Pakistan: An Army With a Country

Discussion in 'Pakistan' started by rock127, Aug 16, 2016.

  1. rock127

    rock127 Maulana Rockullah Senior Member

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    An Army With a Country

    BOOKSHELF | By Isaac Chotiner
    An Army With A Country , Pakistan at the Crossroads
    Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot

    The famous quote about Prussia—that it was not a country with an army but an army with a country—has been used to describe any number of states. Turkey and Argentina, two countries where the military has taken an oh-so-generous role in governing, leap to mind.

    Pakistan has a distinct version of this familiar problem. It has a military that rotates between exerting direct control via coups (1958, 1977 and 1999) and indirect control through its far-reaching influence over domestic and especially foreign policy. It is this indirect control that prevails in Pakistan today, notwithstanding the presence of a democratically elected legislature and prime minister.

    Yet despite the military’s role in everything from crushing political dissent to dominating various sectors of the economy, Pakistan is a country with an army that is, well, not very effective. When was the last time that the Pakistani armed forces were admired for anything tangible? The military has lost every war it has ever fought; it has been humiliated time and again by its archenemy, India; and it was even responsible for the catastrophe of 1971, when Pakistan lost more than half its population after the country’s eastern wing seceded and became Bangladesh amid horrific war crimes committed by those same armed forces. The real question is thus how the military has attained primacy in a country where it has been responsible for one disaster after another. That is the tacit question underlying “Pakistan at the Crossroads,” a thorough and intelligent collection of essays on modern-day Pakistan edited by Christophe Jaffrelot.

    Although the contributors touch on everything from Pakistan- China relations to the current functioning (such as it is) of the country’s electoral system, the overarching theme running through the book is the way in which military rule has inserted itself into almost every aspect of Pakistan’s existence.

    The country was formed in 1947 when the British Indian, Muslim-majority states of Punjab and Bengal were partitioned amid inter-communal violence. The new, Muslim country called Pakistan (meaning “land of the pure” in Urdu) was therefore neither ethnically nor geographically united, with India sitting inconveniently between the country’s two wings. The only other Muslim-majority state in British India, Kashmir, became a source of endless warfare between India and Pakistan. When Kashmir’s (unelected) ruler opted for India after partition, war broke out; today India rules Kashmir with a blatant disregard for human rights.

    As Aqil Shah—himself the author of an excellent recent book on Pakistan’s military—writes in his superb chapter on the armed forces, the fight over Kashmir, coupled with Pakistan’s fear of majority-Hindu India, “spurred the ‘militarization’ of the Pakistani state in the early years. . . . As state building and survival became synonymous with the ‘war effort,’ the civilian leadership diverted scarce resources from development to defense and abdicated its responsibility of oversight over the military, thereby allowing the generals a virtual free hand over internal organizational affairs and national security management.” A decade later, in 1958, the military launched its first formal coup, overthrowing a flailing civilian government.

    Much of this collection covers the most recent decade of Pakistani history, with less attention paid to the lost wars against India (1947-48 and 1965); the military-led genocide that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh and another lost war against India (1971); and the rise of Zia ul-Haq, an autocrat who overthrew an elected government in 1977 and ruled for over a decade.

    After the most recent military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, was forced out in 2008, a civilian government survived its first full five-year term and handover of power, in this case to the country’s current prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. But Mr. Sharif must reckon with a military that still controls all major decision-making, as well as with Imran Khan, the demagogic cricket star who is both a stalking horse for the armed forces and the most popular man in the country.

    Mohammad Waseem, whose chapter on political parties ably lays out this recent history, doesn’t address exactly why they have failed to establish themselves as the supreme actors in Pakistani politics. But Mr. Jaffrelot, in his introduction, does have a go at it, and his thesis is arresting: The failure of civilian supremacy is in part a reflection of the willingness of civilians to be co-opted by the military. “Dictators all have had to liberalize their regime after some time and civilians never asked for all the power,” he writes.

    It’s true that the military’s popularity has made it difficult for civilians to demand their fair share of control. But several of the dictators written about, such as Yahya Khan and Zia, either didn’t liberalize or did so half-heartedly. Moreover, civilians have never asked for total control because doing so would be futile and dangerous, given the control the military has always exerted over the country.

