Pakistani missile news and discussions.
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Pakistan’s Illicit Procurement of Missile and Drone Equipments
Pakistan’s Illicit Procurement of Missile and Drone Equipment Using Multiple Financial Transactions - ISIS
A report by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel of ISIS reads
The Pakistani Department of Defence (DoD) utilizes illicit trading networks to procure controlled, high-technology items for its military programs. The French customs investigations authority, the National Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigations (DNRED)1, provided the following case information to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)2 for its June 2008 Proliferation Financing Report.3 The following case studies are summarized from this FATF report. Some details of the cases, such as dates and names of companies and banks, have been withheld from publication at the discretion of DNRED and the FATF. DNRED also withheld the dates for when these illicit procurements took place. In these cases, items of a sensitive nature usable in missiles and drones were procured by the Pakistani DoD using French companies as intermediaries and suppliers. Some of the items sought by the Pakistani DoD were classified by the French Ministry of Defence as war materiel.
Some examples are:
Case 1: A first instance of illicit trade directed by the Pakistani DoD through a French transit point involved an order placed through a French industrial company for dedicated missile and drone electronic tracking and guidance equipment, manufactured in the United States. Figure 1 displays the routes of purchase orders, shipments, and financial transactions used by the Pakistani DoD and its associates. The representative of a Pakistani purchasing network operating in an unspecified European country first contacted a French industrial company for this equipment. This purchasing network’s representative had known affiliation to the Pakistani DoD. The French company did not carry the equipment, but the firm’s representative contacted an American intermediary who agreed to place the order with an American manufacturer that built the items. A front company located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) actually placed the order with the French industrial company on behalf of the Pakistani procurement network.
The electronic tracking and guidance equipment was shipped from the United States to France by air freight, eventually passing through the transit point of Marseille. The French customs authorities never cleared the cargo, and it was exported to the UAE. It is suspected that the equipment was shipped to its final destination in Pakistan.
Financial Transfers in Case 1: In facilitating payment for the electronic equipment, the UAE front company transferred money to a Dutch bank branch located in Dubai. This money was then sent to the branch of a Spanish banking group located in France. This bank was used by the French industrial company. As seen in figure 1, two banks used by the U.S. company, both located in New York, each received a transfer of money—not from the Spanish bank, but from another French bank also used by the French industrial company, where the money had again been transferred. The transaction that was re-routed in France and the transaction that was split when sent to the New York banks inevitably disguised the origin of the money and gave authorities and bank officials little warning that an illicit financial transaction had taken place.
Case 2: A second instance of illicit trade directed by Pakistan’s DoD failed in part when one of two intended shipments destined for Pakistan were intercepted by the French customs authorities. This shipment contained highly-sensitive drone and ballistic missile testing and programming equipment. Figure 2.1 shows the paths of purchase orders and shipments used by the Pakistani DoD to procure the targeted items. The Pakistani DoD had placed an order for the equipment through its purchasing network, which operated out of the undisclosed European country. The purchasing network contacted a representative of a small French firm of just three employees, which had expertise in building tracking and fire control equipment for missiles and drones. The purchasing network instructed a Pakistani front company to place 45% of an order for a complete drone calibration and guidance system with this French firm. The purchasing network instructed a UAE front company to place the other 55% of the order. It is unclear whether this front company was the same company used by the Pakistani purchasing network in Case 1 of illicit trade described above. The French firm contacted a Norwegian aeronautics and space supplies manufacturer for additional electronic components it needed to develop the equipment. It is not clear whether the Pakistani DoD knew about the French firm’s contract with the Norwegian manufacturer for the electronic components.
The Norwegian parts manufacturer exported the electronic components to France, and the French company exported these and the drone calibration and guidance system, in two separate shipments, to the Pakistani front company and the UAE front company. It is unclear if the two shipments reflected the split nature of the placed orders. The shipments were designated “electrical testing equipment” to customs authorities upon export from France. The Pakistani DoD likely received one of the shipments. The other shipment, bound for either the Pakistani or the UAE front company (it is not clear which), was interdicted at France’s Roissy airport. When the French customs authorities discovered the dangerous nature of the technology nearly exported from their country, authorities raided the office of the French firm and the homes of its three employees. The firm was forced to close down operations and faced subsequent legal action. In the course of the investigation, French authorities uncovered substantial involvement of the French firm’s director in supplying Pakistan’s military programs.
