Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs)

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5aFCGMehxU
Youtube-What makes AGNI 5 Deadlier

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.aviationweek.aero/aw/gen...l&headline=India Stresses Missile Development

India Stresses Missile Development

India has become a major consumer, producer and developer of advanced technology. With indigenous defense programs coming to fruition, partnerships with key global contractors, a clever use of offsets (DTI October 2007, p. 22) and billions of dollars slated for procurement, India and its leading scientific agency, the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO), are becoming world-class players in the development and application of advanced technology.

India has been upgrading its military capabilities in recent years, driven by its growing economy and challenges ranging from border conflicts with Pakistan and China to terrorism. One area in particular, aerospace, is returning major dividends to air, ground and naval forces as measured by advances in force projection, striking power and deterrence.

The DRDO will spend $10 billion over the next seven years on strategic and tactical missiles, including the Astra air-to-air missile, BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (DTI December 2007, p. 17), Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM), Nag antitank guided missile and the Shourya surface-to-surface ballistic missile.

Missile research got a boost when the Defense Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL)—part of DRDO—developed the Akash in the 1990s and added technology upgrades last year that increased its range. The Indian Air Force (IAF) placed an order with government-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) and its partners for two squadrons of Akash SAMs, which have a range of 30 km. (18 mi.). The delivery timeline is 36 months.

“The order will be cleared by 2011,” says Prahlada, chief controller of the DRDO, who uses one name. “This is the first time [an indigenous] SAM for air defense has been ordered. This has also convinced the army to look at Akash.” (An interview with Prahlada appeared in DTI January/February 2006, p. 40.)
Shourya surface-to-surface missile is designed to provide India with a second-strike capability.Credit: AP/WIDE WORLD FILE PHOTO

A long-range SAM (70 km.) is in the pipeline through a joint development program with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) that started last year. The program involves DRDO labs in Pune, Bangalore and Hyderabad. IAI will contribute most of the technology.

Having successfully test-fired the Agni-3 surface-to-surface missile (range 3,000 km.), DRDO is looking at the Agni-5, which has derivative technology for larger payloads and longer range. The Agni-5 will be a solid-fuel ballistic missile with multiple warheads. Two of its three stages will be made of composites. Its range will be over 5,000 km. The first flight-test version is expected by 2010.

The missile is being developed for deterrence, not as an offensive weapon, says V.K. Saraswat, who oversees research and development on missiles and strategic systems at DRDO. “The Agni-3 and Agni-5 will have countermeasures, reentry maneuver capabilities and stealth.”

Sixty percent of Agni-5 subsystems will be similar to those in the Agni-3. The rest of the missile will have advanced technologies such as a locally developed ring-laser gyroscope and accelerometer for navigation and guidance.

The recent test-firing of the new Shourya ballistic missile was another success for DRDO. Shourya, developed for use by the army, is designed to provide a credible second-strike capability. Its range is reportedly 600 km. DRDO has not said if it can carry nuclear warheads, but the missile reportedly has high maneuverability and an anti-missile intercept capability.

 

[Daredevil]

All Agni-III launch related news and discussion moved to Indian Missile Development Thread. Keep this thread for MIRV developments only.

http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/showthread.php?3-Indian-Missile-Development/page28

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Agni mirv designs

AGNI MIRV possible future designs

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2185477/posts

ICBM test to launch India into Big Five
Times of India ^ | 2/14/2009 | Rajat Pandit

Posted on Saturday, February 14, 2009 3:28:25 AM by bruinbirdman

BANGALORE: India will test its most ambitious strategic missile next year, in what will be its first step towards having potent ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capabilities, largely the preserve of the Big-5 countries till now.

With the design work on the 5,000-km-range Agni-V virtually over now, DRDO chief M Natarajan on Friday said the missile would certainly be tested before December 2010. "I am very confident we will be able to do it,'' he said, speaking on the sidelines of the Aero India-2009 show here.

The work on the nuclear-capable Agni-V basically revolves around incorporating a third composite stage in the two-stage Agni-III, along with some advanced technologies like ring laser gyroscope and accelerator for navigation and guidance.

Agni-III, with a strike range of 3,500-km to accord the capability to strike targets deep inside China, on its part, has been successfully tested only two times till now.

