what`s point in raising question on nuclear test carried out that was carried out 10 years back.it may gov`s strategy to arose public feeling and then saying that since people of India are against any deal like ctbt or other so tey are not going to sign it.or if not so can any one explain why bjp is quiet on this issue even when one the scientist claimed that test were carried out in haste.

BJP has not been quiet

BJP condemns questioning of Pokhran-II - India - NEWS - The Times of India

BJP condemns questioning of Pokhran-II
TNN 19 September 2009, 05:53am IST

NEW DELHI: Opposition BJP on Friday vehemently condemned attempts to question the success of Pokharan-II atomic tests by some Indian nuclear
experts, saying that they should not "play with" the country's strategic security and deterrence.

"Some Indian nuclear scientists have demanded a review of the Pokharan tests of 1998. We condemn this outright. Giving full respect to these scientists, we would like to say, `please don't play with our strategic security and nuclear deterrence'," an assertive BJP spokesperson Ravi Shankar Prasad said.

K Santhanam, a DRDO nuclear scientist associated with Pokharan-II, had recently expressed doubts about the success of the tests, saying the yield was not satisfactory. He had said an inquiry should be conducted on the matter.

But the then Atomic Energy Commission chief R Chidambaram, the then BARC director Anil Kakodkar and ex-scientific advisor to the government A P J Abdul Kalam said the tests were a success.

"We don't consider raising of this issue, 11 years after the tests, proper... There are equally important scientists who said the tests were a success. We need to be sensitive to India's strategic security," Prasad said.

Pokharan-II was undertaken in 1998 during NDA rule and was hailed as a big success by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government. It had led to international economic sanctions on India which were later removed.

Three top nuclear scientists -- M R Srinivasan, P K Iyengar and A N Prasad -- on Thursday demanded a probe into the claims made by Santhanam.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/...D=w44iAeuGCu8=&SectionName=m3GntEw72ik=&SEO=I

Perils of minimal deterrence


Bharat KarnadFirst Published : 24 Sep 2009 11:19:00 PM ISTLast Updated : 23 Sep 2009 11:48:05 PM IST

India is lucky that in the decade since the 1998 tests when the Indian government trumpeted the country as a ‘nuclear weapon state’ boasting of thermonuclear armaments in its inventory, no country called its bluff. In the context of deterrence as a high-powered game of poker, luck is a statistical incidence for a player with a weak suite. It will eventually run out.

The coordinator of the 1998 series of nuclear tests K Santhanam has authoritatively shown up the Indian government’s thermonuclear claims as pretension torpedoing, in the process, the longstanding fiction of India’s mastery over the science of fusion weapons purveyed by R Chidambaram, adviser to the prime minister on science and technology and, formerly, chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. By referring, moreover, to the ‘hard data’ regarding the tests Santhanam says he has, the other shoe is yet to drop. Chidambaram & Co must be sweating bricks — the reason why they have been silent, even as the Manmohan Singh regime’s urge to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and close the testing option altogether lies buried. Instead of doing the right thing and having a committee of eminent physicists, including stalwarts from the retired nuclear community, examine the test data and the design details of the hydrogen device, national security adviser M K Narayanan’s talk of a BARC group having already done this job and — surprise, surprise — pronounced the fusion test a success, has only stoked the disbelief freighted with anxiety.

Most significantly, Santhanam disclosed that none of the high yield thermonuclear weapon designs in the 100-kiloton to 300-kiloton range that Chidambaram had repeatedly assured the government and the military had been realised have, in fact, been weaponised. This is a devastating denouement to a story that has the makings of a gigantic fraud perpetrated on the country, a fraud based on a scientific conceit of Chidambaram’s that Indian nuclear weaponeers are able to do what their counterparts in the more advanced countries cannot, namely, configure the complex hydrogen bomb based solely on simulation, not sustained and rigorous explosive testing. It is another matter that India’s supposed simulation prowess is suspect considering that simulation requires extensive test data to write the software and computing speeds in thousands of trillions of operations per second to replicate the variables of a fusion reaction — neither of which the country possesses. Moreover, absent tests, facilities for large scale inertial confinement fusion and for dual axis radiographic hydro testing to enhance the yield by, say, improving the system for injecting tritium gas in the boosted fission trigger in an H-bomb, are unavailable in the country.

