National Security to Dictate Pakistan's Future

[rockey 71]

How National Security Will Dictate Pakistan's Future
November 3, 2016 |09:37 GMT



The pre-eminence of the military in Pakistan is unlikely to fade soon, even though the country's emphasis on national security issues has caused its economic development to lag. (AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images)

Forecast

• The Pakistani military will continue to heavily influence the government in Islamabad, ensuring that national security remains the country's top priority.
• Much-needed reforms will be neglected as a result, preventing Pakistan's economy from realizing its potential.
• The international community, fearing the consequences of a nuclear state's collapse, will continue to come to Pakistan's aid.
• Meanwhile, the military will stick to its strategy of targeting some jihadist groups and backing others, making Pakistan a target for reprisal attacks.

Analysis
Protecting Pakistan's security has proved a daunting task for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif since he took office in mid-2013, but the number of challenges on his plate seems to have grown over the past few months.Tensions are again risingbetween Pakistan and its nuclear-armed neighbor, India. At the same time, Sharif's administration is continuing to feel the fallout from a widely readOct. 7expose accusing the military of undermining Islamabad's efforts to combat the country's militancies. As if this were not enough, the government is also working furiously to piece together the events leading to the Oct. 24 attack on a police academy in Quetta that killed at least 60 people.

On the surface, this may appear to be a chain of disparate events. Yet they are, in fact, linked by a common thread: the military's outsize influence in Pakistani policymaking.

A Role Rooted in History . . .
The Pakistani military has held a prominent political role since the country's independence in 1947. As the smaller of the two sovereign states that emerged from British India's partition, Pakistan inherited only 18 percent of the former territory's revenue. It laid claim, however, to 33 percent of the British Indian military, giving its armed forces — which were already well-organized — a distinct advantage over Pakistan's nascent civilian administration.

Military leaders exploited their position to great effect, aided in part by their civilian counterparts and in part by the structure of the Pakistani government itself. The country's founder and first governor-general, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, favored the viceregal system of the British Raj, which concentrated power in institutions filled by unelected leaders. Though Jinnah initially preferred a more democratic arrangement, the Indian threat looming on Pakistan's eastern border persuaded him to forgo popular rule in favor of a more centralized state that could better protect the country's national security interests. (Jinnah, like many of Pakistan's early leaders, feared that a representative government would undermine national unity by empowering regional movements for greater autonomy, particularly in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.) Unsurprisingly, the military did everything it could to encourage its civilian partners' focus on national security, at times to the detriment of political and economic progress.

. . . And Reinforced by Foreign Patrons
Of course, the military had help in solidifying its pre-eminence during the Pakistani state's formative years. The United States, in pursuit of its own foreign policy objectives in South Asia, was eager to partner with Pakistan on matters of regional security. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration formed an alliance with Pakistan as it sought to block the spread of communism throughout Asia. (India, meanwhile,avoided entering into such alliances, though its political ideology aligned more closely with that of the Soviet Union.) Because of its ties to the United States, Pakistan joined the Western-leaning Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and Central Treaty Organization. Islamabad also allowed Washington to station its U-2 spy planes at Pakistani air bases as it conducted surveillance on its Soviet enemies.

When the United States entered a proxy war in Afghanistan with the Soviets two decades later, Pakistan again became an important partner. Washington quieted its criticisms of Pakistani human rights abuses and channeled more than $3 billion to Islamabad over the following decade. In exchange, the mujahideen backed by Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan under the CIA-sponsored Operation Cyclone.

The United States revived its relationship with Pakistan for a third time as it invaded Afghanistan in 2001, looking to uproot the Taliban forces harboring Osama bin Laden. To secure Pakistan's support in the offensive, Washington doled out an average of $2 billion each year in defense and economic spending to Islamabad. (The Pakistani government had nurtured the Talibanto increase its own strategic depth in Afghanistan, and many of the organization's members took refuge in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas lining the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.)

Perpetuating Pakistan's Problems
For most of its history, Pakistan's place in Washington's foreign policy has guaranteed it a steady stream of aid that has reinforced Islamabad's emphasis on national security issues. For instance, from 2002 to 2010, Pakistan received an average of $2 billion a year in foreign investment, a full three-quarters of which was funneled to the military. Meanwhile, development initiatives in areas such as education, health care and literacy have fallen by the wayside. It is no coincidence that Pakistan, despite having fairly advanced defense and security capabilities, consistently ranks in the bottom tier of the U.N. Human Development Index. (Last year, it was 147th out of 188 countries.)

But Pakistan's status quo is unlikely to change as long as the army retains its pull in Pakistani politics. After all, the military stands to lose the most should the United States lose interest in its partnership with Pakistan. In an effort to protect its position, the military will continue to place the nation's security needs ahead of its economic growth and development.

As a result, Pakistan will have little choice but to keep relying on bailouts from its external patrons. In 2008,Islamabad's mounting foreign debt forced it to turn to the International Monetary Fund for a $7.5 billion loan.Five years later, Pakistan sought a second loan to address a worsening balance of payments crisis. The international community, aware of the dangers of allowing a nuclear state such as Pakistan to collapse, will almost certainly continue to provide a financial safety net for Islamabad. The United States will likely do the same, especially with no real end in sight to the war in Afghanistan. Though the United States has begun to gradually reduce the amount of money it sends to Pakistan, Islamabad could try to use its clout in the Afghan peace process to exact more. Moreover, U.S. aid has proved extraordinarily resilient in the past, in spite of sporadic disruptions in Washington's relationship with Islamabad. These reliable sources of financial aid will discourage much-needed reforms in Pakistan, hampering the country's economic progress in the long run.