    Still, Mr. Jaffrelot’s conclusion seems undeniably correct: “The return to normalcy of Pakistan domestically implies a normalization of its relations with both its neighbors, India and Afghanistan.” The problem is that the military has long prevented any normalization of relations with India and has long viewed the Taliban (which it helped install in Afghanistan) as a helpful ally, despite the “blowback” this has caused in Pakistan itself: Terrorist groups routinely attack civilians—often religious minorities—and even their onetime military patrons. And, as Avinash Paliwal points out in his dispiriting chapter on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, Afghanistan’s understandable anger at Pakistani meddling may lead to an increased use of proxies by the former against the latter as a sort of tit-for-tat. It’s hard to see a positive result for the people of either country.

    For this reason, the title of Mr. Jaffrelot’s fine volume is misleading. Despite the military’s willingness to belatedly go after (some of) the extremist groups it has long nurtured for its own ends, its raison d’etre remains its own power, and it’s difficult to imagine its leaders allowing for stability in Afghanistan or closer ties with India. Pakistan is less at a “crossroads” than it is humming along the same path it’s been on for decades, albeit with slight adjustments of speed.

    The failure of civil rule in Pakistan, Jaffrelot argues, is a reflection of the willingness of civilians to be dominated by the military.
    =======================================================================================
    Maulana Rockullah's Expert comment: Nothing new in the book. A country which is carved out of hatred and MILITANCY would reap it's own fruits. Their refusal to accept their mistakes would cost them dearly, it did in 71 and now they are on another path of division and destruction.

    @Abhijat @A chauhan @Alien @alphacentury @Ancient Indian @anupamsurey @Bharat Ek Khoj @blueblood @brational @Bangalorean @Blackwater @Bornubus @bose @cobra commando @DingDong @DFI_COAS @ersakthivel @fooLIam @gpawar @guru-dutt @hit&run @HariPrasad-1 @Indx TechStyle @jackprince @Kharavela @Illusive @I_PLAY_BAD @LETHALFORCE @Lions Of Punjab @maomao @Mad Indian @OneGrimPilgrim @Peter @piKacHHu @pmaitra @porky_kicker @Razor @raja696 @Rowdy @Sakal Gharelu Ustad @saty @sydsnyper @Srinivas_K @Screambowl @sorcerer @Simple_Guy @Sylex21 @wickedone @tarunraju @TrueSpirit2 @thethinker @vayuu1 @VIP @Vishwarupa @VIP @Varahamihira @roma @Navnit Kundu

    Our esteemed Terrorist Paki Panel: @Neo @Raja.pakistani @Zarvan @musalman @Zulfiqar Khan
    Any comments? Or simply run away? Why do you like to be ruled by Army boots?

    Your Army has given you nothing but LOST wars and humiliations and a tag or a Terrorist State and butcher of Muslims and humanity.

    [​IMG]

    [​IMG]
     
  2.  
  3. SANITY

    SANITY Regular Member

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    Pakistan Inherited A Large Army That Needed A Threat If It Was To Be Maintained: Husain Haqqani
    It was in the military’s institutional interest to encourage Pakistan’s evolution as a national security state.

    [​IMG]
    Pakistani soldiers patrol the border post in Torkham, Pakistan June 18, 2016. REUTERS/Fayaz Aziz

    Pakistan's share out of Partition comprised 21 per cent of British India's population 14 and 17 per cent of its revenue but as much as one-third of the large armed forces that had been raised by the British during the Second World War.


    The British policy of considering certain ethnic groups and communities in India as 'martial races' had favoured recruitment of Pashtun and Punjabi Muslims whose homeland was now part of Pakistan. Under the terms of Partition, Pakistan received 30 per cent of British India's army, 40 per cent of its navy and 20 per cent of its air force. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was forced in 1948 to allocate 75 per cent of Pakistan's first budget to cover the salaries and maintenance costs of this huge force.


    Thus, Pakistan was not like other countries that raise an army to deal with threats they face; it had inherited a large army that needed a threat if it was to be maintained. Although India's army was twice the size of Pakistan's, the country's size and revenue base was larger and India could cite several potential sources of threat to justify its armed forces. In Pakistan's case, the only threat that could be invoked to retain the legions inherited from the Raj was India.


    The Pakistan army's first two commanders-in-chief were British generals. When the first Muslim commander-in-chief, General Ayub Khan, assumed the military's leadership he spoke of how 'Brahmin chauvinism and arrogance' had led to Pakistan's creation. Ayub and other generals argued that Pakistan needed a large military to protect itself against Hindu India.


