Personal Ideas About Cold Start`s Problems

[t_co]

Same as what Indian response will be if tactical nukes are used. Full blown nuke war.
Cold war saw a period where the adversaries thought they could Win nuke wars. All they got was MAD

Exactly my point. If MAD becomes the Pakistani response to Cold Start, then what option does India have?

 

[Yusuf]

Exactly my point. If MAD becomes the Pakistani response to Cold Start, then what option does India have?

India will take out Pak nukes. US will not allow any nuke war. So we may well have a combined Indo-US strike to take out nukes in Pak.

 

[Decklander]

If Pakistan hasn't launched yet, and India makes pre-emptive nuclear strikes on Pakistan on top of mobilizing for a surprise ground invasion of Pakistan, India would have won the battle, but lost the war--India would be as ostracized as North Korea and its rise would be impossibly curtailed. Rage, WG Ewald, or any other US poster would no doubt agree.

India has never attacked any nation in last 10k yrs of its history. Our decision to go to war will be forced on us by some really serious incidents like 26/11 etc. In such a scenerio the whole world knows how much restraints we had shown in the past.

 

[Decklander]

Exactly my point. If MAD becomes the Pakistani response to Cold Start, then what option does India have?

We have far better plans ready to dismember without firing even a single bullet across the border and that is what will be played out in future.

 

[Yusuf]

while I dont think India will go first , I have no doubt in my mind that the world will not mind India taking out Pak nukes or even glassing it

 

[t_co]

while I dont think India will go first , I have no doubt in my mind that the world will not mind India taking out Pak nukes or even glassing it

Given that Pakistani nukes are located near US drone bases, and those drone bases include US personnel, I'm not sure the Americans would be happy having their folks nuked.

 

[t_co]

We have far better plans ready to dismember without firing even a single bullet across the border and that is what will be played out in future.

I'm eager to hear those plans.

 

[Daredevil]

Exactly my point. If MAD becomes the Pakistani response to Cold Start, then what option does India have?

Tactical nukes are a joke. You either use the nukes big to take out cities or you dont use it at all, there is nothing in between.

By using tactical nukes, Pakistan will be welcoming its own destruction by India. Pakistan should rather use big nukes than piddly tactical nukes, because either way the response will be disproportionate which eventually lead to total annihilation of Pak. What is the best option for Pakistan, to use tactical nuke on incoming army corps and invite its total destruction or keep the mutual assured destruction (MAD) option to prevent huge loss of Pakistani land mass?.

Think this through.

 

[Yusuf]

Given that Pakistani nukes are located near US drone bases, and those drone bases include US personnel, I'm not sure the Americans would be happy having their folks nuked.

All the more reason why Pak will not ready any nukes while the US is on there soil. It will be easy for the US to lake them out!

 

[Kunal Biswas]

You skipped again points to pass your opinion, second strike..

Actually, I am pretty aware of S-300 system that India has.

Indian Air Force :: Strategic Air Defences in a Nuclear South-Asia

In reality, they are large warehouses. I have a friend who served in the transport and logistics branches of the US Army and that's what I saw from the photos he sent.

We are not US army & your friend send you the photos of US military warehouse from ? wht again ??

 

[Yusuf]

I'm eager to hear those plans.

And you think we will let you know of our plans? : facepalm:

 

[t_co]

All the more reason why Pak will not ready any nukes while the US is on there soil. It will be easy for the US to lake them out!

Really? You really think the US would take out Pakistani nukes in the event of an Indian invasion of Pakistan? The US has no interest making more enemies in the Muslim world than it already has. Ask any of the US posters on this forum if they would like the US to pursue such an action.

 

[t_co]

You skipped again points to pass your opinion, second strike..

Please elaborate.

We are not US army & your friend send you the photos of US military warehouse from ? wht again ??

Yes, he sent me photos from when he worked in a military supply dump. Several, in fact.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Give a read of the thread, you will get the idea..

 

[Daredevil]

This is point I was making in my earlier post about tactical nukes. Tactical nukes are not a game changer as far as India is concerned.

NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan

Reshmi Kazi

August 19, 2011
On April 19, 2011, Pakistan successfully fired the NASR short-range surface-to-surface multi-tube ballistic missile. The nuclear-capable missile from the family of Hatf-IX missiles with a purported range of 60 km has high accuracy and a shoot and scoot delivery system. According to the Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Divions, Khalid Kidwai, the NASR will provide Pakistan with short-range missile capability. NASR is believed to be a battlefield deterrent, capable of inflicting damage on mechanized forces such as armoured brigades and divisions. This quick response system is expected to deter evolving threats and will provide battlefield support for the Pakistan Army.

The development of the NASR raises several questions. Firstly, does Pakistan require operational Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) for battlefield purposes? The rationale offered by Pakistani analysts for developing the NASR is that it is a counter to India's Cold Start doctrine and is meant to deter any Indian mechanized offensive into Pakistan. The general opinion is that India will launch an offensive surgical attack into Pakistani territory by virtue of its Cold Start doctrine. Pakistan believes that given its inferior conventional capability vis-à-vis India, tactical nuclear capability will serve to deter an Indian riposte to any Pakistani misadventure like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.