In the meantime, Pakistan's security-centered policies will continue to make the country a target for the region's militant groups. The Pakistani military has long pursued a two-pronged strategy against such groups, hammering militant outposts in western Pakistan while backing jihadists in the Indian-administered region of Kashmir. In some ways, this approach has worked: Fatalities stemming from terrorist attacks in Pakistan have dropped by 40 percent since 2014. Nevertheless, several prominent militant leaders continue to operate freely in Pakistan, pointing to Islamabad's reluctance to vigorously hunt down and prosecute certain groups. This strategy has created a significant amount of blowback among the region's militant organizations, contributing to the 40,000 deaths linked to terrorism that Pakistan has seen since 2001. As long as the military adheres to its dual strategy, attacks like the one against the Quetta police academy will undoubtedly persist.

Opportunism is a common theme in geopolitics, and one that Pakistan's military understands well. Within the upper echelons of the Pakistani government, the army has profited from regional instability, and the lucrative partnership with Washington that such instability lays the groundwork for. Though the war in Afghanistan will someday end, Pakistan will do all it can to ensure an outcome that works in its favor, rather than India's. For now, that means following the military's lead as the country has for most of its existence, even if doing so perpetuates the problems that have plagued Sharif for the majority of his term.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Though, there's surely an ongoing crisis in Pak but even after being an Indian I will say, writer is too pessimistic.
Agreed about army's rule made Pak lag. Otherwise Pakistan had double of India's GDP per capita few decades ago.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Care to read whole arcticle please.
The establishment’s dilemma

The writer teaches physics in Lahore and Islamabad.

THE oligarchy which runs Pakistan, often called the establishment, is in a quandary. The problem is that whatever it says through its diplomats abroad — and with however much energy — the world insists on perceiving Pakistan as an ideological state wedded to exporting jihad. This is undesirable, but so also is the idea of changing course.

Writing in this newspaper, Ambassador Munir Akram admits that Pakistan has “few friends and many enemies” in Washington. Indeed, Trump’s victory can only worsen matters. But Europe, Russia, and Japan also see things similarly. Few there would be impressed by Akram’s frank admission that, “Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed participated in the legitimate post-1989 Kashmiri freedom struggle”, do not attack Pakistan, and “enjoy a degree of popular support” — or with his suggestion that no action be taken against such groups until things improve in Kashmir.

Akram’s views likely reflect the current thinking of a powerful section of the establishment. But what precisely is the establishment? Who can belong to it, and what does it want?

Missing from the establishment’s perception of national interest is a positive vision for Pakistan’s future.

From Pakistan’s birth onwards, the establishment has set Pakistan’s international and domestic postures, policies, and priorities. Today it rules on the extent and means by which India and America are to be confronted, and how China and Saudi Arabia are to be wooed. It sanctions, as well as limits, militant proxy forces for use across borders; closely controls what may or may not be discussed in the public media; and determines whether Balochistan or Sindh is to be handled with a velvet glove or banged with an iron fist.

Establishment members are serving and retired generals, politicians in office and some in the opposition, ex-ambassadors and diplomats, civil servants, and selected businessmen. The boundaries are fluid — as some move in, others move out. In earlier days English was the preferred language of communication but this morphed into Urdu as the elite indigenised, became less cosmopolitan, and developed firmer religious roots.

Arguably, most forms of government anywhere are reducible to the rule of a few. In Pakistan’s case how few is few? In 1996 Mushahid Husain, long an establishment insider and currently a senator, had sized the establishment at around 500 persons plus a list of wannabes many times this number.

Stephen Cohen, an astute observer of Pakistani politics over the decades, remarks that establishment membership is not assured even for those occupying the highest posts of office unless they have demonstrated loyalty to a set of “core values”. That India is Pakistan’s archenemy — perhaps in perpetuity — is central. As a corollary, nuclear weapons are to be considered Pakistan’s greatest asset and extra-state actors an important, yet deniable, means of equalising military imbalances. These, and other, assumptions inform Pakistan’s ‘national interest’.

National interest means differently in different countries. For example the post-War American establishment considered the export of American values — particularly free trade — as America’s national interest. Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China competed to implant their respective brands of communist ideology overseas. On the other hand today’s China is purely pragmatic. So is India. Not being ideological states, they are not mission-driven. They just want to be modern, rich, powerful, and assertive.

Let’s compare Pakistan’s national interest with the above. Just what is it in the eyes of its establishment? In search of an answer, I recently browsed through theses and articles in various departments of universities, including the National Defence University in Islamabad.

What I found was unsurprising. National interest is defined exclusively in relation to India. This means resolving Kashmir on Pakistan’s terms, ensuring strategic depth against India via a Talibanised Afghanistan, nurturing the Pakistan-China relationship to neutralise Indian power, etc. To “borrow” power through military alliances against India is seen as natural. Hence, switching from America’s protection to China’s happened effortlessly.

Missing from the establishment’s perception of national interest is a positive vision for Pakistan’s future. I could not find any enthusiastic call for Pakistan to explore space, become a world leader in science, have excellent universities, develop literature and the arts, deal with critical environmental issues, achieve high standards of justice and financial integrity, and create a poverty-free society embodying equalitarian principles.

This lopsided view has distorted Pakistan’s priorities away from being a normal state to one that lives mentally under perpetual siege. To its credit, Nawaz Sharif’s government attempted — albeit only feebly — to make a break and concentrate on development. It knows that the use of covert jihad as an instrument of state policy has isolated Pakistan from the world community of nations, including its neighbours. Diplomats tasked to improve the national image are rendered powerless by the force of facts.

Keeping things under wraps has become terribly hard these days. For example, Pakistan denies any involvement in the Uri attack. But, to commemorate the dead attackers, Gujranwala city was plastered with Jamaatud Dawa posters inviting the public to funeral prayers, to be led by supremo Hafiz Saeed on Oct 25, for the martyred jihadists who had “killed 177 Hindu soldiers”. I did not see any Pakistani TV channel mention this episode. The posters were somehow quickly removed but not before someone snapped and uploaded them on the internet.