    They claimed the Hindus wanted to avenge seven centuries of Muslim rule over the subcontinent by menacing Muslim Pakistan. Ayub even declared that India had 'a deep pathological hatred for Muslims' and that its hostility to Pakistan stemmed from its 'refusal to see a Muslim power developing next door'.


    ||
    ||
    "Pakistan was not like other countries that raise
    || an army to deal with threats they face; it had
    || inherited a large army that needed a threat if it
    || was to be maintained.

    Ironically, the real threats to Pakistan at the time of its inception stemmed from economic and political factors, not military ones. The Partition plan of 3 June 1947 had given only seventy-two days for transition to Independence. But Pakistan, unlike India, did not have a functioning capital, central government or financial resources. The Muslim League leaders had done little homework to prepare for running the country they had demanded.

    Within days of Independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India's assets, both financial and military. It was also caught without a concrete plan to deal with negotiating the accession of princely states, fourteen of whom (out of 562) had Muslim-majority populations and were contiguous to or located within the territory of Pakistan.

    The Muslim League's lack of preparation meant that on the day of Pakistan's independence, only one of these states, Swat, had joined the new Muslim dominion. This contrasted with India's ability to integrate by Independence Day all but six of the 548 princely states that became part of the Indian Union. Thus, Pakistan's territory remained undefined for several months after Independence. The princely states in Pakistan eventually fell in line while one — Kalat, in Balochistan — was coerced through military action in March 1948.

    Moreover, at inception, Pakistan comprised two wings separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Creating a system of governance that would satisfy the Bengalis of East Pakistan and Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan was a tall order. Getting the new state on its feet economically was another major challenge. Pakistan had virtually no industry and the major markets for its agricultural products were in India. Pakistan produced 75 per cent of the world's jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India's cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills....


    [​IMG]
    HINDUSTAN TIMES VIA GETTY IMAGES
    Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldier stand guard during night patrol near the fenced border with Pakistan at Abdullian on January 14, 2013 about 40 kilometers from Jammu, India. (Photo by Nitin Kanotra/Hindustan Times via Getty Images)


    Pakistan's economic crisis was made worse by the threat of political chaos. The larger idea that had united diverse Muslim supporters of Pakistan's creation could no longer be maintained now that the country had come into being. While Jinnah was concerned about containing the communal violence already stoked during Partition, his successors (he died in September 1948, barely a year after Pakistan came into being) decided that the religious passions could also be used for consolidating Pakistan's nationhood and their own power.

    One of the major arguments advanced for an independent Pakistan had been the notion that, irrespective of population, Hindus and Muslims should be treated as two separate and equal nations. The Muslim League referred to this demand as the doctrine of parity. Now that Pakistan had come into existence, its economic and military disparity with India was obvious. Pakistan was India's sovereign equal in terms of international law but the two countries could not be uniform in terms of their military strength or international stature.

    This reality, however, did not matter to Pakistani politicians struggling to create a support base at home. The Pakistani military realised that it would have to effectively control the country to be able to get the lion's share of its resources. Pursuit of military parity with India could justify forever greater allocation of resources to the military. It was in the military's institutional interest to encourage Pakistan's evolution as a national security state, living in constant fear of being overrun by an India that had not reconciled to its existence.


    Excerpted with permission from India vs Pakistan: Why Can't We Just be Friends? by Husain Haqqani published by Juggernaut,
     
    Imaxxx likes this.
  4. Imaxxx

    Imaxxx "Shaktimev Jayate" - Strength Alone Triumphs

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    QUOTE="SANITY, post: 1210431, member: 15325"]Pakistan Inherited A Large Army That Needed A Threat If It Was To Be Maintained: Husain Haqqani
    It was in the military’s institutional interest to encourage Pakistan’s evolution as a national security state.

    [​IMG]
    Pakistani soldiers patrol the border post in Torkham, Pakistan June 18, 2016. REUTERS/Fayaz Aziz

    Pakistan's share out of Partition comprised 21 per cent of British India's population 14 and 17 per cent of its revenue but as much as one-third of the large armed forces that had been raised by the British during the Second World War.


    The British policy of considering certain ethnic groups and communities in India as 'martial races' had favoured recruitment of Pashtun and Punjabi Muslims whose homeland was now part of Pakistan. Under the terms of Partition, Pakistan received 30 per cent of British India's army, 40 per cent of its navy and 20 per cent of its air force. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was forced in 1948 to allocate 75 per cent of Pakistan's first budget to cover the salaries and maintenance costs of this huge force.


    Thus, Pakistan was not like other countries that raise an army to deal with threats they face; it had inherited a large army that needed a threat if it was to be maintained. Although India's army was twice the size of Pakistan's, the country's size and revenue base was larger and India could cite several potential sources of threat to justify its armed forces. In Pakistan's case, the only threat that could be invoked to retain the legions inherited from the Raj was India.


