Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs)

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/June 2010/0610issbf.aspx

The Rise and Semi-Fall of MIRV

In its Nuclear Posture Review, DOD unveiled its decision to convert all Minuteman IIIs into single-warhead ICBMs. Today, USAF has 450 of them. Many have one warhead, but some are "MIRVed," meaning their nosecones have multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. These have up to three warheads.

Not for long, though, as plans call for USAF to "de-MIRV" them all. "This step," claimed the NPR, "will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first."

How will "downloading" US silo-based missiles substantially reduce the nuclear threat? In weighing the answer, it is useful to review some history.

Writing in 1953 about the two nuclear superpowers, J. Robert Oppenheimer, former scientific director for the Manhattan Project (turned harsh nuclear critic), observed, "We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at risk of his own life."

In the 1950s and 1960s, though, weapons were inaccurate. Because one had to commit several weapons to be sure to cover a single target, the attacker would run out of weapons before he wiped out the enemy's nukes. The foe's second strike was assured, so neither side wanted to go first.

MIRVing upset that stability. The US flight-tested a MIRVed system in 1968 and began deploying the triple-warhead Minuteman III in 1970. The USSR soon followed, catching and up with and then far surpassing the US by the early 1980s. On both sides, accuracies sharpened, too.

As MIRVed ICBMs proliferated, Oppenheimer's scorpions-in-a-bottle metaphor moved closer to reality, for two reasons:

Capability. Stacking multiple warheads on each missile dramatically increased each ICBM's firepower and its usefulness in mounting a disarming counterforce strike. An attacker could fire off a portion of his own ICBM force while still keeping some in reserve.

Incentive. Missiles with many warheads instantly became lucrative targets. A single enemy silo might now hold three, six, or more warheads. Even if an attacker had to expend two warheads per silo, the offense would still enjoy the benefits of a favorable exchange ratio.

It was this push-pull combination that made the late Cold War nuclear balance precarious. In a crisis, either side—though still very fearful—might be tempted to go first in hopes of gaining a war-winning advantage.

One of the great ironies of the times was the central role played by arms control in promoting this upward spiral of nuclear danger. While the superpowers probably would have gone MIRV at some point, that day was hastened by SALT talks in the late 1960s. The push was to limit launchers—bombers and missiles—not warheads. The logical response was to make the fullest use of each launcher by piling on warheads.

Arms negotiator Paul C. Warnke memorably, and mistakenly, compared the superpowers to "apes on a treadmill," with both "jogging in tandem on a treadmill to nowhere." There was only one ape, though. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown had it right when he said, "When we build, they build; when we stop building, they build."

According to Natural Resources Defense Council estimates, the US and Soviet Union in 1975 each had roughly 2,200 warheads atop their ICBMs.

Over the next five years, the US total didn't change, but Moscow more than doubled its MIRV force, winding up with 5,630 warheads fitted to its 1,400 or so land-based missiles. A huge number of these—more than 3,000 warheads—were found on the monster, 10-warhead SS-18 missiles. The Soviets had 308 of them.

In Western strategic circles, it was thought that the SS-18 force was powerful enough to destroy 65 to 80 percent of US ICBM silos, using two nuclear warheads against each, with more than 1,000 SS-18 warheads left over for further counterforce strikes.

Over time, as the arsenals grew, officials began to see the drawbacks of MIRVing, while it became clear single-warhead ICBMs were actually stabilizing. Such weapons reversed the push-pull dynamic set in motion by MIRVing.

"The principal cause of instability with current weapons systems is the disproportion between warheads and launchers," wrote Henry A. Kissinger in 1983. "There is no effective or intellectually adequate solution to this problem except to seek to eliminate multiple warheads."

Still, backing away from MIRV has been difficult. Washington took the first step in the 1980s, limiting deployment of its premier 10-warhead Peacekeeper to only 50 weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the US moved to retire that big ICBM. The last was withdrawn in 2005.