Financial Transfers in Case 2: The path of financial transactions used by the Pakistani DoD and its purchasing network to facilitate payments to the French, and indirectly, Norwegian suppliers. To facilitate payment for the electronic equipment procured from France and indirectly from Norway, the Pakistani purchasing network utilized two separate financial transaction routes for importing the technologies. The purchasing network sent one transfer of money to its UAE front company, which then sent the money in split transfers to a Chinese bank, and to a Pakistani bank located in Karachi. These transfers were both sent to a French bank used by the French firm. The Pakistani purchasing network specified to the French firm that one part of the sum transfer should be sent to the branch of an American bank located in London, for unknown reasons.
The second route used by the Pakistani purchasing network to facilitate payment for the second shipment of items passed through even more banking institutions than the first route. The network sent the funds through four separate branches of Pakistani banks located in Islamabad, Karachi, Britain, and the United States, and each of these branches in turn made a payment of some portion of these funds to the French bank used by the French firm. Each of these four branches sent the money via letters of credit to the French bank used by the French firm. The French firm made a financial transfer to the Norwegian manufacturer’s bank, located in Oslo, for services rendered.
The Pakistani purchasing network’s use of the French bank as the central node for financial transfers assisted the investigation of French customs authorities and helped them to uncover all the transfers associated with payment for the procurements.
Case 3: A third case of illicit trade uncovered by DNRED involved the discovery of an illicit trade network directed from French territory by a French industrial company to supply Pakistan’s military programs, and the military programs of two other unnamed countries. The French company was directed by an independently operating industrialist, who also oversaw the operations of another company. These companies were two of four firms in the entire world that had the capability to design a particular type of sensitive, dedicated equipment with application to ballistic missiles. The other companies with this capability were located in the United States and Switzerland. Case 3 reveals no specific item procurements or shipments, but showcases the elaborate financial transaction routes used by the French company and its associates to receive payment for items funneled to countries of proliferation concern.
DNRED was able to halt the France-based network when it acted on counterproliferation intelligence to seize a suspected illicit export on its way from Paris’ Orly airport to an unspecified country. Once seized, the authorities determined that the items were dual-use articles intended for a ballistics research institution in the unspecified country. The articles were controlled under either war materiel or dual-use distinctions and were thus subject to license. Searches of both French companies’ premises revealed that multiple exports of the equipment had already been made to three separate countries, one of which was Pakistan, and that they had consistently been declared non-controlled items upon export. In subsequent legal hearings, the French industrialist admitted knowingly exporting controlled military items and admitted that deception was used to funnel the items.
continues....
Pakistan’s Illicit Procurement of Missile and Drone Equipment Using Multiple Financial Transactions - ISIS
Pakistan’s Illicit Procurement of Missile and Drone Equipment Using Multiple Financial Transactions - ISIS
A report by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel of ISIS reads
The Pakistani Department of Defence (DoD) utilizes illicit trading networks to procure controlled, high-technology items for its military programs. The French customs investigations authority, the National Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigations (DNRED)1, provided the following case information to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)2 for its June 2008 Proliferation Financing Report.3 The following case studies are summarized from this FATF report. Some details of the cases, such as dates and names of companies and banks, have been withheld from publication at the discretion of DNRED and the FATF. DNRED also withheld the dates for when these illicit procurements took place. In these cases, items of a sensitive nature usable in missiles and drones were procured by the Pakistani DoD using French companies as intermediaries and suppliers. Some of the items sought by the Pakistani DoD were classified by the French Ministry of Defence as war materiel.