But, what is so special about thermonuclear weaponry? For one thing, the hydrogen bomb can inspire dread and is truly ‘frightening’ — the essence of deterrence as mind game and something Herman Kahn, the pioneering theorist of deterrence, said was the prime requisite. And, most importantly, the H-bomb is four times more destructive than a fission weapon and costs only a third as much. With limited resources and fissile material stockpile, India will be strategically better off with a mainly thermonuclear arsenal, each warhead providing enormously bigger bang for the buck.

Supporters of the government’s ‘no more testing’ line, incidentally, are also, without exception, adherents of ‘minimal’ deterrence. Acknowledging that India’s thermonuclear cupboard is virtually bare, these worthies now argue that: (1) weapons capable of 150-300 KT, leave alone megaton, yields are not needed because 60-80 KT fission weapons are adequate; (2) instead of one thermonuclear missile on target, India can fire three missiles, each with a 15-25 KT warhead and, in a supportive hypothesis, (3) delivery accuracy is more important than weapon yield.
An Indian arsenal featuring only 20 KT weapons will do for Pakistan but is guaranteed to fail against China. Besides, India does not have 60-80 KT fission weapons. If these are to be acquired, it will mean scaling up the only proven weapon in the armoury — the 20 KT variety. But scaled up fission bombs/warheads will still need to be tested. If testing is deemed politically infeasible for fission weapons as for fusion weapons, then a big question mark will continue to hang around the Indian deterrent.

The fundamental problem with triggering a salvo of missiles with small yield warheads in the place of thermonuclear missiles is that it is inherently illogical to make the effort of investing in and obtaining 5,000 km Agni intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and, in the future, an 12,000 km intercontinental range ballistic missiles or even long range cruise missiles, and then arm these with puny warheads. It skews the cost-benefit calculus. The minimalists think otherwise given their simplistic take on deterrence, which is high risk-acceptant. Costs may be irrelevant once a nuclear war breaks out, but isn’t the purpose of a nuclear deterrent to prevent nuclear war credibly but also as economically as possible? Secondly, there will be that many more fission weapon-armed missiles to secure and keep safe on the ground. Thirdly, against well-defended value targets, such as Beijing, several missiles will need to be fired to penetrate missile defences and to overcome attrition in flight and inaccurate terminal guidance.

Finally, just the threat of incoming Chinese Dongfeng-21 IRBMs carrying warheads in the 1-3.3 megaton range would so psychologically cripple Indian political leaders with only 20 KT firecrackers to bank on, they will likely throw in the towel.

The Armed Services have been shaken up by Santhanam’s outing the weapons programme as fraudulent and the thermonuclear deterrent as hollow. It will be reasonable for them to demand that nuclear weapons principally meet rigorous military performance standards and not, as happens at present, perform mostly on paper or on computer screens — the sort of thing that apparently satisfies the scientists who are not in the firing loop, retired bureaucrats and policemen (as NSA and what not) who offer strategic counsel such as is on display but are safely out of harm’s way, and political leaders making crucial nuclear weapons-use decisions. The pity is that while the military is starting to get a grip on the situation, the retired civil servant-types and politicians, who understand little about nuclear weapons and even less about deterrence dynamics, are predisposed to make the wrong strategic choices because they accept the misleading, short term-oriented, West-pleasing, advice offered by promoters of minimal deterrence.

 

[RPK]

Can build nuke deterrence upto 200 kilotons: Kakodkar

fullstory

Can build nuke deterrence upto 200 kilotons: Kakodkar

Mumbai, Sep 24 (PTI) Rubbishing doubts on the efficacy of the hydrogen bomb test in 1998, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar today said scientists have achieved success in building deterrence capability of upto 200 kiltons.

"Once again I would like to re-emphasise that the 1998 nuclear tests were fully successful. We had achieved all the objectives in toto.

