No mujahideen, only soldiers in Kargil: Pak General

Discussion in 'Military History' started by JAISWAL, Jan 27, 2013.

  1. JAISWAL

    JAISWAL Senior Member Senior Member

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    In a candid admission that only regular troops of the Pakistan Army took part in the Kargil conflict with India in 1999 and not mujahideen fighters as claimed by Islamabad, a retired Pakistani Lieutenant General, who was then heading the analysis wing of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), has written that the intrusion was an “unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions” and there was a “cover-up” later by his then chief, General Pervez Musharraf.
    In an article published in Pakistan’s The Nation newspaper on January 6, Lt Gen Shahid Aziz, who retired in 2005 as commander of the IV Corps in Lahore, presents an account of the Kargil war that rejects many Pakistani claims about the conflict.

    “There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition,” Aziz said.

    Criticising Musharraf in the article, Aziz makes the point that the entire battle was ill-planned and young soldiers were used as “war fodder” for the “misadventure”.

    “An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster.”

    “Whatever little I know, took a while to emerge, since General Musharraf had put a tight lid on Kargil. Three years later, a study commenced by GHQ to identify issues of concern at the lowest levels of command, was forcefully stopped by him. ‘What is your intent?’ he asked.”

    The intrusion was clearly intended to dominate the supply line to Siachen and cut off the glacier for an invasion by Pakistani troops.

    “It certainly wasn’t a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn’t pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence and it was my job to know,” he wrote.

    “To say that occupying empty spaces along the Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement and came under the purview of the local commander is astounding. This area was with the Indians as a result of Shimla Agreement, and there had been no major violation of the Line of Control since 1971.”

    Describing how Pakistan army soldiers died after they were isolated and came under the Indian counter attack, Aziz said assumptions were made by the military leadership that the Indian Army would not be able to dislodge the fighters from the heights.

    “The boys were comforted by their commander’s assessment that no serious response would come. But it did — wave after wave, supported by massive air bursting artillery and repeated air attacks. The enemy still couldn’t manage to capture the peaks, and instead filled in the valleys. Cut off and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though the General (Musharraf) publicly denied it,” he said.

    He criticised the manner in which Pakistani leaders thought that India would have a more subdued reaction to the invasion.

    “The entire planning and execution was done in a cavalier manner, in total disregard of military convention. In justification, to say that our assessment was not wrong, but there was, “unreasonably escalated Indian response” is a sorry excuse for not being able to assess Indian reaction. Assumptions were made that they would not be able to dislodge us and the world would sit back idly.”

    “Kargil, like every other meaningless war that we have fought, brings home lessons we continue to refuse to learn. Instead, we proudly call it our history written in the blood of our children. Indeed, our children penning down our misdeeds with their blood! Medals for some, few songs, a cross road renamed, and of course annual remembrance day and a memorial for those who sacrificed their tomorrow for our today; thus preparing more war fodder for our continuing misadventures. Since nothing went wrong, so there is nothing to learn. We shall do it again,” he wrote.

    ‘Boys were told no serious response would come’

    There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages... our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges

    Wasn’t a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn’t pre-empt anything

    Boys comforted by assessment that no serious response would come. But it did — wave after wave

    Astounding to say occupying empty spaces along Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement

    .
    .
    .
    No mujahideen, only soldiers in Kargil: Pak General - Indian Express Mobile


    Putting our children in line of fire

    Kargil, like every other meaningless war that we have fought, brings home lessons we continue to refuse to learn. Instead, we proudly call it our history written in the blood of our children. Indeed, our children penning down our misdeeds with their blood! Medals for some, few songs, a cross road renamed, and of course annual remembrance day and a memorial for those who sacrificed their tomorrow for our today; thus preparing more war fodder for our continuing misadventures. Since nothing went wrong, so there is nothing to learn. We shall do it again. We decide. You die. We sing.

    Cut off from the reality of pain and affliction that would be brought upon the nation, the decision maker takes the course most suited to his whimsical ambitions. Possible hurdles are sidetracked, on the basis of ‘need to know’, or merely bulldozed. Never has there been an institutional decision for the bloodshed. And at the end of each fiasco, original objectives are redefined to cry, “Hurrah! We have won”.

    Our leaders seek personal glory, and desire honour in the eyes of other nations. Sadly, that has become our definition of national honour; but how can we be respected when we have little self respect? So concerned have we become about how they perceive us that we openly deride our religion and all the social values that we once stood for.