Moscow has also reduced its reliance on MIRVed missiles. Some reports claim it retains in service only about 60 out of the 308 SS-18 missiles, and plans to go down to about 40.

According to the White House, USAF's Minuteman III force has 550 warheads. Administration plans would cap the fleet at 420 deployed ICBMs, all with a single warhead.

In Russia, however, the situation is different. It has 331 functioning ICBMs, with about 1,100 warheads, an excess of 750 warheads. That is to say nothing about the US and Russian strategic submarine fleets, which are also equipped with high-performance MIRVed missiles.

It makes sense to end MIRVing and go to a single-warhead Minuteman force. Clearly, though, the golden age of single-warhead peace won't arrive unless Russia follows suit.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-will-de-mirv-its-icbms-leave-them-hair-trigger-alert

U.S. will de-MIRV its ICBMs, but leave them on hair-trigger alert

The new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control contains technical agreement more important than the precise number of warheads and delivery vehicles each side is allowed; for example: All U.S. ICBMs will be "de-MIRVed," U.S. strategic forces will remain, for the time being, on a "hair trigger" alert; the practice of "open-ocean targeting" for ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will continue: In the event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the missiles will be programmed to land in the ocean

The new arms control treaty, now available online, is an interesting document for what it contains, and for what it does not. Much of the conversation about arms control is typically fixated on counting warheads: As part of the New START treaty, the United States and Russia are committing to new limits on deployed warheads and delivery systems.

Nathan Hodge writes, though, that the technical details are also important, and he highlights some of them.

All U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, will be "de-MIRVed" (that is, limited to a single warhead each instead of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles).
The current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces — referred to during the cold war as "hair-trigger"alert — will be maintained. This means U.S. Air Force missile crews will stay on alert, and a significant number of nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines will remain at sea, although nuclear-armed bombers will be off full-time alert. The practice of "open-ocean targeting" for ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will continue: In the event of an unauthorized or accidental launch, the missiles will be programmed to land in the ocean (or in the case of the ICBMs, drop somewhere in the Arctic Sea).
European allies should also give the document a close read. The United States keeps some forward-deployed "non-strategic" nuclear weapons stationed in NATO countries. The nuclear review says a "small number" of those nuclear weapons will remain. The document also calls for "retain[ing] the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and proceed with full scope life extension for the B-61 bomb including enhancing safety, security, and use control."
Hodge writes that among other things, the administration will press for ratification the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996 but never ratified by the Senate. The document also calls for investment in new facilities to support the requirements of the stockpile stewardship: Maintenance of the nuclear arsenal without testing. And it foresees more funding for chemistry and metallurgy research facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old facility, as well as a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://spsaviation.net/story_issue.asp?Article=370


India Developing MIRVs
By Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia

NEWS
India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is reportedly validating technologies that will help India deploy multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) warheads on its missiles. The DRDO has confirmed it has made significant progress over the past few years in developing an indigenous technology for the single-rocket-multiple-warhead system, and DRDO expects this ultimate war machine will be ready in another three to four years. Scientists of the organisation claim the guidance system will have a high degree of accuracy to offset even a small circular error of probability or a negligible deviation from the intended target.

VIEWS
If true, India would indeed join the elite club of the first five 'Nuclear Haves' countries—the US, Russia, China, UK and France—which also possess MIRV warheads in their respective nuclear arsenals. It would also greatly enhance the country's nuclear deterrence capability. But what exactly is an MIRV? The multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle is a type of payload fitted on long-range guided missiles. An MIRV payload allows a single missile to carry several nuclear warheads and attack a number of targets in quick succession in the enemy territory. The concept was initially conceived in the early 1960s by the US to enhance the limited capacity of its nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles. It triggered a major escalation of arms race between the US and Russia (then USSR), the two major adversaries of the Cold War period. The Soviets retaliated by developing a similar technology but placing the warheads on larger rockets. This enabled them to put more/heavier warheads into one missile with much higher individual and collective weapon yields. Subsequently, the remaining 'nuclear weapon countries' also followed suit by developing indigenous capabilities of their own.