"It has given us the capability to build deterrence based on both fission and thermonuclear weapon systems from modest to all the way upto 200 kilotons," he said addressing a press conference here.

Kakodkar, who was Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1998, termed as "unnecessary" the controversy over the Pokhran-II nuclear tests triggered after claims by a former DRDO scientist that the hydrogen bomb experiment was a failure.

 

[RPK]

Can build nuke deterrence upto 200 kilotons: Kakodkar- Hindustan Times

Rubbishing doubts on the efficacy of the hydrogen bomb test in 1998, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar on Thursday said scientists have achieved success in building deterrence capability of upto 200 kilton.

"Once again I would like to re-emphasise that the 1998 nuclear tests were fully successful. We had achieved all the objectives in toto. "It has given us the capability to build deterrence based on both fission and thermonuclear weapon systems from modest to all the way upto 200 kiloton," he said addressing a press conference in Mumbai.

Kakodkar, who was Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1998, termed as "unnecessary" the controversy over the Pokhran-II nuclear tests triggered after claims by a former DRDO scientist that the hydrogen bomb experiment was a failure.

R Chidambaram, Chairman of the AEC in 1998 and the current Principal Scientific Adviser to the Union Government, made a presentation on the results of the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

Former DRDO scientist K Santhanam, who was the DRDO coordinator for the 1998 tests, had claimed that the thermonuclear test was much below expectation triggering a controversy.

Santhanam had also demanded an inquiry by an independent panel of experts into the test results.

 

[RPK]

domain-b.com : India has H-bomb capability of upto 200KT: Kakodkar

Mumbai: In yet another attempt to mute a flaring controversy, Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar today affirmed that the 1998 test was not only successful but also enables Indian scientists to build H-bombs with an explosive power of upto 200 kilotons.


This photo released by the Government of India on May 17, 1998 shows the Pokhran-II test site after a nuclear device was detonated underground on May 11.
"Once again I would like to re-emphasise that the 1998 nuclear tests were fully successful. We had achieved all the objectives in toto.

"It has given us the capability to build deterrence based on both fission and thermonuclear weapon systems from modest to all the way upto 200 kilotons," Kakodkar said, addressing a press conference here.

Kakodkar termed as "unnecessary" the controversy over the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

The controversy flared upon claims by senior ex-defence scientist K Santhanam, who was the co-ordinator for the Pokhran-II tests, that though the fission tests – i.e. atom bomb – test had worked like a ''song,'' the fusion or the hydrogen bomb test was a failure.

Addressing a press conference in Mumbai along with the Principal Scientific Adviser to the Union government, R Chidambaram, Kakodkar said the Pokharan-II nuclear tests provided India the capability to build deterrence in both the fission and fusion categories.

Earlier, on 15 September, in a signed statement, atomic energy secretary K Muralidhar also ruled out the claims and stated that ''the thermonuclear test had to be kept at 45 KT in order to protect the nearby Khetorai village from the combined yield of the thermonuclear and fission test.''

The current controversy flared up as Dr Santhanam, who was a senior scientist with the Defence Research and Development Organisation in 1998, claimed that the Pokhran-II 'Shakti' tests resulted in less 'yield' than what was actually claimed. He also claims that in a 50-page classified report he had warned the central government then of the discrepancy and had stressed that the country may need to go in for another round of tests to fully satisfy itself about the efficacy of the weapon design.

He has demanded an inquiry by an independent panel of experts into the test results.

R Chidambaram, chairman of the AEC in 1998 made a presentation on the results of the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

 

[RPK]

BBC NEWS | South Asia | India nuclear tests 'successful'

Dr Anil Kakodkar was speaking in Mumbai (Bombay) following recent controversy over the tests.

In August a retired atomic scientist closely associated with the tests said they were not as successful as claimed. That led some to call for more tests.

India's 1998 tests led to similar tests by Pakistan, raising fears of a nuclear conflict between the two countries.

'Unnecessary controversy'

Differences over the success or otherwise of India's 1998 tests emerged in public in August.

K Santhanam, a respected atomic scientist who was project director of the tests, said one of the tests - on a hydrogen bomb - had not worked.