Some examples are:
Case 1: A first instance of illicit trade directed by the Pakistani DoD through a French transit point involved an order placed through a French industrial company for dedicated missile and drone electronic tracking and guidance equipment, manufactured in the United States. Figure 1 displays the routes of purchase orders, shipments, and financial transactions used by the Pakistani DoD and its associates. The representative of a Pakistani purchasing network operating in an unspecified European country first contacted a French industrial company for this equipment. This purchasing network’s representative had known affiliation to the Pakistani DoD. The French company did not carry the equipment, but the firm’s representative contacted an American intermediary who agreed to place the order with an American manufacturer that built the items. A front company located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) actually placed the order with the French industrial company on behalf of the Pakistani procurement network.
The electronic tracking and guidance equipment was shipped from the United States to France by air freight, eventually passing through the transit point of Marseille. The French customs authorities never cleared the cargo, and it was exported to the UAE. It is suspected that the equipment was shipped to its final destination in Pakistan.
Financial Transfers in Case 1: In facilitating payment for the electronic equipment, the UAE front company transferred money to a Dutch bank branch located in Dubai. This money was then sent to the branch of a Spanish banking group located in France. This bank was used by the French industrial company. As seen in figure 1, two banks used by the U.S. company, both located in New York, each received a transfer of money—not from the Spanish bank, but from another French bank also used by the French industrial company, where the money had again been transferred. The transaction that was re-routed in France and the transaction that was split when sent to the New York banks inevitably disguised the origin of the money and gave authorities and bank officials little warning that an illicit financial transaction had taken place.
Case 2: A second instance of illicit trade directed by Pakistan’s DoD failed in part when one of two intended shipments destined for Pakistan were intercepted by the French customs authorities. This shipment contained highly-sensitive drone and ballistic missile testing and programming equipment. Figure 2.1 shows the paths of purchase orders and shipments used by the Pakistani DoD to procure the targeted items. The Pakistani DoD had placed an order for the equipment through its purchasing network, which operated out of the undisclosed European country. The purchasing network contacted a representative of a small French firm of just three employees, which had expertise in building tracking and fire control equipment for missiles and drones. The purchasing network instructed a Pakistani front company to place 45% of an order for a complete drone calibration and guidance system with this French firm. The purchasing network instructed a UAE front company to place the other 55% of the order. It is unclear whether this front company was the same company used by the Pakistani purchasing network in Case 1 of illicit trade described above. The French firm contacted a Norwegian aeronautics and space supplies manufacturer for additional electronic components it needed to develop the equipment. It is not clear whether the Pakistani DoD knew about the French firm’s contract with the Norwegian manufacturer for the electronic components.
The Norwegian parts manufacturer exported the electronic components to France, and the French company exported these and the drone calibration and guidance system, in two separate shipments, to the Pakistani front company and the UAE front company. It is unclear if the two shipments reflected the split nature of the placed orders. The shipments were designated “electrical testing equipment” to customs authorities upon export from France. The Pakistani DoD likely received one of the shipments. The other shipment, bound for either the Pakistani or the UAE front company (it is not clear which), was interdicted at France’s Roissy airport. When the French customs authorities discovered the dangerous nature of the technology nearly exported from their country, authorities raided the office of the French firm and the homes of its three employees. The firm was forced to close down operations and faced subsequent legal action. In the course of the investigation, French authorities uncovered substantial involvement of the French firm’s director in supplying Pakistan’s military programs.
Financial Transfers in Case 2: The path of financial transactions used by the Pakistani DoD and its purchasing network to facilitate payments to the French, and indirectly, Norwegian suppliers. To facilitate payment for the electronic equipment procured from France and indirectly from Norway, the Pakistani purchasing network utilized two separate financial transaction routes for importing the technologies. The purchasing network sent one transfer of money to its UAE front company, which then sent the money in split transfers to a Chinese bank, and to a Pakistani bank located in Karachi. These transfers were both sent to a French bank used by the French firm. The Pakistani purchasing network specified to the French firm that one part of the sum transfer should be sent to the branch of an American bank located in London, for unknown reasons.