But this is a fallacious assumption. India's Cold Start doctrine has been devised because of Pakistan's proxy operations against India at the sub-conventional level and because of the concern that retaliatory strikes against Pakistan may escalate into a full-fledged war. In any event, the Indian military strategy is not to dismember Pakistan but to have a stable neighbour and to foster a beneficial relationship at all levels. Nor does India favour initiating surgical attacks against Pakistan without grave provocation. Further, India is acutely aware of the risk of escalation from sub-conventional to conventional and nuclear levels, and is therefore unlikely to embark upon a senseless war. The Cold Start has been devised precisely with this aspect in mind.

Pakistan can actually discourage India's Cold Start doctrine in two ways: by giving up its covert sub-conventional operations against India, or by formulating a prudent strategy to counter India's proactive tactics. As has been argued by Rodney Jones, Pakistan need not resort to the nuclear option to counter India's Cold Start doctrine since the results of the Azm-e-Nau III military exercises held in 2009-10 suggest that its conventional defences alone are fully capable of resisting a shallow penetration as envisaged by the Cold Start doctrine. 1

Secondly, does Pakistan's development of battlefield nuclear weapons erode India's no-first-use (NFU) policy? It is a contentious idea that the use of TNWs will not escalate into a full fledged nuclear war. It is irrelevant whether a target has been hit by a strategic or tactical weapon. A nuclear attack is a nuclear attack. To quote Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik, "Tactical or strategic, it (NASR) is a nuclear weapon. Our response would be absolutely violent, if it is used, as per our existing policy. So, it's not a game-changer." What this essentially means is that in the event India faces a nuclear attack, New Delhi will be left with no other choice but to use nuclear weapons in the form of a massive retaliation. In that case it makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon or a long range or short range weapon is used, since the general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

There is no universal definition of TNWs and hence it is difficult to categorize them. They cannot be defined either by their range or yield. Notwithstanding their battlefield utility, TNWs can lead to uncontrolled escalation given their inherent tendency to obscure the decision-making process thus creating confusion and leading local commanders with pre-delegated authority to use them. Further, there is a risk that they could be grabbed by terrorist groups.

Although by definition TNWs are meant for employment against counterforce targets, they can also be potentially used for countervalue strikes. The moment a nuclear weapon whether tactical or strategic is used the deterrent factor suffers a failure. Thus, Pakistan's nuclear deterrence against India will fail if it launches TNWs. Moreover, given the geographical proximity with India any detonation of TNWs by Pakistan will have radiation fallouts on the territories of both countries. Pakistan could thus find itself in a situation where it would be self-deterred. Considering the pros and cons of TNWs like NASR, it does not pose any advantage to Pakistan; it only creates disadvantages.

NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

 

[Yusuf]

India gets to bomb counter value targets while Pak spends its nukes on ammo dumps

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Reminds me BM-30 in IA service can hit to 90kms away, BM-30 rockets include precision strike rockets too..

 

[Daredevil]

A more balanced article on Pros and Cons of Pakistani tactical nuke weapons (TNWs). Summary is, Pakistan can have tactical gains at a strategic cost, simply put gain 2 points but lose 10 points. Whichever way, there are more cons for Pakistan in using TNW than pros. The most likely pro of a pakistani TNW is more caution on the part of India. But once India calls bluff, its downhill for Pakistani army.

What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr?


A partisan debate has understandably followed the unveiling of Nasr in April 2011. While analysts in Pakistan have taken pains to underline its utility, those in India have expressed an informed scepticism. This debate notwithstanding, the assumption informing this commentary is that Nasr exists as a potent weapon system with capabilities as advertised.

An answer for the question posed in the title can be hazarded along four levels: grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical. There appears to be a contradiction in the implications of Nasr at these different levels. How Pakistan resolves these contradictions will determine how it will eventually employ the weapon system.

At the grand strategic level, the idea seems to be to focus international attention on South Asia as a 'nuclear flashpoint'. The possibility of use of nuclear weapons increases with the 'use them lose them' connotations of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). It is expected that this would energise the international community towards crisis de-escalation and conflict termination. The aim would be to have the pressure work on Indian decision makers, depriving them of autonomy of decision making.

At the strategic level, it has been rightly pointed out by Indian nuclear analysts that Nasr is an attempt at lowering, or rather projecting, a low nuclear threshold. The idea is to restrict the scope for India's conventional operations. In the limited war logic, India does not intend to flirt with Pakistan's nuclear thresholds. In any event, keeping these low would help Pakistan preserve its territory and military forces to the extent possible.