Defence scientists want the solid-fuelled Agni-V, for which the government has sanctioned around Rs 2,500 crore, to be a canister-launch missile system to ensure it has the requisite operational flexibility to be fired from any part of the country.

Agni-V will be slightly short of true ICBMs, which have ranges in excess of 5,500 km. "We have the capability to go in for much higher range but it is for the government to give a go-ahead. At present, we have a green signal for only Agni-V,'' said a scientist.

As reported recently by TOI, while China is several leagues ahead, India continues to lag behind even Pakistan in the missile race. At present, only the 150-to-350 km short range Prithvi missile can be said to be "fully operational'' in the armed forces. The 700-km Agni-I and 2,000-km Agni-II are still in the process of being inducted into the forces.

India, of course, hopes to gate-crash into the very exclusive club of countries like US, Russia and China, which have both ICBM as well as SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) capabilities, by 2010-2011.

DRDO is working on the K-15 SLBM, having tested it from submersible pontoon launchers till now, with the aim to integrate it on the indigenous nuclear submarines being built under the secretive ATV (advanced technology vessel) project.

Though not in the range of the over 5,000-km SLBMs in the arsenal of US, Russia and China, the 750-km range K-15 will accord India with the desperately-needed third leg of the "nuclear weapon triad''. India currently depends on the Agni missiles as well as fighters like Mirage-2000s as its platforms to deliver nuclear weapons.

DRDO, of course, is also going to shortly conduct the third test of the fledgling two-tier BMD (ballistic missile defence) system, capable of tracking and destroying incoming hostile missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) the earth's atmosphere.

The BMD system was tested for the first time in November 2006 when an "exo-atmospheric'' hypersonic interceptor missile was used to destroy an "enemy'' Prithvi missile at an altitude of 40-50 km.

The second time, in December 2007, an "endo-atmospheric interceptor'' took on an enemy missile at an altitude of 15-km. "After the third test in a month or so, we will test the endo and exo together in an integrated mode later this year,'' said a scientist.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/big-story/isro’s-feat-civil-show-missile-muscle-278

Isro’s feat a civil show of missile muscle

ON SEPTEMBER 23, Isro once again demonstrated the expertise it has acquired over several satellite launches — the ability to put multiple payloads into precise orbits in a single rocket mission. Each time it does so, questions are asked about whether India could use this capability on its military missiles.
It’s an important question, especially for India’s nuclear enemies and the non-proliferation lobbies in the US. What they worry about is a missile that can carry and lob multiple warheads at an enemy — the multiple independently-targetable vehicle, or MIRV-ed, missile. The US, Russia, Britain and France possess such missiles, each of which can carry between 3-10 nuclear warheads and shoot each at a different target. MIRV-ed missiles are the ultimate vehicles for nuclear weapons delivery because they are impossible to defend against.
But what has that got to do with Isro and its civilian satellite launches? Space technology is inherently dual use: the technologies and capabilities that one develops for rocket launch can help build missiles; spacecraft can be used for both military and civilian purposes. By design or by default, therefore, many of the technologies demonstrated by Isro in launching multiple satellites in one shot validate Indian capabilities to design MIRV-ed missiles. In the 1960s, technologies that were developed for the US space programme served as forerunners to the MIRV-ed missiles that came later. There are essentially four critical technologies that go into making a MIRV-ed missile, and in successive launches at least since 2007, Isro has demonstrated pretty much all of them (see box).
The question, however, is whether Isro is palming off these technologies to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which develops the country’s missiles. The answer is no, for several reasons. For one, Isro maintains a strict firewall between itself and India’s military R&D establishment, for fear of attracting US sanctions and technology denial.
Second, the DRDO itself has its own programmes to develop MIRV-ed missiles, many of them initiated before Isro demonstrated its technologies. Indeed, it is said the missile makers have made enough headway to MIRV a missile that’s currently under development — the 3,000+ km Agni-III missile may be designed to carry three nuclear warheads. India’s eventual ICBM will carry at least eight warheads, according to DRDO sources.
Third, MIRV-ed missiles are so much more demanding in terms of accuracy, response times and manouvreability of the missile, the warhead dispensing systems and the warheads themselves that satellite launch technology cannot be taken and readily used on missiles.
“The basic technologies for dispensing, navigation, etc., are the same, and they are available with India in both its space programme and in DRDO. Each, however, requires its own customisations. Satellites go into space orbit, our MIRV warheads come back into the atmosphere, etc., and so there are different demands on each,” a top DRDO missile scientist said, although he would neither confirm nor deny details about Agni-III.
Still, the value of Isro’s capability demonstrations should not be underestimated. As one top DRDO scientist said while asking not to be quoted, each time Isro or DRDO show a capability that the other is also interested in, it tells the scientists and engineers in the other camp that even they can achieve it within the constraints imposed upon India, meaning despite the technology denial regimes imposed on India.
When the French wanted to MIRV their missiles, they struggled unsuccessfully for several years. What got them going was an “innovative” method of technology transfer — actually, proliferation — by the Americans. In exchange for the French military agreeing to coordinate its plans for a military response to the erstwhile Soviet Union with those of the Nato, the Americans agreed to help the French missile scientists MIRV their missiles through a “negative feedback” mechanism — French scientists would put before the Americans various options they were considering to solve the problems they were facing in MIRV-ing, the Americans would tell them which ones wouldn’t work. Over a number of iterations, the French were left with a distilled set of solutions that worked. France got its MIRV-ed missiles.

