Designing India’s Future Carriers for Operational Success
The principal objective that should guide bilateral cooperation in carrier development is the need to ensure that India’s next-generation aircraft carrier—to include its air wing and its capacity for combat operations—will be superior to its Chinese counterparts. China has been a late entrant into carrier aviation, but it appears determined to make up for lost time. Beijing currently deploys an extensively refurbished Kuznetsov-class vessel of approximately 65,000 tons, the
Liaoning, which is likely to serve as the baseline for its future carrier forces. The
Liaoning, now used mainly for training missions, is larger than the INS
Vikramaditya, a Kiev-class ship of about 45,000 tons. But both vessels, being formerly Soviet aviation cruisers, are only capable of short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) operations: the deployed aircraft launch under their own power using a ski ramp for added lift, but they use arresting cables to terminate their landing run when returning to the ship.
After building its first indigenous carrier, the Vikrant, as a relatively small STOBAR platform, the Indian Navy has sensibly decided that its successor will be a larger, approximately 65,000-ton vessel capable of catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) aviation operations. T
his is indeed a wise choice because, given the vast ocean areas of interest to India and the expectation that its CVBGs will have to operate more or less independently, such carriers can host larger air wings composed of high-performance fighters capable of carrying heavy ordnance loads, integrate the requisite number of support aircraft, and mount substantial cyclic air operations, meaning the rapid launch and recovery of aircraft.
A carrier larger than the ship currently contemplated might have been even better because it would have had the capacity to host an even bigger air wing in comparison to its Chinese competitor. But so long as the Indian vessel can conduct CATOBAR air operations, in contrast to China’s STOBAR-only capabilities, the Indian Navy will still retain the edge. Together with the superior training, doctrine, and other complementary capabilities that India now possesses,
such a carrier capability would improve the Indian Navy’s chances of securing sea control even against an otherwise formidable Chinese opponent operating in the Indian Ocean region.
The laws of physics only make large carriers a more sensible choice for India, given its vast operating areas and its diverse operational objectives, which include air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine warfare, amphibious warfare, and land-attack operations.
For starters, it is more economical, in terms of installed horsepower per ton of displacement, to propel a larger vessel at 30-plus knots than a smaller one. And, thanks to the square-cube law, an aircraft carrier’s useful hull volume increases at a rate greater than its structural weight, thus allowing for a balanced design that maximizes flight deck size; expands the number of aircraft that can be carried; increases the size of the armored box that protects ordnance, propulsion, command and control, and other vital spaces; and in general improves passive protection throughout the ship. At the end of the day, however, the large carrier’s greatest advantage is its potential for increased sortie generation and, by extension, higher-tempo cyclic operations, which permit the force to unleash greater firepower relative to its opponent.
If it is assumed, as a rule of thumb, that one aircraft can be spotted on a carrier for every 1,000 tons of displacement, the navy’s Vishal-class ships will be able to routinely host a notional air wing of at least some 50 aircraft (the smaller number allowing for safety margins): 35 strike fighters, three airborne early warning (AEW) platforms, eight ASW and utility helicopters, and four support aircraft, aerial tankers, or electronic warfare (EW) platforms. Over time, a squadron of unmanned combat aerial vehicles—for particularly dangerous tasks such as the suppression of enemy air defenses or for long loiter missions such as reconnaissance and surveillance—would be plausible as well.
An Indian carrier air wing hosting high-quality assets in such numbers would represent significant combat capabilities, especially when the weapons and sensors of its escorts are factored into the equation. A CVBG of this kind would be able to conduct air, surface, and anti-submarine warfare operations simultaneously against all regional adversaries as well as against any future Chinese carrier operating STOBAR aviation in the Indian Ocean. When the Indian Navy finally deploys the three Vishal-class vessels it hopes for, these capabilities will only expand further, enabling its CVBGs to hold their own against future Chinese CATOBAR carriers operating in proximity to India, while undertaking additional responsibilities such as supporting amphibious and mine-warfare operations as well as executing significant land-attack missions with tactical aviation against any local competitor. Success in all cases will still depend on a broad range of continental capabilities, to include shore- and space-based sensors along with long-range maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. But the combat power embodied by such large-deck carriers will bestow on the Indian Navy a capacity for extrapeninsular sea control that it has not enjoyed before.
Where to Focus Cooperation
Because helping the Indian Navy to develop these capabilities in the context of rising Chinese power remains a U.S. interest, bilateral cooperation in carrier development should in principle span all the mission areas involved in the vessel’s design (see table 1).