Today, all Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and some Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) of the US are fitted with MIRV warheads. Russia uses MIRVs on its ICBMs and SLBMs as well, whereas France and UK operate only SLBMs with MIRV warheads. China has developed MIRV technology for use on its ICBMs. It may also be extending this capability to its SLBMs.

An MIRV payload separates from an ICBM/SLBM as the missile reaches the top, or apex, of the ballistic arc. The individual warheads can then be directed to a number of different targets as the warheads fall toward earth. The use of MIRV makes it much more difficult to defend against a ballistic missile attack. Even if some warheads malfunction or are intercepted by anti-ballistic missile defences, the increased number of warheads provided by the MIRV payload greatly increases the chances of destroying the intended targets. In the same vein, several MIRVs may be aimed at a single, heavily defended target, in an attempt to ensure its destruction.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Rus...nder_MIRV_As_21st_Century_ABM_Buster_999.html

Russian Officials Tout Iskander MIRV As 21st Century ABM Buster

The commander of the Russian Ground Forces, Alexei Maslov, said Wednesday Russia has "a 21st century weapon," following two successful missile tests Tuesday. Earlier commenting on the tests - of a strategic RS-24 MIRV intercontinental missile launched from the north and a new version of the Iskander (SS-26), an advanced theater-level surface-to-surface missile in the south - Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said, "Russians need not worry about defense: they can look confidently to the future."
"We now have new [missile] systems at the strategic as well as theater level," Ivanov had said, adding that "these systems can beat any operational and future missile defenses," in a veiled reference to U.S. plans to place part of its missile shield in Central Europe, notably Poland and Czech Republic.

Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the U.S. plans at a Tuesday meeting with Jose Socrates, the premier of Portugal poised to take over as EU presidency on July 1.

"We believe that attempts to turn Europe into a powder keg and to deploy new kinds of weapons are harmful and dangerous," Putin said.

The RS-24 is a MIRVed version of the operational Topol-M (SS-25), carrying up to 10 independently targetable warheads.

The R-500 is a new cruise missile adapted for the Iskander launcher previously used only with tactical ballistic missiles. With a range of up to 280 km (170 miles), a radar-evading trajectory and a hit error of no more than three meters, it can be effectively used against small targets, including separate missile launchers.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/MIRV-ing_The_Topol_Part_One_999.html

MIRV-ing The Topol

An anti-missile shield, or America's ambition to establish one in Europe, has become the event of the year in security and strategic terms. The most discussed subject in Russia has been an adequate but asymmetrical response.
To counter several interceptor missiles and a radar station in Europe, Russia has repeatedly said it will build up its strategic offensive capability.

Now it is deploying a new intercontinental ballistic missile RS-24 with multiple individually targetable warheads. "The RS-24 will boost the Strategic Missile Force's ability to penetrate the missile defense system," Colonel Alexander Vovk, head of the Force's information service, said in mid-December.

There is nothing surprising about the asymmetry: Russia responds with what it has. But one wonders about the cost and wisdom of such a reply.

To begin with, the RS-24 is a converted Topol, only with a new nosecone. Remarks by Russian officials that the RS-24 was built around Topol elements are indirect, but there is substantial evidence in favor of that theory.

On Dec. 19 First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov twinned the two missiles, saying the new Topol-M "will also have separable warheads."

The RS-24 owes its origins to the START-I Treaty. Under it, neither Russia nor the United States has the right to change single for multiple warheads until 2009. New developments, however, are free from this restriction.

Take a closer look at the Topol. It is a mobile solid propellant missile developed as an asymmetrical response to American strategic missiles with separable warheads and increased firing accuracy deployed in the mid-1970s. Russia did not have anything of the kind. So mobile Topols (or SS-25 Sickle according to the NATO reporting name) began to enter combat duty in 1984.

In the 1990s Russia undertook a sweeping upgrading of Topols and in 2000 put in service a silo-based Topol-M (SS-27). About a year ago a mobile Topol-M2 went on operational status.