 

[bengalraider]

The thing i am waiting for is the road mobility; Agni 5 may have a 5000km range and Mirv's but what shall truly up the ante in the subcontinent shall be the road mobility of the missile

 

[LETHALFORCE]

The thing i am waiting for is the road mobility; Agni 5 may have a 5000km range and Mirv's but what shall truly up the ante in the subcontinent shall be the road mobility of the missile

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2009/10/road-mobility-gives-agni-5-global-reach.html

 

[bengalraider]

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2009/10/road-mobility-gives-agni-5-global-reach.html

Exactly, i knew about the road mobility aspect of the A5 what i was talking about is that i am waiting for the road mobility tests of the missile not the Mirv tests, anybody know which chassis we plan to use for a TEL.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://mightyindiapower.blogspot.com/2009/10/india-mutliple-warhead-system.html

India's mutliple-warhead system

This one is on the lines of free-market commercials: Ask for one and get at least four free! The difference is that it is not a shirt or a pair of jeans. It's a single rocket capable of delivering multiple warheads - even non-conventional nuclear systems - at different targets.

The country is on the verge of getting one as the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is validating technologies that will help India deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) on its missiles.

Currently, the country has missiles that can deliver only one warhead at a time. The defence research establishment has confirmed that it has made significant progress over the past few years in developing an indigenous technology for the single-rocket-multiplewarhead system. In another three-four years, this ultimate war machine will be ready.

The DRDO says the platform for re-entry vehicles would be different from the indigenously developed Agni series of missiles. Since it would be precision device, sources said the guiding system would require a high degree of accuracy to offset even a small circular error of probability or a negligible deviation from the intended target.

Another reason for this overbearing inclination for detail and accuracy is that the destructive potential of smaller warheads on multiple vehicles is low. Hence, these warheads will have to hit the intended targets at the accurate point and optimise the damage. That apart, the scientists will have to miniaturise the size of the warheads and develop a superior guidance system.

The MIRV system is not a new concept. Senior analyst G. Balachandran of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses said the technology was conceived in the early 1960s by the US to enhance the limited capacity of its nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

It triggered a major escalation of the arms race between the US and Russia (then USSR) in the Cold War period. The Soviets retaliated by developing a similar technology but placing the warheads on larger rockets. This enabled them to put more warheads into one missile.

Eventually, the two countries signed several strategic arms limitation agreements, reducing the number and weight of the warheads.

The Indian MIRV could also kick up a storm on whether it is against the principle of "nuclear restraint" that guides the country's nuclear doctrine.

Senior journalist Praful Bidwai, also an anti- nuclear activist, said the move would "escalate a disastrous arms race with China". In 2002, China successfully tested its first MIRV - to offset the advantage the US enjoyed with its American National Missile Defence System.

Bidwai said China would surely view the Indian development as threat. "It also strikes at the root of the concept of minimum, credible deterrence as multiple warheads on a missile would surely hike the Indian arsenal manifolds." But Balachandran and Air Commodore (retired) Jasjit Singh, who is now the director of the Centre for Air Power Studies, begged to differ.

"Escalation is a condition that the other party denotes on the basis of its perception. If a single missile delivers multiple warheads, it actually reduces the number of launch vehicles," Singh explained.