To conclude: while the rise of the hardline anti-Muslim Hindu right and India’s obduracy in Kashmir is deeply deplorable, it must be handled politically. One cannot use it to rationalise the existence of non-state militant groups. Such groups have taken legitimacy away from those fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. They have also turned out to be a menace to Pakistan’s society and armed forces.

Today’s crisis of the establishment can lead to positive change provided gut nationalism is subordinated to introspection and reflection. It is a welcome sign that a significant part of the establishment — the Nawaz Sharif government — is at least aware of the need for Pakistan to reintegrate itself with the world. Concentrating on our actual needs is healthier than worrying about matters across our borders. One can only hope that other parts of the establishment will also see this logic.

 

[Mikesingh]

It is a welcome sign that a significant part of the establishment — the Nawaz Sharif government — is at least aware of the need for Pakistan to reintegrate itself with the world. Concentrating on our actual needs is healthier than worrying about matters across our borders.One can only hope that other parts of the establishment will also see this logic.

Lol! It's easier threading a camel through a needle's eye than the Porks turning their sinking ship around!

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Lol! It's easier threading a camel through a needle's eye than the Porks turning their sinking ship around!

Problem is that they still think that they have become a real country and portraying India as a foreign nation enemy or competitor. Pakistan was, is and will remain an ideological state throughout it's existence with ethnicity originated from India. This is Universal Fact which can't be changed, their identity claim will always be shadowed by their history.
Pakistanis are Ex Indians, some fools who betrayed their own country being blinded by religion and now even failing their ideological state.
Neither Pakistan was ever integrated to world, nor it will be. Everyone knows the history. So, there's nothing called Pakistani culture.

 

[IndianHawk]

Problem is that they still think that they have become a real country and portraying India as a foreign nation enemy or competitor. Pakistan was, is and will remain an ideological state throughout it's existence with ethnicity originated from India. This is Universal Fact which can't be changed, their identity claim will always be shadowed by their history.
Pakistanis are Ex Indians, some fools who betrayed their own country being blinded by religion and now even failing their ideological state.
Neither Pakistan was ever integrated to world, nor it will be. Everyone knows the history. So, there's nothing called Pakistani culture.

But they are trying so hard with all the goats and Arabs ..if only they can go back a few more centuries they will reach true PAKIYAT.:biggrin2:

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Invite Trump to Gaddafi Stadium

The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.

In Zia Mohyeddin’s readings of Ghalib’s letters there’s a heartrending one about the wholesale eviction of Muslims from their homes in Delhi by the colonial winners of 1857. Donald Trump is passé.

Moreover, unlike his predecessors, by his own campaign assertions, Trump will be a foreign leader of no integral purpose to the world, including South Asia. Analyse him dispassionately and South Asia would seem among the leading vestigial zones spread across the continents that are less than crucial to anything Trump plans to do in his allotted four years. He is not sending Richard Armitage to the region. Stay blessed.

Trump wants to cancel or change international pacts, both economic and security, which he sees as costly obligations. He wants to stay home in his own version of Brexit. Being a builder, he plans to refurbish his country with more tunnels, flyovers and highways, to use his words, to generate a few extra jobs. All this is predicated, of course, on giving the world the boot. So why is there such commotion as if we have seen a nationalist ogre for the first time?

Read: Pakistanis worry that President Trump may favour India

Trump has problems with China. Are the Chinese showing signs of nervousness? If anything, for better or worse, they have just unveiled a stealth bomber. Let the Pentagon figure that out. An inward-looking America will be good for Sino-Indian rapprochement. Should Sino-US economic ties hit the doldrums under Trump, China has presciently cast its net wide for the contingency, including the trade highway through Pakistan to Africa and beyond.

India should stop worrying about Uttar Pradesh elections and find a way to join the Pakistan-China bonhomie. Imagine Kashmiri carpets in Africa via Gwadar. Imagine leather and tea heading to the vast Central Asian markets via Afghanistan. What has Trump got to do with that?

If the dislike of Trump can turn on South Asia’s rusted faucets of collective struggle we will owe the president-elect a debt of gratitude.

The new president will be inclined to repair relations with Russia. Some of my more knowledgeable friends in the anti-nuclear war camp have seen this with relief. Regardless of its potential to calm things down in the Middle East or Ukraine, is Vladimir Putin jumping with excitement in anticipation of the imminent rendezvous with Trump?

Are the Iranians jittery? Yes, President Rouhani could lose next year’s election if Trump tinkers with the nuclear deal. Interestingly, while the president-elect is hostile to the treaty with Iran, he must be the first American leader in years who didn’t genuflect before the omnipotent American-Israeli club. On the contrary, on occasions, his campaign was dubbed anti-Semitic.

He has problems with the militant Islamic State group and Nato. He should be encouraged to put his foot on the accelerator. One excels in slitting throats and commandeering religion for mass rape; the other threatens to annihilate the world over any untenable ruse.

Trump is particularly paranoid of extremist Muslims of whom there’s a troubling whole lot in Pakistan. Pakistan has to fix it, and we are told the army is doing precisely that already. Where does Trump come into the picture if Pakistan and Afghanistan and Bangladesh among others can do the cleaning up by themselves?

Terrorism needs to be attended to, urgently, doesn’t it? Any help in this regard, even loose change, will go some distance in preventing a future massacre in a Dhaka restaurant, in the streets of Mumbai, in a Sufi shrine in Pakistan. What’s the consternation about? Don’t we need help to fight fanatics who are killing our people?

