Pakistan, Caste and dilemma of quislings

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Sir Muhammad Iqbal and the Ahmadiyya Movement
By Kunwar Khuldune Shahid - November 3, 2016

Anyone remotely familiar with the poetry of Dr Muhammad Iqbal would know of his multi-pronged flirtations with numerous – often paradoxical – ideologies, at the same time. From fluctuating between a poet and a preacher to being the torchbearer of theocracies and personal faith at the same time – from presenting an anti-capitalist case for theism through Vladimir Lenin in Lenin Khuda Ke Huzoor Mein to his appraisal for sultani, while ostensibly challenging the British Raj – from promoting a Pan-Islamist caliphate-lusting monolithic Muslim world spearheaded by the mard-e-momin (inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche’s übermenschen or superman) to propagating individualism through khudi (inspired by Nietzsche’s der Wille zur Macht or Will to Power) – Iqbal’s writing is brimming with beautifully phrased contradictions. Little wonder that one can find Islamists, secularists, democrats, autocrats, everyone quoting an Iqbal verse to forward – and substantiate – their viewpoint.

Iqbal’s staunch followers argue that these paradoxes are actually exhibits of philosophical evolution that the ‘Poet of the East’ manifested during various stages of his writing career. This assertion, however, doesn’t factor in inconsistencies found during the same epoch of Iqbal’s poetry, and quite often in the same book if not the same poem.

Just like his political and social ideological ‘pluralism’, Iqbal’s religious understanding was an amalgamation of a wide array of centrifugal – and centripetal – interpretations of Islam. A perfect implementation of ideas set in Iqbal’s The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam touted as the ‘Bible of Modern Islam’ would be Tahirul Qadri’s recently launched “anti-ISIS, counterterrorism curriculum” in the UK, which relies on selective readings – and understanding – of Islamic scriptures. It could also be called the ‘Bible of Islam apologia’.

Islam’s journey from Sunni Islamism to Sufi Islam, also made a pit-stop at the Ahmadiyya ideology, something that has been heavily debated in the secret chambers of Two Nation Theory enthusiasts. “…in 1897, Sir Muhammad Iqbal took the (Ahmadiyya) pledge,” according to the Daily Nawa-i Waqt, Lahore, 15 November 1953. Ex-General Secretary of the Anjuman Himayat-i Islam, Lahore, Maulvi Ghulam Muhiy-ud-Din Qasoori, confirmed this during the Munir Enquiry. The Munir Report was crucial in sidelining the popular call for excommunication of Ahmadis in Pakistan following the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya riots. The Munir Report confirmed that “neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims, and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death, if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs.”

While Maulvi Ghulam Muhiy-ud-Din Qasoori’s assertion of Iqbal’s allegiance to the Ahmadiyya ideology proved to be pivotal in overcoming calls for judicial takfir, it was the same Iqbal whose essay The Muslim attitude towards the Ahmadiyya movement (1935) that presented the case for declaring ‘Qadianis’ a separate community, which was cited in the lead-up to the Second Amendment in 1974 ‘officially’ excommunicating the Ahmadis.

Iqbal had written: “The best course for the rulers of India is, in my opinion, to declare the Qadianis a separate community. This will be perfectly consistent with the policy of the Qadianis themselves, and the Indian Muslim will tolerate them just as he tolerates other religions.”

Whether Iqbal’s regression from labelling Ahmadiyya community “a true model of Islamic life” – as he had asserted in an Aligarh session – to their identification as a separate community altogether, was a corollary of Islamist pressure, or a result of theological self-reflection only he would’ve known best. For, only in 1931 Iqbal had played an instrumental role in the selection of Ahmadi leader Basheer-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad as president of the All India Kashmir Committee.

The 1930s saw an upsurge in anti-Ahmadiyya protests among the Muslim community, with Jinnah being condemned as an infidel for his visits to the ‘Fazl Mosque’ in London, which was affiliated with the Ahmadiyya community. It was Maulana Abdur Rahmin Dard, the Ahmadiyya Imam who persuaded Jinnah to return to India and it was inside the ‘Fazl Mosque’ that he announced his decision to return. Jinnah staunchly defended the Ahmadis’ right to self-identify as Muslims, and stood by Sir Zafarullah Khan – Pakistan’s first foreign minister – whenever his religious identity was attacked to discredit his political acumen.

According to multiple literary sources, Iqbal regularly visited Qadian following his conversion to the Ahmadiyya ideology in 1897. When the founder of the ideology – who Iqbal had praised as “probably the profoundest theologian among modern Indian Muslims” in a paper written in 1900 – visited Sialkot in 1904 Iqbal, along with his friend Sir Fazli Husain, was in audience with him. While many believe that Iqbal formally left the Ahmadiyya ideology in 1908, his correspondence with the Ahmadi khalifas continued in the coming years. Before 1935 Iqbal had never exhibited any condemnation of, nay disagreement with, the Ahmadi ideology.

Iqbal’s parents are believed to have converted to the Ahmadiyya ideology, along with his elder brother Shaikh Ata Muhammad, which might have influenced his early affiliation with the ideology. Even though narrators suggest that Iqbal himself was inspired by the ‘reformist movement’ as he exhibited in his writings and recorded exchanges with many Ahmadi leaders during his lifetime.

Iqbal’s affiliation with the Ahmadiyya ideology is used by Islamists to discredit his work; and by his staunch followers as an exhibit of his ‘spiritual pluralism’. The actual remnants of the affiliation unfortunately self-manifests in the anti-Ahmadiyya bigotry that prevails in Pakistan – the country whose ideological founding father – and his blood relatives – were once affiliated with the Ahmadiyya ideology.

Iqbal’s critics have long debated over self-defeatism in his writings. With the same man being cited to maintain the faithfulness and infidelity of the same community, in 1953 and 1974 respectively, Pakistani Ahmadis are the most unfortunate emblem of Iqbal’s paradoxes.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Why Dalits in Pakistan are reluctant to convert to Islam en masse!

Written by Sufi Ghulam Hussain
Published on 09 December 2017

Mukhi, the panchayat headman of Oad [Dalit] community begged in the name of holy Gita and even threw his turban at Seetal's feet, but Seetal just didn't care much and replied:
"Mukhi! Do whatever you like, but I shall change my religion.
Mukhi: "But why after all you do, you want to change your religion?
Seetal: My choice, my wish simply.
Mukhi: Even then?
Seetal: I just don't like my religion. That's it.
Mukhi: Alas! Why on earth don't you like your religion?
Seetal: Alright Mukhi. Tell me who are we?
Mukhi: We are Hindus.
Seetal: Why then Hindus cremate the dead, whereas we bury them?
Mukhi: It's our ritual.
Seetal: Alright, Why do we eat goat after butchering it (like Muslims)?
Mukhi: This too is our ritual—since the times of old ancestors.
Seetal: But these are the rituals of Muslims!!
Mukhi: These are theirs. But ours too!!
Seetal: Then how can you say, we are Hindus?
Mukhi: Then what the heck are we, crank?
Seetal: Half-Half Hindus, half Muslim. Body of sheep, head of goat."

(Excerpt translated from Kafir, a short story by a renowned Sindhi writer, Naseem Kharal1)

This fictitious exchange of persuasive dialogue depicts many such events that have actually happened in the history of Sindh and brings out the dilemma of being an 'untouchable' Sindhi. Oad is a Dalit caste having the tradition of building mud houses by loading mud on donkeys. In this conversation, Seetal stands accused before the Oad community of betraying it by proclaiming that the Hindu religion is based on falsity. It infuriated all Oad attending that panchayat but they remained calm believing that Seetal has been bewitched by a Mullah (Islamic cleric). Mukhi just threw the final blow and said "Remember Seetal! No matter how lavishly you harness donkeys like horses, they will remain donkeys, and never become horses."

Seetal's story ultimately ends up with Seetal's realization that in case his ailing wife dies, he cannot marry from any Muslim caste, because he is considered as mean as any of his non-Muslim, lower caste Oad relatives. Realisation comes as a revelation in a dramatic dialogue between Mukhi and a Muslim, that caste is stronger than religion, Seetal converts back to his indigenous religion. The story, however, ends with the bigoted disappointment of the Molvi (religious) at the re-conversion of Seetal, who says the 'Infidel is after all infidel'. This short story depicts what continues to hold true of Sindhi society for decades, although its emphasis on religious fanaticism in the final words of Mullah, eludes many to take interest in its religious aspect, and be indifferent to the casteist one. It proves that caste reigns supreme overriding syncretism and commonality of religion or faith. It brings to relief the syncretic religion of Dalit communities, religious bigotry and the craving of Mullahs to convert non-Muslims particularly Hindu-Dalits, and the violence of caste.

This socio-religious polity continues to hold true of much of Sindhi society today as it was decades even centuries ago. This story written in 60s by Naseem Kharal, the renowned upper caste landlord (wadero), and one of the leading Sindhi progressive writers of the 60s and 70s is the rare piece of fiction in the Sindhi language that brings the caste divide in Sindh so sharply. Although most of the readers and interpreters of it pay less attention to its content on casteism and more on religion, which is the default thinking approach of the civil society in Sindh. Another short story often referred to is by Manik: 'Haveli jaa Raaz' 2(Secrets of Sayed's bungalow) brings to relief the polar opposite case of casteism and patriarchy. In it, the writer shows how strict caste endogamy and patriarchy prevalent in Sayed families creates conditions of celibacy for women and sexual relations outside of wedlock. Equally interesting is to mention the reaction of the Sindhi community against Manik's story that traversed the tabooed sacred space of Sayedism, the sanctified order of Sindhi society of which it is jealously proud of. Manik was abused, ridiculed and even socially boycotted and pressured to such limits to eventually commit suicide.