Prominent strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam said the multiple warheads would increase the survival chances of the weapons in case of a nuclear attack.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?page=0&cp-documentid=3288644&=&

Missile breakthrough: Agni-V poised for a global reach

Hyderabad: The Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) in Hyderabad, which develops India’s strategic (long-range, nuclear-tipped) missiles, has dramatically increased the options for its forthcoming Agni-5 missile by making it highly road-mobile, or easily transportable by road.

In many other respects, the Agni-5, which is scheduled to make its first flight in early-2011, carries forward the Agni-3 pedigree. With composites used extensively to reduce weight, and a third stage added on (the Agni-3 was a two-stage missile), the Agni-5 can fly 1,500 km further than the 3,500-km Agni-3.

"The Agni-5 is specially tailored for road-mobility," explains Avinash Chander, Director, ASL. "With the canister having been successfully developed, all India's future land-based strategic missiles will be canisterised as well".

Made of maraging steel, a canister must provide a hermitically sealed atmosphere that preserves the missile for years. During firing, the canister must absorb enormous stresses when a thrust of 300to 400 tonnes is generated to eject the 50-tonne missile.

Canister technology was first developed in India for the Brahmos cruise missile. But it was the K-15 underwater-launched missile, developed here in Hyderabad for India's nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant, which fully overcame the technological hurdles in canisterising ballistic missiles.

Another major technological breakthrough that will beef up the Agni-5 is ASL's success in developing and testing MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles). An MIRV, atop an Agni-5 missile, comprises three to 10 separate nuclear warheads. Each warhead can be assigned to a separate target, separated by hundreds of kilometres; alternatively, two or more warheads can be assigned to one target.

"We have made major progress on the MIRVs in the last two years," is all that Avinash Chander is willing to say on the subject.

Nevertheless, extensive testing still lies ahead for this highly complex technology. MIRVs will be deployed on the Agni-5 only after another 4-5 years.

While MIRV technology is similar to launching multiple satellites through a space rocket, a missile requires far greater accuracy. A satellite would be considered in correct orbit even it is a kilometre higher or lower than planned.

But each warhead in an MIRV must impact within 40 metres of its target. With such high accuracies, even small nuclear warheads are sufficient for the job.

Strategic planners consider MIRVs essential, given India's declared "no first use" nuclear policy. Even after an enemy has hit India with a full-fledged nuclear strike, destroying or incapacitating much of the strategic arsenal, a handful of surviving Indian missiles must be capable of retaliating with massive and unacceptable damage. Multiple warheads on a handful of Agni-5 missiles would constitute such a capability.

MIRVs also enable a single missile to overwhelm the enemy's missile defences. Tracking and shooting down multiple warheads are far more difficult than intercepting a single warhead.

Providing each warhead with the capability to manoeuvre, and dodge enemy interceptor missiles, increases survivability further. The MIRV warheads are also being given electronic packages for jamming enemy radars.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://knol.google.com/k/agni-v-irbm#MIRV_Warheads

Agni-V IRBM

The canisterized intermediate range nuclear capable Agni-V missile is also referred to as Agni-III+
The Indian Government sanctioned Rs2,500 crore to develop the Agni V missile, with a range of 5,000km in 2008. The missile is expected to be ready for testing in the 2010-11 time frame.
Contents

* At a Glance
* Introduction
* Navigation System
* Operational Status
* Use of Composites
* MIRV Warheads
* Canister Launch

At a Glance

Range 5,000 km
Stages Three
Warhead Weight 1.5 ton
Warhead Type Single
MIRV warheads under development.
Total Weight 51 ton
Dimensions 22m long, 2m diameter
Status Design completed. First Test - Early 2011

Introduction
The Indian Government sanctioned Rs2,500 crore to develop the Agni V missile, with a range of 5,000km in 2008. (The Agni V is also referred to as Agni III+).

The missile is being developed by adding an all composite third state to the two-stage, 3, 500km Agni III missile.

The missile will have 60% commonality of components with Agni III, including its ring laser gyroscope and accelerometer.

The gyroscope was developed by Research Centre Imarat (RCI), sister laboratory of ASL, and is part of DRDO's missile complex in Hyderabad.

The ring laser is also fitted on the Shourya tactical missile.

Navigation System
Agni-V uses the same navigation system as the one fitted on Agni-III.