The second route used by the Pakistani purchasing network to facilitate payment for the second shipment of items passed through even more banking institutions than the first route. The network sent the funds through four separate branches of Pakistani banks located in Islamabad, Karachi, Britain, and the United States, and each of these branches in turn made a payment of some portion of these funds to the French bank used by the French firm. Each of these four branches sent the money via letters of credit to the French bank used by the French firm. The French firm made a financial transfer to the Norwegian manufacturer’s bank, located in Oslo, for services rendered.
The Pakistani purchasing network’s use of the French bank as the central node for financial transfers assisted the investigation of French customs authorities and helped them to uncover all the transfers associated with payment for the procurements.
Case 3: A third case of illicit trade uncovered by DNRED involved the discovery of an illicit trade network directed from French territory by a French industrial company to supply Pakistan’s military programs, and the military programs of two other unnamed countries. The French company was directed by an independently operating industrialist, who also oversaw the operations of another company. These companies were two of four firms in the entire world that had the capability to design a particular type of sensitive, dedicated equipment with application to ballistic missiles. The other companies with this capability were located in the United States and Switzerland. Case 3 reveals no specific item procurements or shipments, but showcases the elaborate financial transaction routes used by the French company and its associates to receive payment for items funneled to countries of proliferation concern.
DNRED was able to halt the France-based network when it acted on counterproliferation intelligence to seize a suspected illicit export on its way from Paris’ Orly airport to an unspecified country. Once seized, the authorities determined that the items were dual-use articles intended for a ballistics research institution in the unspecified country. The articles were controlled under either war materiel or dual-use distinctions and were thus subject to license. Searches of both French companies’ premises revealed that multiple exports of the equipment had already been made to three separate countries, one of which was Pakistan, and that they had consistently been declared non-controlled items upon export. In subsequent legal hearings, the French industrialist admitted knowingly exporting controlled military items and admitted that deception was used to funnel the items.
continues....
Pakistan’s Illicit Procurement of Missile and Drone Equipment Using Multiple Financial Transactions - ISIS
continues...
The legal hearings involving the French industrialist also revealed the network’s extensive use of a French front company to conceal its identity as the exporter of items. Intermediaries from abroad often contacted this front company to obtain items from the French industrialist’s companies. One of the unnamed countries also used a front company located in Dubai to obtain items from one of the primary French suppliers. The other French supplier was contacted directly for items by a firm located inside Pakistan for items.
Financial Transfers in Case 3: The French authorities uncovered a complex financial transaction scheme used by the French industrialist and his associates to receive payment from the Pakistani DoD and the other two countries for procured items. Figure 3 shows the routes of financial transactions and payments used by the network, facilitated by the use of multiple banking institutions. While some direct payments were made by both Pakistan and one of the unnamed countries to the French companies’ banks via letters of credit, the French industrialist also utilized the French front company’s bank accounts as transaction hubs. The front company would take a commission of 3% of the sale for its services before transferring the money to a bank accounts used by the French industrialist.
The use of transaction hubs by the network enabled authorities to uncover a massive web of financial transfers, sale relationships, and procurement and shipping routes after they began investigating the network’s activities. Without doubt, the use of front companies, in addition to circuitous and layered payment routes, made the France-based network and the other French companies incredibly successful at sending controlled missile and drone technology to Pakistan and two other countries.
The legal hearings involving the French industrialist also revealed the network’s extensive use of a French front company to conceal its identity as the exporter of items. Intermediaries from abroad often contacted this front company to obtain items from the French industrialist’s companies. One of the unnamed countries also used a front company located in Dubai to obtain items from one of the primary French suppliers. The other French supplier was contacted directly for items by a firm located inside Pakistan for items.
Financial Transfers in Case 3: The French authorities uncovered a complex financial transaction scheme used by the French industrialist and his associates to receive payment from the Pakistani DoD and the other two countries for procured items. Figure 3 shows the routes of financial transactions and payments used by the network, facilitated by the use of multiple banking institutions. While some direct payments were made by both Pakistan and one of the unnamed countries to the French companies’ banks via letters of credit, the French industrialist also utilized the French front company’s bank accounts as transaction hubs. The front company would take a commission of 3% of the sale for its services before transferring the money to a bank accounts used by the French industrialist.