    The Pakistan army's first two commanders-in-chief were British generals. When the first Muslim commander-in-chief, General Ayub Khan, assumed the military's leadership he spoke of how 'Brahmin chauvinism and arrogance' had led to Pakistan's creation. Ayub and other generals argued that Pakistan needed a large military to protect itself against Hindu India.


    They claimed the Hindus wanted to avenge seven centuries of Muslim rule over the subcontinent by menacing Muslim Pakistan. Ayub even declared that India had 'a deep pathological hatred for Muslims' and that its hostility to Pakistan stemmed from its 'refusal to see a Muslim power developing next door'.


    ||
    ||
    "Pakistan was not like other countries that raise
    || an army to deal with threats they face; it had
    || inherited a large army that needed a threat if it
    || was to be maintained.

    Ironically, the real threats to Pakistan at the time of its inception stemmed from economic and political factors, not military ones. The Partition plan of 3 June 1947 had given only seventy-two days for transition to Independence. But Pakistan, unlike India, did not have a functioning capital, central government or financial resources. The Muslim League leaders had done little homework to prepare for running the country they had demanded.

    Within days of Independence, Pakistan was concerned about its share of India's assets, both financial and military. It was also caught without a concrete plan to deal with negotiating the accession of princely states, fourteen of whom (out of 562) had Muslim-majority populations and were contiguous to or located within the territory of Pakistan.

    The Muslim League's lack of preparation meant that on the day of Pakistan's independence, only one of these states, Swat, had joined the new Muslim dominion. This contrasted with India's ability to integrate by Independence Day all but six of the 548 princely states that became part of the Indian Union. Thus, Pakistan's territory remained undefined for several months after Independence. The princely states in Pakistan eventually fell in line while one — Kalat, in Balochistan — was coerced through military action in March 1948.

    Moreover, at inception, Pakistan comprised two wings separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Creating a system of governance that would satisfy the Bengalis of East Pakistan and Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan was a tall order. Getting the new state on its feet economically was another major challenge. Pakistan had virtually no industry and the major markets for its agricultural products were in India. Pakistan produced 75 per cent of the world's jute supply but did not have a single jute-processing mill. All the mills were in India. Although one-third of undivided India's cotton was grown in Pakistan, it had only one-thirtieth of the cotton mills....


    [​IMG]
    HINDUSTAN TIMES VIA GETTY IMAGES
    Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldier stand guard during night patrol near the fenced border with Pakistan at Abdullian on January 14, 2013 about 40 kilometers from Jammu, India. (Photo by Nitin Kanotra/Hindustan Times via Getty Images)


    Pakistan's economic crisis was made worse by the threat of political chaos. The larger idea that had united diverse Muslim supporters of Pakistan's creation could no longer be maintained now that the country had come into being. While Jinnah was concerned about containing the communal violence already stoked during Partition, his successors (he died in September 1948, barely a year after Pakistan came into being) decided that the religious passions could also be used for consolidating Pakistan's nationhood and their own power.

    One of the major arguments advanced for an independent Pakistan had been the notion that, irrespective of population, Hindus and Muslims should be treated as two separate and equal nations. The Muslim League referred to this demand as the doctrine of parity. Now that Pakistan had come into existence, its economic and military disparity with India was obvious. Pakistan was India's sovereign equal in terms of international law but the two countries could not be uniform in terms of their military strength or international stature.

    This reality, however, did not matter to Pakistani politicians struggling to create a support base at home. The Pakistani military realised that it would have to effectively control the country to be able to get the lion's share of its resources. Pursuit of military parity with India could justify forever greater allocation of resources to the military. It was in the military's institutional interest to encourage Pakistan's evolution as a national security state, living in constant fear of being overrun by an India that had not reconciled to its existence.