It uses a ring laser gyroscope that was developed by Research Centre Imarat (RCI), sister laboratory of ASL, a part of DRDO's missile complex in Hyderabad.

The ring laser is also fitted on the Shourya tactical missile.

Operational Status
The design of the missile has been completed. Subsystem testing and material cutting was in progress as on February 10, 2010.

The missile is expected to be ready for testing in the 2010-11 time frame.

Speaking to the press on February 10, scientific advisor to defence minister V.K. Saraswat said:

"Agni-V has crossed material cutting stage and subsystem testing is going on. Agni-V is derivative of Agni-III. Practically it is the same missile but it is five metres longer and one tonne heavier. Its navigation system is same.

"Sixty percent missile is available and we are just adding another stage. It will be a three-stage missile and it is the first time we will be building a three-stage missile."

Use of Composites
Besides the all composite third stage, the second stage of the missile will also use composites to save weight and allow for the addition of a third stage.

Talking to The Hindu in November, Avinash Chander, director of the Agni program and of the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) said the Agni V design has been completed and the first development flight test will be conducted in 2010.

MIRV Warheads
VK Saraswat, DRDO's Chief Controller of Missiles and Strategic Systems, told Business Standard in May 2008 that DRDO is working on a 5,000kme range Agni-5 missile, with multiple warheads (MIRVs) that can maneuver and send out decoys to confuse enemy anti-missile defenses.

In October 2008, ASL Director Avinash Chander told Business Standard:

"We have made major progress on the MIRVs in the last two years."

MIRV technology is very similar to the multiple satellite launch technology that ISRO has mastered and repeatedly demonstrated using its PSLV launcher. However, warhead separation requires a higher degree of accuracy than satellite separation. MIRV is effective only when accuracy of the individual warheads is high, allowing relatively small warheads to be targeted at widely dispersed targets.

MIRVed missiles deployed on nuclear submarines represent a potent second strike capability in support of a no first use nuclear doctrine like the one embraced by India.

Canister Launch
The mobile missile will be the first Indian strategic missile capable of canister launch, allowing it to be deployed and launched from any part of the country. A canister launch capability is also compatible with reports that the missile will ultimately equip India's newly launched nuclear powered submarine - INS Arihant.

Placing the missile in a hermetically sealed canister facilitates long term storage. The missile canister is made of maraging steel allowing it to withstand the 300 to 400 t shock generated when the 50-ton missile.is ejected out.

All future missiles will be canister based ASL Director Avinash Chander told Business Standard in October 2009,

"The Agni-5 is specially tailored for road-mobility," explains Avinash Chander, Director, ASL. "With the canister having been successfully developed, all India's future land-based strategic missiles will be canisterised as well".

Canister technology was initially developed for the naval variant of Brahmos missile. The technology was completely mastered during the development of the K-15 missiles that will initially equip INS Arihant.

Ref:
Road mobility gives Agni-5 global reach (Business Standard)
Agni-V design completed; to be test-fired in 2010 (The Hindu)
Govt allots Rs2,500 cr for Agni-V (DNA India)

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://news.oneindia.in/2010/05/17/indiato-fire-over-5000-km-range-agni-v-in2011.html

India to fire over 5000 km range Agni V in 2011

New Delhi, May 17 (ANI): After the successful launch of the Agni II missile, India is all set to test fire its first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, Agni-V, in Mach-April 2011.

Buzz up!
Agni V is being designed by adding a third composite stage to the two-stage 3,500-km Agni-III, having a range of over 5000 km to carry multiple warheads and will have countermeasures against anti-ballistic missile systems.


It is a three-stage solid fuelled missile with composite motor casing in the third stage. Two stages of this missile will be made of composite material. The Agni V will be the first canisterised, road-mobile missile in India.

Buoyed by the success of the Agni II missile, Dr W Selvamurthy, DRDO's Chief Controller Research and Development, said: "We are now working on Agni V, which has a range capacity of more than 5,000 kilometres. It is a strategic missile being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation."

"It will be ready by next year. We hope during March-April next year. It will be an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile."

The Strategic Force Command on Monday successfully test fired Agni II, an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 2000 km, from Wheeler Island off the coast of Orissa at 9:18 a.m., meeting all mission objectives.

"Agni II is a strategic missile, which has a range capability of 2,000 km. It can carry a nuclear warhead," said Dr Selvamurthy.