Both these stories show how Sindhi society is divided into castes with Sayeds at the one end and the Dalits on the other, with various Muslim and Hindu castes falling all along the hierarchical continuum. Sindhi progressive movements have had anti-pir, anti-sayed, anti-patriarchal, pro-peasant or anti-landlord and feminist liberating elements in it, reflected in the writings of Amar Jaleel, Noorulhuda Shah, Manik and Khairunnisa Jafferi, all upper caste writers. But the anti-caste aspect, despite the equal pervasiveness of castiesm, is not prominent in their writings, showing the level of caste hegemony. This neglect of casteism by the Sindhi writers is rooted in their Sindhi nationalist agenda glossed over in Hinduised Sufism, the greater influence of the literate class of caste Hindus, the state narrative that divides society on religious lines, and the dominant culture of Islam that continues to believe in the superiority of the descent in case of Sayeds and Ashrafia castes, and the inferiority of Dalits.

To identify the progressive Sindhi Muslim class as either Sufi Muslim or Sindhi Muslim may be a bit misleading. The Sindhi class that holds the hegemony over so called progressive, secular knowledge production is, in fact, crypto-Hindutvadi in terms of political ethos that either blinds them to casteism or proposes to tolerate it for larger pan-Sindhi trans-caste union tyo be restored.

This inherent tendency to find common grounds with caste Hindus, is buttressed by two other factors, i.e. the state narrative of Hindus as a minority, and the 1960's and 70's progressive Sindhi nationalist movement's re-assertion of Sindhiness as Hinduness justified on the rediscovered narrative of syncretic Sufi culture of Sindh. This post-partition shaping up of the political culture of Sindh developed among socially ambitious Dalits an urge to Sindhize themselves while claiming Hindu minority status within Sindhi society. Sindhisation was a process similar to Sanskritsation that was going on even before partition, but differed in that while Sanskritised Dalits upheld Indian nationalism, Dalits of Sindh praised Sindhi culture, preferred to speak Sindhi language instead of their mother tongue, and upheld Sindhi nationalism3. Certain others, followed both Sindhianising and modernizing route supporting state and its ideology as the majority of Sindhis did (or were made to do so by the state).

Education and merit was, and is still believed by them, the major modus operandi to become part of society, to develop and progress. They argue that casteism and untouchability can be defeated primarily through education, not through religious conversion or by politicizing casteism. This tendency to depoliticize any emerging movement within Dalits is there since the rise of Sindhi nationalist movement. Some Sindhi nationalist progressive writers agree that caste discrimination has been there, yet simultaneously they maintain that it is dissipating and can be further eradicated through education. As a proof of it they persistently quote examples of individual educational achievements of certain Dalits. Taj Joyo, the caste Muslim nationalist writer, the product of Sindhi progressive movement wrote in Hemandas Chandani's (Scheduled Caste activist and poet) book Humerche Hoongarpublished in 2017, said:

I remember for sure that it was the night of December 11, 1977, when I met at Hemandas' home I had a chit chat with Kanji Mal (officer national bank), Ganesh Balani, Bhani Mal, Sarvan Kumar, Naraern and Heaman. If I remember correctly, either Ganesh Mal (or any of the friends present) put up a proposal that 'we Meghwar are considered as lower class Hindus, by caste Hindus. Therefore, our survival lies in converting to Islam'. There, I opposed that thinking that it is not the solution. Because (caste-based) class discrimination also exists among Muslims. No Sayed Muslim will allow marry his daughter into any other caste, not to mention of Machi Muslim (fisherman caste considered the lower among Muslims). Although the days have muchchanged now, but even then I narrated them the fiction story (based on social reality of casteism among Muslims) of NaseemKharal. Finally we came to a consensus that the solution of social discriminations lies in 'education and only education'. Today I feel proud that it is the effect of my ideas and the fiction story of NaseemKharal narrated by me, that Ganesh Balani's four daughters have now reached the highest educational achievement:Shabnam Rathore made Sindh famous by doing PhD from Germany in 'Underground Saline Water'. Another Pushpa Kumari has done M.Sc from Agricultural University Tando Jam. Third daughter Nimrita, is a lecturer in Sindh University's microbiology department. Fourth Sushhma Devi who did M.Sc from botany and serving as lecturer in Karachi."

(Taj Joyo, Preface to Hemanda Chandani's Humerche Hoongar, pg 12)

As it is evident, Taj Joyo suggested Dalits to get Sindhised, instead of converting to Islam, and that he made them believe, through his peculiar narration of Naseem Kharal's fiction (the excerpt shared in the beginning of the section) that the eradication of casteism is possible only through getting education. But the Dalit activists whom he met, although they abide by his suggestion of getting education, and did not convert to Islam, most of them continued to struggle against untouchability and caste discrimination. Conversions of individual Dalit families, particularly the most poor families continues till today, at a slow pace though, with the relative caste discrimination among 'Hindus' being one of the major reasons for such conversions.

Taj Joyo's attempt shows that , despite all the personal and social good of a 'Sindhi' patriot, how upper caste Sindhis continues to have control on knowledge production, and the construction of the narrative for Dalit consumption thus disallowing them to come up with their own alternative ways of tackling with issues that matter to them the most. Upper caste Sindhi very artfully depicts the true picture of Sindhi society, but leaves the oppressed in the paradoxical state of indecision. He sympathizes with the oppressed (Dalit and the women) but leaves her alone in the blind alley. Flattening of caste discrimination as an equally distributed social identity, hides the hierarchy of oppressions. This Sindhutvadi approach is incapable to see that the decision by the Dalits to convert is not simply a social but a political one. It is just one of the ways to get free from the caste based humiliation which is more deeply entrenched in Hinduism than in Islam.

Education is the necessary condition, but not the ultimate condition for the eradication of caste discrimination and untouchability. It is the medium that enables the person to raise his/her voice and chalk out a personal or public program for the reformation of society. Gopal Guru argues that caste discrimination and untouchability can be eradicated through the combined effort of Dalit and non-Dalit anti-caste activists for the moral-ethical reformation of society[1]. Here, the Dalit's concern for education and the post-education attempts to reform society and struggle against caste discrimination can be evidenced. If education does not enable them to politicize caste or generate momentum in the society, it then fails in its prime social goal. Dalit persons that Taj Joyo mentioned, although they did not convert to Islam, most of them continued to strive against caste discrimination through their writings and public protests. In reality, as far as religion of the majority of Dalits is concerned, they are neither Hindus nor Muslims, yet they are both. The politically charged section of Ambedkarites and Dalit activists, however, are, in fact, crypto-Buddhists and Sufis without having a radical association with any religion.

Religion or the lack of it did not and does not seem to affect the existential reality of Dalits in Pakistan. Ganesh Balani wrote in his biography how, despite being so highly educated, his family and their Dalit community continued to be persecuted and oppressed throughout their life. His daughter Pushpa, the president of Dalit Sujaag Tehreek, Sindh, and member of several minority forums talked in an interview of several incidences where she personally continued to be the victim of caste discrimination. Hemandas Chandani, in whose praise Taj Joyo wrote that preface to his book, did not go by the spirit of suggestion given by Joyo and continues to be a staunch defender of Scheduled Caste rights. Hemandas Chandani, in a personal interview, told me how up till now caste Hindus of Mithi and other regions of lower Sindh continue to practice untouchability and discriminate against Meghwar and other Dalit castes, and how in various subtle ways they practice untouchability at temples, at their homes, and in public when they come to interact with Dalits.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Sayyids in Muslim Societies

Published on 14 August 2017

Morimoto Kazuo

The world today is home to a great number of putative lineal descendants—and collateral relatives—of Muḥammad, the Prophet of Islam. Let us begin by sharing three recent episodes involving some of these kinsfolk of the Prophet.

Episode I: The film Close-Up (1990) by the renowned Iranian film director Abbas Kiarostami is an intricate cross between documentary and fiction, featuring a man apprehended for falsely presenting himself as Mohsen Makhmalbaf, a leading figure of Iranian cinema. The film re-enacts the interaction between the cinema-loving "conman" and his "victims," the Āhankhāh family, as well as the trial of the case before a judge. Just as the trial is approaching its conclusion, an interesting incident takes place in the film. The defendant's mother, clad in a black chador, suddenly steps forward and begins to plead with the judge that he should consider the prophetic descent of her son when handing out his sentence. It is true that this incident may not have taken place in reality. However, Kiarostami must certainly have thought that the scene would not appear unrealistic to his audience.

Episode II: Three days after Saddam Hussain was captured by the American troops in a burrow near Takrit, the "Syndic of Sharīfs" (Naqīb al-Ashrāf) of Iraq, named al-Sharīf al-Arajī, held a press conference. The naqīb announced that the investigation by the "Committee of Genealogies" (Lajnat al-Ansāb) confirmed that the prophetic descent claimed by the deposed president was utterly false. Saddam, he said, had forced genealogists to approve and sign his baseless genealogy. Further, the naqīb stated, Saddam had had a plan to establish the "Niqābat al-Ashrāf" (Syndicate of Sharīfs) and to become the naqīb himself; a plan that was thwarted by the passive resistance of the sharīfs themselves. Al-Sharīf al-Arajī was representing the new niqābathat was established after the collapse of Saddam's regime, and which held its first meeting two days earlier with the theme, "For the Construction of New Iraq."1

Episode III: In March 2010, a new action planned by the Saudi lawyer Faisal Yamani attracted the attention of the press. After getting the Danish newspaper Politiken to apologize for having offended Muslims by reprinting the well-known cartoons featuring the Prophet, he sent a "pre-action" letter to the ten other newspapers that had refused to apologize, and announced that he was planning to file a libel case against them with a London court. Yamani had been representing eight associations of the Prophet's descendants from eight countries (Egypt, Libya, Qatar, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine and Australia) through these processes. Yamani was seeking to sue the newspapers on the ground that the reprinting of the cartoons amounted to defamation against the approximately 95,000 direct descendants of the Prophet that he was representing.2

As shown by these episodes, the Prophet's kinsfolk, who are most frequently called by the honorific titles "sayyid" (pl. sāda, sādāt) or "sharīf"(pl. ashrāf, shurafā), have formed and still form a distinct social category in many Muslim societies. Their lineage may be adduced when an exceptional legal treatment is sought for them. It also constitutes symbolic capital to which a political leader seeking to enhance general perception of his or her qualifications may resort. Moreover, these people, in a good number of cases, possess enough cohesion to form organizations beyond their immediate families in order to promote their shared interests. Reliable statistics showing the number of the Prophet's kinsfolk, spread all through the Muslim world and far beyond it, are not available. Even a conservative estimate, however, would suggest that the number of kinsfolk is in the tens of millions3.