He also said India would have to carry out more tests for a credible nuclear deterrent.

Dr Kakodkar said: "There is absolutely no reason for any doubt about the yield of that test."

He and R Chidambaram, principal scientific adviser to the Indian government, told reporters that "unnecessary controversy has been raked up" by Mr Santhanam's comments.

They said the five nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 had achieved their scientific objectives, including the capability to build fission and thermonuclear weapons with yields of up to 200 kilotons.

Mr Chidambaram said proliferation sensitive information such as the composition of materials used or their quantities had not been revealed so it was "speculative" on the part of others to calculate the yield.

"No one outside the design team has the data to calculate this fission-fusion yield break-up or any other significant parameter related to fusion burn," the two men said in a statement.

Dr Kakodkar stressed that the tests had given India the capacity to build deterrence and meet the country's security requirements.

 

[Pintu]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...sts-fully-successful-/articleshow/5052234.cms

Kakodkar says Pokhran-II tests fully successful
PTI 24 September 2009, 08:25pm IST

MUMBAI: Trashing the contention that the Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998 were a failure, India's top scientists on Thursday said all objectives had been achieved and the country now has the deterrence capability of upto 200 kilotons.

Describing the tests as "fully successful", atomic energy commission chairman Anil Kakodkar and principal scientific advisor to government R Chidambaram said the controversy triggered by K Santhanam, former DRDO scientist, was "unnecessary".

The two scientists held a joint press conference seeking to clear the air in the wake of Santhanam, who was the coordinator for the 1998 tests, claiming that the thermonuclear nuclear (hydrogen bomb) test was a failure.

"Rhetoric cannot be a substitute for good science," they said adding "unnecessary doubts have been created by ex-colleagues" in an obvious reference to Santhanam and former AEC chairman P K Ayengar who too raised doubts over the efficacy of the test.

"There should be no doubt over the yield of the tests. Once again, I would like to re-emphasise that the 1998 nuclear tests were fully successful. We achieved all objectives in toto," said Kakodkar.

Defending the thermonuclear test, Dr R Chidambaram said that it was a success and the doubts voiced over it were unjustified.

Santhanam had stuck to his assertions earlier this week and was dismissive of National Security Advisor M.K.Narayanan calling his statements incorrect and horrific.

 

[Rajan]

All I got from past one month's news articles, TV interviews, 'sources', 'expert' comments and foreign 'ideas' that,

1. The leading brains behind the hydrogen bomb like Dr. S.K. Sikka, Dr. R. Chidambaram, Dr. A. Kakodkar and Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam (then DRDO chief) claimed that the test was successful but Dr. Santhanam (site preparation coordinator under Dr. Kalam) said that it was partially successful.

2. Dr. Santhanam claimed that 'the timing was right and hence decided on making this statement now' because this Govt may going to sign the CTBT and he opened his 'truth'.

3. Dr. Santhanam don't want India to sign the CTBT. He wants more tests. I see most of his evidences are picture based!!! I think he was not associated with the TN bomb development. He and his two previous colleagues also made some personal attack toward DC and APJ Kalam!!!

4. Home Minister 'Babu' Chidambaram is puzzled!! He is just puzzled!!! Thank God, Atal Bihari Vajpayee tested the nukes otherwise this Govt is so puzzled that they dare not to take any appropriate decision.!

5. Ministry of Defence and armed forces said that our nukes are proven and matured. Its a long time since we tested our first nukes and now we can make all kind of nuclear reactors, nuclear submarine, nuclear engine for rocket/satellite and a partner of the ITER.

6. Foreign 'experts' claimed that 'India just lining up to conduct more nuclear
tests to validate and improve the country’s newly developed arsenals.'

7. Desi Media spreading scary headlines, animations and 'we have lost everything' kind of stories.

8. Indian public watch this news and immediately skip to a new exciting reality show. lol

At this moment if we test another one, Pakistan/China will surely get huge diplomatic and strategic advantages over India. We should further improve our design than just debating.