Russian top planners give the new Topols the key role in the country's ground nuclear forces for years ahead. Now they are also to act as a counterweight to American missile defenses.

Mobility is considered to be the Topol's main advantage. It hides its deployment and adds to its capability to pierce hostile missile defenses by using separable and maneuverable warheads.

These are serious arguments. But there is another side to the matter.

It would seem mobility is the answer to all prayers for camouflage and concealment. Unfortunately, ever since the United States developed Lacrosse imaging radar in the mid-1990s, darkness and cloud cover ceased to be an obstacle to missile detection.

Any concealment is out of the question now, and the system's survivability is practically zero in a hostile missile attack.

In passing it can be said that the United States decided against developing a mobile Midgetman strategic missile, concentrating instead on the survivability of its ground-based nuclear systems by hardening silos as part of the Minuteman-3 modernization program.

Now let us have a look at multiple warheads, their range and accuracy.

A host of information sources, from Encyclopaedia Britannica to such specialized magazines as Military Technology and Aviation Week, tell us that initially the Topol was fitted out with a single nuclear warhead with a TNT equivalent of 550 kilotons. Circular error probable was about 200 meters.

At the same time, America's main intercontinental ballistic missile Minuteman-3, which entered service in 1970, was equipped with three Mk-12A individually targetable re-entry vehicles each with a TNT equivalent of 335 kilotons.

Its CEP did not exceed 220 meters, and, following modernization, is estimated at 120 meters. The Minuteman has a range of up to 14,800 kilometers.

Compared with that, the Topol's all-up weight is 12 tons more than the corresponding figure for the American missile, which, naturally, affects its range.

As time went by, the single-warhead Topol-M, according, for example, to the Russian Military Parity Internet publication, "caught up" in many respects. Its sustainers now have better thrust characteristics, and CEP is reduced.

The upshot, however, is that the modernized Topol does no more than come near the American missile of 40 years ago, inferior in range and warhead yield.

But any modernization has its limits. Multiple warheads differ in principle from a single warhead, both in equipment and weight. The first requirement is a bus with an independent control system, whose electronics must be protected against the effects of a nuclear explosion and have special facilities to detect and counter noise.

Another requirement is a propulsion unit with a fuel supply to alter speed and attitude before the separation of each warhead. Besides, all warheads are provided with several attitude engines. The necessary increase in weight can be achieved only by reducing the yields or reducing the range.

The last factor is critical for the Topol-M. According to the Military Parity, the mobile system has a range not exceeding 5,760 miles, or 9,600 kilometers.

This raises a question, or rather two questions. Does asymmetry devalue the concept of ground strategic nuclear forces, which have for a long time and through difficult years guaranteed the country's security? Would it not be wiser to develop an adequate and symmetric answer by deploying Russia's own anti-missile point defense alongside an intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with standard penetration aids based on individually targetable re-entry vehicles?

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.military.cz/usa/navy/weapons/trident/trident_en.htm

SLBM Trident

Tridents are intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from submarines. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) have been an integral part of the strategic deterrent for six generations, starting in l956 with the U.S. Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Polaris (A1) program. Since then, the SLBM has evolved through Polaris (A2), Polaris (A3), Poseidon (C3) and today's force of Trident I (C4) and Trident II (D5). Each generation has been continuously deployed at sea as a survivable retaliatory force and has been routinely operationally tested and evaluated to maintain confidence and credibility in the deterrent.

Trident I (C4) was first deployed in 1979 and is planned to be deployed until phased out in the early 2000s. Trident II (D5) was first deployed in 1990 and is planned to be deployed past 2020. The Trident II (D5) missile is also provided to the United Kingdom which equips the missile with UK warheads and deploys the missile on Vanguard Class UK submarines.

Trident I (C4) and Trident II (D5) missiles are deployed in Ohio- class (Trident) submarines, each carrying 24 missiles.