The use of transaction hubs by the network enabled authorities to uncover a massive web of financial transfers, sale relationships, and procurement and shipping routes after they began investigating the network’s activities. Without doubt, the use of front companies, in addition to circuitous and layered payment routes, made the France-based network and the other French companies incredibly successful at sending controlled missile and drone technology to Pakistan and two other countries.
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This particuler archive with naming Pakistani Missiles discussions seems to be quite irrelvant. Since Pakistan yet to foray into missile technology beyond stealing the missile tech and begging the technology for the same. As developing the missile need complete Industrial capability which Pakistan lacks.
A.V.
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sir irrespective of pakistan's procurement policy pakistan does posses some credible missile systems,its capabilities and shortcoming must be a point of analysis for the indians.
thanx
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Invicible, I am not questioning creadibility of Missiles in the hands of Pakistani's, rather I am objecting to the title of this thread. Since it looks way odd for me especially when using the word "Capability" has much wider meaning in itself, rather then using it for title.
A.V.
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agreed sir, title is changed for the good.
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Onus of proving this so called "Pakistani Missile capabilities" rest upon you. Whatever we have expressed ourselves above is true in a wider term. If you really have seen something inappropriate then have your opinion about it. We would be more then grateful enough to bring back our words. Since complete absence of any detail technology being innovated by Pakistan as a nation as far as its industrial capabilities are concerned, we were truthful to greater extent. Just because our previous top post didn't go down well with some pakistani's over here, that doesn't make those post any bias.If you guys really want to have a balanced and mature debate about Pakistan's missile capabilities with Pakistani members I suggest you refrain from typical bs as shown in last two posts...
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I would advice all our Members to Discuss Pakistani Missiles and If they feel its all copied from the Chinese, then they are free to Post Articles proving their points, and Our Pakistani Members can equally Post articles Refuting it.
We all have our views, the Onus of proving it, lies with Us.
We all have our views, the Onus of proving it, lies with Us.
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thanks for the Info Zoom, Musharaf has admitted that Korean Tech was crucial and so has Benazir. Only the people living under a false illusion would say its fully Indigenous.
I liked the Recent Cruise missile, Babur of pakistan. I mean its a potent weapons system, all the more because of the Tomahawk.
I liked the Recent Cruise missile, Babur of pakistan. I mean its a potent weapons system, all the more because of the Tomahawk.
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Some illustrations/pics of Babur, Pakistani LACM
Some pics of Ghadr, Iranian LACM
Illustration of Kh-55, UKrainian LACM
LETHALFORCE
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China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design
China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-Indo-US nuke deal-The Times of India
WASHINGTON: While an assortment of non-proliferation hardliners and hi-tech suppliers treat India with immense suspicion in the matter of nuclear trade predicated on tests, it turns out that the United States and the west were fully aware of Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation to Pakistan, including conducting a proxy test for it, as far back as 1990.
In some of the most startling revelations to emerge on the subject, a high-ranking former US official who was also a nuclear weapons designer has disclosed that ''in 1982 China's premier Deng Xiaoping began the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan.''
The whistleblower isn't a think-tank academic or an unnamed official speaking on background. Thomas Reed, described as a former U.S ''nuclear weaponeer'' and a Secretary of the Air Force (1976-77) writes in the latest issue of Physics Today that China’s transfers to Pakistan included blueprints for the ultrasimple CHIC-4 design using highly enriched uranium, first tested by China in 1966. A Pakistani derivative of CHIC-4 apparently was tested in China on 26 May 1990, he adds.
Reed makes an even more stunning disclosure, saying Deng not only authorized proliferation to Pakistan, but also, "in time, to other third world countries.'' The countries are not named. He also says that during the 1990s, China conducted underground hydronuclear experiments—though not full-scale device tests—for France at Lop Nur.
Reed’s disclosures are based on his knowledge of and insights into the visits to China by Dan Stillman, a top US nuclear expert who went there several times in the late 1980s at Beijing invitation, in part because the Chinese wanted to both show-off and convey to the US the progress they had made in nuclear weaponisation.