 

[Pintu]

Nukes of 200kt yield possible: Architect of Pokhran-II - India - NEWS - The Times of India

Nukes of 200kt yield possible: Architect of Pokhran-II
TNN 25 September 2009, 03:23am IST

MUMBAI: R Chidambaram, ex-AEC chief and the architect of the 1998 Pokhran nuclear weapons tests, on Thursday rejected the demand for a peer review to assess the yield of the thermonuclear bomb saying the Pokhran-II data had already been subjected to several peer reviews.

In fact, Chidambaram said India had the capability to build fission and thermonuclear weapons with yields up to 200 kilotons. Trying to put a damper on the raging controversy on the yield of India’s H-bomb, Chidambaram said that due to ‘‘proliferation sensitivity, the design details of the thermonuclear device have not been made public’’.

‘‘Considering this, I do not think there is any need of a peer review. It’s an unnecessary controversy. Kakodkar and I are saddened that two of our colleagues are raising doubts about the yields,’’ he said at a press conference that was also attended by Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar and Barc director S Banerjee.

Chidambaram was responding to a demand made by former AEC chief P K Iyengar and former Barc director A N Prasad that there should be a peer review of the thermonuclear test. Iyengar and Prasad were subsequently supported by K Santhanam, a key player in the Pokhran test, who was the first to reveal on August 27, 2009, that the yield of the device was around 25kt and not 45kt as stated by Chidambaram and then scientific adviser A P J Abdul Kalam.
Santhanam, when contacted to respond to Chidambaram’s clarification, refused comment.

The thrust of the media briefing held at AEC headquarters in Colaba was that the May 1998 weapons tests were fully successful .

‘‘They have helped us build a nuclear deterrence of different yields. A great deal of further scientific and technical development work has taken place since May 1998. We have published as much data as possible without
releasing proliferation-sensitive information,’’ Chidambaram said.

Chidambaram said that yield measurements were based mainly on advanced seismology and radio chemistry. ‘‘Radio chemistry has been used in many areas,’’ he said.

Dismissing suggestions that computer simulation was no substitute for a real test, Kakodkar said that the biggest gain of these tests was in the area of computer simulation.

 

[RPK]

The Hindu : News / National : Pokhran II: "no scientific basis for doubts"

Refuting the doubts raised recently over the success of the May 1998 Pokhran II tests, Anil Kakodkar, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and R. Chidambaram, AEC Chairman in 1998 and now Principal Scientific Adviser to the Union government, said on Thursday that the controversy was “unnecessary” and the doubts had “no scientific basis.”

In defence of the accuracy of the tests, Mr. Chidambaram made an elaborate power point presentation to the press and members of the scientific community. He sought to clear doubts about the test yield raised by scientists K. Santhanam, Project Leader, Pokhran-II, and P.K. Iyengar, a former AEC Chairman.

Santhanam’s contention

Mr. Santhanam had spoken about the differences in the yield estimates of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).

He had contended, “The fission bomb yield from DRDO’s seismic instrumentation was 25 kiloton (kt).”( The Hindu, September 17, 2009: “Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure”).

In his response, Mr. Chidambaram clarified, “The BARC estimate of the yield for the fission device is 15 kiloton [not 25 kiloton] and for the thermonuclear device 45 kiloton. One of the methods used for the estimation of the device yield was close-in acceleration measurement, for which both DRDO and BARC had set up instrumentation. It soon became apparent that after discussion among the two groups of specialists that the DRDO data had anomalies and had to be rejected and that the BARC data, which had the expected waveforms, would be accepted.”

Dr. Kakodkar added there were different methods to find out the yields’ seismic measurement, instrumentation, radiochemical, actual simulation of ground motion, among others.

“These are all different disciplines; there are different groups which do it. BARC is a large institution and assessment is done by different expert groups.”

On crater’s diameter

To Mr. Santhanam’s yardstick of the diameter of the crater, Mr. Chidambaram said: “The fission device was emplaced in rhyolite medium whereas the fusion device was emplaced in the pink granite medium. The medium for the Pokhran-I test was shale and sandstone. The geology in the Pokhran region is inhomogeneous. The propagation of the shock wave is affected by every interface. 3-D simulation calculations of the rock mechanical effects, done by BARC scientists, after considering all these factors accounted for the observed effects in the thermonuclear test.” He said he failed to understand what scaling laws Mr. Santhanam had used.