The idea that the Prophet's kinsfolk must be differentiated from the rest of the population and be given special treatment in one way or another has been shared by many, if not most, interpretations of Islam. It might appear quite natural to many readers when, for example, the Twelver Shiite scholar al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq Ibn Bābūyah (d. 381/991) writes:

Our belief concerning the Alids [the descendants of the Prophet's paternal cousin Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, who form the core of the Prophet's kinsfolk] is that they are the Family of the Apostle of God (Āl Rasūl Allāh) and that loving them is obligatory (mawaddatuhum wājiba).4

Those readers may point out (somewhat rhetorically) that Shiites, after all, consider the leadership of the Umma (Muslim community) to be the birthright of the Prophet's family. What then is the opinion of the Ḥanbalite scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) in his Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, a refutation against nothing other than Twelver Shiism? This paragon of the traditionalist Sunnism also writes:

There is no doubt in that Muḥammad's Family (Āl Muḥammad) has a right on the Umma that no other people share with them and that they are entitled to an added love and affection to which no other branches of the Quraysh are entitled.5

Certainly, the opinions of various Muslim religious scholars, including al-Ṣadūq and Ibn Taymiyya, can be markedly different when it comes to more concrete questions, such as who exactly constitute the Prophet's kinsfolk, what the special treatments are that they are entitled to, or why they must be treated differently from the rest of the people. However, the base line that the Umma considers the Prophet's kinsfolk to constitute a special category within the community and that a particular respect or regard should be offered to them has evidently been shared rather widely by various interpretations of Islam through the centuries.

[Morimoto Kazuo is an Associate Professor of Islamic and Iranian History at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo. The above extract is from Morimoto Kazuo (Ed.). (2012). Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet. London and New York: Routledge.]

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Feudalism in Pakistan

The Feudalism in contemporary Pakistan(Urdu: زمینداری نظام‬‎ zamīndāri nizam) usually refers to the power and influence of large landowning families, particularly through very large estates and in more remote areas.[1] The adjective "feudal" in the context of Pakistan has been used to mean "a relatively small group of politically active and powerful landowners".[2] "Feudal attitude" refers to "a combination of arrogance and entitlement".[2]According to the Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research (PILER), five per cent of agricultural households in Pakistan own nearly two thirds of Pakistan’s farmland.[3] [4]

Large joint families in Pakistan may possess hundreds or even "thousands of acres" of land, while making little or no direct contribution to agricultural production, which is handled by "peasants or tenants who live at subsistence level".[5][6] Landlord power may be based on control over local people through debt bondage passed down "generation after generation",[1] and power over the "distribution of water, fertilisers, tractor permits and agricultural credit", which in turn gives them influence over the "revenue, police and judicial administration" of local government.[5][6] In recent times, particularly "harsh" feudalism has existed in "rural Sind",[5] Baluchistan,[7]"some parts of Southern Punjab".[5] Feudal families influence has extended to national affairs through the government bureaucracy, the Armed Forces and the Pakistani political class.[7] Pakistan's "major political parties" have been called "feudal-oriented", and as of 2007, "more than two-thirds of the National Assembly" (Lower House) and most of the key executive posts in the provinces were held by "feudals", according to scholar Sharif Shuja.[5]

Some prominent landed families in Pakistan consist of the Rajputs (such as the Bhuttos[6], Taluqdars, and the Rana Zamindars). Malikand Others include the Jats, Nawabs, Khans, Nawabzadas, Mansabdars, Arbabs, Makhdooms, and the Sardars.

Critics of feudalism have complained of a "culture of feudal impunity", where local police will refuse to pursue charges against an influential landowning family even when murder or mayhem have been committed;[6][8] of abuse of power by some landlords who may place enemies in "private prisons" and "enslave" local people through debt bondage;[1] the harming of "progress and prosperity" by feudals who discourage the education of their "subjects" for fear it will weaken feudal power;[7] the giving of "space" to extremists (such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) who peasants turn to in the search for deliverance from the cruelty of feudal lords;[7] and an agriculture sector made stagnant by absentee landlordism.[7]

Other have complained that Pakistan has developed a "fixation" on feudalism (Michael Kugelman);[3] that it has become a scapegoat for Pakistan's problems, frequently denounced but not seriously studied (Eqbal Ahmed);[9] a "favorite boogie of the urban educated elites";[10] or that it does not exist because South Asia never developed large concentrations of land ownership or a feudal class, and what is called feudal in Pakistan is merely a "rural gentry", who are "junior partners" to those who actually hold power (Haider Nizamai).[11]“Feudalism serves as the whipping boy of Pakistan’s intelligentsia. Yet, to my knowledge not one serious study exists on the nature and extent of feudal power in Pakistan, and none to my knowledge on the hegemony which feudal culture enjoys in this country.”

Often criticized for being the root of our modern feudal system, the mansabdari system...................... The officials, mansabdars, who were granted the job of overseeing of the land, never owned their mansabs but were only granted a share of its earnings as a reward for their work.................these mansabdars, turned into de facto hereditary landlords and petty chiefs of their mansabs.

^^^ so punjabi, sindhi, british feudal system bad (sure everyone would agree with that) but mughal feudal system not bad?
the reference for last line seems from left liberal friday times. and the writer has some articles about karachi (mohajir? muhajirs it seem complain a lot about feudals. even the psychotic blogger Riaz Haq acted holier than thou and wrote against feudalism in Pakistan )

Almost half of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product and the bulk of its export earnings are derived from the agricultural sector, which is controlled by a few thousand feudal families. With this concentration of economic power, they also have considerable political power.[7]

The leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League, the political party that established Pakistan in 1947, was dominated primarily by feudal landowners such as the Taluqdars, Zamindars, Jats, Rajas, Mahers, Chaudries, Khans, Jagirdars, Nawabs, Nawabzadas and Sardars. The sole exception was the Jinnahs.[7]

Through the '50s and the '60s the feudal families retained control over national affairs through the bureaucracy and military. Later on in 1971, they assumed direct power (Ali Bhuttobeing of a very large landowning family) and retained it until the military regained power.

the reference for last line is from a paper by three people named khan (left leaning pashtuns? Im not saying anything grossly wrong with analysis though. just an observation)

The feudal class aligns themselves with the Democrats and dictators equally. Muslim league, the flag bearer of Pakistan movement, was dominated by the feudal interests and did not favor any serious attempt to carry out land reforms. The first constituent assembly crowded with Nawab, Sardars and Choudhry’s, Ayub Khan surrounded by Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan, the Nawab of Kala Bagh and a feudal who, as a governor governed his province ruthlessly, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a gigantic landlord from Sindh and cabinet minister of Ayub Khan and other such families of Pirs and sajda nashineens and Currently, PPP under the chairmanship of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari son of a large landowner from Sindh, Asif Ali Zardari. PML-N is over flooded with landlords like Ranas of Faisalabad, Zehris of Balochistan and Legharis from southern Punjab. Thirdly, PTI which claims to be the most democratic and change demanding party is crowded with the landlords previously having connections with the other political parties. There is a very low proportion of the youths and common men PTI promised in the campaign of May 2013 elections.
http://balochistanvoices.com/2017/11/feudalistic-power-structure-pakistan/

According to statistical reports, 80 per cent of people elected as representatives in Punjab are feudal lords, whereas in Sindh the number hits 90 per cent.

Floods uncover evidence of feudalism’s impact on poor

.......The floods that swept across vast tracts of land from July to September 2010 covered many fields, houses and roads in a sea of swirling water - but they also played a part in exposing the depth of existing poverty and deprivation in Pakistan.

“The malnutrition we are seeing is not new. It has nothing to do with the floods; it is just that we are seeing it now as people come into contact with medical teams,” ...............

....................The impact of feudalism, and the poverty it gives rise to, is poorly documented, but six months after the most devastating floods in the country’s history, with Sindh Province worst hit, a provincial government report based on a survey conducted with UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) support, has revealed a grave nutritional crisis. .......................

Floods rupture Pakistani feudal ties

.............."We couldn't have moved away in normal circumstances. Then the floods came and we fled. It was a blessing in disguise. We are not going back now."................

.

.

.


Where feudalism lives on



In the Unhappy Valley of Pakistan’s Sindh Region, Feudal Slavery Is Alive and Well


Politics in Pakistan — Failed by the Feudal System


https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/feudalism-in-pakistan/


Pakistan's Modern Feudal Lords
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/04/08/pakistans-modern-feudal-lords/45b45d57-d74a-4b73-8098-1bdc9490c255/?utm_term=.d6f36319a654

http://www.aljazeera.com/humanright...ht-against-feudalism-2014814135134807880.html

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch...b73-8098-1bdc9490c255/?utm_term=.d6f36319a654
.......By all accounts, the feudal landlords no longer wield the kind of clout they did in the 19th century, or even 40 years ago. The transfer of land from one generation to the next has diluted family holdings. The rise of a new class of industrialists and commercial real estate barons has encroached on feudal economic power. The military, meanwhile, has acquired its own vast landholdings,.........

................To adapt to a changing world, the feudal class has sought to diversify, investing in businesses such as textile mills and preparing its offspring for professional careers by sending them abroad to study.................