    Excerpted with permission from India vs Pakistan: Why Can't We Just be Friends? by Husain Haqqani published by Juggernaut,[/QUOTE]
    A little context would have helped. From his wiki page:
    Haqqani worked as a journalist from 1980 to 1988, and then as political adviser for Nawaz Sharif and spokesperson for Benazir Bhutto. From 1992 to 1993 he was ambassador to Sri Lanka. In 1999, he was exiled following criticisms against the government of then-President Pervez Musharraf. From 2004 to 2008 he taught international relations at Boston University.[9] He was appointed as Pakistan's ambassador (to the US) in April 2008, but his tenure ended after the Memogate incident, when the claim was made that he had been insufficiently protective of Pakistan's interests. A judicial commission was set up by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to probe the allegations against him. According to commission's report which was issued in June 2012, Haqqani was declared guilty of authoring a memo which called for direct US intervention into Pakistan, though Pakistan's Supreme Court noted that the commission was only expressing an opinion.[10][11]. Haqqani is currently a Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia at theHudson Institute in Washington, D.C. and co-editor of Hudson's signature journal Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,[8]
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husain_Haqqani
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hudson_Institute
     
    Last edited: Oct 1, 2016
  5. OrangeFlorian

    OrangeFlorian #GoldAndBlack Senior Member

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    Pinochetist Chile had a military government now their at the 7th place in the heritage ranking
    http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking


    Economic history
    of
    Chile

    [​IMG]
    Colonial era[show]
    Early republic[show]
    Saltpetre Republic[show]
    Internal growth[show]
    Return of liberalism[show]
    [​IMG]
    Chilean (blue) and average Latin American (gray) GDP per capita (1950–2008)
    [​IMG]
    Chilean (orange) and average Latin American (blue): Rates of Growth of GDP (1971–2007)

    The “Miracle of Chile” was a term used by Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman to describe the reorientation of the Chilean economyin the 1980s and the benefits of the economic policies applied by a large group of Chilean economists who collectively came to be known as the Chicago Boys, having studied at the University of Chicago where Friedman taught. He said the “Chilean economy did very well, but more importantly, in the end the central government, the military junta, was replaced by a democratic society. So the really important thing about the Chilean business is that free markets did work their way in bringing about a free society.”[1] The junta to which Friedman refers was a military government that came to power in a 1973 coup d'état, which came to an end in 1990 after a democratic 1988 plebisciteremoved Augusto Pinochet from the presidency.

    In the early 1970s, Chile experienced chronic inflation, reaching highs of 140 percent per annum, under socialist President Salvador Allende, whose government implemented high protectionist barriers, resulting in a lack of foreign-exchange reserves and falling GDP.[2] The economic reforms implemented by the Chicago Boys had three main objectives: economic liberalization, privatization of state-owned companies, and stabilization of inflation. The first reforms were implemented in three rounds – 1974–83, 1985, and 1990.[2] The reforms were continued and strengthened after 1990 by the post-Pinochet center government of Patricio Aylwin's Christian Democrats.[3] However, the center-left government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle also made a commitment to poverty reduction. In 1988, 48% of Chileans lived below the poverty line. By 2000 this had been reduced to 20%. The 1990s center-left governments implemented a 17% increase in the minimum wage, a 210% increase in social spending targeted at the low-income sectors of the population, and across the board tax increases, reversing the Pinochet tax cuts of 1988 and taxing an additional 3% of the country's GDP into government coffers. A 2004 World Bank report attributed 60% of Chile's 1990's poverty reduction to economic growth, and claimed that government programs aimed at poverty alleviation accounted for the rest.[4]

    Hernán Büchi, Minister of Finance under Pinochet between 1985 and 1989, wrote a book detailing the implementation process of the economic reforms during his tenure. Successive governments have continued these policies. In 2002 Chile signed an association agreement with the European Union (comprising free trade and political and cultural agreements), in 2003, an extensive free trade agreement with the United States, and in 2004 with South Korea, expecting a boom in import and export of local produce and becoming a regional trade-hub. Continuing the coalition’s free-trade strategy, in August 2006 President Bachelet promulgated a free trade agreementwith the People's Republic of China (signed under the previous administration of Ricardo Lagos), the first Chinese free-trade agreement with a Latin American nation; similar deals with Japan and India were promulgated in August 2007. In 2010, Chile was the first nation in South America to win membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, an organization restricted to the world’s richest countries.

    Some economists (such as Nobel laureate Amartya Sen) have argued that the experience of Chile in this period indicates a failure of the economic liberalism posited by thinkers such as Friedman, claiming that there was little net economic growth from 1975 to 1982 (during the so-called “pure Monetarist experiment”). After the catastrophic banking crisis of 1982 the state controlled more of the economy than it had under the previous so-called "socialist" regime, and sustained economic growth only came after the later reforms that privatized the economy, while social indicators remained poor.[5] Pinochet’s dictatorship made the unpopular economic reorientation possible by repressing opposition to it. Rather than a triumph of the free market, the OECD economist Javier Santiso described this reorientation as “combining neo-liberal sutures and interventionist cures”.[6] By the time of sustained growth, the Chilean government had “cooled its neo-liberal ideological fever” and “controlled its exposure to world financial markets and maintained its efficient copper company in public hands”.[5]