On the question of finding trace-levels of radioisotopes in Apsara, a pure fission reactor, Mr. Chidambaram stated, “The tail of the fission neutron spectrum extends to beyond the excitation energy of these reactions. But the fusion neutrons are of 14 MeV. That is why isotopes like Mn-54 and Na-22 are found in significant [not trace] quantities in the rock samples from the thermonuclear device site rock samples.”

“If one sees the gamma-ray spectrum of a typical rock sample of the thermonuclear test site, published in refereed journals by BARC scientists, sharp peaks for these radioisotopes are seen, not just bumps in the background! In the Mn-54/Ce-144 ratios from the samples of the two test sites, reproduced by R. Ramachandran in his Frontline article of 25th September 2009, this ratio for the thermonuclear test samples is seen as a high multiple of the ratio for the fission test samples.”

Poser to P.K. Iyengar

Mr. Chidambaram pointed out, that Dr. Iyengar, in his contention made in 2000, had not disputed the yield of the thermonuclear test. However, he said: “We do not understand, how, without knowledge of the design and, therefore without knowledge of the fusion-fission break-up and the quantity of thermonuclear material in the device and its isotopic composition, he [Dr. Iyengar] has tried to calculate the efficiency of fusion burn.”

“No need for more nuclear tests”

R. Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Adviser to the Union government, said on Thursday that no nuclear weapon state ever revealed the thermonuclear design as that information would be proliferation-sensitive.

He and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar stressed that India was the only country to release so much information on the Pokhran II tests through scientific media. They said the tests had gone through peer review and been discussed in international scientific journals.

Reiterating that there was no need for more nuclear tests, Dr. Kakodkar said: “We want to re-emphasise that the 1998 tests were fully successful and had achieved in toto their scientific objectives and the capability to build fission and thermonuclear weapons with yields up to 200 kt.”

While the U.S. had conducted several tests, they stopped after 1991, Mr. Chidambaram said. With the increase in scientific knowledge and advancements in computer technology, “there is no need for so many tests.” Also, the charge of being hasty, applied to Pokhran II “is unfounded.” The team was waiting since 1974 (Pokhran I), Mr. Chidambaram argued.

 

[RPK]

Press Statement by Dr. Anil Kakodkar and Dr. R. Chidambaram on Pokhran-II tests

PIB Press Release

India conducted five nuclear tests of advanced weapon designs on 11 and 13 May 1998 at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan Desert. The first three detonations took place simultaneously at 15:45 h. IST on 11 May. These included a 45 kt thermonuclear device, a 15 kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton (i.e. less than 1 kiloton) device. The two nuclear devices detonated simultaneously on 13 May were also in the sub-kiloton range – 0.5 and 0.3 kt.

The Atomic Energy Commission(AEC), in its press release of 15 September 2009, has stated that, in the meeting of the AEC held on May21, 1998, the Commission had been briefed about the technical details of the tests. In the meetings of the Commission held on March 26, 1999 and November 18, 1999, the results of the radiochemical analysis of bore-hole samples, reconfirming the estimated yields, were presented. The AEC, in the press release of 15th September, 2009, noted that the yield of the thermonuclear test was further confirmed through comparison of ground motion and displacement simulation with actual observations in the field. The AEC’s statement concluded that “the AEC has thus no reason to doubt the yield of the thermonuclear test carried out on May 11, 1998”.

Shaft depths for containment of radioactivity

The physical–mechanical processes associated with the propagation of the stress field set up in a geological medium by a sudden release of the explosive energy of a nuclear device – such as vaporisation, melting, crushing, fracture and motion of the rock – are dependent on the chemical composition of the rocks and their physical and mechanical properties such as density, porosity, water content, equation of state, strength, etc. Detailed computer simulation calculations were carried out for each of the five shafts of the May 1998 tests in order to ensure containment of radioactivity.