"We have successfully test fired this today. The Strategic Force Command has carried this out. They have done the whole operation themselves and our scientists have been observing the whole operation.

"It has gone very well. All the mission objectives have been successfully met. This has been inducted in the Armed Forces. It was successfully test fired from the Wheeler Island," he added.

The Agni missile is a family of medium to inter-continental range ballistic missiles developed by India. It comprises of Agni I, Agni II, Agni III and Agni V. By Praful Kumar Singh (ANI)

 

[SHASH2K2]

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.espionageinfo.com/An-Ba/Ballistic-Missiles.html

Ballistic Missiles

In 1999, Pakistan test fired this Ghauri II ballistic missile, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead deep inside the territory of its neighbor and rival, India.sophisticated guidance computers of later ballistic missiles, was inaccurate. Only 50% of V-2s aimed at a given point would, on average, land within 11 mi (17 km) of that point. The V-2 was therefore not aimed at military installations but, like its predecessor the V-1 (the first cruise missile, also developed by Nazi Germany), at the city of London. Some 518 V-2s struck London during the final years of World War II, killing over 20,000 people and making the V-2 the deadliest ballistic missile in history—so far. (The "V" in V-1 and V-2 stands for Vergeltungswaffe , German for "retaliation weapon," reflecting the fact that the V-2's primary purpose was not victory but vengeance.)

The United States and Soviet Union were far behind Germany in the design of large rockets during World War II, but both captured V-2 technicians and information at the end of the war and used them to accelerate their own missile programs. The U.S. began by experimenting with captured V-2s, and during the late 1940s built several new rockets of its own based on the V-2. During the 1950s both the Soviet Union and the United States turned their attention to the development of ballistic-missile boosters that could reach the other country's heartland from anywhere in the world. The Soviet Union flight-tested the world's first ICBM, the R-7, in August, 1957. Two months later the R-7 was used to launch the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, and four years later launched the world's first orbital manned space flight. The U.S. was not far behind, and by 1959 had deployed its own ICBMs, the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan missiles. The Americans also used their ICBMs for early space-flight efforts; the first manned U.S. space flights (Mercury and Gemini programs) used the Redstone, Atlas, and Titan II missile boosters.

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union competed in the development of numerous types of ballistic missiles and built thousands of missiles in all range categories. At the peak of their buildup, which occurred in the late 1980s, the two superpowers together possessed approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons, many mounted on ballistic missiles. After the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, arms-control agreements were made between Russia and the U.S. that reduced their combined nuclear arsenal to approximately 30,500 warheads. The number of ballistic missiles in all range categories was also drastically reduced.

Nevertheless, the U.S. and Russia still maintain hundreds of nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles (i.e., ICBMs and SLBMs) in a state of launch readiness, mostly in submarines and in concrete-lined holes in the ground (silos). Specifically, the U.S. as of 2003 has approximately 550 ICBMs carrying 2,325 warheads and 432 SLBMs carrying 3,616 warheads, while Russia (the nuclear inheritorstate of the now-dissolved Soviet Union) has approximately 756 ICBMs carrying 3800 warheads and 348 SLBMs carrying 2272 warheads. (The warhead numbers are greater than the missile numbers because of MIRVing.) The U.S. and Russia also maintain hundreds of nuclear warheads mounted on various BSRMBs, SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, and hundreds of nuclear weapons configured for delivery by aircraft rather than by ballistic missile.
Categories of Ballistic Missiles

With the exception of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), ballistic missiles are categorized according to range. Five commonly accepted categories of ballistic missile, with their associated ranges, are as follows: (1) battlefield short range ballistic missiles (BSRMBs: <93 mi [150 km]); (2) short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs: 93–497 mi [150–800 km]), (3) medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs: 497–1490 mi [800–2400 km]), (4) intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs: 1490–3416 mi [2400–5500 km]), and (5) intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs:>3416 mi [> 5500 km]).

Alternatively, the U.S. Department of Defense defines ballistic missiles with ranges less than 683 mi (1100 km) as SRBMs, those with ranges between 683 and 1708 mi (1100–2750 km) as MRBMs, those with ranges between 1708 and 3416 mi (1100–5500 km) as IRBMs.