    Contents
    [hide]


    Background[edit]
    In 1972, Chile’s inflation was at 150%.[7] According to Hernán Büchi, several factors such as expropriations, price controls, and protectionism caused these economic problems.[8]The Central Bank increased the money supply to pay for the increasing deficit. Büchi states that this increase was the primary cause for inflation.[8]

    United States government documents report an antagonistic foreign economic policy toward the Allende government that was "articulated at the highest levels" during this time.[9]:33 Shortly after Salvador Allende was elected president, but before he assumed office, then-CIA-director Richard Helms met with President Richard Nixon and discussed the situation in Chile. Helms' notes from his September 15, 1970 meeting contain the indication: "Make the economy scream." A week later Ambassador Edward Korry reported telling outgoing Chilean president Eduardo Frei Montalva, through his Defense Minister, that "not a nut or bolt would be allowed to reach Chile under Allende." By late 1972, the Chilean Ministry of the Economy estimated that almost one-third of the diesel trucks at Chuquicamata Copper Mine, 30 percent of the privately owned city buses, 21 percent of all taxis, and 33 percent of state-owned buses in Chile could not operate because of the lack of spare parts or tires. In overall terms, the value of United States machinery and transport equipment exported to Chile by U.S. firms declined from $152.6 million in 1970 to $110 million in 1971.[9]:33

    Immediately following the Chilean coup of 1973, Augusto Pinochet was made aware of a confidential economic plan known as El ladrillo[10] (literally, “the brick”), so called because the report was “as thick as a brick”. The plan had been quietly prepared in May 1973 [11] by economists who opposed Salvador Allende’s government, with the help from a group of economists the press were calling the Chicago Boys, because they were predominantly alumni of the University of Chicago. The document contained the backbone of what would later on become the Chilean economic policy.[11] According to the 1975 report of a United States Senate Intelligence Committee investigation, the Chilean economic plan was prepared in collaboration with the CIA.[9]:40[12]

    The plan recommended a set of economic reforms that included deregulation and privatization. Among others reforms, they made the central bank independent, cut tariffs, privatized the state-controlled pension system,[13] state industries, and banks, and reduced taxes. Pinochet’s stated aim was to “make Chile not a nation of proletarians, but a nation of entrepreneurs”.[7]

    Reforms[edit]
    The first reforms were implemented in three rounds – 1974–1983, 1985, and 1990.[2]

    The government welcomed foreign investment and eliminated protectionist trade barriers, forcing Chilean businesses to compete with imports on an equal footing, or else go out of business. The main copper company, Codelco, remained in government hands due the nationalization of copper completed by Salvador Allende, however, private companies were allowed to explore and develop new mines. Copper resources were, however, declared “inalienable” by the 1980 Constitution.

    Minister of Finance Sergio de Castro, departing from Friedman’s support for free floating exchange rates, decided on a pegged exchange rate of 39 pesos per dollar in June 1979, under the rationale of bringing Chile’s rampant inflation to heel. The result,[14] however, was that a serious balance-of-trade problem arose. Since Chilean peso inflationcontinued to outpace U.S. dollar inflation, every year Chilean buying power of foreign goods increased, all fueled by foreign loans in dollars[citation needed]. When the bubble finally burst in late 1982, Chile slid into a severe recession that lasted more than two years.

    This deep economic recession of 1982–1983 was Chile's second in eight years. (In 1975, when GDP fell by 13 percent, industrial production plunged by 27 percent and unemployment increased to 20 percent). During the 1982-1983 recession, real economic output declined by 19%, with most of the recovery and subsequent growth taking place after Pinochet left office,[15] when market-oriented economic policies were additionally strengthened.[3]

    In his Memoirs (“Chapter 24: Chile”, 1998), Milton Friedman criticized De Castro and the fixed exchange rate.[16]

    Starting in 1985, with Hernán Büchi as Minister of Finance, the focus of economic policies shifted toward financial solvency and economic growth. Exports grew rapidly and unemployment went down, however, poverty still represented a significant problem, with 45 percent of Chile’s population below the poverty line in 1987. Büchi wrote about his experience during this period in his book La transformación económica de Chile: el modelo del progreso. In 1990, the newly elected Patricio Aylwin government undertook a program of “growth with equity”, emphasizing both continued economic liberalization and poverty reduction. Between 1990 and 2000, poverty was reduced from 40 percent of the population to 20 percent. 60 percent of this reduction can be attributed to GDP growth, with the remaining 40 percent attributable social policies.[17]