In practice, however, the most valuable American contributions are likely to materialize in what is known as the “fight” function, possibly in the “move” function, and hopefully in the “integrate” function. Because the Indian Naval Design Bureau already has a history of designing major surface combatants (and local dockyards are currently building warship hulls of close to 40,000 tons), India will probably not seek U.S. assistance where the “float” element of carrier design is concerned. Yet it would profit from cooperation even in this area—if only in peer review of its engineering designs—because India has not fabricated large-deck carriers before, whereas the United States is an acknowledged leader in designing and constructing such vessels.
An identical judgment holds where the “enable” and “survive” functions are concerned: the former refers to the human services necessary to run a ship, while the latter involves both human and technical elements that bear on minimizing the vessel’s vulnerability, enhancing its damage-control capability, and assessing its susceptibility to degradation in varying conditions.
While U.S. collaboration in these areas would be desirable, it would be less pressing, given India’s familiarity with the British and Russian ship designs already in its inventory.
The Fight Function: Indispensable Cooperation
The United States can tender its most valuable assistance to the Indian Navy in the fight function—a mission area that involves both design as well as technology. The large, approximately 65,000-ton size of the Vishal-class carriers offers the Indian Navy a chance to design a flight deck that sustains relatively high-tempo simultaneous launch and recovery operations, while correcting the most egregious design flaws of the INS
Vikramaditya and
Vikrant (and
Liaoning) flight decks, namely, their converging takeoff runs.
An aircraft carrier exists principally to launch its primary weapon—ordnance-laden aircraft—and the speed with which it can conduct cyclic operations makes a fundamental difference to the kind of operational superiority it enjoys in combat. The ability to generate sorties rapidly, then, remains the holy grail of carrier operations and it depends, human factors being held constant, mainly on the flight deck size and design; the number, size, and reset speed of the catapults; and the capacity to service aircraft speedily on recovery.
The
Vishal’s general size should permit a flight deck of over 900 feet in length and a recovery area of over 650 feet on an angled deck, thus enabling the operation of all current and prospective high-performance aircraft. Yet the flight deck’s precise design will be critical because, ideally, it should permit the largest number of aircraft to be spotted—to prevent delays associated with retrieving aircraft from the hangar deck below—without obstructing any of the catapults; without interfering with recovery operations (including emergency barricade arrestment); and without requiring excessive respotting of recovered aircraft prior to servicing, refueling, and rearming. Meeting these criteria requires the enlargement of deck-edge parking spaces, the development of “pit stop” approaches to aircraft servicing, the careful placement and sizing of elevators and the island on the flight deck, and the rationalization of fuel and ordnance flow (as well as of repair facilities) in order to advance the objective of maximizing sortie generation when required operationally.
The number and type of catapults and their positioning on a carrier obviously have a direct impact on its ability to launch aircraft rapidly. A Vishal-class ship can easily be equipped with four catapults if required, because the launch and arresting systems (to include the barricade) will take up only minuscule quantities of its internal volume or internal deck space.
The EMALS—the newest U.S. innovation, which promises revolutionary advances in launch capability and is currently the object of Indian craving—is almost three times smaller in volume and weighs less than half the steam catapult it replaces, with great advantages to topside weight.
But its costs are exorbitant, it has not yet been fielded on any deployed U.S. carrier, and there are still significant export control issues 
that affect its potential sale to India.
The advantages of EMALS, however, are seductive for any operator seeking to maximize sortie generation: the system can launch heavier high-performance aircraft, can be exquisitely calibrated in real time to differences in the launch load, has a lower peak-to-mean tow force ratio (and hence imposes less stress on the airframe), is highly efficient in terms of thrust density while being mechanically simpler, cycles faster for repeated aircraft launches, and is—in theory—more reliable and requires fewer personnel to operate, thus contributing to further savings in space and cost.
The system, however, requires enormous amounts of electricity for its operation, which suggests that a nuclear-powered vessel is the ideal host.
It is conceivable that a combined diesel- and gas-powered carrier could also do the job, but given the demands on electricity associated with habitability, sensors, and other ship operations, powering the EMALS would likely require a number of additional generators simply for that purpose. In any case, its costs notwithstanding, an EMALS-equipped Indian carrier would enjoy tremendous advantages over its regional rivals, and if the Indian Navy chooses to incorporate at least three catapults into the vessel—two at the bow, one at the waist—it would gain impressive operational flexibility.
