Nehru's stubbornness led to 1962 war with China?

Discussion in 'Politics & Society' started by sandeepdg, Dec 19, 2010.

  1. sandeepdg

    sandeepdg Senior Member Senior Member

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    Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru "shut the door to negotiations on the (India-China) boundary on July 1, 1954", according to a just-released book by A G Noorani based on archival research and hitherto unpublished material.

    And this — Nehru's refusal to negotiate, and the 1960 rebuff to Chou En-lai when he was visiting and appeared ready to settle the issue — may well have sowed the seeds of the 1962 India-China war.

    The important and explicit directive, from Nehru, in a 17-para memorandum, cited by Noorani in his book, says: "Both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our Agreement with China, this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody. There may be very minor points of discussion. Even these should not be raised by us."

    Noorani, an expert on legal and constitutional issues, known for his study of the boundary issue, writes in the book, "India-China Boundary Problem. 1846-1947: History and Diplomacy", that "India unilaterally revised its official map. The legend 'boundary undefined' in the western (Kashmir) and middle sectors (Uttar Pradesh) in the official maps of 1948 and 1950 were dropped in the new map of 1954. A firm clear line was shown instead."

    The author says that Nehru's directive of July 1, 1954 was apparently in pursuance of a decision taken on March 24, 1953 to formulate a new line for the boundary. "It was a fateful decision. Old maps were burnt. One former Foreign Secretary told this writer how, as a junior official, he himself was obliged to participate in this fatuous exercise."

    It is speculated that the official was Ram Sathe, India's last consul-general in Xinjiang and later Ambassador to China. The book, dedicated to the memory of Sathe, was released on December 16 at the residence of Vice President Hamid Ansari during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit.

    The book mentions that new maps were printed showing Northern and North Eastern frontiers without any reference to any line. Nehru also wanted that these maps should be sent to embassies abroad and introduced to the public generally and be used is schools and colleges.

    Describing as "historically untrue" every one of the statements of Nehru in his letter to Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai of March 22, 1959, Noorani states that as late as 1950, Indian maps showed the boundary as undefined.

    The unpublished archival material in Chapter 12 titled 'Aftermath', quotes extensively from the 17-page memo and says a "divided Cabinet, an irresponsible opposition, an uninformed press and a restive Parliament, all fed on bad history held Nehru hostage."

    Selective excerpts:

    "A century-old problem was neglected, by a conscious decision, in 1954. It acquired the dimensions of a boundary dispute in 1959. Unresolved in 1960 when the prospects of a fair settlement were bright, the dispute was sought to be resolved by confrontation. Indias attempt to revise the status quo in 1961 by a Forward Policy in the West came to grief. China decided to settle the matter by recourse to war in October 1962."

    "The conclusion is hard to resist that there was a total disconnect between the facts of history and India's policy on the boundary problem and later boundary dispute. Its diplomacy became inflexible because it espoused a policy which barred give and take. Each one of the propositions stated earlier in Chapter XI was flouted the 1842 Treaty; and undefined boundary; the Karakoram boundary; and, worst of all, an impermissible recourse to unilateral change of frontiers."

    "This, in a dispute pre-eminently susceptible to a fair solution; for, each had its vital non-negotiable interest securely under its control. India had the McMahon Line while China had the Xinjiang-Tibet road across the Aksai Chin in Ladakh."

    "Zhou En-lai was all too ready to accept such a solution during his visit to New Delhi in April 1960. He was rebuffed. China proceeded to practice its own brand of unilateralism, sanctifying territorial gains won by armed force."

    "There was nothing inevitable about this impasse. A settlement was possible at the summit in New Delhi in April 1960, despite the fact that public opinion had been ignited over the armed clashes in Longju and the Kongka pass in 1959. A divided Cabinet, an irresponsible opposition, an uninformed press and a restive Parliament, all fed on bad history, held Nehru hostage; not that he had a different view of the past. Had he so willed between January 21 and March 22, 1959 when he replied to Zhous letter, a policy based on the historical truth and sensible diplomacy conducted in private could have charted a route that would assuredly have led to accord."

    "But history was scorned and it took its revenge; paving the way to a wild, irrational play of military might and the politics of power to shape a border dispute inherently and pre-eminently susceptible to a fair compromise. The diplomatic consequences of the deepening rift between India and China are incalculable; especially in India's relations with its other neighbours, particularly Pakistan."

    The book reveals that the only comprehensive and objective study of the Northern Frontier — conducted under the supervision of K. Zakaraiah, director of the Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs in 1953 is still kept secret.

    The book says that in 1979 Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had told then Minister of External Affairs Atal Behari Vajpayee, when he was on a visit, to settle on the basis of the status quo of 1980 and not 1960; albeit with minor adjustments.