Self-reliance in the nuclear weapons development programme

These tests were the culmination of a committed team effort and backed by the development of the necessary know-how and expertise over decades. Nuclear weapons development requires expertise in a range of disciplines including explosive ballistics, shock wave physics, condensed matter physics, materials science, nuclear and neutron physics, radiation hydrodynamics, radiation–matter interaction physics, advanced electronics engineering backed by production, fabrication and processing technologies over a wide range. It requires complex computer simulation software development to enable accurate prediction of weapon yields. In each one of these areas, we have some of the world’s leading experts. In the field of shock wave physics, for example, we are one of the leading groups in the world in the area of equation of state at high pressures.

Nuclear weaponisation

The 15 kt fission nuclear weapon had evolved from the PNE device tested in 1974, with substantial changes that were needed to make it smaller in size and weight from the point of view of weaponisation. The two-stage thermonuclear device, with a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and with the features needed for integration with delivery vehicles, was tested at the controlled yield of 45 kt and had the purpose of developing nuclear weapons with yields up to around 200 kt. The sub-kiloton devices tested again had all the features needed for integration with delivery vehicles and were tested from the point of view of developing low-yield weapons and of validating new weapon-related ideas and sub-systems. It was gratifying that all the devices functioned perfectly in all aspects certifying the quality and robustness of the designs. Thus the carefully-planned series of tests carried out in May 1998 gave us the capability to build nuclear weapons from low yields up to around 200 kt. A great deal of further scientific and technical development work has taken place since then.

The yield of the May 1974 PNE experiment

The common physics makes a PNE relevant for weapon design and, therefore, the success of the May 1974 test was important for us. Even at that time, our diagnostic capabilities were good. The yield of the May 1974 test announced by Chidambaram and Ramanna in a meeting on PNEs in the International Atomic Energy in Vienna in 1975 of the May 1974 test was 12–13 kt, which is also accepted internationally.

Seismic and other data on May 11, 1998 tests
Nature of seismic magnitudes

BARC scientists have published detailed analysis of the seismic data on the 11 May 1998 tests and it fully confirms the total announced yield for these tests. Most of the global analysis of seismic data on underground nuclear explosions is based on two seismic ‘magnitudes’, mb and Ms, the so-called body-wave magnitude and surface-wave magnitude, respectively. The former is calculated from measurements of compressional seismic waves (P waves) in the body of the Earth and the latter from measurements of surface seismic waves (Rayleigh waves).

International analysis of the 11 May 1998 seismic data

Surprisingly, indicative of the need for careful analysis, the Prototype International Data Centre for verifying the compliance of CTBT first announced our 11 May nuclear explosion seismic event as ‘an earthquake at a depth of 56 km on the India–Pakistan border’! But this was later corrected to ‘explosions with a combined yield – consistent with the announced yield (by India)’

Professor Jack Evernden, a world renowned US seismologist, has always maintained that, for correct estimation of yields, one should ‘account properly for geological and seismological differences between test sites’; this was in the context of what he called the ‘incorrect (U.S.) claims of Soviet cheating on the (1976 Threshold Test Ban) treaty limit of 150 kilotons.’ He had also warned about the use of indiscriminate ‘magnitude bias’ while analysing mb (body wave magnitude) teleseismic data. The underestimation of our May 11 total yield by one group in the USA can be traced to the use of such an invalid ‘bias’. Jack Evernden prefers the use of surface wave magnitudes to body wave magnitudes and his analysis of the 11 May 1998 seismic data is consistent with ours.

Analysis by Indian seismologists

Strong Lg and Rayleigh waves (period 3.5–7 s) were observed from the 11 May tests at several sensitive in-country stations of the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) and of the Department of Atomic Energy. These have been analysed by BARC scientists.

The main conclusions are summarised below:

* A comparison of body wave magnitudes of the 11 May 1998 tests and of the 18 May 1974 test from thirteen stations around the world gives an average difference, ∆mb, of 0.45 between them.

* The estimated mb values at any recoding station are susceptible to geological and seismological uncertainties at the test site and at the recording site. But these get cancelled out when taking the difference in mb values for two underground explosions at the same site and for the same recording station. So this value of ∆mb of 0.45 is reliable and gives a ratio of yields of 4.46. As explained earlier, the yield of the May 1974 test was 12–13 kt. So this method gives the total yield of the 11 May 1998 tests as between 54 and 58 kt.