Feudalism in Sindh

................
There is a debate over whether feudalism exists in Sindh or whether the term is now a catchphrase for the rural elite’s exploitation and impunity.

The landed elite did not evolve out of the economic or social imperatives of the province but in the service of broader regime requirements.

There are four distinct waves in the creation of zamindars in Sindh.

The first was a product of colonialism, where landholding revenue collectors were declared cultivators, and gifted land ownership in exchange for services for the empire.

The second set emerged after the construction of irrigation infrastructure starting from the Jamrao Canal to the Sukkur barrage in the 1930s where land was allocated to retired army men, civil servants and to settler cultivators.

The third wave that saw the strengthening of zamindars was during Gen Ziaul Haq’s dictatorship where small owners, indebted feudals and non-cultivators were granted land and allowed to keep armed militias in lieu of support for the regime and opposing the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.

The fourth wave was during Gen Musharraf’s regime where local contests for power were erased through an equilibrium carved by the local bodies system, delineating niches for each.

Zamindars at different historical junctures had a transactional relationship with ruling regimes. They had an autonomous power base because of their role in the rural economy, wealth, prestige, the ability to implement decisions and the deference of locals. In return for patronage of gifts, titles and concessions, they promised delivery of land revenues, power and a workforce to get decisions executed, control of the rural population, and after the colonial exit, they guaranteed votes for elections.

Now, they pay little agricultural tax, cannot independently get their decisions executed, have no control over the immense social changes in the province; face protests and dissent and have periodically been defeated in elections.

Most zamindars, pirs and gaddi nashins have at some point lost in their home constituencies, voted out by those accused of blind slavery. The 1988 election was Sindh’s referendum against feudalism and witnessed some legendary defeats of feudal lords and tribal chiefs: Pir Pagara, Sardar Sultan Chandio, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Sardar Mahar, Nazar Shah were all defeated by middle-class PPP candidates,though they went on to become the new exploitative elite themselves.

But the landed elite no longer have a power base distinct from that of the state. They pilfer state power or refract it onto themselves. Even landlords holding large contiguous tracts of land (keti) have little ability to get decisions executed without utilising state institutions.

Whether using police to get people roughed up or ‘intiqaami karwai’ (revenge through registering fake legal cases) or getting FIRs quashed, making bureaucrats endorse a faislo or jirga in their favour, initiating development projects etc, it all requires access to officialdom. Local bureaucracies are subject to transfer/postings because landed elites fight for officers of their choice, often giving positions to bidders on one-year leases.

The landlord’s economic base is no longer exclusively tied to landholding. Now their presence and influence is there in the capillaries of the state, the petrol pumps, permits, real estate dealings and money from transfer/posting bids.

Others have changed their mode of operation — they no longer oppose schooling and education and try to ensure service delivery in their areas to get benefits for constituents even though that means lessening dependence on land-based livelihoods, albeit through systemic distortions.

The state is no longer peripheral. It is an intrinsic need in people’s lives, and they turn to the elites as a conduit. But the internal logic sustaining feudalism has ruptured; feudal culture exists without a feudal economic base and without feudal power.

The culture is also unravelling. Landlords used to field dalit labourers as candidates to insult their opponents who were contesting elections.

The rising number of court cases filed signal that the mechanism of landlord arbitration of conflicts is breaking down.

Broadcast media has created awareness that transcends literacy boundaries. There are numerous indicators of social change.

But state institutions are the impediment, not the catalyst.

Almost 50 percent of Pakistan’s population now lives in urban areas, and the center of gravity is shifting from the countryside to the large cities.

The eclipse of feudalism in Pakistan
BY ARIF HASAN
16 NOVEMBER 2012
Rural Pakistan has been transformed over the last half-century, the people are more free; but the old values continue to extract a toll.

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/15_54_1_17.pdf

Pakistan’s fixation with feudalism

.....................That said, the feudal mindset — an embrace of impunity, brutality, and corruption that’s also manifested by plenty of non-feudals — is deeply troubling. So are the power asymmetries under girding the institutionof feudalism..............

...............urbanisation may eventually reduce rural populations and diminish the sway of feudals in the countryside. However, their influence will simply be reasserted in urban settings...........

The takeaway? Fighting feudalism may well be futile.

...................................................................................................................................

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Some home truths about feudalism

It is wrong to assume that throwing the landowners out and giving the land to the people is going to have the effect that people imagine. On the contrary, it will lead to violence and destruction. The feudals will be no more in a generation or two, and it will happen without anyone actually havingto do anythingabout it

I AM a member of a land-owning family in Sindh. ..................................

.


Ayesha Siddiqa's reply to the above article:

The inner tragedies of feudal life

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa

TFT Issue: 09 May 2014
In a candid personal essay, Ayesha Siddiqa takes on recent attempts at rebranding feudalism

A few days ago I chanced upon some writings of Bina Shah explaining the intricacies of feudalism. Her key point was that people must separate the wheat from the chaff – the feudal system is not as bad as it is made to look and so people must distinguish good feudalism from the bad. Furthermore, she suggests that lower Sindh has good feudalism while upper Sindh has bad due to its proximity with Punjab. There are many problems that have traveled from Punjab to Sindh but feudalism may not be one of them. Lest she forgets, Sindh extended up until Multan before the British changed political boundaries. In any case, such statement reflect a needless ethnic bias that Sher Mohammad Marri once talked about and termed as a product of the feudals and bureaucrats of Sindh. I suspect she hasn’t heard of stories of feudal-pirs from lower Sindh involved in kidnapping for ransom done through dacoits that Sindh was famous for during the 1980s.

But what does one make of this good versus bad feudalism? Since I belong to South Punjab from where, in Bina Shah’s imagination, all bad feudalism comes from let me engage her and many others who believe that feudalism has some inherent goodness, in a conversation. I have used the reference also to put Ms Shah at ease so that she doesn’t take my comments as that from an urban-middle class ignoramus often referred by some as burgers. According to Shah, the good part of feudalism pertains to values such as the feudal lord and his family taking care of its minions or clients. You would probably think of these clients as lucky since there is someone powerful enough to provide for their needs such as health, food and security. After all, what would people do without a demigod? Perhaps even commissioning robberies and kidnapping is an extension of this magnanimity – keeping poor people busy from creating larger damage to mankind? I was also reminded about a conversation with scion of a landowning pir from South Punjab arguing that the festivals indicated the pir’s large heartedness in allowing poor people opportunity to earn. No use asking the young man why wouldn’t he consider creating more meaningful opportunities for the poor than just confining them to non-value added jobs.

But feudalism’s brutality is not limited only to those who are not part of it. It is a demon that eats its own. Wonder how and why a creative writer failed to see the loneliness of those that suffer the system much more because they are part of it and do not even have an opportunity to play the victim. From a human perspective, feudalism is a deeply unbearable state of being. Forced into a marriage with the Koran, not being allowed to get married even through a family arrangement, or killed for someone’s imagined honour are not just matters of random bad habit. They grow out of the need of the ‘lord’ to acquire power. The ‘lord’ will certainly not wake up one day and decide that his grown up daughter or sister has an equal right to live and must not be sacrificed on the altar of his ego. Wealth, land and the family’s women are an expression of the patriarch’s power. It is to retain this wealth that human lives, especially those of women, are sacrificed. Later, it is justified as respect for traditions. So, be it the Makhdooms of Hala or RahimYar Khan the apparent sheen of these households is quite superficial. It does not change the inner reality of how generations of women are not allowed to find partners so that land holding is retained in the family. I recently saw the Facebook page of a niece whose mother was married into one of the Makhdoom families from Rahim Yar Khan. Since the girl in her mid-twenties is forced to follow in her aunt’s footsteps and not get married she has found her solace in religion. Now, she posts religious messages which is not a matter of free choice but surrender.

Some women in similar conditions, who are more daring and restless, find their own pleasures. Those that are unlucky, as has happened in many cases in Punjab and Sindh, get killed, secretly buried and forgotten forever. The brutality is brushed under the carpet, while the menfolk parade a public liberalism, which in most cases is confined to other women not their own.

The feudal lifestyle casts a web around the lives of those that are part of it and do not have an equal stature in the hierarchy of relations. Human life is measured in terms of wealth and power of the family that you are a part of. It’s the patriarch and family at large which has agency. For people to survive within this system not only requires sensitivity to its norms, but also the ability to create a world of lies and make belief. At times, I find women of feudal-pir families even less fortunate than ordinary folk who can find some means for emancipation. The lower class woman can at least pretend that some evil spirit possesses her. In most cases this is her ticket to some freedom, fun and frolic. Going for exorcism to the pir or the shrine also provides opportunity for her to socialize and to do shopping and sightseeing. I quite believe that shrines in Sindh and Punjab will not go out of business, at least for a long while mainly due to the fact that these also serve as community centers and great meeting points considered as socially and morally kosher. Ultimately, places of worship that encourage congregation (anywhere in the world) provide excellent opportunities for socializing.

My lament, however, is for the woman in the heart of the feudal system who carries so much burden of male honour that she cannot live her life except in very dark shadows shrouded with deceit. Wonder if some storyteller would one day write about those women whose lives swing like a pendulum – between their unfulfilled desires, a maddening urge in some to fulfill (often carnal) desires for which one would venture into socially dangerous territories, and a burdensome consciousness of the patriarch’s code of honor for her. In fact, what Bina Shah should know is that just a couple of decades ago South Punjab was not known for honour killings.

The real tragedy of this system is inside it. And it would be an utter lie if someone said it didn’t happen in his or her families.