One of Stillman's visit to the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research (SINR), writes Reed, ''also produced his first insight into the extensive hospitality extended to Pakistani nuclear scientists during that same late-1980s time period,'' which would eventually lead to the joint China-Pak nuclear test.
Chinese nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, including the supply of hi-tech items like ring magnets in the early 1990s, has always been known to the non-proliferation community (which largely slept on the reports). But this is the first time it has been confirmed by such a senior official.
In the late 1980s, both the Reagan and the George Bush Sr administration repeatedly fudged the issue to certify that Pakistan had not gone nuclear despite obvious evidence to the contrary.
In his assessment of the Chinese nuclear program based on Stillman’s visits, Reed writes admiringly about Beijing’s successes, saying ''Over a period of 15 years, an intellectually talented China achieved parity with the West and pre-eminence over its Asian peers in the design of nuclear weapons and in understanding underground nuclear testing.''
"China now stands in the first rank of nuclear powers," he concludes.
In trenchant observation, Reed writes, ''Any nuclear nation should consider its nuclear tests to be giant physics experiments. The Chinese weaponeers understood that well; other proliferators do not. Many states have considered their early nuclear shots to be political demonstrations or simple proof tests. In China, however, extremely sophisticated instrumentation was used on even the first nuclear test.''
Chronicling the progress of China’s nuclear weapons program, Reed writes: Atop a tower on 16 October 1964, China's first nuclear device, 596, was successfully fired. US intelligence analysts were astonished by the lack of plutonium in the fallout debris and by the speed with which China had broken into the nuclear club, but that was only the beginning.
Eighteen months later, in the spring of 1966, China entered the thermonuclear world with the detonation of a boosted-fission, airdropped device that used lithium-6, a primary source of tritium when bombarded with neutrons. That test, their third, achieved a yield of 200–300 kilotons. By the end of the year, they made the leap to multistage technology with a large two-stage experiment that yielded only 122 kilotons, but it again displayed 6Li in the bomb debris.
The Chinese then closed the circle on 17 June 1967, unambiguously marching into the H-bomb club with a 3.3-megaton burst from an aircraft-delivered weapon. On 27 December 1968, the Chinese bid the Johnson administration farewell with an improved, airdropped 3-megaton thermonuclear device that for the first time used plutonium in the primary.
It is clear from the reactor-to-bomb progression times that by 1968 China had unequivocally entered the European nuclear cartel on a par with the U, says Reed. Furthermore, China had become a thermonuclear power. It had achieved the leap from the initial A-bomb test to a 3.3-megaton thermonuclear blast in a record-breaking 32 months. It had taken the US more than seven years to accomplish that feat.
China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-Indo-US nuke deal-The Times of India
Edit: Provide The Link .
- Amar
China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-Indo-US nuke deal-The Times of India
WASHINGTON: While an assortment of non-proliferation hardliners and hi-tech suppliers treat India with immense suspicion in the matter of nuclear trade predicated on tests, it turns out that the United States and the west were fully aware of Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation to Pakistan, including conducting a proxy test for it, as far back as 1990.
In some of the most startling revelations to emerge on the subject, a high-ranking former US official who was also a nuclear weapons designer has disclosed that ''in 1982 China's premier Deng Xiaoping began the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan.''
The whistleblower isn't a think-tank academic or an unnamed official speaking on background. Thomas Reed, described as a former U.S ''nuclear weaponeer'' and a Secretary of the Air Force (1976-77) writes in the latest issue of Physics Today that China’s transfers to Pakistan included blueprints for the ultrasimple CHIC-4 design using highly enriched uranium, first tested by China in 1966. A Pakistani derivative of CHIC-4 apparently was tested in China on 26 May 1990, he adds.
Reed makes an even more stunning disclosure, saying Deng not only authorized proliferation to Pakistan, but also, "in time, to other third world countries.'' The countries are not named. He also says that during the 1990s, China conducted underground hydronuclear experiments—though not full-scale device tests—for France at Lop Nur.