Irrespective of the type of catapult selected—and the Indian Navy might have to settle for sourcing steam catapults from the United States if it cannot develop an appropriate nuclear reactor for its new ships (an issue discussed further below)—at least three would be required if the carrier is to secure the operational advantages deriving from high sortie generation.
All catapults are susceptible to transient malfunctioning:
in fact, the EMALS currently has a much higher failure rate than is desirable for shipboard operations. While the system’s reliability is certain to increase as the technology matures further, t
he Indian Navy would benefit from integrating a minimum of three catapults aboard its carriers—no matter what their cost—so that at least two launch systems are always available in case one goes “cold” or “soft” during combat operations.
Because the Indian strike group’s capacity to secure tactical superiority over its Chinese counterpart will depend fundamentally on its ability to extract maximum performance from its aircraft carriers, it would be well served not simply by acquiring cutting-edge technologies such as EMALS and the new electric advanced arresting gear but by actually working closely with its American counterparts to incorporate these capabilities into an enhanced flight deck design that maximizes the ships’ striking power.
Achieving this objective will hinge indisputably on the character and the potency of the deployed air wing—and, here again, U.S. aviation systems can make a significant difference. The success of all carrier—indeed, of all naval—operations depends on effective scouting: the ability to detect an opponent first and to unleash offensive action before one’s own presence is noticed and invites attack. Although diverse passive systems also play a critical role in threat detection, fixing and tracking the adversary’s air and surface components prior to engagement invariably requires active emitters, usually AEW systems.
Because the Indian Navy has hitherto deployed small carriers, its principal AEW assets have been heliborne systems, primarily the Russian Ka-31 Helix B. The role of the Helix is to expand the CVBG’s surveillance envelope by detecting either low-altitude or more distant targets that escape detection by surface radars because of the earth’s curvature. Heliborne AEW, however, is a poor choice for the Indian Navy’s next-generation carriers because its poor endurance, short flight radius, limited operating altitude, and low radar refresh rates, despite improving lower-altitude coverage, do not substantially enlarge the size of the CVBG’s surveillance bubble beyond the range of its surface radars.
The solution to this critical deficit, which has plagued Indian carrier aviation for the longest time, is the U.S. Navy’s E-2C/D Hawkeye airborne early warning and battle management system, a platform that is capable of being deployed aboard India’s future CATOBAR carriers. With its operating altitude of over 25,000 feet (compared to some 10,000 feet for a helicopter) and its mission endurance of over six hours unrefueled—more than twice that of a helicopter—the aircraft’s extended radar horizon and its powerful active and passive detection systems combine to provide 360-degree detection coverage of fighter-sized targets (as well as other surface threats and even submarine masts) more than 200 miles from its own position. Furthermore, its ability to maintain station—and support a combat air patrol—at great distance from the carrier implies that it can enlarge the surveillance envelope enormously, while actually supervising the offensive and defensive battle, to protect the CVBG in a way that heliborne AEW simply cannot.
Given the risks of counting on the availability of the IAF’s shore-based airborne warning and control systems in a conflict, acquiring high-quality organic airborne early warning and battle management systems for the Indian Navy’s new carriers is a critical priority: these platforms would enhance the carriers’ protection and offensive capability simultaneously, while bestowing on them both independence and flexibility.
Deploying capable combat aviation remains the next complementary task for invigorating the Indian Navy’s next-generation carrier. Although the navy’s primary carrier aircraft currently, the MiG-29K Fulcrum, is a versatile multirole fighter, it is not superior to the Chinese J-15 Flanker D—the reverse-engineered Russian Su-33 that is likely to become the primary strike fighter aboard China’s emerging carriers. The J-15 has a longer operating radius, enabling it to project combat power farther away (or to defend its carrier at a greater distance); its KLJ-4 or Slot Back series radar has a longer detection and tracking range compared to the MiG-29’s Zhuk series system, thus permitting earlier target detection and engagement; and its primary beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapon, the PL-12, is reputed to have greater range than the Russian AA-12 carried by the MiG-29K and from which it was cloned—allowing the Chinese fighter, therefore, to fire first, at least in theory. The Indian Navy’s advantages in this context no doubt remain pilot quality and superior tactics and proficiency in carrier operations, but these virtues will not survive unchallenged indefinitely.