    The whole truth about Kargil is yet to be known. We await the stories of forgotten starved soldiers hiding behind cold desolate rocks, with empty guns still held in their hands. What stood them there could only be a love higher than that of life. Some refused to withdraw even when ordered, and stayed to fight the proverbial last man last round. Such precious blood spilled without cause!
    Whatever little I know, took a while to emerge, since General Musharraf had put a tight lid on Kargil. Three years later, a study commenced by GHQ to identify issues of concern at the lowest levels of command, was forcefully stopped by him. “What is your intent?” he asked. His cover-up was revealed many years later, on publication of his book.

    An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster. The question then arises why was it undertaken? Were there motives other than those proclaimed, or was it only a blunder, as I had assumed for many years?

    It certainly wasn’t a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn’t pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence and it was my job to know. Our clearly expressed intent was to cut the supply line to Siachen and force the Indians to pull out. This was not a small result we sought and cannot be classified as a tactical manoeuvre, where no one other than the local commander needed to be aware. General Musharraf himself writes, “800 sq kms of area was captured.... and it created strategic effects”. To say that occupying empty spaces along the Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement and came under the purview of the local commander is astounding. This area was with the Indians as a result of Simla Agreement, and there had been no major violation of the Line of Control since 1971.

    The entire planning and execution was done in a cavalier manner, in total disregard of military convention. In justification, to say that our assessment was not wrong, but there was, “unreasonably escalated Indian response” is a sorry excuse for not being able to assess Indian reaction. Assumptions were made that they would not be able to dislodge us and the world would sit back idly.

    There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition. There was no way to dig in, so they were told to make parapets with lose stones and sit behind them, with no overhead protection. The boys were comforted by their commander’s assessment that no serious response would come. But it did — wave after wave, supported by massive air bursting artillery and repeated air attacks. The enemy still couldn’t manage to capture the peaks, and instead filled in the valleys. Cut off and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though the general publicly denied it.

    The gung-ho mannerism, when there were no pressures, was cowed when lines started shrinking and the international setting became frightening. There was no will to stay the course. Media was hushed to silence, so that pulling out does not become a political issue. We will sing when our songs don’t tie us down.

    The operation, in any case, didn’t have the capacity to choke Siachen. When this truth surfaced, the initial aim was quickly modified. Now the book reads, “I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict.” Glory be to the victors.

    We continue to indulge in bloody enterprises, under the hoax of safeguarding national interest. How many more medals will we put on coffins? How many more songs are we to sing? And how many more martyrs will our silences hide? If there is purpose to war then yes, we shall all go to the battle front, but a war where truth has to be hidden, makes one wonder whose interest is it serving?
    It must be Allah’s country, for who else is holding it afloat?!


    The writer is a retired lieutenant general and former corps commander of Lahore.

    http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-n...Jan-2013/putting-our-children-in-line-of-fire
     
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  3. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    The repeated humiliation war after war is making the poor chaps realise that is is futile to prove that 1 Pakistani is equal to 10 Indians!
     
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  4. Tolaha

    Tolaha Senior Member Senior Member

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    This article pasted 2 weeks back has 10 comments (most by Indians) while the article on Hindu terrorism in India posted a week back in the same site has close to 100 comments. If Pakistanis don't change, why will their army?
     
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  5. cobra commando

    cobra commando Tharki regiment Veteran Member Senior Member

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    "No mujahideen, only soldiers
    in Kargil: Pak General"

    Pfft tell us something we don't know :dude:
     
  6. Dovah

    Dovah Untermensch Senior Member

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    This means they refused to rake back bodies of their own soldiers?

    :pakistan: Such honourable people.
     
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  7. Tolaha

    Tolaha Senior Member Senior Member

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    NLI has a minor Sunni component and are recruited from Gilgit and Baltistan. In other words, they were expendable.
     
  8. Blackwater

    Blackwater Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    No mujahideen, only soldiers in Kargil: Pak General

    is there any difference between the two???:p:p:p
     
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  9. Blackwater

    Blackwater Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    both are unprofessional, unethical, jahil, inhuman:cool2::cool2::cool2:
     
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  10. opesys

    opesys Regular Member

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    Welcome back... It's never the same without you reporting about Pakis :D
     
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  11. rock127

    rock127 Maulana Rockullah Senior Member

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    Ex-ISI General admitting this.

    Few days ago Mushraf idiot was refuting Arnab in TimesNow debate that he and his "Army" had no hand in it and it was local Mujahiddin with "public support" taking on Indian Army.

    This again PROVED Mushraf aka Pakistan a LIAR... his last BIG LIE was not knowing where Osama is.
     
  12. Kunal Biswas

    Kunal Biswas Member of the Year 2011 Moderator

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    Ahh .. So first it was Men dressed as Mujaheddin and now just dress in there default uniform, What makes the difference for the bullet ??