Ballistic missiles can be launched from submarines, silos (i.e., vertical underground tubes), ships, or trailers. All ballistic missiles launched from submarines, regardless of range, are categorized as SLBMs; modern SLBMs have ranges comparable to those of ICBMs. The purpose of mounting ballistic missiles on submarines is to make them secure from attack. Modern missile submarines, such as those in the U.S. Trident class, are difficult to locate and can launch their missiles without surfacing.
Ballistic Missile Function

The flight of a ballistic missile can be divided into three phases: boost phase, cruise phase, and descent (terminal) phase. Boost phase begins with the ignition of the missile's booster rocket. The booster lofts the missile at a steep angle, imparting a high speed to the payload before burning out. The payload and booster then separate, beginning the cruise phase. The spent booster falls back to Earth while the payload, starting to lose speed, continues to gain altitude. If the missile is sufficiently long-range, its payload rises above the Earth's atmosphere during cruise phase, where it jettisons its aerodynamic protective shroud and arcs under the influence of gravity. The payload may be a single cone-shaped warhead or a flat "bus" with several warheads attached to it like upside-down icecream cones arranged circularly on a plate.

Individual warheads are not propelled downward toward their targets on the ground, but follow ballistic paths determined by gravity and aerodynamics, gaining speed as they lose altitude. Modern reentry vehicles usually feature small external fins or other steering devices that enable them to control their course, within limits, as they fall through the atmosphere; though such maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs) are not, strictly speaking, ballistic objects, missiles delivering them are still termed "ballistic" missiles for convenience. Maneuverability increases accuracy; a modern MARV delivered by ICBM or SLBM can land within a few hundred feet of its target after a journey of thousands of miles. Warheads may explode in the air high above their targets, on the surface, or under the surface after striking into the ground.

Boosters. The booster rockets of early ballistic missiles were powered by liquid fuels. A liquid-fuel rocket carries fuel (hydrazine, liquid hydrogen, or other) and liquid oxygen in tanks. Pressurized streams of fuel and oxygen are mixed and ignited at the top of a bell-shaped chamber: hot, expanding gases rush out of the open end of the bell, imparting momentum to the rocket in the opposite direction. Liquid fuels are unwieldy, as they must be maintained at low temperatures and may leak fuel or oxygen from tanks, pipes, valves, or pumps. Early U.S. ICBMs such as the Atlas and Titan I required several hours of above-ground preparation, including fueling, before they could be launched.

Since the late 1950s, ballistic-missile design has concentrated on solid-fuel boosters, which require less maintenance and launch preparation time and are more reliable because they contain fewer moving parts. Solid-fuel rockets contain long, hollow-core casts of a fuel mixture that, once ignited, burn from the inside out in an orderly way, forcing gases out the rear of the rocket. Starting in the early 1960s, liquid-fuel ballistic missiles were gradually phased out of the U.S. and Russian arsenals in favor of solid-fuel missiles. The first U.S. solid-fuel ICBM was the Minuteman I missile (so-called because of its near-instant response time), which was deployed to underground silos in the Midwest starting in 1962. Today, the ballistic-missile fleet of the United States consists almost entirely of solid-fuel rocket boosters. The Minuteman III, for example, like the Minuteman I and II it replaces, has a three-stage solid-fuel booster and a range of over 7000 miles. ( Stages are independent rockets that are stacked to form a single, combined rocket. The stages are burned from the bottom up; each is dropped as it is used up, and the stage above it is ignited. The advantage of staging is that the booster lightens more rapidly as it gains speed and altitude. There are single-stage, two-stage, and three-stage ballistic missiles; the greater the number of stages, the longer the range of the missile.)

Payloads, warheads, and MIRVs. As mentioned above, the payload of a ballistic missile may be either a single warhead or a bus bearing several warheads which can each be sent to a different target in the same general area (e.g., the eastern United States). Such a payload is termed a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system, and missiles bearing multiple independently targetable warheads are said to be MIRVed. The first MIRVed missiles were deployed the U.S. in 1970; only long-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) are MIRVed. After a MIRV bus detaches from the burnt-out upper stage of its booster, it arcs through space in its cruise phase. It may possess a low-power propulsion system that enables it to impart slightly different velocities to each of its warheads, which it releases at different times. (Slight differences between individual warhead trajectories in space can translate to relatively large differences between trajectories later on, when the individual warheads are approaching their targets.) The U.S. Minuteman III ICBM is a modern MIRVed missile carrying up to three warheads; other MIRVed missiles, such as the MX, have been capable of carrying up to 10 warheads.