Trump has problems with African Americans, and also with Mexicans in his country. They will fight him, as they should. But when did Indians or Pakistanis or Bangladeshis join hands with the cause of the blacks, leave alone Mexicans in America? If they feel compelled to join a just fight for any refreshing reason they must go ahead with full force, but that would be against their selfish tradition. The Palestinians have been pummelled perennially regardless of who sat in the White House. Did we lift a finger for the ghettoised inhabitants of the West Bank or Gaza?

If the dislike of Trump can turn on South Asia’s rusted faucets of collective struggle and we join the gathering chorus for justice worldwide we will owe him a debt of gratitude. Remember that when Bush’s ratings were rock bottom everywhere, India defied the pattern by embracing him. There may be a chance here for it to abandon its grocer-like foreign policy of seeking petty advantages.

Strangely, so many of us have started counting the worry beads, unnecessarily pulverised by the Israeli flags at Trump’s victory rallies. It smacks of hypocrisy. Who is fighting Israel — not with worry beads but with their lives on the line? Are they India and Pakistan? Trump ignorantly said: “I love Hindu.” His minders told him he meant India. He looked puzzled but agreed. The question in either case is the same: will his love result in more visas for the techies? Live in hope.

If anything, the Indian prime minister’s ‘Make in India’ distress call is on a head on collision with Trump’s ‘Make in America’ mega project. Craven analysis sees Trump resembling Narendra Modi. Look again. Modi’s campaign was sponsored by a system that owns TV channels. Trump’s election exposed the media pundits and their contrived predictions. Moral of the story: the media is cat’s paw of the system in America as it is now in India. Trump defied the system; Modi was shored up by it.

Trump has made somersaults in his view of the world. He was unhappy with the criminal removal of Saddam and Qadhafi. He saw them as useful sheet anchors against the IS and Al Qaeda. After clearing up the terror mess at home, Pakistan should refurbish the Gaddafi Stadium and invite Trump and Clinton there. She will regret her victory dance at Qadhafi’s gory death. He will thank Qadhafi’s spirit for blessing his victory.

The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Pakistan can't be bullied, capable of defending itself: Nawaz Sharif

Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz briefed Nawaz Sharif on the increased firing and shelling by India.

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif today said Pakistan cannot be bullied by Indian "tactics" and its restraint should not be "misunderstood" as weakness, warning that his country was fully capable of defending against "any belligerence".

Sure, you have to tell us about your sovereignty again and again.

His remarks came a day after the Pakistan Army admitted that seven of its soldiers were killed in firing by Indian troops across the Line of Control (LoC) in Bhimber sector.

"Pakistan cannot be bullied by such tactics as we are fully capable of defending our soil against any belligerence," Sharif said while chairing a high-level meeting to review the situation along the LoC.

He said Pakistan was exercising "maximum restraint" in the face of Indian firing, which should not be "misunderstood as our weakness."

Expressing grief over the death of the seven soldiers, Sharif said deliberate escalation of tension along LoC by Indian forces is a threat to regional peace and security.

"It is also a futile attempt of the Indian authorities to divert the world's attention from the worst kind of atrocities they are committing" in Kashmir, he said in a statement.

He called on the United Nations to take notice of the ceasefire violations along the LoC. "Our armed forces do not initiate fire but will always respond in a befitting manner to any aggression," Sharif said.

Yesterday, Army chief General Raheel Sharifo ordered troops to "effectively" respond to firing by India across the LoC.

Earlier, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz briefed Nawaz Sharif on the increased firing and shelling by India.

He said the recent incidents of firing have led to 26 deaths and 107 injuries in complete violation of the 2003 ceasefire understanding and international law.

The premier was also briefed on Pak-US relations in the backdrop of recently held presidential elections in the US. Reaffirming to strengthen bilateral relations, Sharif said Pakistan and the US enjoy strong and strategic partnership spanning over a period of seven decades.

"Pakistan looks forward to closely work with the newly elected government for realisation of peace, security and prosperity in the region and beyond," he said.

Pakistan's National Security Adviser General Nasir Khan Janjua and other government officials were present during the meeting.

 

[IndianHawk]

restraint should not be "misunderstood" as weakness, warning that his country was fully capable of defending against "any belligerence"


These are manmohan Singh's lines.
How the times have changed :biggrin2:

 

[rockey 71]

National security is the top concern of all nations - small or large.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Navy says prevented Indian submarines from entering Pakistani waters
Oh my gaad! What a great achievement for Pakistanis!

Somebody inside the comment section.

Pakistan is a far more pathetic country when compared to Myanmar, who at least corporated to track militants.

On Topic: I'm pretty happy that our sub sailed near their waters. Someday, it will even enter it.:biggrin2:
@Akask kumar @republic_roo97

 

[aditya10r]

Navy says prevented Indian submarines from entering Pakistani waters
Oh my gaad! What a great achievement for Pakistanis!

Somebody inside the comment section.
View attachment 11702
Pakistan is a far more pathetic country when compared to Myanmar, who at least corporated to track militants.

On Topic: I'm pretty happy that our sub sailed near their waters. Someday, it will even enter it.:biggrin2:
@Akask kumar @republic_roo97

Well the next time our Nukes sub nears their waters it will be to give them the taste of Sagarika k series missiles.

For Balochistan liberation

 

[Indx TechStyle]

National security is the top concern of all nations - small or large.

Just correcting a little as well, it's for ideological states also, not nations. Cuz, Pakistan and Bangladesh are not actual nations at first place, they are disintegrated parts of India. No matter how much they jump, they can't change the history by any means.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

A united national front

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

INDIA is maintaining its daily shelling along the LoC in Kashmir. As advised editorially in this paper, Pakistan must “keep its nerve”. Yet, Pakistan’s response cannot be passive. It must dissuade India from pursuing its aggressive designs against Pakistan, now and in the future.