Many years ago at a family gathering I overheard a nine-year-old son of a distant cousin inquiring from his mother if my beautiful orchard would be taken over by the government when I died. I was then unmarried and surrounded by step relations who could not legally inherit my property. Probably many elders will have discussed the consequences of this in my absence for the young boy to have blurted out his concern for a piece of property that was an eyesore for most family members. It was the first time I realized that instead of thinking of my future my family was thinking about my death (and I would like to add that these people are not vicious either, just ordinary feudal folk). I remember then it did pinch me a bit. My mother had gently raised me as a rebel who did not poke tradition in the eye but stood firm and contested her rights as an equal individual. I was armed with education and exposure. I was the only family female not asked to wear a veil. But all this traveling off-the-beaten-track had not changed my other reality: that at the end of the day my worth was only weighed in land and capital that I could leave behind.

This was also not the last time that the question was asked. The other day I accidentally found out that a 12-year-old son of my house help was curious to know who would inherit my lovely house. As I stood frowning at this information, I was told that others had asked similar questions such as servants of a visiting family member who were curious to know who the beneficiary would be. This time, though, I couldn’t help but break into laughter. It was not mirth but a sense of helplessness at realizing that years of education, grooming and battling the system had not succeeded in transforming my image beyond that of a commodity – a thing whose extinction might result in opportunities for some. I could feel weariness in the heart realizing how horribly redundant I was as a human. No children, especially no male issue, made me absolutely useless. Living every extra minute I was wasting the time of my legal successors. To them I am nothing more than a trophy whose wealth would add to their existing fortune which will be passed on to their absolutely useless male children. Only if I could die.

For all these years, I had seen my mother battle for my survival. I was raised as a tomboy partly because, I imagine, it might have given my parents some comfort to raise me in a typical feudal setting as a male child. As I look back I wish I could turn back the clock and take ownership of my femininity. Later, after my father’s death I was encouraged to play the male because it mentally put my mother at some relative comfort. It was possibly a wee bit easier for her to protect someone who looked like a boy than a girl. The legal cases and general hostility was already too much of a burden for her.

I salute her for all the struggle she went through for me, always turning down the suggestion of selling the land because, for her, it was a decision that I would take when I came of age. But at age 22 she left me alone to deal with the hollowness of the feudal system and the added burden of wanting to stand up for my parents’ name and honor. Although I managed to do better than most, I couldn’t find the strength to free myself. Almost 25 years later I wonder why I didn’t take the leap. Winning a battle also depends on the battleground. Some battles are just not worth it. I am tired of people wanting me to die and thinking of developments through the prism of my death rather than my life. I am tired of being constantly seen as a path to a treasure and not the treasure. The fatigue catches on and there are times when you even begin to wait for your own death.

I also wonder if religion is a tool in the hands of the feudal to ensure laws that would stop the melting of their empire. The law of inheritance justified in the name of religion is so flawed it doesn’t allow leaving a will that might ensure that inheritance can be spent on people who deserve rather than those who greedily desire.

All the battles fought and won and all qualifications dissolve in thin air because ultimately the feudal environment doesn’t own womanhood. Actually, it doesn’t support manhood either. It only recognizes patriarchy which gets a lease of life through male members and not female. Hence, having children, which indicates extension of this patriarchy, is analogous to putting coins in a moneybox. Your worth is determined by your ability to fill the box up.

Of course, I will not suggest that all people in the system are evil. There are great individuals out there as you will find in any other socioeconomic order. But it is the human sorrow that lies at the heart of this system which is too much of a burden for an individual to carry. Look inside. There are stories aching to be told.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

http://www.left.ru/inter/july/rahman.html

The Pakistani Rich are Worse than Animals
=========================================
Taimur Rahman
Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party

Even animals have their limits, but the Pakistani ruling-class,
arguibly the most reactionary ruling-class anywhere in the world (if not
in the history of the world) are worse than animals. In Muzaffargarh
the worst crime imaginable has occurred.

A boy of low class peasant origin was found sitting in a field next to a
girl of the feudal family. The boy was twelve years old and the girl was
about 16. Obviously, these were two kids just playing in the fields.

The feudal lords of the area, who live with a culture of strictly
segregating their women and themselves from the manual workers were
infuriated by the fact that the two were socialising. Feudal lords in
Pakistan think of women as property that might become unclean if low
class people come in contact with their Izzat (honour).

So they kidnapped the boy and raped him.

At first they thought that the 12 year boy would not leak the story. As
it became clear that the boy might leak the story possibly even to the
police, the feudal lords made another attack on the peasants.

To cover up their earlier deed, they called a meeting of the Jirga
(feudal tribal council) and alleged that the two had been found in a
"compromising position" and that justice could only be served by the
rule "an eye for an eye". 400 peasants were watching the meeting of the
Jirga.

The Jirga ordered the father of the girl to bring his 18 year old
daughter (the sister of the boy) to the Jirga. He complied. She was
taken to a nearby barn and gang raped by four adult men. She was sent
back to her father and parents NAKED.

All the low classes of the village stood-by powerless.

These are the Jirgas and Panchayats that politicians such as Imran Khan
and Karzai (in Afghanistan) so boldy hold up as the model of democracy.
Who order the gang rape of teenagers. Some of the names of those who
committed this crime are: Fayyaz, Manzoor, Allah Ditta, Maulvi Abdul
Razzaq and Mazoor Jatoi. The name of the sixth member could not be
ascertained.

The Punjab police has allegedly arrested some people involved with this
incident. But the fact is that the Punjab police is full of more rapists
than the feudals of Pakistan. In my opinion they have arrested the
perpetrators of this crime to save them from a possible attack by other
people.

There are powerful lessons to be learnt from this incident.

First, this teenage girl (just like your daughter or sister) was not
gang raped by
some frustrated group of youngsters acting on their own (not that this
would have made this henious act any less barbaric), but by the TRIBAL
COUNCIL. To further humiliate the poor peasants, she was sent back home
naked.

This was therefore, a decision taken by the ruling-class against the
poor peasants. Its intention was to "teach them all a lesson". The
lesson is that the poor are the slaves of the rich ruling-class of
Pakistan. If they mistakenly feel that there is any form of equality,
even socialisation between the rich and the poor, the worst possible and
most humiliating punishment will be metted out against them. Even the
Israeli army has to maintain some semblance of democracy and concern for
human rights in the international media, but the feudal lords of
Pakistan are criminals beyond compare. They are worse than the
zionists.

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that these slave drivers are unwilling
for any form of equality or democracy. Is there any solution open to
the workers and peasants of Pakistan other than a revolution?

No! The slave holders of Pakistan, who have denied the people the
opportunity for freedom and justice have themselves sealed the fate of
the future course of development of Pakistani society. They are the
ones that should be held responsible for violent revolution. They have
denied the people any other course of action. The peace-loving people
have tried every means to achieve some semblance of equality and
democracy but it has always been crushed by the military, the feudals,
and the capitalists.

The time has come for the people of Pakistan to take their destiny into
their own hands. To not wait for the establishment, the police, the
army, the courts, the judiciary, the parliament (which does not exist),
and all these other institutions that are only built to protect the rich
to "deliver" justice. The time has come for the people to create a
peoples justice.

Just like the women of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) are arming
their women, the women of Pakistan should be fully armed to defend
themselves. Not only those who raped the girl, but all those who
participated in anyway in the decision of to rape this girl should be
given the death sentence.

People talk of non-violence, they say we need reform not revolution.
These are the silly dreams of utopians who are totally disconnected and
unaware of the reality of the oppression on the ground. They are
unaware of the barbaric character of the ruling-class of Pakistan.

The first conclusion is that Pakistan needs a peoples-democratic
revolution.

Second, we must ask ourselves, when Pakistan was created it was said
that this was in order to safeguard the Muslims. Have the Muslims been
safeguarded? On the Khabarnama (news) at 9 pm our government talks of
the rape of Kashmiri women by the Indian soldiers. Are the working-women
of Pakistan safe from the feudals, police, and army of Pakistan? It is
said that the rights of self-determination of the Kashmiri people are
not safeguarded. Are the rights of self-determination of the people of
Pakistan guaranteed?

The answer to all these questions, and many others, is NO!
Today the people of Pakistan are enslaved to the feudals, capitalists,
and the civil military oligarchy.

Therefore, the greatest enemy of the people of Pakistan is not the
Indian aggressor. The Indian aggressor is the greatest enemy of the
people of India. The greatest enemy of the people of Pakistan is the
enemy at home. The ruling-class and rich of Pakistan who thrive on
looting, plundering, and rape.

It is against our own ruling-class that we need to make a
peoples-democratic revolution.

Therefore, I appeal to you:

People of Pakistan, do not be fooled by the nationalist and religious
sloganeering of our ruling-class.

The real enemy of the poor people of Pakistan, the workers and peasants
of Pakistan, the men and women of Pakistan, the Baluchi, Sindhi, Pathan,
Kashmiri, Punjabi is the ruling-class, the class of rich people of
Pakistan.

In what sense can we talk of Independence when our daughters and sisters
raped by jirgas and panchayats. Enough is enough.

Unite the many to fight the few!
Unite the poor to fight the rich!
Unite the people to overthrow the ruling-class!

Inqalab Zindabad

Taimur Rahman
Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party

.

.

http://www.marxist.com/is-pakistan-a-feudal-society.htm

Is Pakistan a feudal society?
Lal Khan
07 August 2012

For quite some time now several so called secular parties, especially the MQM, have been campaigning around the idea that feudalism is the real cause of the country’s plight and its abolishment is the only solution to Pakistan’s tribulations. Their endeavour is in fact mainly to defend the petty bourgeois businesses and the Mafia capitalism on which they rely for their social and economic basis.

This cliché has been in vogue for decades. The ex-lefts and the liberal intelligentsia have been analysing Pakistan as a feudal society and defining the solution in the accomplishment of the national democratic or the bourgeois revolution for the development of the country.

However, in the last sixty-five years the Pakistani capitalist elite has failed to abolish any of the vestiges of feudalism and the conservative mindset related to it. All the signs are that the present ruling classes and this crisis ridden capitalism will never be able to abolish what they call “feudal relations”.

At the same time, to define Pakistan as a feudal society is simplistic and erroneous if one looks at the socio-economic basis of this society. The patchy and emaciated capitalist relations have penetrated deep into the debilitated feudal structures of society.