Reed’s disclosures are based on his knowledge of and insights into the visits to China by Dan Stillman, a top US nuclear expert who went there several times in the late 1980s at Beijing invitation, in part because the Chinese wanted to both show-off and convey to the US the progress they had made in nuclear weaponisation.
One of Stillman's visit to the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research (SINR), writes Reed, ''also produced his first insight into the extensive hospitality extended to Pakistani nuclear scientists during that same late-1980s time period,'' which would eventually lead to the joint China-Pak nuclear test.
Chinese nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, including the supply of hi-tech items like ring magnets in the early 1990s, has always been known to the non-proliferation community (which largely slept on the reports). But this is the first time it has been confirmed by such a senior official.
In the late 1980s, both the Reagan and the George Bush Sr administration repeatedly fudged the issue to certify that Pakistan had not gone nuclear despite obvious evidence to the contrary.
In his assessment of the Chinese nuclear program based on Stillman’s visits, Reed writes admiringly about Beijing’s successes, saying ''Over a period of 15 years, an intellectually talented China achieved parity with the West and pre-eminence over its Asian peers in the design of nuclear weapons and in understanding underground nuclear testing.''
"China now stands in the first rank of nuclear powers," he concludes.
In trenchant observation, Reed writes, ''Any nuclear nation should consider its nuclear tests to be giant physics experiments. The Chinese weaponeers understood that well; other proliferators do not. Many states have considered their early nuclear shots to be political demonstrations or simple proof tests. In China, however, extremely sophisticated instrumentation was used on even the first nuclear test.''
Chronicling the progress of China’s nuclear weapons program, Reed writes: Atop a tower on 16 October 1964, China's first nuclear device, 596, was successfully fired. US intelligence analysts were astonished by the lack of plutonium in the fallout debris and by the speed with which China had broken into the nuclear club, but that was only the beginning.
Eighteen months later, in the spring of 1966, China entered the thermonuclear world with the detonation of a boosted-fission, airdropped device that used lithium-6, a primary source of tritium when bombarded with neutrons. That test, their third, achieved a yield of 200–300 kilotons. By the end of the year, they made the leap to multistage technology with a large two-stage experiment that yielded only 122 kilotons, but it again displayed 6Li in the bomb debris.
The Chinese then closed the circle on 17 June 1967, unambiguously marching into the H-bomb club with a 3.3-megaton burst from an aircraft-delivered weapon. On 27 December 1968, the Chinese bid the Johnson administration farewell with an improved, airdropped 3-megaton thermonuclear device that for the first time used plutonium in the primary.
It is clear from the reactor-to-bomb progression times that by 1968 China had unequivocally entered the European nuclear cartel on a par with the U, says Reed. Furthermore, China had become a thermonuclear power. It had achieved the leap from the initial A-bomb test to a 3.3-megaton thermonuclear blast in a record-breaking 32 months. It had taken the US more than seven years to accomplish that feat.
China tested nukes for Pakistan, gave design-Indo-US nuke deal-The Times of India
Edit: Provide The Link .
- Amar
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Where China Fits in the Missile Trade
Where China Fits in the Missile Trade - New York Times
William Safire (column, March 5) notes that China is assisting Syria to obtain a missile production program. However, Mr. Safire's characterization of Congressional legislation as "linking China's missile restraint to M.F.N. status" is off the mark.
A report on China's missile trade issued by the international missile proliferation project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where I am a research associate, notes that the most important long-term cause for proliferation concern is China's tendency to provide technical and manufacturing assistance to would-be third world missile powers, rather than sell complete systems. China helps create new and powerful missile-producing states, which are likely to operate outside limitations on the sales of such systems.
For example, North Korea, having received vital aid from China for its cruise and ballistic missile programs, has become a prime supplier of missile technology to the Middle East, including sales to Syria, Libya, Iran, Egypt and possibly Iraq. Iran has also been a major recipient of Chinese missile largess (including production technology transfer) and has recently signaled its intention to sell third world buyers ballistic and cruise missiles.