The Trident II (D5) is a three-stage, solid-propellant, inertially guided FBM with a range of more than 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 statute miles). Trident II is more sophisticated than Trident I (C4) with a significantly greater payload capability. All three stages of the Trident II are made of lighter, stronger, stiffer graphite epoxy, whose integrated structure means considerable weight saving. The missile's range is increased by the aerospike, a telescoping outward extension that reduces frontal drag by about 50 percent. Trident II is launched by the pressure of expanding gas within the launch tube. When the missile attains sufficient distance from the submarine, the first stage motor ignites, the aerospike extends and the boost stage begins. Within about two minutes, after the third stage motor kicks in, the missile is traveling in excess of 20,000 feet (6,096 meters) per second.

General characteristic Trident I (C4)

Primary function Strategic Nuclear Deterrence
Contractor Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space, Sunnyvale, Calif.
Propulsion Three-stage solid-propellant rocket
Length 34 ft 10.36 m
Weight 73,000 lb 33,112 kg
Diameter 74 in 188 cm
Range 4,600 miles 7,400 km
Guidance system Inertial
Warhead Nuclear MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles)
Deployed 1979
General characteristic Trident II (D5)

Primary function Strategic Nuclear Deterrence
Contractor Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., Sunnyvale, Calif.
Propulsion Three-stage solid-propellant rocket
Length 44 ft 13.41 m
Weight 130,000 lb 58,967 kg
Diameter 83 in 211 cm
Range more than 4,600 miles More than 7,400 km
Guidance System Inertial
Warheads Nuclear MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable re-entry Vehicle); Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle
Unit Cost $30.9 million
Date deployed 1990

 

[LETHALFORCE]

CROSS POSTED
http://www.spacewar.com/news/abm-05zzd.html

Russia Developing New Generation Of Super Missiles

Almost ignored by the mainstream U.S. media, the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia has revived -- with spending and weapons development at an intensity unseen since the days of the SS-18 and Pershing II deployments a quarter of a century ago.
On Nov. 17, as reported by United Press International, the U.S. Navy successfully carried out its most ambitious and successful test yet of an anti-ballistic missile interceptor launched from an Aegis class cruiser in the Pacific Ocean. The success of the test contrasted sharply with the enormous delays, cost over-runs and major test failures that have plagued the land-based anti-missile technology deployed by the Missile Defense Agency around Fort Greely, Alaska.

But meanwhile, Russia continues to push ahead with its most massive intercontinental ballistic missile testing and upgrading program since the collapse of communism. Flush with oil export revenues, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been pouring resources into his Strategic Missile Forces to upgrade the land-mobile SS-27 Topol-M and submarine-launched Bulova ICBMs and make them maneuverable and impervious to America's still untried new anti-missile defense systems.

"You would think the Cold War never ended," analyst James Hackett wrote in the Washington Times Nov. 14.

This week, the Russian Space Troops Force announced that it and the Strategic Missile Forces had successfully test-launched another Topol missile (designated by the Russians as RS-12M) from the high security Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Russia's northern Arkhangelsk Region.

"The missile was launched from an autonomous launch station. The purpose of the launch is to confirm the flight, technical and operation characteristics of the mobile ground-based Topol missile complex so that its service life can be extended to 20 years," Aleksey Kuznetsov, the head of the Space Troops' press service, told the Interfax news agency. He said that the launch went smoothly and proceeded as planned.

The test was just the latest in a massive, ambitious and so far generally successfully series of tests previously reported by UPI.

Hackett noted that the SS-27 Topol is the strategic centerpiece of the rapidly upgrading Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. "The mobile version, harder to find and target, will be deployed beginning next year," he wrote. "A rapid-acceleration, solid-fuel missile, it will be difficult to intercept in the boost phase and the maneuvering warhead will make it hard to stop thereafter."

British analyst Duncan Lamont wrote in an executive overview to the new edition of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems in November that the upgraded Topol-Ms and Bulavas now being tested are "armed with some sort of hypersonic payload which would be capable of maneuvering in its midcourse and terminal phase, and thereby evading the sort of ground-based, midcourse ballistic missile defenses currently being fielded in Alaska and California."