Pakistani officials and analysts have opined that India’s LoC firing is designed to divert attention from the ongoing popular revolt in India-held Kashmir (IHK) and/or prevent Pakistan’s armed forces from acting robustly against terrorism on our western border. These are reasonable assumptions.

However, Pakistan’s response should take account of India’s comprehensive strategy against it, not merely its current LoC belligerence. India seeks to isolate Pakistan by portraying it as a terrorism sponsor while it sponsors TTP terrorism and separatism in Balochistan; it seeks to demonise and delegitimise Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and attempts, directly or through western friends, to co-opt Pakistani politicians, businessmen and intellectuals to accept Indian dominion over Pakistan.

Pakistan’s response should take account of India’s comprehensive strategy against it.

Through such military, diplomatic and political avenues, and combined with the economic and diplomatic pressure from the US and its allies, India hopes to wear down Pakistan’s resistance to Indian domination. The scent of defeat reeks already within parts of Pakistan’s elites. If India believes that Pakistan is sufficiently ‘isolated’ and internally divided, it may feel emboldened to embark on a military adventure against it.

Pakistan’s response should encompass well-prepared, determined diplomatic and media campaigns to neutralise India’s propaganda, expose the reality of its militarism and oppression in IHK and signal its determination to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the Kashmiri people’s rights.

It is regrettable that the prime minister’s bold speech at the UN General Assembly in September has not been followed by promised actions, including formally approaching the UN Security Council. Pakistan should approach it with three clear proposals:

One, a call to end Indian brutality and grave human rights violations in occupied Jammu & Kashmir and the dispatch by the UN high commissioner for human rights of a UN fact-finding mission to India-held Jammu & Kashmir to investigate and secure an immediate end to these violations.

Two, a proposal that the Security Council demand an end to ceasefire violations on the LoC and instal other measures of mutual and reciprocal restraint and arms control to prevent the outbreak of a Pakistan-India conflict.

Three, a proposal for adopting specific steps by the Security Council to implement its own resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir, including the appointment of a special representative of the UN secretary general to update and activate the approved arrangements for its demilitarisation and organisation of the promised plebiscite there.

Other diplomatic moves that Pakistan can make to exert pressure on India include:

First: a proposal in the Security Council’s counterterrorism committee to investigate links between TTP and the militant Islamic State group, and the relationship between TTP and the intelligence agencies of India and Afghanistan. These two countries are, in effect, sponsoring the IS terrorists.

Second: an approach to international human rights groups to press for the release of Kashmiri political prisoners and repeal of India’s emergency laws, which enable Indian security forces to oppress Kashmiris with complete impunity.

Third: an approach to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the extensively documented evidence of Narendra Modi’s responsibility for the 2002 massacre of 2,000 Muslims in Gujarat.

Ullu ke patthe hain sale, pata hai Kashmir ki marey pit rahe hain, jaan chhorni ni fer bhi, chahe apni fat ke chaar ho jaye.

Pakistan may be obliged to consider options beyond diplomacy. India has claimed, falsely, that it conducted “surgical strikes” across the LoC. This claim provides Pakistan with a legitimate right to reciprocate. It should refrain from doing so since this is likely to provoke a general conflict. However, if India does cross the LoC, Pakistan should be prepared to respond decisively, for instance, by cutting off the road between the Kashmir Valley and Jammu.

Pakistan is also well within its rights to respond to Indian and Afghan sponsorship of terrorism by attacking and eliminating TTP safe havens in Kunar and other parts of Afghanistan. If the US-Nato forces do not eliminate these safe havens, Pakistan will need to do so.

While Pakistan has disavowed support for the outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, Kashmiris have an internationally recognised right to seek self-determination from alien occupation through all available means at their disposal, including armed force. There is nothing to stop them from forming a Kashmir liberation army.

Many Pakistanis, including some in our ruling circles, are concerned about the economic implications of possible US sanctions and appear willing to sacrifice the Kashmiris and accept Indian diktat to avoid such sanctions. If such fears had prevailed in the past, Pakistan would not have established its strategic relationship with China, developed its nuclear capability, nor conducted the 1998 nuclear explosions in response to India’s tests.

Pakistan should be prepared to face pressure from India and its Western friends. There can be no development without security and sovereignty. Sanctions against Pakistan, if imposed, will be unjustified. Their impact will be limited and temporary. The preservation of national dignity and Pakistan’s commitment to the Kashmiri people make the possible cost worthwhile.

Some Pakistani analysts have pointed to the lack of international response to Pakistan’s demarches on Kashmir and India to argue that Pakistan’s positions are unpalatable. In fact, other countries are unlikely to respond positively so long as they perceive that Pakistan’s leadership is itself not fully committed to the objectives its diplomats and envoys propagate.

Pakistan’s politicians appear to be more preoccupied by their own petty squabbles over Panamagate, MQM divisions and CPEC projects.

Instead of advocating united national action against Indian subversion and aggression, many of Pakistan’s Western-oriented ‘intellectuals’ argue that the fault lies with Pakistan and especially its armed forces. Pervez Hoodbhoy’s recent denunciation of Pakistan’s so-called establishment is a case in point.

When a nation faces an existential external threat, unity is its ultimate strength and weapon. National unity can be promoted by mobilising the people, as Churchill did to enable Britain to resist Hitler. But, at times, national unity has to be imposed. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to form a ‘united national front’ with Mao’s communists against the Japanese invader only after the ‘generalissimo’ was incarcerated by one of his own commanders.

Today, Pakistan needs a ‘united national front’ to confront an aggressive India.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Spies underwater

The writer is former legal adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and law faculty at Lums.

AT present, relations between Pakistan and India are incredibly tense, with almost daily military and civilian casualties on both sides of the LoC due to firing and mortar shelling. Pakistan recently shot down an Indian spy UAV on its side of the LoC, and conducted an impressive military exercise near the border (dubbed ‘strike of thunder’) to demonstrate its military preparedness against potential Indian armed aggression.