Syria now appears next on the list of states whose missile factories were built, wholly or in part, with a helping hand from Beijing. Such second- and third-tier proliferation is particularly troublesome, because of the limited options for its control.
But the United States-China bill the Senate recently voted on makes no mention of Chinese missile technology transfer or production assistance. It would deny extension of most favored nation status if the President determines China has transferred to Syria or Iran "ballistic missiles or launchers for the weapons systems known as the M-9 or M-11." The bill avoids linking the long-term difficulties posed by China's missile practices and most favored nation status.
The Chinese know that transfer of such systems would harm Chinese-American relations; they are content to hold off on these sales and continue to earn hard currency by selling their missile expertise. Thus, even if the President's veto of the bill is overridden, erroneous assumptions about the Chinese missile proliferation problem will still be guiding United States policy. TIMOTHY V. MC CARTHY Monterey, Calif., March 8, 1992
Where China Fits in the Missile Trade - New York Times
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- Amar
Where China Fits in the Missile Trade - New York Times
William Safire (column, March 5) notes that China is assisting Syria to obtain a missile production program. However, Mr. Safire's characterization of Congressional legislation as "linking China's missile restraint to M.F.N. status" is off the mark.
A report on China's missile trade issued by the international missile proliferation project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where I am a research associate, notes that the most important long-term cause for proliferation concern is China's tendency to provide technical and manufacturing assistance to would-be third world missile powers, rather than sell complete systems. China helps create new and powerful missile-producing states, which are likely to operate outside limitations on the sales of such systems.
For example, North Korea, having received vital aid from China for its cruise and ballistic missile programs, has become a prime supplier of missile technology to the Middle East, including sales to Syria, Libya, Iran, Egypt and possibly Iraq. Iran has also been a major recipient of Chinese missile largess (including production technology transfer) and has recently signaled its intention to sell third world buyers ballistic and cruise missiles.
Syria now appears next on the list of states whose missile factories were built, wholly or in part, with a helping hand from Beijing. Such second- and third-tier proliferation is particularly troublesome, because of the limited options for its control.
But the United States-China bill the Senate recently voted on makes no mention of Chinese missile technology transfer or production assistance. It would deny extension of most favored nation status if the President determines China has transferred to Syria or Iran "ballistic missiles or launchers for the weapons systems known as the M-9 or M-11." The bill avoids linking the long-term difficulties posed by China's missile practices and most favored nation status.
The Chinese know that transfer of such systems would harm Chinese-American relations; they are content to hold off on these sales and continue to earn hard currency by selling their missile expertise. Thus, even if the President's veto of the bill is overridden, erroneous assumptions about the Chinese missile proliferation problem will still be guiding United States policy. TIMOTHY V. MC CARTHY Monterey, Calif., March 8, 1992
Where China Fits in the Missile Trade - New York Times
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Neo
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I don't care how you call this thread, the emphasis should rest on Pakistan's missile capability to strike anywhere in India instead of how she got the technology. Your approach is wrong, meant to derail the thread.Onus of proving this so called "Pakistani Missile capabilities" rest upon you. Whatever we have expressed ourselves above is true in a wider term. If you really have seen something inappropriate then have your opinion about it. We would be more then grateful enough to bring back our words. Since complete absence of any detail technology being innovated by Pakistan as a nation as far as its industrial capabilities are concerned, we were truthful to greater extent. Just because our previous top post didn't go down well with some pakistani's over here, that doesn't make those post any bias.
The point is that Pakistan has a credible, diverse and tested missile capability and she's only growing stronger. In a war scenario with India I'm sure Mr. Anthony won't be interested in how we got the missiles but rather how he can counter them. Discuss designs, parameters, yields, radar detection etc if you want to learn about Pakistani missiles. If your only interest is to prove Chinese or Korean assistence than your post is indeed bias, not worth replying.
I'm only being frank and honest...
Neo
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What is the point of discussing copy or reverse engeneering issues, will it make India less vulnerable to any missile attack from Pakistan? We all know Pakistan got help from the Chinese and North Korean, so what? It ain't dangerous because it ain't Pakistani???
Neo
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Thats exactly my point, thank you!