Precisely due to their historical belatedness and economic and technological weakness together with their fragile nature, the ruling classes of Pakistani capitalism have failed to abolish the remnants of feudalism. On the contrary, they have incorporated the semi-feudal landlords into the elite and created a hotchpotch of semi-capitalist/semi-feudal political economy. This has distorted the social and economic infrastructure and intensified the contradictions, creating a ravaged culture that is wreaking havoc on the ordinary inhabitants of this land.

However, the historical truth is that classical feudalism that was part of the historical evolution of Europe never became a completely dominant social system in the South-Asian subcontinent. What we had here in the past was the Asiatic Mode of Production, also known as Asiatic despotism. This system that prevailed for thousands of years – till the advent of the British – was devoid of the individualistic ownership of the vast landed estates, as was the case in the rise of the European feudal aristocracy.

In the Asiatic form (at least, predominantly), the individual has no property but only possession; the real proprietor, proper, is the commune – hence property only as communal property in land. The Asiatic form necessarily hangs on most tenaciously and for the longest time... that there is a self-sustaining circle of production, unity of agriculture and manufactures, etc.”

The irony was that this self sufficient system of the commune isolated it from the other rapid developments around the world and its tools and modes of production remained obsolete. Whereas the commune in this Asiatic despotism provided a relative egalitarianism, its isolation was the cause of its primitiveness that made it ripe for the innumerable foreign conquests. However, for a long period of history, most of the conquering tribes and invaders were of a relatively lower cultural level and were therefore absorbed into the local culture that was the product of the fertile land and the flowing rivers of the subcontinent and richness of its agriculture.

It was the British who were the first invaders that did not get absorbed into this culture as they had gone through an industrial revolution and renaissance which not only gave them a technological and military advantage but also imparted a rather higher level of culture. Thus feudalism in the subcontinent was grafted onto the previous system by the British raj, mainly to consolidate their colonial rule through the policy of divide and rule and to create subservient local elite.

This process started with the bill on ‘permanent settlements’ introduced in the Bengal parliament in 1793. From Bengal this policy was spread across the colonised subcontinent and the landlords in Pakistan today are not really “ancestral” but were granted large swathes of land by the British due to their connivance in the suppression of the liberation movements of the masses and their betrayals.

After the creation of Pakistan the nascent bourgeoisie found itself in a weak position to carry out the agrarian revolution and other tasks of the national democratic revolution. The imperialists tried to develop Pakistan as a capitalist state like South Korea and Taiwan where the industrial revolution was carried out under the jackboots of US general Douglas MacArthur. The Ayub dictatorship tried to carry out land reforms under instructions of Robert McNamara, head of the World Bank at the time. These reforms miserably failed to abolish the labyrinthine semi-feudal structures.

The most radical reforms came after ZA Bhutto took power during the 1972-74 period. But the aim could not be achieved with the bourgeois state apparatus. The landlords, in connivance with the corrupt bureaucracy, managed to avoid major expropriations as capitalism was not abolished. But they were seriously shaken and in panic. According to a 1981 report of the UNDP, 96 percent of all landholdings above 100 acres were pledged to the banks by the end of 1974. From the Qureshis in the Punjab to the Chandios in Sind, most of the feudal lords, with massive amounts of mortgaged capital, invested massively in industry and the services sector. Pseudo-landlords became pseudo-capitalists. If those lands had then been expropriated the banking system would have collapsed.

Under capitalism even the most radical land reform will never be able to accomplish an agrarian revolution or develop mechanised agriculture, nor ameliorate the plight of the poor landless peasants. In Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and several other Indian states many peasants who were allotted land through the reforms under Nehru now work as wage labourers on their own plots for the contractors in horrific conditions.

The fact is that the barter relations of feudal economics do not exist anywhere in Pakistan. Finance capital has penetrated the agrarian sector and even the reactionary rulers of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia now own vast land holdings in Pakistan where agricultural wage labour is severely exploited and the products are freely delivered to wherever these owners want. On small land holdings the costs of agricultural products are far less than what they get from the middlemen in the grain markets.

The capitalist system cannot solve the agrarian question. Its own financial and economic crisis exasperates the crisis in the agricultural sector. The poor peasants are being crushed under huge debts and their life is a living hell. The emancipation of the peasantry is clearly linked with the mass struggle under the leadership of the proletariat to transform this system.

[This article was originally published in the Pakistani Daily Times]

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

.

http://www.newindianexpress.com/mag...ic-politics-continues-in-pakistan-1641367.amp

Most of Pakistan’s political families are agricultural with zamindari backgrounds. The changing scenario has encouraged other clans from urban, sectarian and Army backgrounds to enter the Assembly.

After 1947, a new power layer rose over the decade from industrialist and business families, which began to spread their effect over the economy. As the Bhuttos came under attack by General Zia-ul-Haq, a challenger rose in the form of the Sharifs with the military’s tacit support. As a departure from the traditional feudal farming elite, the mass base of the Sharifs is the urban merchants in Punjab who have first generation money and clout.

The Pakistan Army remains the controlling influence, having made hereditary politics inclusive in its style of running the government by proxy.

.

https://unwinnable.com/2015/08/17/feudal-pakistan/

The current social order in Pakistan is a holdover of the dynastic Indian kingdoms, tax collectors and landowners – all who acted as auxiliaries for the Mughal and British Empires – and tribal institutions.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a member of a Sindhi Rajput clan (while the majority of Rajput clans in South Asia are Hindu, some, including the Bhuttos, are Muslim) and founder of the center-left Pakistan People’s Party, became Prime Minister in 1971; a year later, Bhutto began the nationalization of urban factories.

One of the casualties of the program was the pride and finances of Punjabi industrialist Muhammad Sharif. Any promised agricultural land reform in parallel to industrial nationalization was trifling, likely because the Bhutto family holds large swaths of farmland. Thus began a rivalry

https://www.csmonitor.com/layout/se...to-Pakistan-flood-recovery-Wealthy-landowners

Pakistan’s Army, the country’s most powerful institution, meanwhile, is unlikely to be the agent of change, says Dr. Ali, because of its own vested interests. “Over the years, the Army has granted large amounts of land to retired generals and brigadiers. So it’s not in anyone’s interest to have any land reform.”

.


Dynasties and Clientelism in Pakistan
Raza Rumi

.
.


Life as a slave in Pakistan
.
Influence of feudal system on rural education

In rural areas of our country you would find plenty of schools which are being used either for animals as farms or “Autaks” by our landlords and powerful politicians. These people never want the children of a common man to get education as it might make them vulnerable. They feel that if a poor man gets education, he would know his rights and be able to defy the feudal lords.

Ironically, teachers also act on the directives of these landlords in order to keep the masses deprived of the right of education.

As a result of this conspiracy, many children belonging to poor families wander in the streets and waste their time sitting at various places throughout the day, while the middle and the upper class educate their children in well-reputed schools far from their villages and beyond the approach of poor children.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Military Slaves: A Uniquely Muslim Phenomenon
by Daniel Pipes

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

http://m.gulfnews.com/amp/news/uae/general/kashmir-diary-caste-bias-in-kashmiri-muslims-1.376653

Caste bias in Kashmiri Muslims
00:00 January 28, 2002
By David Devadas

In the Indian sub-continent, caste-based discrimination is not unique to Hindus.

Even among Kashmiri Muslims, distinctions based on descent are pretty common, and sometimes not very subtly.

Sayeeds often consider themselves superior. Some years ago, a barber happened to be at the wedding feast of a well-to-do family of the Sayeed descent.

When the meal was served, in traditional Wazwan style with four persons sharing a meal of many courses from the same large platter, three young men from Sayeed families found they would have to share their platter with the barber.

One by one, each of them got up, making one excuse or another, and sat elsewhere. The barber was an assertive sort and, as the meal began to be served, got up and announced that he would not eat unless those three boys shared his meal. There was a commotion as the three showed no signs of moving back.

A community leader got up and offered to share the barber's meal but the young man would not settle for anything less than those three young men sharing his meal. Finally, they had to return.

This little story was related to me by Dr Bashir Ahmed Dabla, the head of the sociology department at the University of Kashmir. It had occurred in the late 1980s but Dr Dabla was using it to illustrate the existence of the strong, although often denied, caste bias in Kashmiri Muslim society.

In fact washermen, milkmen and bakers in Kashmir even have backward caste status under the rules of government recruitment.

Most tourists to Kashmir never realise it but the families that run houseboats, whom tourists often presume to be Kashmiris, are actually commonly reviled by most other Kashmiris as Hanjis, the name of the boatmen's caste.

No doubt, those who visualised the Doordarshan serial Gul, Gulshan Gulfam, centred on the life of a houseboat owner's family, did not realise how little other Kashmiris identify with boatmen.

The word Hanji sounds as if its roots are in the word Majhi, which is commonly used in the Ganga plains for boatmen. One strain of Kashmiri lore even maintains that the Hanjis came to the valley from Kerala, with philosopher-preacher, Shankaracha-rya.

Since they were well-versed with fishing and boats, they took to the lakes and rivers of Kashmir like, well, fishermen to water.

The degree to which Kashmiris often carry their consciousness of their own and others‚ caste backgrounds is sometimes amazing. Not just housewives around kitchen hearths but bright, well-educated young men will slip easily into descriptions of their own or other people's caste antecedents.

Even the veteran trade union leader and former member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference general council, Ishtiaq Qadiri, told me one day without the slightest trace of embarrassment that he would not accept an invitation to dine with a milkman's family.

The result of such social ostracism is that some families with a Hanji background who have taken to other occupations often adopt the surname Dar, which denotes descent from a sub-caste of distinction among Brahmin Kashmiris.

Far more common among various other castes of Kashmiris is the adoption of the surname Sayeed. Indeed, if the number of Kashmiris who claim the Sayeed name are to be accepted at face value … Of course, it would also mean that all these families, at some point in history, migrated from further west.