    What a show .. :D
     
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  13. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Delusional @farhan_9909 listen what your won ISI generals are telling about Kargil. :rofl:

    I hope you can come out of your delusions now. The story is same with 1947, 1965 wars as well. Pakistan always underestimated Indian Army and got a sound thrashing in the back.
     
    Last edited: May 10, 2015
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  14. lcatejas

    lcatejas Regular Member

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    Its all election propaganda ... its all old story . There are nothing new in it...:tsk:
     
  15. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Its old story but its first time that it came from a General who was in a authoritative position during the war - Intelligence Analyst DG ISI.
     
  16. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    @farhan_9909 refuses to visit this thread and comment on this news :p
     
    Last edited: May 10, 2015
  17. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Kargil adventure was four-man show: general


    The Kargil operation began in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control.
    The infiltration, which managed to cut off Indian supply lines, took New Delhi by surprise. — File Photo

    ISLAMABAD: The men who witnessed the Kargil fiasco continue to spill the beans. Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, a former chief of general staff of Pakistan Army who has till now kept his peace about what he witnessed in the summer of ’99, says the ‘misadventure’ was a four-man show the details of which were hidden from the rest of the military commanders initially.

    This is the first time someone this senior in the military hierarchy of the time has spoken in such detail and with such frankness about the fiasco that was Kargil.

    According to him, initially the Kargil operation was known only to Gen Pervez Musharraf, chief of general staff Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, FCNA (Force Command Northern Areas) commander Lt Gen Javed Hassan and 10-Corps commander Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad.

    The majority of corps commanders and principal staff officers were kept in the dark, says Gen Aziz. “Even the-then director general military operations (DGMO) Lt Gen Tauqir Zia came to know about it later,” says Gen Aziz who at the time was serving as director general of the analysis wing of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

    He said that Gen Musharraf worked on a policy of “need to know” throughout his tenure as COAS and later president — in other words, Musharraf would issue orders to only those who were required to implement orders instead of first consulting corps commanders and other military officers.

    The Kargil operation began in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control.
    The infiltration, which managed to cut off Indian supply lines, took New Delhi by surprise.

    Initially, Islamabad claimed that the infiltrators were mujahideen but it could not maintain this façade for long. The Indian response coupled with international pressure forced the Pakistan military to withdraw.

    However, the aftermath of the operation served to heighten tensions between Gen Musharraf and then prime minister Nawaz Sharif which culminated in the October coup when the military removed the elected government and took over.

    ‘Operation was never planned’

    “The Pakistan Army did not plan the operation because Gen Musharraf never saw Kargil as a major operation. Only the FCNA was involved in it and perhaps a section of 10-Corps,” says Aziz, adding that it was a major intelligence failure for India. More details of the operation are expected in Gen Aziz’s book which is hitting the bookshelves next week.

    “It was a miscalculated move,” he says when asked about the operation, adding that “its objectives were not clear and its ramifications were not properly evaluated”.

    At his picturesque farmhouse in Pind Begwal in the foothills of Murree, about 30km from the capital, Gen Aziz was not averse to speaking frankly about the operation.

    “It was a failure because we had to hide its objectives and results from our own people and the nation. It had no purpose, no planning and nobody knows even today how many soldiers lost their lives.”

    He said he was personally not aware of what information had been shared with then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, but he felt that Mr Sharif “was not fully in the picture”.

    He, however, recalls a general telling him that Nawaz Sharif asked “when are you giving us Kashmir?” during an informal discussion. This suggests, says Gen Aziz, that Mr Sharif was not completely in the dark.

    Gen Aziz himself first discovered that something was up when he came across wireless communication intercepts from which he could tell that something was making the Indian forces panic.

    “The intercepts worried me as I thought we were not aware of whatever was unsettling the Indians. I deputed two officers to figure out what was happening.” The next day’s wireless intercepts were clear enough for Gen Aziz to realise that the Indians’ anxiety stemmed from the fact that someone from Pakistan had captured some areas in Kargil-Drass sector but it was not clear if they were mujahideen or regular troops. “I took these intercepts to then ISI director general Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt and asked what was happening.”

    It was then that Gen Aziz was finally told by Gen Butt that the army had captured some area in Kargil.

    This, says Gen Aziz, was not right. In his opinion, he should have been told about the proposed operation in advance so that he could have provided his analysis in advance.

    A day after this conversation between Aziz and Butt, the latter called Gen Aziz and told him that he had been invited to the General Headquarters for a briefing on Kargil.