But the most alarming recent development has been the detection of an Indian nuclear-powered submarine near Pakistan’s territorial waters on Nov 14, with the apparent objective of conducting submerged espionage on Pakistan.

India denied this but the Pakistan Navy released aerial surveillance footage as evidence, as well as an official statement strongly rebuking India. Many in the navy feel that India’s long-term aim is to hinder an increase in maritime traffic generated from the operationalisation of Gwadar Port.

India’s submarine intrusion violated our sovereignty under UNCLOS.

Initial reports suggested that the submarine was detected around 40 nautical miles (nm) off Pakistan’s coast, which would place it in Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — which both Pakistan and India have ratified — a coastal state enjoys different levels of sovereignty based on three sea zones beyond which lie the high seas.

The first zone is the territorial sea, extending up to 12nm from the state’s baseline, in which the state enjoys virtually full sovereignty. The next 12nm are classified as the contiguous zone — claimed by Pakistan — in which the state exercises limited forms of jurisdiction to prevent or punish “infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea”.

This zone is also part of the EEZ, which extends up to 200 miles from the baseline, and in which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources. Lastly, the continental shelf of a state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas, and allows exploitation thereof up to 350nm from the baseline.

State sovereignty over the territorial sea is subject to one major exception: in peacetime, a coastal state has to grant ‘innocent passage’ to both commercial ships and warships through these waters. Innocent passage requires passage to be continuous and expeditious, and bars spying. Under Article 19(2)(c) of UNCLOS, “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal state” would render the passage non-innocent.

Submarines, by their nature, are clandestine vehicles; it thus stands to reason that under Article 20 of UNCLOS, to be consistent with the principle of innocent passage, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface of a coastal state’s territorial sea and display their flag of registry.

Under UNCLOS states also have the right of ‘continuous and expeditious’ transit through an international strait (a body of water used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ). Submarines have the right to pass submerged through an international strait.

We are seeing a rapid expansion of submarine fleets worldwide, including both nuclear-powered and nuclear-attack. All major powers, including the US, Russia and China, have been implicated in submarine espionage in coastal states’ territorial seas and EEZs, and in the last two decades the presence of US navy jets and surveillance ships in the South China Sea (within China’s EEZ) has led to clashes. Conversely, the US has protested Chinese interference with its naval vessels as a violation of its sovereign immunity.

India’s espionage inside Pakistan’s territorial sea would constitute a clear violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty under UNCLOS. Nor are there any international straits in the vicinity to otherwise enable an Indian submarine to remain submerged.

Espionage in EEZ, however, is more complicated under international law. But Pakistan has a strong case in arguing that the recent Indian intrusion even within its EEZ was with prejudice to the defence and security of its coastal areas, and that it was a clear violation of UNCLOS Article 301 (which requires peaceful uses of the seas and, in relation to activities at sea, obliges states to refrain from the threat or use of force or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter).

This incident cannot be viewed in isolation. Both countries must realise that, while any individual act of aggression might not cross the requisite threshold to qualify as an armed attack under the UN Charter’s Article 51, taken together, continued transgressions will eventually trigger the right of self-defence and could give rise to armed conflict.

Err!! Pakistan itself defied UNCLOS by supporting China against Philippines in SCS case at Arbitration Court. So, court isn't going to support them.
Something similar is happening to IWT, which is not backed by a single UN member, not even China. India can rubbish it completely anytime any second and there won't be any legal action against us.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

The developing ‘strategic depth’ and ‘full spectrum deterrence’

The Indian Navy has recently conducted major exercise in North Arabian Sea from 2-11th November. The exercise was aimed to test operational readiness of the navy. Approximately over forty warships, submarines, fighters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft from western naval command were involved. Elements of navy’s eastern command also joined in the drills. Reportedly, India’s foremost locally constructed and opertionalised ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arihant may also have taken part. In fact Arihant might already be prowling in waters close to Pakistan coast gathering operational intelligence and validating command and control systems.

The 22nd meeting of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) was convened under the chairmanship of prime minister in February this year. The press release issued later had this to say: “-- NCA took note of the growing conventional and strategic weapons’ development in the region. It expressed serious concerns over the adverse ramifications for peace and security on this account. NCA reiterated its determination to take all possible measures to make national security robust; enabling it to effectively respond to the threats to national security without indulging in arms race. Reiterating that nuclear deterrence is the factor of stability in South Asia, NCA expressed the resolve to maintain ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence,’ in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence.”

Significant changes have taken place in the region since NCA met early this year. In April, India’s first, INS Arihant successfully test fired its long range nuclear capable missile, K-4. A unique aspect of the test firing was that Arihant launched the missile for the first time while submerged. Also inked by India and the United States is a Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) which allows for reciprocal use of bases for military logistics and resupply purposes. As reported in the press, LSA practically amounts to a “war pact.”

Conceptually, “deterrence” is a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of retaliation, a conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a belief that the costs of action will far exceed any possible gains. “Strategic stability” on the other hand is a condition in which a country feels confident that the potential adversary will not be able to undermine (weaken) his deterrent capability. As a concept, strategic stability has never been under any doubt. Nuclear powers strive to maintain strategic stability against their perceived adversary through balance in weaponry and employment strategies. In the absence of any measuring instrument, the concept nonetheless remains abstract.

Since their first emergence in the United States navy in 1955, nuclear submarines have continued to play a formidable role in providing nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Driven by miniature nuclear reactors and with nuclear weapons onboard, a nuclear submarine offers assured second strike. With distinctive characteristics like stealth, global reach and high speed, it becomes the most dependable branch in a nuclear triad. By making nuclear assets harder to find, a nuclear submarine guarantees that even if an incoming first strike was to destroy land-based weapons and attendant command and control system (counterforce strike), the sea-based assets remained available for retaliatory strike against a civilian target (counter value strike) such as major population centre.

