The report says the army has attained an abysmal 17 per cent capability in combat choppers. Full combat capability by helicopters would not be possible before 2027.
I'm going to try and bite the lip here.
I've taken this and tried to assay it in the context of: a) actual weapons system numbers; b) political agenda and c) slated modernization plans, of the interim report; and with respect to those platforms mentioned in the article, modernization delays.
I think what the General implies here is that he is guaging the deficits by factoring in shortfall numbers by excluding / withholding "old" platforms that are slated for replacement, and arriving at a "combat preparedness" ratio for "artillery, helicopters and infantry weapons" purely on the basis of the newer ones.
We know that the Army has always been big on its 'qualitative leverage' given that it cannot simultaneously match both its northern neighbours weapon-for-weapon. To the extent that its
strategic advantage: that is the terms on which it is fought, lies on its simultaneous conventional (excluding numerical superiority) theatre and tactical / technological advantage, its "preparedness", with respect to winning a war is at "17% for helicopters, 52% for artillery and 65% for infantry small weapons and capabilities" for the Army. To the extent that a war takes place, all the older systems are still at the beck of the Army and can be used in a wartime capacity. What's more, these are actually superior to almost all of which Pakistan has in its inventory.
Around 250 helicopters are currently in service with the Indian Army, mainly obsolete domestically manufactured Cheetah attack helicopters and Chetak multipurpose helicopters, as well as Advanced Light helicopters.
On a slightly tangential note, and with respect to the Armed Forces as a whole, take a look at the list of combat helicopters operated by the Air Forces of the two countries:
1) Ind 2) Pak. The closest the P@kies come to a 'comparison' is a measly 4 Mil M-17's and 15 Alouette III's (that comprises the 'combat' and transport/aerial-refuelling group of their helicopter inventory).
What's really shocking is the shortage in fighting arms. The artillery has just 52 per cent of the total capability required to defend the country. The country will near 97 per cent capability in artillery only by 2027.
Arty is definitely a concern. Particularly given Pakistan's larger calibre artillery: in particular its 155 mm howitzers, and given the importance of artillery in all our wars and the sizable numerical superiority they enjoy. However, what the b#stards won't tell you is that apart from their 144 M114 155mm towed howitzers, their 148 M109A5 self-propelled howitzers, their 200 M109A2 SP guns and their 60 M110A2 203mm self-propelled howitzers, to which India's only ostensible answer at the moment is the 155 mm Bofors Haubits FH77/A and the 155mm Soltam M68, most of their artillery systems are comparably or even older. What the b@stards will also not tell you is that the Def Research Development Organization have upgraded an "unidentified number" of 130mm M46 field guns to an 'upgunned' 155 mm/45 calibre barrel with a range of 39 km under a project entitled 'Metamorphosis'.
Another problem is the army's inability to develop a communication network. India will not have a real-time information sharing network before 2027. The current capability is just 24 per cent despite the country's stellar show in information technology.
True, and this remains a concern. Given China's rapid strides in digital and information technology, its band of cyber warriors and astroturfers is something we oughta be concerned about. But the Army Static Switched Communications Network [ASCON] launched in 2000, has to date metamorphosed into decent network. Though DoT infrastructure is still used at many places, this informal
interview with Lt. Gen. Kumar states that the Army largely depends on its own networks for telecommunication, with ASCON improved from [TDM] Time Division Multiplexing to state-of-the-art [ATM] Asynchronous Transmission Models.
They're also exploiting facilities available on the INSAT series to augment terrestrial communication, where operationally justified, and for strategic long haul communications for special applications.
And surprise surprise! I also came across this today from the Mid-Day:
Indian Army goes into Star Wars mode
The infantry too is struggling at a 65 per cent capability. The infantry wants to replace its indigenous INSAS rifles, acquire night-fighting capabilities, new generation anti-tank missiles and rockets. Shields for nuclear, biological and chemical warfare too are not properly in place.
That I cannot fathom! So they want to replace the indigenous INSAS rifle with something else? What the f%ck for? Both series of problems have already been rectified: the high-altitude jamming and cracking of polymer magazines during the Kargil war by the
Ishapore ISOFB, that has seen no recurrence since; and reports that the gun malfunctioned during a gunbattle with Maoists by the Nepalese forces were disproved trials conducted before the Nepalese Army showed that the rifle was satisfactory and that the malfunctions had been due to poor handling and improper cleaning of the rifle by Nepalese soldiers.
As for ATGM's, was there something wrong with what was bought by the armed forces of
Tanzania, Botswana and Morocco. The Nag is "competitively priced" and will provide a potent counterweight to the Russian Konkours and the European Milan, which can and will be manufactured in excess under license by BDL from both. And what about this:
Indian Army to Purchase 4100 Milan 2T Anti Tank Guided Missiles in USD 120 million Deal.
And this:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4177415
And this:
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_india-s-next-big-buy-is-a-missile-from-us_1295087
Are we still looking at 2027?