    The briefing

    During the briefing, which was also attended by all the principal staff officers, Director General Military Operations Lt Gen Tauqir Zia explained that units of NLI (Northern Light Infantry) and regular troops had captured areas in the Drass-Kargil sector.

    Aziz feels that even though the briefing was conducted by DGMO Tauqir Zia, it was clear that he had not been aware of the operation from the beginning.

    The day after the DGMO briefing, the friction at Kargil operation was reported in the Pakistani media; interestingly, the Indian media had carried stories a day earlier.

    This shows that the military leadership was informed about such a critical operation only after it began and by that time information was trickling down to the media.

    At the briefing, Gen Zia did explain the ‘objectives’ of the operation — it had cut off India’s supply lines to Siachen because of the closure of Zojila Pass on Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.

    This, said Gen Zia, would block India from supplying its troops in Siachen and subsequently, India would evacuate Siachen. That this did not happen is now history.

    Gen Aziz says this was because the planners “miscalculated the Indian response and overall repercussions”.

    At the briefing, Gen Tauqir Zia talked about airing pre-recorded Pashto messages that he hoped would be intercepted by the Indian forces.
    His objective was that these intercepts would fool India into thinking that the Afghan mujahideen had occupied areas in Kargil.

    Gen Aziz says he objected to this plan as “these would get exposed very shortly”. He adds that this led to lengthy discussions and finally Tauqir Zia conceded that the truth could not be hidden for long.

    In retrospect, Gen Aziz feels that “even if only NLI men were up there, it would be wrong to suggest that the operation was carried out by paramilitary forces because NLI falls under the military chain of command unlike the Rangers that are headed by a military officer but technically they fall under the control of the ministry of interior”.

    The study that never was

    But for Gen Aziz the end of the operation did not mean the end of the matter.

    After he was promoted as chief of general staff, he says that in 2004 he ordered a small study to inquire into what miscalculations had led to
    such a huge loss of men and money. He also asked each battalion concerned for details.

    But the reaction was swift.

    An angry Gen Musharraf called him and asked what the objectives of the study were. “I told him it would provide a professional understanding of our mistakes and losses but Gen Musharraf insisted that this was not the time for such a study and ordered that it be stopped.
     
  18. Tolaha

    Tolaha Senior Member Senior Member

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    ^^ I wish Musharraf comes back to rule Pakistan! Or any general for that matter. Pakistan is at it's best when generals rule it directly rather than through proxies.
     
  19. Daredevil

    Daredevil On Vacation! Administrator

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    Tell us Truth about Kargil : Dawn Editorial

    IT is only as information has leaked out in bits and pieces over the years that we have understood how Kargil came to be what it really was: a poorly planned and badly executed operation that put hundreds of our soldiers at risk, and not the mujahideen-led jihad initially sold to the nation. New revelations paint an even bleaker picture of this gamble that Gen Musharraf took as army chief. One man’s testimony cannot provide a complete picture of a controversial armed conflict. But when the head of the ISI’s analysis wing at the time says he only found out about the operation after it had been launched — and that the same was true for most of the corps commanders and senior army staff, including the head of military operations — his words should prompt yet another look at the Kargil fiasco. Not taking the senior leadership into confidence, both within the army and in the other armed forces, had obvious consequences: the lack of a viable strategy, inadequate logistical planning and a poor calculation of the Indian response, all of which cost Pakistan the lives of hundreds of soldiers, further damaged relations with India and contributed to the political upheaval that followed.

    And yet aside from occasional insights provided by those who are relatively well-informed and have chosen to speak up, there is no objective public record of what took place. Gen Musharraf had reportedly banned discussion of the topic at the National Defence University, where military operations otherwise form important case studies. And while it eventually surfaced that scores of Pakistani soldiers had died, the lies the media was fed in the early days of the conflict indicate that misinformation was a critical component of this operation. Told in daily press briefings that this was a mujahideen struggle and shown what appeared to be mujahideen training camps, reporters were blatantly used to mislead and rally the public.

    Many questions still remain, including about the role of the political leadership. Was the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, aware of the plan? Was he ordered to seek out American help for a ceasefire, or was he responsible, as Gen Musharraf has claimed, for the operation’s failure? A decade and a half later, it is time for an objective, official examination of the facts, and for making them public. If Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz and others who have spoken up are wrong, they should be contradicted. Even though preventing future mistakes is all that can be done now, the country deserves to know the truth.

    Time for truth | Newspaper | DAWN.COM
     
  20. cobra commando

    cobra commando Tharki regiment Veteran Member Senior Member

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    Pakis doing what they do best..each and every time when they get Bitchslapped by India then slap each other on the face :pm: [​IMG] :lol:
     

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