Because carrier air wings are relatively small, and losses in combat cannot be readily recouped, it is important that each airplane deployed aboard India’s carriers be of higher sophistication
and maintainability than those of India’s potential adversaries. Qualitative superiority of both aircraft and pilot provides uncontestable operational advantages, while maintainability—meaning the reliability of the airframe and its combat subsystems as well as the ease of diagnostics and repair—contributes toward the ability to turn an aircraft around quickly for repeated sorties, thus making it a vital combat multiplier, particularly for small- or medium-sized air wings. These characteristics converge to imply that India’s future carriers must deploy true fifth-generation fighters if they are to secure a combat advantage over the J-15s (which will likely be further improved with avionics pilfered from the Russian Su-35 now slated to enter the Chinese inventory) or newer Chinese stealth aircraft such as the J-20 and J-31 (which will migrate eventually to Beijing’s aircraft carriers).
As India contemplates this challenge, it would do well to consider the U.S. F-35C Lightning as the principal strike fighter aboard its next-generation carriers. The F-35C may not be as fast or as maneuverable as some of today’s best tactical aircraft, but it has no sea-based peer where stealthy BVR anti-air and anti-surface warfare are concerned. Its unmatched onboard radar capability and sensor fusion, ability to carry diverse long-range weaponry, and redoubtable electronic warfare systems permit it to penetrate even dense adversary barrier air patrols to achieve either “first look, first shot, first kills” in the air-to-air regime or successful standoff weapons release in the air-to-surface regime—even in the presence of current and prospective Chinese AEW systems. When the F-35C operates synergistically with the E-2C/D, its lethality only increases because it can engage varied targets without ever having to use its own active sensors and thereby betray its own presence.
Unfortunately for India, there are few alternatives to the Lightning: the fifth-generation Russian T-50 has no naval variant, whereas other possible candidates—such as the French Rafale, the notional Indian advanced medium combat aircraft, or even an evolved Su-30MKI—would be poor substitutes when considering both sophistication and maintainability, the critical qualities that matter if the Indian Navy is to deploy an air wing that is superior to its regional competitors over the long term.
The Su-30MKI, for example, even if it were to be navalized to mimic the Su-33, would still be handicapped by its unreliable avionics. The Rafale too, for all its aerodynamic strengths, is a maintenance-intensive platform, and it is atrociously expensive to boot: the F-35C in the eighth lot of its low-rate initial production is priced at $115.7 million per aircraft—a cost that is certain to contract further as the Lightning is produced in larger numbers—whereas the Rafale, a combat aircraft that is one generation older, is apparently being offered to the IAF for its medium multi-role combat aircraft requirement today at about $120 million apiece.
When costs are thus factored into the equation, the F-35C still retains an edge. Of the few competitors worth considering for the Indian carrier, only the F/A-18E Super Hornet, at a flyaway cost of some $65 million per aircraft, beats the F-35C hands down where price is concerned. The F/A-18E, undoubtedly, has formidable sensors and deploys weapons similar to the F-35C, but being a fourth-generation aircraft (which also happened to lose out in the IAF’s recent fighter competition) could make it somewhat unattractive as the principal strike fighter for the Indian Navy’s new carriers, given the emerging threat environment in the Indo-Pacific.
On balance, therefore, the case for the F-35C as the primary aviation weapon aboard the Vishal-class carriers remains strong. But if India were to pursue this option for its future carriers, it would need to pay particular attention to the aircraft-ship interface because the F-35C’s exhaust temperatures and noise levels would affect both flight deck design and operating procedures, making the need to accommodate the unique characteristics of future fifth-generation aircraft an important consideration from the get-go when designing these large-deck carriers.
Although the air warfare threats emerging from a future Chinese carrier in the Indian Ocean will be formidable, the dangers posed by China’s submarine force would be even greater. The Indian Navy has already moved swiftly to prepare for this challenge, among others, by acquiring the U.S. P-8I Poseidon for long-range, high-altitude, area ASW, and it will eventually deploy a variant of the U.S. MH-60R ASW helicopter aboard its surface fleet for tactical missions. These systems could be supplemented by new U.S. towed sonar arrays on India’s major combatants, but the Indian Navy’s air ASW capabilities will remain significantly constrained so long as it does not acquire the advanced avionics subsystems usually found aboard comparable U.S. platforms. The Indian unwillingness to sign the bilateral “foundational” agreements that enhance interoperability and ensure technological safeguards remains a major reason for this lacuna, and it should be rectified expeditiously if India is to utilize its newly acquired U.S.-origin ASW capabilities most effectively.
Read more at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/22/making-waves-aiding-india-s-next-generation-aircraft-carrier