There is an irony in that too. For, among a people so conscious of the supposed superiority of a Brahmin background, the deference given to certain sorts of foreign origin is remarkable.

For instance, Khans, who generally have Pathan ante-cedents, are also highly regarded and many Kashmiris are almost as happy to have a match arranged with a Khan family as with a Sayeed.

These Pathan families are not only descended from those who settled here during the highly oppressive period of Afghan rule in the first half of the eighteenth century. Some of them were also settled here as officers during the British or Dogra period.

Some Kashmiris also take such surnames as Naqshbandi or Makhdoomi after the names of Sufi saints whom they hold in reverence, although Naqshband Sahib is foreign.

The name Sheikh is particularly interesting. When used before the person's name, as in the case of the Abdullah family, it denotes descent from Brahmins and often landlords. When used as a suffixed surname, it generally denotes the cleaner caste and so is generally looked down upon.

Certain Kashmiri caste names are similar to Parsi names, in that they denote the occupations of those with the name.

Kokru, for instance, is rooted in the word kokur, which means chicken in Kashmiri and the bearer of the name is likely to have descended from a family that ran a hatchery.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

http://manukhsi.blogspot.in/2012/12/muslim-dalits-in-jammu-kashmir.html?m=1

Muslim Dalits in Jammu & Kashmir


Caste, Religion And Untouchability
14 Dec 2012 By Vidya Bhushan Rawat


Ashaq Ali Wattal hails from a community which has the sole ‘right’ to clean the toilets in Jammu and Kashmir. Hailing from Doda, Wattal moans at the continuous negligence by the state government and its authorities towards the community of manual scavengers in Jammu and Kashmir. His father was a manual scavenger working with municipality but now has left the work and does bamboo work.



Ashaq has passed 10th standard and does electric work in his town. He was in Delhi to speak about his people and the discrimination they face in their daily life. According to Wattal, nobody wants to keep relations with them though there is no discrimination in the mosque during the Namaz.

It is strange that the Jammu and Kashmir government has no policy for these people. After much persuasion they are placed among the Scheduled Caste category and yet when the question of reservation comes, they never get any opportunity in the government. And therefore despite a huge population of about several lakhs, it would be a rare site to see a Wattal community person outside their traditional occupation.

According to a report submitted to the Supreme Court by Safai Karmchari Andolan, there are 7.94 lakhs open latrines in the country and apart from Uttar-Pradesh and Tamilnadu, Jammu & Kashmir is one of the biggest violators in this regard, where 1,78,330 households need manual scavenging but the latest figures from J& K government suggest that out of total 1,60,804 Households in the rural areas over 1,49,492 depend on manual scavenging which shows the status of ‘development’ in Kashmir. Out of total 5,17,168 urban households, 17,768 houses are dependent on manual scavenging.

According to reports, Shopian, Kupwara, Bandipur, Srinagar, Kulgaum, Anantnag, Ganderbal and Pulwama have very large number of dry latrines which need manual scavengers to clean them. And as Ashaq Wattal says, all of them who are engaged in the manual scavenging task are Muslims.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

https://ideas.repec.org/p/vor/issues/2016-06-05.html
Personality Traits Of College Going Students Of Kashmir Division: A Caste Based Dynamics

• Lokesh Verma
• Jawaid Ahmad Itoo

Voice of Research Volume 5, Issue 1 June 2016 ISSN 2277-7733

The present study attempts to study the personality traits of college students of Kashmir division belonging to two dominant upper caste (Syeds and Khan) and five under- privileged lower caste (Hajam, Kumar, Gurjar,Lohar and Teeli,) will be taken into consideration. For this study a sample of 800 was drawn by using cluster sampling technique.

Castes in Kashmir Valley

In actually, (Dabla, 2012) the Kashmir Muslim society (KMS) maintains caste as social system but not as a set of traits of stratification. The structure and function of caste in Kashmir is different from its ideal Hindu traits. It has been observed that Kashmir Muslim society compose of following castes:
I. Sayyed Castes; II. Khan Castes; III.Occupational Castes; IV. Service Castes
First, the Sayyeds, as they claim are the descendents of the family of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), have converted locals to Islam and consider themselves as custodian of religion. Second, the Khans composed of nobility and their descendents who feel themselves as superior for their foreign origin. Third, the occupational castes composed of different occupational communities- groups dealing with trade and commerce. Fourth, the service castes stand at the lower strata of society which compose groups providing basic and menial jobs to the society. They also include Hanjis and Gujjars.

Personality traits refer to characteristics of an individual that are stable over time and determine the behaviour of an individual. Traits reflect who we are and determine affective, cognitive and behavioural style.

Findings and Discussion

From the study it has been found that there exist significant differences in personality traits among students belonging to various castes. This finding is in line with (Shavita, Duhan and Choudary, 2014) who also found that there exist significant differences in personality traits with respect to caste, family income and educational level. While students belonging to higher castes have been found to be higher on Activity, enthusiastic and assertive personality characteristics, students belonging to lower castes have been found to possess more of suspicious, depressive and emotional instability characteristics. The possible reason for this could be due to the fact that children from dominant and privileged caste function in an atmosphere of positive social acceptance and expectation where as children from lower and underprivileged caste is subjected to rejection and operates under a pall of negative social expectations (Hansen et at., 1969; Alden et al., 1970). Such an atmosphere moulds the mental structure of an individual or group of persons so severely that they turn out to be introvert type of personality characterised by depression, suspicion and emotional instability. Another reason for the existence of depressive tendencies among students belonging to lower castes could be due to the treatment meet out to them at the hands of dominant and privileged castes e.g. On October 2015, in Jodhpur a 12 year old dalit boy was beaten up by his teacher for allegedly taking a palate from a stack meant for higher castes (Khan, 2015). Education is considered to be the tool of psycho-social, cultural and economical development but the Educational institutions are middle class institutions run by middle class persons along middle class lines and when the lower caste child reaches the educational institution he finds a different world, a foreign environment different from what he has experienced. Due to theses environmental inequalities, students from disadvantaged sections are bound to have repercussions in their adjustment to classroom which in turn has a direct bearing on their personalities and aspirations (Getzel (1970), Soares and Soares (1969) Jenson (1973) and (Eapen 1973).

From the study it has been found that Income category has significant effect on personality traits. This finding is in line with (Shavita, Duhan and Choudary, 2014) who reported that there exists a significant difference in personality with respect to family income. Students belonging to upper Income category have been found to be more active, enthusiastic and assertive as compared to their lower income category counterparts. Moreover, students belonging to lower income category have been found to possess more of suspicious, depressive and emotional instability characteristics. The reason could be due to low economic status (poverty) as it is a significant predictor of physical and mental health outcomes. Poverty adversely influences the whole individuality of the child as it is considered by World health organization (WHO,1995) as world’s most ruthless killer. Poor parents are not able to meet the daily requirements of their children as a result of which children develop symptoms of depression, stress, emotion instability and other mental health related problems. Further, brain imaging research has shown that children from lower income families tend to have smaller hippocampus than children from affluent families (Hanson, Chandra. Wolfe and Pollak, 2011) - a smaller hippocampus has been found to be associated with psychic disorders such as schizophrenia, anti social personality disorder and depression. A child because of his lower economic status is not accepted by the rich ones and hence always remains suspicious and wary about himself as a result of which he becomes the victim of personality disorders. Being suspicious about one’s own self, the children from low income families feel hesitant in taking initiative in dealing with the social environment which poses a serious threat to their path of upliftment. A famous kashmiri saying, Aasun chu heshnawan, nah aasun chu mandchawan meaning prosperity improves ones personality, adversity cripples it highlights thevimportance of economic aspect in one’s life. Children from well heeled families have upper hand in every aspect of their life. They are found to be active, fervent and directive in nature, while as children from underprivileged and hard up families feel shy, reluctant to participate and are submissive and acquiescent to the commands of the rich ones.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/mobi/ne...miri-pandit-youth-breaking-taboos/439099.html

Considered as “cardinal sin” for Pandits before the exodus of 3.5 lakh community from Kashmir in 1990, the rising trend of inter-community marriages in the past 27 years is bringing immense changes in social and cultural fabric of once close-knit society.

Situation has reached such an extent that 50 per cent of Pandit youth are tying knot outside the community which has already lost much of its ancient cultural and historical heritage due to forced migration after the eruption of militancy in the Kashmir valley.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Dalits In Jammu: Demanding To Be Heard

By Yoginder Sikand
10 November, 2004
Countercurrents.org

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

http://brighterkashmir.com/racism-and-casteism-in-islam/

Racism and Casteism In Islam

Zeeshan Rasool Khan

Interestingly, Modern World has become concerned about such issues in 20th century, but our religion has given sense about it 1400 years ago. If I would say Islam is first religion that has uprooted and objected such evils, it wouldn’t be mistake.
Islam protects honor. In religion Islam, insulting others or making fun of them on the basis on caste, creed, race etc has not been permitted. Merciful Prophet (pbuh) says.........

Prophet (pbuh) says.....

Islam gives clear message......

Prophet (pubh) denounced and opposed the concept of Racism and Casteism, not only vocally, but practically too and furnished honor to a number of occupations (upon which castes are based) that people treat inferior to practice.
Let me cite few facts in this regard:-............

why beloved Prophet (PBUH) cobbles his sandal himself?

Prophet (Saw ) reared goats and milked his goat

In nutshell, Biography of Prophet (saw) provide ample evidence that prophet (saw) was first anti-Racist & anti-casteist.

Need of hour is to be obedient to Allah and Follow Teachings and way of Beloved Muhammad (pbuh) that is only the solution to present day problems .Let’s pledge to be faithful to Allah and promote and propagate the true message of Islam

Perhaps Bahujan samaj of Pakistan should take inspiration from the above article and rise in the name of holy prophet (pbuh) and lynch Pakistan’s bigoted elites and marry their widows?