    Free trade agreements[edit]
    Successive Chilean governments have actively pursued trade-liberalizing agreements. The process began in the 1970s, when Pinochet cut tariffs on imports to 10%. Prior to that, Chile had been one of the most protectionist economies in the world, ranking 71 out 72 in a 1975 Cato Institute and Fraser Institute annual report.[18] During the 1990s, Chile signed free trade agreements (FTA) with Canada, Mexico, and Central America. Chile also concluded preferential trade agreements with Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. An association agreement with Mercosur—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—went into effect in October 1996. Continuing its export-oriented development strategy, Chile completed landmark free trade agreements in 2002 with the European Union and South Korea. Chile, as a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, is seeking to boost commercial ties to Asian markets. To that end, it has signed trade agreements in recent years with New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, India,China, and most recently Japan. In 2007, Chile held trade negotiations with Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, and China. In 2008, Chile hopes to conclude an FTA with Australia, and finalize an expanded agreement (covering trade in services and investment) with China. The P4 (Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, and Brunei) also plan to expand ties through adding a finance and investment chapter to the existing P4 agreement. Chile’s trade talks with Malaysia and Thailand are also scheduled to continue in 2008.[19]

    Performance on economic and social indicators[edit]
    [​IMG]
    Unemployment in Chile and South America (1980 - 1990).
    Amartya Sen, in his book Hunger and Public Action, examines the performance of Chile in various economic and social indicators. He finds, from a survey of the literature on the field:

    The so-called "monetarist experiment" which lasted until 1982 in its pure form, has been the object of much controversy, but few have claimed it to be a success...The most conspicuous feature of the post 1973 period is that of considerable instability...no firm and consistent upward trend (to say the least).

    According to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis the unnecessary radicalism of the shock therapy in the 1970s caused mass unemployment, purchasing power losses, extreme inequalities in the distribution of income and severe socio-economic damage.[20] According to United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean data the percentage of Chilean population living in poverty rose from 17% in 1969 to 45% in 1985.[21]

    Nobel laureate and economist Gary Becker states that “Chile’s annual growth in per capita real income from 1985 to 1996 averaged a remarkable 5 percent, far above the rest of Latin America.”[22] Since then the economy has averaged 3% annual growth in GDP.[23]

    Developments were very positive with regards to infant mortality and life expectancy—infant mortality rate fell so much that Chile achieved the lowest level of infant mortality in Latin America in the 1980s.[24] Infant mortality rate in Chile fell from 76.1 per 1000 to 22.6 per 1000 from 1970 to 1985.[23] In 1988, the military government passed a law making all abortion illegal, and the law remains in place today.

    However, Sen claims that this improvement was not because of “free-market” policies but because of active public and state intervention. Chile had a very long tradition of public action for the improvement of childcare, which were largely maintained after the Pinochet coup:

    ... there is little disagreement as to what caused the observed improvement in the area of child health and nutrition...It would be hard to attribute the impressively steady decline in infant mortality ... (despite several major economic recessions) ... to anything else than the maintenance of extensive public support measures

    Performance on economic indicators in comparison to those of other Chilean presidencies:[25]

    Presidency Alessandri (1959–64) Frei-Montalva (1965–70) Allende (1971–73) Pinochet (1974–89) Aylwin (1990–93) Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–99)
    Economic growth (% of GDP) 3.7 4.0 1.2 2.9 7.7 5.6
    Growth rate of exports 6.2 2.3 -4.2 10.6 9.6 9.4
    Rate of unemployment (Workers in job creation programs counted as unemployed) 5.2 5.9 4.7 18.1 7.3 7.4
    Real wages (1970 = 100) 62.2 84.2 89.7 81.9 99.8 123.4
    Milton Friedman[edit]
    Milton Friedman gave some lectures advocating free market economic policies in Universidad Católica de Chile. In 1975, two years after the coup, he met with Pinochet for 45 minutes, where the general “indicated very little indeed about his own or the government’s feeling” and the president asked Friedman to write him a letter laying out what he thought Chile’s economic policies should be, which he also did.[26] To stop inflation, Friedman proposed reduction of government deficits that had increased in the past years and a flat commitment by government that after six months it will no longer finance government spending by creating money. He proposed relief of cases of real hardship among poorest classes.[2] In October 1975 the New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis declared that “the Chilean junta’s economic policy is based on the ideas of Milton Friedman…and his Chicago School”.[26]