    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...o-1962-war-with-China/articleshow/7125862.cms
     
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  3. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    No, it is our own lack of awareness on our defence preparedness and putting Nehru on pedestal led to the humiliation.
     
  4. LurkerBaba

    LurkerBaba Staff Administrator

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    Well from what I've read the 'backstabbing' myth is just an elaborate coverup for Nehru's failures. Wish we had a realist like Sadar Patel than Nehru.

    India China boundary problems will not solved till Congress is in power, on the other hand BJP will find it difficult too since it won't go well with it's 'hawkish' stance. *sigh*
     
  5. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    I believe the nahru-GandiS are still trying to hold onto power to mask decades of failure with more failures. When i see people like SAshi Tharoor sucking upto the Nehru-Ganghi dynasty, i believe the rot will continue to ruin India.
     
  6. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    People be objective in your criticism. Just because you hate Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, dont criticize everything about them. When you criticize Nehru for what he did vis a vis China, keep in mind a whole gamut of history. India recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Tibet had a treaty that finalized the McMohan Line. That means, China had to respect that. That China didnt marks is expansionist agenda which is evident till today with all of its neighbors.

    Why should have Nehru conceded an inch to China in a give or take deal when legally everything is ours? You very same people would now have been discussing how Nehru sold India to China back then. Please get objective in criticism and not say things just for the sake of saying things just because of prejudice.
     
  7. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    We speak of vote buying and monetary favours for MLA, MP seats as big scams now.

    NehuS virtually bought the prime ministership to India with huge fortune left over by his father. of the 16 british Indain constituences 13 opted for Sardar patel to be PM, but Gandi decided otherwise and sardar obeyed him.

    The institutions created by Sardar IAS, Amul etc still thrive in India. The institutions built by Nehru's intellect like government owned economy,very large dams,Defence PSU, DRDO completely sapped India of its dynamism and continue to plague us still e.g Air India looking for govt handouts. Non-intellectual Indira enhanced her father's ambitions to the limits of a virtual commmunist state. with regard to china . HereS patel's pragmatic stance.

    Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 November 1950 not only deploring Indian Ambassador KM Panikkar's action but also warning about dangers from China



    My dear Jawaharlal,

    Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.

    I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

    In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

    Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

    Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengar to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.

    It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.

    a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.

    b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.

    c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat.

    d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.

    e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.

    f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.

    g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.

    h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.

    i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.

    j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.

    These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.

    I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.

    Vallabhbhai Patel,
    7th November 1950

    http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html
     
  8. Phenom

    Phenom Regular Member

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    What do you think Patel would have done as a "realist"?
    Do you want India to give up territory just so that the Chinese may become friendly towards us.
     
  9. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    Talking in hindsight is great. Both Sardar and Nehru in their own rights were tall leaders of their time. Nehru talked about self reliance and thats why steel plants, dams etc came up. Management of it is a separate issue. Idea even back then was to have self reliance. Its the same even now. Even today we want self reliance and not depend on anyone. You can curse everyone in hind sight because you know what the result is and after many analysis we come to a conclusion as to how it could be done better. Thats what learning from mistakes is all about. Quite like how an umpire on the cricket field has to adjudicate a caught behind or LBW. Maybe there was no nick or it was going down leg. He had to make his decision. Action replays played a million times tells you it was not out. But then time has gone, batsman back in the hut.
     
  10. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    Nehru was an idealistic, lazy ass who made mistake after mistake because he could seldom arrive at a practical solution. What kind of an intellect would have gone to UN when Hari Singh's accesion deed was enough to integrate whole of Kashmir with India. A delusional leader would have sent Indian Red Cross to Korean war, but leave tibetians to fend off for themselves on face of chinese invasion. He prefered too simpler solutions to very complex issues e.g China-india bye bye slogan.

    It would have done India a world of good, if Nehru had been made Deputy PM in 1947 and president in 1950 instead of prime ministership telling sorry pal large houses and rupees don't cut it anymore.


    Gandhi's death and relations with Nehru


    Patel was intensely loyal to Gandhi and both he and Nehru looked to him to arbitrate disputes. However, Nehru and Patel sparred over national issues. When Nehru asserted control over Kashmir policy, Patel objected to Nehru's sidelining his home ministry's officials.[58] Nehru was offended by Patel's decision-making regarding the states' integration, having neither consulted him nor the cabinet. Patel asked Gandhi to relieve him of his obligation to serve, knowing that he lacked Nehru's youth and popularity. He believed that an open political battle would hurt India. After much personal deliberation and contrary to Patel's prediction, Gandhi on 30 January 1948 told Patel not to leave the government. A free India, according to Gandhi, needed both Patel and Nehru. Patel was the last man to privately talk with Gandhi, who was assassinated just minutes after Patel's departure.[59] At Gandhi's wake, Nehru and Patel embraced each other and addressed the nation together. Patel gave solace to many associates and friends and immediately moved to forestall any possible violence.[60] Within two months of Gandhi's death, Patel suffered a major heart attack; the timely action of his daughter, his secretary and nurse saved Patel's life. Speaking later, Patel attributed the attack to the "grief bottled up" due to Gandhi's death.[61]