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

Discovering the Caste System in Azad Kashmir POK as a British Kashmiri

Written by Sameer Hussain
Many years ago, during a school holiday visit to Dadyal (POK), I became aware of the importance given to the caste system in my region. I was with a friend at his shop in the Bazaar, when he asked me about my friends in England. I told him I had several friends whose families originate from Pakistan and even from POK. He then asked me to name a few close friends and was curious to know what caste they belonged to. When I explained that I didn’t know what caste any of my close friends were from, he was shocked and for a moment he failed to believe what I’d said. I realised that locals had a habit of asking people what their caste was, that’s if they didn’t already know.

I found it quite strange at first, because whilst studying Religious Studies at school, I learnt that the Hindu religion had a caste system but there was no such system or its equivalent in Islam. In fact, Islam opposed the concept of a caste system altogether, as it undermined the importance attached to unity. I had no doubt come across the names of a few castes mentioned in various conversations but I assumed that they were merely family names and not associated with a caste system. I recall that my Grandfather often referred to one of my Uncles as ‘Chaudhary’ with great pride in his voice, as if it was a title of great significance and deserved admiration. I began to pose questions and I then grasped that a caste system was undeniably in place. I discovered the names of some of the castes such as Chaudhary, Raja, Khawaja, Ansari, Masalli, Gujjar, Sanyaray, Malik, etc. To complicate things further, I learnt that some castes are given more than just one name e.g. people from the Chaudhary caste are also known as Jatt. Some castes are divided further into groups and even those groups are at times divided even further. For example, within the Raja caste, one of the groups is that of the Keyani's and within it you will find there are other groups, one of which is known as the Gakhar's. Understanding the caste system itself is quite a challenge and no doubt my knowledge is and probably will always be limited as is the case with most people I assume, with the exception of the odd historian. I realised that the word ‘Baradri’ is used to refer to caste. I often heard people making comments such as ‘apni baradri ne log” meaning people of our own caste. It made me think how we have so many castes and members of each one in a strange way are made to feel a part of their own clan, and that caste is regarded as an important part of an individual’s identity. People are stereotyped, judged, ignored, disrespected, welcomed, loved, married, and all these actions are somewhat based on caste.

I still didn’t have a genuine understanding of what each caste represented or how the different castes were arranged within society. Though I knew some of the basics, it didn’t really make much sense to me. Fair enough, caste can be used to categorise people into say for example different professions e.g. Masalli are drummers and Sanyaray are jewellers. But if you are born as a Massalli and then become a Jeweller, are you still a Massalli? It just doesn’t hold any logic. Surely, people change their jobs and the same profession is rarely passed down from one generation to another. Or do we assume that society is constructed in such a way that opportunities remain with the so called ‘high’ castes and the others are left stuck in their professions. It seems that such a system doesn’t reward people based on merit, instead the positions of honour are granted to the prestigious castes even if there are more deserving candidates from elsewhere in the imposed hierarchy.

Some people seem to hold the belief that caste to some extent does affect how people behave and it plays a significant role in what they do in life. I somehow don’t understand how I would have been any different if I wasn’t a Chaudhary, I’m pretty sure everything would have been the same in my life. I find it very strange when I see youngsters wearing t-shirts that have slogans on them such as ‘Jatts Rule’ or ‘Rajay are the Best’. I seriously find it bizarre that young people are wearing symbols to show off their caste. They proudly display their caste on their car or their motorcycle. Even on the increasingly popular social-networking site Facebook, individuals often remove their surnames and add their caste instead. There are even Facebook pages which make claims that one caste is the best or aim to get together all members of a particular caste. There seems to be a lot of pride and people want to show their caste to others. Then we have people who stick to their own castes i.e. they don’t socialise with people from other castes, because they feel that they are superior and better than others. I was in Dadyal during the local elections in 2011, and many people simply voted by looking at caste, this was referred to as ‘Baradriism’. However, the public was in shock when Raja Noman Kamal decided to leave Raja Ali Zaman’s party and instead support Chaudhary Khalid Masood. A lot of people were surprised because Noman Kamal neglected the typical mentality of siding with your own caste. In many circles, this political decision was saluted because it demonstrated that people are willing to see beyond the narrow mindedness of ‘caste-ism’ and are not limiting their perspectives due to the traditional caste system.

In England, many people have moved on from the caste system, it just doesn’t seem to matter anymore. We are seeing more and more families getting their sons and daughters married out of caste. However, there are still certain groups of people that are stuck in the 1970’s it seems, and they sometimes openly, at other times - secretly dislike people of other castes. This is a real shame because you wouldn’t expect this from people who are living in a multicultural society such as the United Kingdom, where credit is given, in most cases, based on merit. Race, colour, religion, gender, caste and other such factors are not given much importance.

Going back to POK, families are still reluctant to marry from out of caste, because they fear that they will lose their dignity in their own Baradri. People will say things like, for example, ‘inna apni kurri ‘caste name’ ne hawalay karri shori’, they have handed their daughter over to a ‘caste name’ family, and such comments no doubt are accompanied by a negative tone of voice, often with more venomous comments. Some will say these people are backwards and such practices are only common amongst illiterate people. However, this kind of mentality is common in Azad Kashmir and it seems like this is the case amongst even educated and religious families. Families are afraid to break away from the culture they have followed for many years. Many youngsters are left with a difficult decision, if they want to marry someone from a different caste, then they often have to oppose their parents, humiliate them in the Baradri, or instead they can decide to give in and marry someone within their own caste.

I personally don’t see any real benefit in the caste system. I fail to see how its application has or can deliver any vale to society. Instead, it poses a threat to bonds between people, promotes a culture of disunity and in many ways leaves us divided and consequently weakened. If we cannot see beyond caste, then I’m afraid to say our future is not going to be anywhere near as bright as we’d like it to be.

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

https://kashmirobserver.net/2016/letters/peer-review-7091

As the progeny is carried forward by sons who our beloved Prophet was purposely kept devoid of by the Almighty, one wonders who the self righteous peers claim their descent from. They forget to mention in their cherished lineages that the revered Makhdoom sahb was the son of a Rajput and Sheihkul Aaalam the descendent of maharaja Vikramjit. Those of them who owe their origin to Iranians should be reminded to further trace it to the Vedic Aryans. So there is no point in arguing the lineage as goes the saying, ' last year I was a julaha (weaver); this year a sheikh and next year if the harvest be good, I shall be a Sayyid'.

Contrary to the Quranic worldview, the institution of caste is vibrant among the Muslims in Kashmir. This is largely due to pretension of peers to superior learning or culture which according to them can only be inherited and not imbibed as they tend to preserve it through intra caste marriages and separate graveyards.

 

[Suryavanshi]

@LordOfTheUnderworlds which communities in Pakisatn mostly boast of Arab Persian or Tukiky ancestory

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

http://sameerbhat.blogspot.in/2009/01/peers-of-kashmir.html?m=1

Monday, January 19, 2009
The Peers of Kashmir

I’ve nothing against the Peers of Kashmir. The truth be told I grew up among Peers. It is one of the more common surnames in the valley and most people born under a Peer star – [ie to a Peer] – consider themselves very respected. The class has a collective mindset that they owe their descent to the Prophet [which is pure poppycock because everyone in the subcontinent from the mainstream Sunnis to Shiites as well as the countless heretical sects often trace their ancestry to Islam’s last prophet]. It is funny that people would use Islam – a religion founded on the basis of egalitarianism – to elevate themselves to some higher imagined status. Hallucination of castes!

Ergo -- most peers intermarry. Marriage outside the caste might somewhat dilute the hallowed status. In earlier days there used to be a block Peer surname but it got sub-divided over the years into a dozen categories according to their rank. So we now have Syeds and Qadiris and Muftis and Nagashbandis and Andrabis and Mantaqis and Hamdanis and Masudis and Bukharis and Nazkis and Geelanis and Rufayees and on and on. [Notice the emphasis on the last letter ‘I’, which translates to ‘Lakut Yae’ in Kashmiri]. In local idiom that is very poetic.

Traditionally the Peers were either clerics in local mosques or they practiced the craft of 'Peer Muridi’ [spiritual intuition to disciples]. They would also be in charge of various shrines. Ironically the practice of using poetic surnames along with personal names was not followed in ancient Kashmir. Academics observe that in olden days no caste system was prevalent among Kashmiri Muslims. People were mostly divided on the basis of their professional status.

In any case the Kashmiri Brahmins – considered to be some of the smartest Hindus – occupied most of the important court and -- later -- government jobs. Peers would gradually assume that responsibility. The control of the pulpit would naturally make them special to believers.

With changing times, the vocation of Peers has also transmogrified. Take a random name in Kashmir’s swelling media frat. You will inadvertently come up with a peer name [of any stripe]. The Peer monopoly over media is total. The mosque continues to remain their stronghold. Locals will tell you that Peers know the rituals better. In a saint ridden place their control over shrines and tombs is also complete. The main standard bearers across the political spectrum -- in both Azadi/non-Azadi camps – Mirwaiz, Syed Ali Geelani, Mufti sayed – are, yes you guessed it right, Peers. They are the new Pandits of Kashmir.

I’ve always been baffled by this rather weird fixation for surnames in Kashmir. One would understand such a phenomenon as a bygone corollary of bigotry but when you have educated – but under-exposed – people still hung up with their ancestry, you seriously need to pause and ponder.

We didn't all come over on the same ship, but we're all in the same boat.

Sameer

 

[LordOfTheUnderworlds]

@LordOfTheUnderworlds which communities in Pakisatn mostly boast of Arab Persian or Tukiky ancestory

I guess question should be which Pakistanis DON'T boast of Arab, Persian or Turkey ancestry?
: Perhaps some obviously local names like Rajput and Afghan surnames - In which case they can claim to have some cental asian aryan origins.