At the operational level, the impact of Nasr is more psychological. The aim would be to slow down Indian offensive pincers by making them 'button down' for a battlefield that could potentially suddenly 'go nuclear'. The precautions, logistics load and time cycle of standard operations procedures would slow down and complicate operations. This would translate into increased combat friction, resulting in an increased leadership burden. There will be higher levels of vulnerability of bottlenecks such as bridgeheads. Pakistan would be able to counter thrust lines that it cannot address due to the relative imbalance of forces or if it is surprised. Indian forces will not be able to exploit opportunities with a sense of impunity, even those of pursuit. In fact, the more successful they get, the more the nuclear shadow of Nasr will loom large. The element of fear, surprise and its disconcerting effect will be exploited fully by Pakistan. India may need additional forces to cater for various contingencies. This will have a corresponding affect on logistics, the pace of progress of operations, coordination, presenting potential targets, etc.

At the tactical level, the physical and psychological pressures of operating in a potential nuclear battlefield will add to the strain of combat. In hot weather there would be increased physical attrition to troops, requiring earlier relief and time consuming rotation in subunit/unit roles. Wider dispersion that nuclear tactics necessitate will increase command and control problems and the fog of war. Wide frontages increase the vulnerability to counter attack, since the freedom to concentrate would be with the counter attacker.

It would appear that the seeming advantages stated above are behind Pakistan's development of Nasr. However, it is surely not an unmixed blessing. What are the cons?

At the grand strategic level, attracting international attention to the region as a crisis point works both ways. As the Kargil conflict showed, India can profit from the situation and the onus on backing off could well be on Pakistan. Any propensity for first use may prompt the feared crackdown on its nuclear assets by the US-led international community, which would be to India's advantage. This may convulse the Pakistan military into an internal battle over its assets, which would be especially untimely when faced with an Indian 'threat'. Pakistan will finally end up a nuclear pariah with a dysfunctional military, a state it has managed to avoid so far.

At the strategic level, by displaying its new found capability, Pakistan has partially attempted to go down the NATO route during the Cold War. The NATO planned to employ TNW to counter the overwhelming mechanised attacks which were expected to be carried out by the Warsaw Pact forces. Using TNW would destroy the very land being defended. The difference in Pakistan's case would be in the limited numbers of such weapon systems and, secondly, on India's self-restraint in pulling its conventional punches. Therefore, the employment of Nasr will not be so much as to effect the military situation as to signal the crossing of the nuclear threshold. Since this would trigger the Indian nuclear doctrine of assured retaliation, in uncertain ways, it is not self-evident what Pakistan could achieve by this. It could, however, attempt to escape paying the price by choosing a 'green-field' option of a demonstration strike on its own territory, for instance, in the Cholistan desert.

The operational level fallout of the use of Nasr will be equally on Pakistani forces. Once nuclear weapons have had battlefield incidence, they will prove to be an equaliser. The advantages that Pakistan seeks as a defender would be nullified in a violent, possibly nuclear, Indian response. (The former Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik let on as much in his meeting with the press prior to demitting office.) The psychological, physical and logistics load will be exponentially increased by the panic among civilian populations. This will be relatively greater in Pakistan since the theatre of operations, defined by proactive Indian offensives, will be inside Pakistan.

At the tactical level, there are no empirical studies on the sociological impact of a nuclear battlefield. If combat cohesion breaks down, it will be as likely among Pakistani troops as Indian. The depth in terms of numbers available with India may help it compensate. This luxury is not available to Pakistan. The effect on the force multiplier that Pakistan intends using - irregulars – can only be expected to be negative. Since Pakistani civilians will be more affected, the ties of Pakistani soldiers to kith and kin may prove distracting. There is no evidence of either side having thought through the leadership, bonding and discipline issues on a nuclear battlefield. The emphasis has only been on personal protection at best, and that too is largely lip service for want of training equipment.

As can be seen, there are some operational level dividends that would accrue to Pakistan by using Nasr though it will come at some strategic cost. Two possibilities emerge. The first is that the Pakistani military - true to its wont in being more sensitive to military as against political and strategic concerns - has perhaps focused overly on the operational gains as against strategic costs. Alternatively, given the inescapably obvious costs that it will incur, the military is sensitive to the contradictions. It is only milking Nasr as an information war opportunity.

The judgment here is in favour of the latter. Nasr can at best likely increase India's natural restraint and operational caution. There is no particular harm in this for there is little case for nuclear haste and any additional operational caution can only energise prior preparation. In its employment, the Nasr is unlikely to halt India in its tracks. Instead, it will likely be employed in nuclear signalling, the most likely manner of which could be in a demonstration strike.

India can arrive at prudent answers, both at the conventional and nuclear levels, to deal with this issue. What might such an answer be? The suggestion here is that the employment of Nasr, even in a 'green-field' mode, must release India from NFU constraint. This does not imply default retaliation. Instead, it is for debate whether manipulating the threat of nuclear attack(s) will beget India more political and military dividends than indulging in them.

What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr? | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

 

[sayareakd]

if Pak want to be wiped out from earth, NASR is good idea on our forces.
If Pak ever want to nuke our forces even in Pak or our country, they better send all they got, because they wont have country to look up to when we launch counter strike.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

nasr is a PR tool for those who dont understand military and there are bunch of them, real threads are IRBMs..

nasr or any system dont move alone but in a convoy consist of many other support vehicles that is again an drawback for a system just 60km range...