    Criticism arose from the media and other politicians that Patel's home ministry had failed to protect Gandhi. Emotionally exhausted, Patel tendered a letter of resignation, offering to leave the government. Patel's secretary persuaded him to withhold the letter, seeing it as fodder for Patel's political enemies and political conflict in India.[62] However, Nehru sent Patel a letter dismissing any question of personal differences and his desire for Patel's ouster. He reminded Patel of their 30-year partnership in the freedom struggle and asserted that after Gandhi's death, it was especially wrong for them to quarrel. Nehru, Rajagopalachari and other Congressmen publicly defended Patel. Moved, Patel publicly endorsed Nehru's leadership and refuted any suggestion of discord. Patel publicly dispelled any notion that he sought to be prime minister.[62] Though the two committed themselves to joint leadership and non-interference in Congress party affairs, they would criticise each other in matters of policy, clashing on the issues of Hyderabad's integration and UN mediation in Kashmir. Nehru declined Patel's counsel on sending assistance to Tibet after its 1950 invasion by the People's Republic of China and ejecting the Portuguese from Goa by military force.[63]

    When Nehru pressured Dr. Rajendra Prasad to decline a nomination to become the first President of India in 1950 in favour of Rajagopalachari, he thus angered the party, which felt Nehru was attempting to impose his will. Nehru sought Patel's help in winning the party over, but Patel declined and Prasad was duly elected. Nehru opposed the 1950 Congress presidential candidate Purushottam Das Tandon, a conservative Hindu leader, endorsing Jivatram Kripalani instead and threatening to resign if Tandon was elected. Patel rejected Nehru's views and endorsed Tandon in Gujarat, where Kripalani received not one vote despite hailing from that state himself.[64] Patel believed Nehru had to understand that his will was not law with the Congress, but he personally discouraged Nehru from resigning after the latter felt that the party had no confidence in him.[65]
     
  11. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    separate issue ICB. yes that was a mistake, he should not have gone to the UN. But that is not related to the topic at hand. Yes Nehru made a lot of mistakes. He did what he thought was good. People of India voted him to power and we have to live with that.
     
  12. Tshering22

    Tshering22 Sikkimese Saber Senior Member

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    ^^ People of India did NOT vote him to power. It was Gandhi's appointment and pressure from Nehru himself that let to appointment of Nehru. Congress then from all the constituencies had overwhelmingly favoured Sardar Patel including significant senior members. And boy he would have made a classy first PM. but Nehru being Gandhi's favourite took over. But that is different case.

    The point is, Nehru's obsession with Gandhian idealism of not getting latest weapons before implementing forward policy was the cause of 1962's loss and loss of 19,000 sq. kms of land. Which strategist is idiotic enough to not see adequate stock of military supplies before a war starts? Even a high school kid will tell you that is the most stupid decision. India was never true democracy until 1990s, when Soviet had collapsed and we had a semi-authoritarian left-leaning governance till then. News censored, information limited, limited private business, tight government control, we were a command society.

    Democracy only came when economy liberalized, information was freely distributed and in the last 63 years first time people came to know of their rights and duties 20 years back. Before that, election was simply a formality when all knew which party would win. As far as the war goes, Chinese backstabbed as as it is to be expected from any enemy by a sane bunch of leaders (which we didn't have and don't have even to this day); what is our responsibility is to make sure that we always have adequate weapons and combat systems to counter the threat anytime. Till now we haven't seemed to learn this lesson with all the 40s style delays in procurement, corruption and a disregard for indigenization.

    The only thing that is preventing PLA from marching into Arunachal and Sikkim is our nuclear weapons. Otherwise, conventionally we are in no different position than 1962, no matter what any defence minister says. If we have grown, China has grown 5 times more as well. If we have 150 MKIs, they have 500 SU-30 variants. If we have Agni-2s and Agni-3s, they have DF-41s that can cover half the globe and have MIRV tech. If we have 1.3 million troops they have 3 million active troops as well. If we bought 5 lakh bullet proof vests to arm our military, their entire ground forces are armed to teeth with latest weapons and excellent protective gear alongside parallel to any Western military force.

    So in short, if we have overcome something, so have they. Giving a bloody nose won't stop Dragon if it came down to a "Must take Arunachal at any cost" war. What matters is whether Indian security forces can break their legs and arms and send them packing which they cannot. So Nehru's legacy lives on even now if we see this in depth.
     