All through the cold war, the United States as well as USSR maintained large quantities of nuclear arsenal onboard sea going platforms. But unlike on land where nuclear weapons can be kept de-mated, warheads onboard SSBNs are usually coupled (mated) with the delivery system, ready for launch. For deterrence to be effective, this is indispensable. Today, between 60-70 percent of globally deployable nuclear warheads are sea based.

Some leading western authors have lately questioned the efficacy of India’s sea-based deterrence and its contribution towards the strategic stability in South Asia. They argue that geostrategic and operational realities of South Asian theatre vary significantly from the cold war and these differences, combined with the “bureaucratic inertia, resource constraints, and sharp asymmetries between actors, suggests that the addition of nuclear armed submarines in the Indian Ocean will likely result in increased crisis in stability and fuel the conventional and nuclear arms races currently underway in the region.”

India’s latest maritime strategy of October 2015 however holds a contrary view. The document draws an unambiguous parallel with cold war in justifying India’s development of SSBN and nuclear triad. “Cold war experience has shown that reduction in the first strike and increase in second strike (retaliatory) component stabilises and strengthens deterrence,” expounds the document. Regardless, India’s nuclear submarines will have a serious impact on Pakistan’s maritime security and strategic stability in the region. In fact it fundamentally undercuts the premise of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD).

The potential threat of a limited conventional war by India following development of a proactive strategy led Pakistan to broaden its nuclear force posture. Although officially Pakistan maintains “Credible Minimum Deterrence” (CMD), the posture now embraces “Full Spectrum Deterrence”. According to local scholars and think tanks, FSD is Pakistan’s response to India’s complete spectrum of threat. Theoretically, what Pakistan needed was ‘limited nuclear options to fill the gap between doing too much, such as starting a general nuclear war, to doing too little like acquiescing to enemy’s attack’, they maintain. FSD, it is said, fulfills this very purpose for Pakistan. It aims to plug the gap created by Indian conventional advantage in the deterrence equation in South Asia.

But while FSD strives to plug the gap on land (India’s perceived spatial gains against Pakistan on land and latter’s response through Hatf-IX, short range Nasr missile), it does little to address the developing breach in the Indian Ocean strategic stability. Call it breach, gap or whatever, at sea Pakistan’s conventional and strategic asymmetry continues to multiply.

India aims to expand its existing fleet of 136 warships to 200 within next decade. Indian navy will soon have three carrier strike groups one for each of existing three commands. The carrier force will be backed by five to six Arihant class nuclear submarines. India’s aggressive naval built up, operational integration of SSBNs in nuclear construct coupled with escalating policy of backing proxy warfare inside Pakistan also serves to dent the “stability-instability paradox.” The concept developed during the cold war allowed the two super powers to engage in proxy wars against each other without threatening the equilibrium at the strategic level. But in South Asia, the equilibrium at both levels now grossly favours India.

As most of Asia veers towards sea, Pakistan remains glued to a tried, tested and futile land fixation -- a classic case of “sea blindness.” India’s proactive strategy may never realize on land. The country’s real “strategic depth”, it must be appreciated, now resides in the western Indian Ocean. With a bellicose government in New Delhi, the sooner Pakistan adapts to changed dynamics in the region, the better it would be. The fast maturing CPEC lends further credence to this necessity.

Pakistan’s FSD will remain “incomplete” so long as it does not provide an answer to the ever widening gap in Indian Ocean strategic stability. To all intents and purposes, Pakistan could view its “deterrence” incomplete, and thus, “not assured”. If our AIP fitted submarines cannot hit India’s distant eastward targets or population centres, this only means India’s strategic capabilities (especially with its SSBN now in operation) essentially remain unthreatened.

Moronic journo is comparing India vs Pak with US vs USSR.:biggrin2:
Cold War is there between countries with close levels of economic, military and technological prowess. Where does Pak stand against India in any of these aspects?

 

[Indx TechStyle]

The Indian ‘no’
What did they expect?

So much for the outside chance of a sit-down on the sideline of the Heart of Asia. Surely nobody at the prime minister’s secretariat, or the foreign office for that matter, really believed the Indians would be taken over enough by Sartaj’s flight to Amritsar to agree to start talking again. If anything, Sartaj’s fear – that India will use the summit on Afghanistan to badmouth Pakistan all over again – will most likely come true. So precious little, if anything at all, is likely to come out of this particular journey. It seems Islamabad’s only purpose behind sending Sartaj over was showing the international community that we want to talk, even in the face of Indian aggression in Occupied Kashmir as well as the LoC and working boundary.

Yet, as much as Sartaj might be doing the right thing by going, isn’t the exercise – of exposing Indian excesses – better served by a more proactive foreign ministry with a more serious formula of reaching out to the international community? The PM’s recent initiative, of sending a good two dozen envoys to foreign capitals, did not turn out to be a smart idea after all. And all that huff and puff at the UN didn’t get much moving either. Perhaps an overhaul of the machinery back home, then, is in order.

Despite PML-N’s denials, foreign policy has been in a mess for quite a while now. And it’s not just the Indians; Islamabad’s relations with many important countries are going south. The dip with the US is no secret. Nor is the hostility with the Afghans anything new. Dhaka, recently, not only hosted Modi’s shocker about the ’71 war, but also joined Delhi in boycotting Saarc in Islamabad. The Iranians, too, were ignored to the point of turning sour before they were given a little delayed attention. Had it not been for the Chinese and CPEC there would not have been much to write home about. The Indian ‘no’ to yet another offer to talk should finally open Islamabad’s eyes. The foreign ministry needs some serious revamping. And it needs it now.