    Friedman has wondered why some have attacked him for giving a lecture in Chile: “I must say, it’s such a wonderful example of a double standard, because I had spent time in Yugoslavia, which was a communist country. I later gave a series of lectures in China. When I came back from communist China, I wrote a letter to the Stanford Daily newspaper in which I said, 'It's curious. I gave exactly the same lectures in China that I gave in Chile. I have had many demonstrations against me for what I said in Chile. Nobody has made any objections to what I said in China. How come?'” He noted that his visit was unrelated to the political side of the regime and that, during his visit to Chile, he even stated that following his economic liberalization advice would help bring political freedom and the downfall of the regime.[27]

    Democracy[edit]
    Commenting on his statement about the “Miracle”, Friedman says that “the emphasis of that talk was that free markets would undermine political centralization and political control.”[27] Friedman stated that “The real miracle in Chile was not that those economic reforms worked so well, but because that’s what Adam Smith said they would do. Chile is by all odds the best economic success story in Latin America today. The real miracle is that a military junta was willing to let them do it.”[28] Friedman said the “Chilean economy did very well, but more important, in the end the central government, the military junta, was replaced by a democratic society. So the really important thing about the Chilean business is that free markets did work their way in bringing about a free society.”[27] The term Miracle of Chile is also commonly[by whom?] used to refer to the favorable economic results of economic liberalization in that economy.

    According to the Chilean scholars Javier Martínez and Alvaro Díaz it is a fallacy that the return to democracy in Chile was the result of free market reforms. Contrary to that argument the return of democracy required the defeat of the Pinochet regime. The essential contribution came from profound mass rebellions and finally old party elites using institutional mechanisms to bring back democracy.[29]

    Current Chilean economy[edit]
    Main article: Economy of Chile
    According to the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom (of the Heritage Foundation, Fraser Institute and WSJ), Chile's economy is the 7th freest.[30] Chile is ranked 1st out of 29 countries in the Americas and has been a regional leader for over a decade. Chile's annual GDP growth was 3.2% in 2008 and had averaged 4.8% from 2004 to 2008.[23]

    The percent of total income earned by the richest 20% of the Chilean population in 2006 was 56.8%, while the percent of total income earned by the poorest 20% of the Chilean population was 4.1%.[23] Chile's Gini index (measure of income distribution) was 52.0 in 2006, compared to 24.7 of Denmark (most equally distributed) and 74.3 of Namibia (most unequally distributed).[23] Chile has the widest inequality gap of any nation in the OECD.[31]
     
  6. Imaxxx

    Imaxxx "Shaktimev Jayate" - Strength Alone Triumphs

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    How is this relevant to this thread?
     
  7. OrangeFlorian

    OrangeFlorian #GoldAndBlack Senior Member

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    that some countries with military governments actually turn out well and don't turn out to be complete garbage
     
  8. Brood Father

    Brood Father Regular Member

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    change the title as .. Pakistan..An army soon to be without country
     
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  9. Bengal_Tiger

    Bengal_Tiger Regular Member

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    1. The Pakistan army is a Punjabi army and the biggest employer in the Punjab.

    2. In a country which has not produced any multi-nationals of any note unlike Japan's Sony or Honda, Korea's Daewoo or India's Tata, the army acts as a career program for the sons of upper-class Punjabis.

    3. To perpetuate all this it needs to sustain its image as a heroic defender of the nation, which is vitally needed against "evil Hindu" India.
     
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  10. vayuu1

    vayuu1 Regular Member

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    One thing, I'd like to say is, when ur whole military doctrine, is based on religious extremism, then u don't care for the welfare of ur country, u look for short goals instead of long time solution, forget about uniting for some time, had their been cooperation between neighbours, whole subcontinent, would not only have been a much peaceful place, but a much more prosperous and developed area, I bet all the economies of this region would have been at least 2.5 to 6 times more than what they are now,but extremism and sanity don't gel together.

    Sent from my SM-N900 using Tapatalk
     
  11. rida500

    rida500 Regular Member

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    ap pehly khaalistaan, aasam, kashmir aur deegar states ki fikar karen jo k azaad honay waali hain jald hi
     
  12. Brood Father

    Brood Father Regular Member

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    Really ...last I checked all the three state were directly or indirectly ruled by BJP
    So please get out of your slumber ..look inside Pakistan for Christ sake
    You will not get Kashmir ..period
    Save Pakistan becuase if history is a lesson it's you who have been broken not us ...savvy
     

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