  13. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    Tshering what you are talking about is tactical mistake. how the war was to be fought if at all or forward policy or whatever. The point of this thread is Nehrus inflexibility led to war. Why should have Nehru been flexible on that issue?
     
  14. divya

    divya Regular Member

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    Nehru had a thought that Chines will not respond even if sends patrols more deep into the area as there was a lot hoopla going on for "hindi chini bhai bhai" and chinese will quitely accept whatever we were doing. He was one helll of a fool who thought India is land of Gandhi and does not require armed forces just police....
     
  15. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    agreed, but still doesnt answer the question why criticize Nehru for not letting in to chinese demand for resolution by parting with Indian land?
     
  16. Tshering22

    Tshering22 Sikkimese Saber Senior Member

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    ^^ Yusuf, then the point of thread is wrong. My personal criticism for Nehru is not his stubbornness with Forward Policy but with his stubbornness that "China will be a good brother neighbour". AND certainly it was not a tactical mistake but at strategic level. Tactical would have been some blunder that IA committed then. But the war rooms had Nehru, Kaul, Patel and Menon making decisions long before the battle actually began. So it was a strategic mistake on Nehru's part.

    Do you think that Communists of all the people, would agree for a "peaceful resolution"? LOL! Communist China borrows its tactics from Imperial Japan where the country said something and did something totally different until it was shut up with nukes. China is continuing the same as it works in its favour. We cannot nuclear strike them because of our weak positioning, but the point here is that Nehru should have never put so much crazy trust in Chinese.

    First of all, Tibet should have been made international rather than Kashmir which idiotic Nehru did other way around. China was then really weak in international stage and could have been easily susceptible to international pressure if we had seriously done something about it. Tibet's independence was our last buffer zone chance to avoid an enmity with Chinese but we lost that.
     
  17. divya

    divya Regular Member

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    Technically Yusuf If we look by chinese perspective from a neutral stance the same land was under chinese occupation for quite sometime in History but when British drew the lines Chinese neither accpeted nor denied them and waited for the right time. In1962 at one end we were going gaga over "Hindi chini bhai bhai policy" at one end and at the other end we were doing agressive patrolling. So we had this war and then chines later declared a unilateral ceasefire. Chines were not willing to discuss that issue at all at that moment and would have been pretty happy about status quo.

    But there are certain articles which suggest that It was a propaganda victory for Chines and they suffered heavy losses and that is the reason they declated unilateral ceasefire.

    This came as a blessing for us in a sense that the pipe dream of police state was broken and we realized how desperately we needed defence. If it would not have been 1962 i dont know what our Nehru chacha would have done in 1965
     
  18. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    Divya that will take us back again to the history of Tibet and stuff..Tibet agreed to the McMohan line.. Tibet was not part of China then.
     
  19. divya

    divya Regular Member

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    Thats the main controversy we have and point which we make. But if we look by the chinese perspective then they say that the Tibet itself was a part of china once so they do not agree with it. Its more like if some idiot comes to power in India and gives off kashmir and the next government claims it back.(Just as an example not in the objective sense and going into complexities that it is part of India and stuff). That is the stand of the Chinese. But since the territory was already acceded to us there is no question of giving it back.

    As far as the Chinese are concerned they are never ever gonna fight India for AP for the reason there is very less to gain and more to loose in such a scenerio till we do something stupid like 1962. The public is hostile to them at the same time terrain is hostile and there is no such great resources in AP to make a war with India over them.

    The issue is more about power projection in the sub continent. No India or China will go down because whomsoever goes down will go down the drain.
     
  20. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    Thats the reason why they allied with Pak and uses it to pin down India.
     
    Last edited: Dec 19, 2010
  21. rcscwc

    rcscwc Tihar Jail Banned

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    People of India did not vote for Nehru. The elections were held on the basis of limited franchise, on the basis of religious carving of seats. Second, the issue got got crystallised: To Partition India or not. Congress got all the seats RESERVED for Hindus, BUT Muslim League got ALL the seats reserved for muslims. Even bloody Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, show boy of Cong, was defeated.

    Die was cast. There HAD to be a partition. Most of Cong members were in favour of electing Patel as PM, but Gandhi practically imposed Nehru.

    So let us not talk of Nehru as a legitimate leader of India. A legitimate PM would have first liberated Kashmir and then talked, not go to the UNO. Why is it that Kashmir's instrument HAD to be countersigned by Sheikh Abdullah, while no such provision was there for the other princely states? REASON. J & K happens to be MUSLIM majority AND Nehru was the ONLY true muslim.

    Again sorry. Constitution was NOT adopted by a popularly elected assembly, but by the pre partition assembly continuing into the independent India.
     

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