"A new class of ballistic missiles is emerging, now being called 'quasi- or semi-' ballistic missiles. These are missiles that can maneuver during the boost, mid-course, and the terminal phases of flight," Lennox wrote.

Submarine-launched missiles, like the Bulova SRBM "have very depressed trajectories, possibly as low as 24 miles altitude for a missile with a range of 180 to 240 miles. The trajectory shape is flat, but with the ability to change direction across track as well as to increase or decrease the range. This will make it more difficult for any defensive system to forecast the impact point," Lennox wrote.

Russia already has 46 Topols deployed in silos but that is only the tip of its strategic nuclear missile iceberg. Hackett writes that the Kremlin plans to upgrade all of them with three maneuvering warheads each, and to replace all its existing, road-mobile SS-25s with road-mobile Topols.

Money will not be a problem. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced last month a $1.8 billion increase in the Strategic Missile Forces budget to pay for the upgrades.

Hackett notes correctly that the only currently feasible way, even theoretically, to develop missile defenses against the dramatically upgraded Bulavas and Topols would be to pre-position space-based anti-ballistic missile interceptors in orbit. Russian analysts agree with this conclusion.

But of course, it would be much more expensive and technically demanding for the United States to add a space-based interceptor program to its current, vastly over-budget and behind schedule ABM programs at a time of unprecedented federal deficits. When the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has failed in two of its last three attempts to get even the basic engine of a ground-based ABM interceptor to ignite for take-off, the sheer engineering challenge of deploying a fleet of space-based interceptors that could intercept dozens of Topol Ms or Bulavas appears insurmountable.

Therefore, for all the scores of billions of dollars that have already been poured into ABM defense, the physics and engineering advantages on the High Frontier still lie overwhelmingly with the offensive systems. A quarter century after Ronald Reagan unveiled his "Star Wars" vision of an effective anti-ballistic missile space defense, the world remains locked in the straitjacket of Mutually Assured Destruction theory as its only viable deterrent against nuclear war.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Bulava missile

 

[sayareakd]

Agni missile with MIRVs artistic impression

 

[LETHALFORCE]

ICBM defense penetration chart

 

[sayareakd]

why is this big difference in payload of Agni3 and Agni1, i strongly think that big cone of Agni 3 can house (500kg X 3) warhead. it is too big for single warhead.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/leitenberg/mirv.pdf

Studies of Military R&D and Weapons Development: The Origin of MIRV

 

[LETHALFORCE]

why is this big difference in payload of Agni3 and Agni1, i strongly think that big cone of Agni 3 can house (500kg X 3) warhead. it is too big for single warhead.

some more info on payload and range for AGNI 3

 

[nrj]

MIRV Warhead

This is a Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV).
Each of the small black cones is a warhead that can deliver to separate targets.

 

[sayareakd]

Agni 3

Now compare the two remember for Agni2 it use those fins which carry extra weight, while the same is missing in A3.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

cross posted

AGNI MIRV DESIGNS

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Minutemen 2 prior to Minutemen 3 MIRV

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes...eported-to-be-developing-MIRV-capability.html

India reported to be developing MIRV capability

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is working on the technologies needed to allow the country to deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on its ballistic missiles, the newspaper India Today reported on 16 October.

Although the newspaper claimed that India was "on the verge" of getting a MIRV capability, it noted that an operational weapon was not likely to be available for another three or four years.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.indiastudychannel.com/resources/119643-Commercial-Viability-India-s-Space-Program.aspx

Commercial Viability of India's Space Program
First, India's progress in launch vehicle technology is evident in the following areas: First, the launch capacity of India's launch vehicles has increased. India began to develop launch vehicles in 1963 and made substantial progress in launch vehicle technology in the 1980s. Its launch vehicle technology matured in the 1990s. Later, India improved its PSLV launcher to enhance its launch capacity. Today, it is developing a more powerful launch vehicle, GSLV-MK3, which can deliver a payload of 4 tons to the geostationary transfer orbit and a payload of 10 tons to the low earth orbit. It will develop a cryogenic upper stage for its GSLV launcher and accelerate its research on air-breathing engines and reusable launch vehicles. Reusable launch vehicles, which can help reduce the costs of space transportation, will further increase India's launch capacity.


