Cold Start assumes the India Army can get underway into Pakistan in 24-72 hours in units of at least brigade strength. The trouble is, in order to support those brigades and protect them from a Pakistani counterattack, the Indian Army needs to project division-sized or even corps-sized forces into Pakistan, and also seize main routes of lateral movement in Pakistan. In order to do that, the IA needs to build up division-sized and corps-sized supply dumps along the desert south of Sindh. Those supply dumps--essentially big warehouses full of fuel and ammunition--would take months to establish and be trivial for Pakistan to locate. Even if the ISI doesn't find it themselves, the Americans, Russians, and Chinese all have spy satellites who would be able to find such a warehouse in a single pass over the region, and any one of them could give the coordinates onto the Pakistanis. With the coordinates, all Pakistan would have to do is find ways to hit those warehouses with conventional, or even tactical nuclear, warheads when Cold Start begins. And while it would take 24-72 hours to get a brigade into Pakistan, it would only take 15 minutes for a Pakistani ballistic missile to set off all that fuel and ammunition in the desert. Once that happens, any IA force that got into Pakistan would just run out of ammo and fuel and find itself stranded and cut off--or at the very least, waiting three to four weeks while the rest of the Indian Army mobilizes and rescues them, losing all semblance of surprise in the process. Ergo, Cold Start, while sounding nice, is in reality not the proper way to use the Indian Army. The concept of deep penetration and mobile battlegroups is built to achieve penetrations of strategic depth and win a complete victory, not contain the conflict at a sub-nuclear level and wring negotiated concessions.