Not national security, but it seems like the INDIA FACTOR is going to dominate the future of Pakistan. The "Obsession" Factorr!!
:biggrin2:

 

[OneGrimPilgrim]

@Indx TechStyle - as i had commented before, you're doing a great job researching, sharing all these info. however, do you also consolidate all this data and save for personal reference or achival-purposes too? that is also important.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

however, do you also consolidate all this data and save for personal reference or achival-purposes too? that is also important.

For small articles, DFI is my archive but yes, I collect a lot of long e books (pdf copies of strategy pages or writings by diplomats in 90s or long documents and reports printed now a days.)

I have a 50 page reference about cold start, some 10 pages about Indian Cold nuclear test capabilities etc. etc.
More than these small articles, these archives are actually responsible for building up my PoV.
But funny thing is that Im myself yet to read a lot of archive what I have.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Old challenge, new approach

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.

AMRITSAR reconfirmed Pakistan remains a target of joint criticism by India and Afghanistan. Much of domestic and international opinion by and large concurs with such criticism. Such is the failure of our Afghanistan and India policies. They cannot and will not be redressed by those who can only construct self-serving narratives. Control of our Afghanistan and India policies remain with those who are neither authorised nor qualified for the task. The situation is similar for much of our domestic security and political policies,

Our India policy impacts our Afghanistan policy. This is not to say Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy should run through Delhi. But to a great extent it does because our short-sighted and incompetent policymakers effectively insist that it does — with consistently negative results. Consistent with Einstein’s definition of lunacy, our adherence to such an India-focused Afghanistan policy is endlessly pursued in the hope that, somehow some day, it will produce positive results! We remain obstinately India-centric in the conduct of our Afghanistan policy, which has always alienated Afghanistan. It wilfully ignores the sensibilities and self-image of our Afghan brethren. Moreover, history testifies that any policy towards Afghanistan that provokes Afghan resistance is doomed to failure.

While Afghanistan cannot be treated as an aspect of our India policy, the state of our relations with India does impact on the range of options we can avail of to improve our relations with Afghanistan. This is because any significant and sustained improvement in our relations with India may (a) incline us to re-evaluate our dysfunctional strategies towards Afghanistan and (b) reduce India’s incentive to use its influence with Afghanistan as an option against Pakistan. For Pakistan to be simultaneously locked in a zero-sum relationship with two of its most immediate neighbours is pure folly. Pakistan can never be stable in such a situation.

India is, of course, the greater challenge because it is by far the bigger country and there is a long and cumulative history behind the current relationship. Moreover, Pakistan cannot control and contain the longer-term consequences of a hostile relationship with India. In the case of Afghanistan, the ‘differences’ are much more recent and far less profound even if they are not insignificant. Pakistan as the larger country is more able to lend a positive orientation to the development of the relationship. This would enhance our ability to cope with the challenge of India. We should, accordingly, ensure that the India-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dynamic does not remain a vicious circle for us.

Pakistan cannot control and contain the longer-term consequences of hostile ties with India.

Let us very broadly consider the policy challenges posed by India (and Afghanistan in a following article). In our relations with India we are confronted with six basic questions. (i) Where are we today in our relationship with India?; (ii) where should we want to be in our relationship with India?; (iii) why?; (iv) what is the cost of staying where we are in our relationship with India?; (v) what are the main obstacles to moving towards where we want to be in our relationship with India?; and (vi) how can we overcome these obstacles?

Broad answers to each of these questions are:

(i) We are today by and large where we have been for the past 70 years in our relationship with India which ranges from bad to very bad to conflict to relative improvement and back to bad;

(ii) We should want to move away from a silly, boring and dangerous relationship, especially given that we are both nuclear weapons states with a second strike and in search of a first strike capability against each other. We have no shared nuclear doctrine to minimise the potentially fatal risk of a misperception of an imminent nuclear threat or a miscalculated response to conventional aggression. We should also move towards a more sustainable working relationship pending a breakthrough on the core concerns of both countries ie Jammu and Kashmir and the use of terrorist violence including non-state actors as policy instruments;

(iii) Continued uncertainty and tension will hinder Pakistan in attracting sufficient FDI for a sustainable growth rate of eight per cent per annum to reduce its growing pool of the unemployed and thereby strengthen political stability;

(iv) The costs are ultimately existential for Pakistan as they involve the risk of becoming a failed state incapable of allocating the resources required to meet the survival challenges of 2050 including climate change and massive environmental destruction, and a population approaching 400 million of whom only a small fraction will have sufficient education, technical proficiency and family-supporting jobs to economically survive. This would inevitably lead to fascist political leadership offering calamitous solutions. CPEC can at best mitigate some of these lethal costs, and only for a while;

(v) Our major obstacles are our short-term and often zero-sum approach to resolving long-standing issues and our structural inability to learn from repeated failure and frustration; and

(vi) We need to adopt a longer-term policy perspective in which sensible short-term policies can cumulatively develop direction, momentum, understanding and support; similarly our security policies need to be embedded in our development and transformation strategies; and our civil-military relations need to be embedded in the constitutional and democratic imperative of civilian supremacy.

Finally, Jammu and Kashmir is a core issue for Pakistan. Positive movement on it is essential for progress in relations with India to be sustainable. India’s position regarding Kashmir is obdurate, rigid, dismissive of Pakistan and wrong. The major powers are only concerned over the possibility of nuclear conflict. They will not countenance any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan in any foreseeable situation. These are givens.

Within them, Pakistan must address India’s core concerns and move towards a principled compromise settlement acceptable to the Kashmiris. This is possible despite India’s current obstructionism provided Pakistan has confident and far-sighted leadership that is morally and politically able to communicate with its own people and assert Pakistan’s survival and transformation interests. Impossible? Only if our grasping and greedy elites are allowed to continue to subvert our people’s interests.