Second, India is a player in the international commercial launch market. It became the world's fifth commercial launch service provider when it put an Italian satellite into space with its PSLV launcher in April 2007. Its GSLV-MK1 launcher, on which it takes only $15,000-$16,000 to send 1 kg of payload to the geostationary transfer orbit, is competitive in the international market. The ISRO said India would take 10 percent of the international commercial launch market in the next five years due to its stable performance, multi-satellite launch capacity and low launch costs.

Third, India has gained an initial command of some basic technologies of the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). India put a cluster of 10 satellites into orbit on a PLSV launcher in April, becoming the fifth country to be able to launch more than one satellite on a single launch vehicle after the United States, Russia, the European Space Agency and China. Multi-satellite launch technology and MIRV technology share some similarities, and a mastery of the former can pave the way for the latter. India is expected to gain a complete command of MIRV technology in 15 to 20 years. This technology will enable it to use a single launched missile to strike several targets.

Fourth, India has forged ahead with its research on intercontinental missiles. India now possesses short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and is developing long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Indian defense experts said it would not be difficult to convert PSLV launchers to intercontinental ballistic missiles. India has test-fired its Surya missile, whose range is close to an intercontinental missile. Its Ministry of Defense also has disclosed that the country is speeding up research on intercontinental missiles. All these moves provide evidence to India's improving intercontinental missile technology.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/U...ed_Launch_Of_Fleet_Ballistic_Missile_999.html

U.S. Navy Marks 50th Anniversary Of First Submerged Launch Of Fleet Ballistic Missile

July 20 marked the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs' first underwater launch of a Fleet Ballistic Missile, which was designed and built by Lockheed Martin.

The Polaris A1 missile successfully launched from the submerged USS George Washington (SSBN-598), the first ballistic missile submarine, July 20, 1960, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Fla. This successful Navy test proved the capability of launching missiles from the natural protection of the deep sea, securing a strategic advantage to the nation.

In 1956, as part of a Navy-industry research and development effort, the first Fleet Ballistic Missile, Polaris A1, became a critical component of the U.S.'s strategic triad of defenses.

A mere four years later, a 28,800-pound, two-stage ballistic missile with a range of 1,200 nautical miles, powered by solid fuel rocket motors and guided by an inertial guidance system, broke the surface of the water like never before.

"Launching the A1 missile was a significant accomplishment for the Navy and the nation," said Melanie A. Sloane, vice president of Fleet Ballistic Missile programs, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company.

"A submerged launch has several added technical challenges and considerations, such as launch tube environment, underwater current flow impacts and pressure differentials at various depths. Overcoming these challenges in concert with our Strategic Systems Programs partner, and evolving the capability over the past 50 years to today's Trident II D5 missile, is a national security mission we are proud to support."

Today's Trident II D5, a three-stage, solid-propellant, inertial-guided ballistic missile, travels a nominal distance of 4,000 nautical miles and carries multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles.

The Navy has achieved 134 consecutive successful submerged test launches of the D5 missile since 1989 - a record unmatched by any other large ballistic missile or space launch vehicle. The Trident missile is currently aboard OHIO-class submarines and British VANGUARD-class submarines patrolling international waters.

Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, Calif., has designed and produced six generations of Fleet Ballistic Missiles as the Navy's strategic missile prime contractor since program inception, including: Polaris A1, Polaris A2, Polaris A3, Poseidon C3, Trident I C4 and Trident II D5.

Lockheed Martin Space Systems employees, principally in California, Georgia, Florida, Washington, Utah and Virginia, support the design, development, production, test, and operation and sustainment of the Trident Strategic Weapon System.