* From the surface wave magnitude obtained from an analysis of regional Rayleigh waves, a total yield of 49–52 kt is obtained for the 11 May 1988 tests.

* The average mb (Lg) magnitude obtained from the data from the IMD stations and the Gauribidanur array and the ARC stations is 5.47. A comparison of Lg waves for the 11 May 1998 tests and the May 1974 test gave a yield ratio of 4.83 between these events. So this method gives the total yield of the 11 May 1998 tests as between 58 and 63 kt.

• Thus, the yield estimates of the 11 May 1998 tests from the teleseismic and regional seismic data are fully consistent with the yields announced immediately after the tests for the fission device and the thermonuclear device.

Confirmatory evidence

We have other confirmatory evidence from close-in measurements carried out on the day of the tests. For example, comparison of the acceleration data with the available global data from a similar geophysical environment gives a total yield value of 58 kt (Sikka et al., 1998a).

The bore-hole gamma radiation logging and radiochemical measurements on the rock samples extracted from the sites by BARC scientists give the yield for the fission device (unpublished data) as (13 ± 3) kt and for the thermonuclear device as (50 ± 10) kt.

The Thermonuclear device
The two-stage device
The thermonuclear device tested on 11 May was a two-stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion and ignited. For reasons of proliferation sensitivity, we have not given the details of the materials used in the device or their quantities. Also, our nuclear weapon designers, like nuclear weapon designers all over the world, have not given the fusion component of the total yield for our thermonuclear test.

Controlled thermonuclear yield

We tested our thermonuclear device at a controlled yield of 45 kt because of the proximity of the Khetolai village at about 5 km, to ensure that the houses in this village would suffer negligible damage. All the design specifications of this device were validated by the test. Thermonuclear weapons of various yields up to around 200 kt can be confidently designed on the basis of this test.

The post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the thermonuclear test site have confirmed that the fusion secondary gave the design yield. The radioactivity generated from an underground thermonuclear explosion, apart from unburnt fissile material and tritium, consists essentially of two parts:

• fission products from the fission trigger and from the fission component in the fusion secondary stage, if present

• neutron-induced radioactivity in the surrounding rock mass and construction materials; here one can look specifically for the neutron activation products of high energy neutrons, such as sodium-22 and manganese-54, which are produced much more in fusion reactions than in fission reactions.

Comparison of the radioactivity of samples extracted from the test sites of thermonuclear and pure fission devices showed a much higher activity of 22Na and 54Mn in the former. This unambiguously confirmed the occurrence of the expected fusion reaction in the thermonuclear test. From a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated. A comparison of the ratios of various activation products to fission products for the 15 kt device and for the 45 kt thermonuclear device also shows that these ratios are in agreement with the expected fusion yield in the thermonuclear device. The total yield comes out as (50 ± 10) kt for the thermonuclear device, consistent with the design yield and with the seismic estimate of the total yield.

As mentioned earlier, we have not given the fusion–fission break-up and, since we have not given the composition of the materials used nor their quantities, for reasons of proliferation sensitivity as mentioned earlier, no one outside the design team has data to calculate this fission–fusion yield break-up or any other significant parameter related to fusion burn. The full containment of radioactivity for a yield significantly more than 45 kt (the design yield and achieved yield) would also not have been a surety ; that was another reason for limiting the controlled yield of this device. Release of radioactivity occurs if the fractures reaching the ground surface get connected to the cavity of hot radioactive gases produced by the nuclear explosion.

CONCLUSION

* The May 1998 tests were fully successful in terms of achieving their scientific objectives and the capability to build fission and thermonuclear weapons with yields upto 200 kt.

* Computer simulation capability to predict the yields of nuclear weapons-fission, boosted fission and two-stage thermonuclear – of designs related to the designs of the devices tested by us has now been established.

* A great deal of further scientific and technical development work has taken place since May, 1998.

We have published as much data as is possible without releasing proliferation-sensitive information.