Regional or approximate targeting for each MIRVed warhead is achieved by bus maneuvering and release timing during cruise phase. During descent phase, the warhead may steer itself to its precise target by means of inertial guidance, radar, or a combination of the two. Inertial guidance is based on the principle that every change in an object's velocity can be sensed by that object as an acceleration. By knowing its exact prelaunch location and state of motion (e.g., by consulting the Global Positioning System) and by precisely measuring all accelerations during and after launch, an inertial guidance system can calculate its location at all times without needing to make further observations of the outside world. Ballistic-missile payloads rely primarily on inertial guidance to strike their targets; MARVs may refine their final course by consulting the Global Positioning System (as is done, for example, by the Chinese CSS-6 SRBM) or by using radar to guide themselves during final approach (as was done, for example, by the Pershing II IRBM deployed by the U.S. in Europe during the 1980s).

The nuclear warheads mounted on modern long-range ballistic missiles are usually thermonuclear warheads having yields in the range of several hundred kilotons to several megatons. (One kiloton equals the explosive power of one thousand tons of the chemical explosive TNT; one megaton is equivalent to a million tons of TNT.) Those nations that do not possess nuclear weapons mount conventional-explosive warheads on their ballistic missiles.

Proliferation. Ballistic missiles offer the ability to inflict sudden damage on a distant foe. This is the central military motive behind their invention by the U.S. and Soviet Union and behind their more recent development or purchase by many states. The U.S. Department of State estimates that at least 27 nations now possess, or are in the process of developing, ballistic missiles. However, China, France, and the United Kingdom are the only countries beside the U.S. and Russia to possess long-range ballistic missiles (i.e., ICBMs and SLBMs): China, 20 ICBMs with 20 warheads; France, 64 SLBMs with 384 warheads; and the UK, 48 SLBMs with 185 warheads.

Of the many countries that possess some type of ballistic missile, only China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and (as of early 2003) possibly North Korea have nuclear weapons to mount on them. India and Pakistan, which in the 1990s and early 2000s fought several border wars in the last few decades, are engaged in a competitive ballistic-missile development race in which India is distinctly ahead. India has produced an SRBM, the Prithvi (range 155 mi [250 km]), and an IRBM, the Agni (range 1550 mi [2,500 km]); it also has built several space-launch rockets capable of being used as ICBMs. Pakistan manufactures several BSRMBs and SRBMs of its own (the Hatf I, II, and III missiles, all with ranges of 373 mi [600 km] or less) and has purchased M-11 SRBMs from China. Israel's Jericho 2B IRBM (range 930 mi [1,500 km]) can reach southern Russia and much of the Middle East; North Korea's Taep'o Dong 2 IRBM (range 2,480–3,720 mi [4,000–6,000 km]) can reach much of mainland Asia, Japan, the Pacific, and probably Scandinavia. Some states (e.g., Japan, Sweden) are technically capable of building both ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons but have refrained from doing so; however, many more states are likely to develop ballistic missiles in the near future.

Read more: http://www.espionageinfo.com/An-Ba/Ballistic-Missiles.html#ixzz0ryqQiige

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/mirv/mirv.html

"MIRV: A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINUTEMAN and MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES" by Daniel Buchonnet, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, February 1976

Released through FOIA request to Defense Department, June 1997

At the request of the National Security Archive, the Department of Defense has released the only known classified history of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles [MIRV]. This heavily excised document reflects a declassification review by both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. Due to the numerous redactions, some of which appear to be unjustifiable, the Archive has requested the Energy Department (which has the principal equity in this document) to determine whether additional portions may be released.

This document confirms much of what has been known about the basic purposes of the MIRV but provides additional valuable detail1. Among the findings:

An anticipated benefit of MIRVs was that they would permit the "enhancement of a first-strike capability" for U.S. strategic forces (p. 12). According to the study, "the issue of first strike capability was raised and widely discussed" (p. 9). That is, by increasing the numbers of warheads per missile, whether land or sea-based, MIRVs would put the United States in a better position to penetrate Soviet defenses and simultaneously strike diverse targets, especially Soviet missile and air bases.
The idea of multiple warheads dates back to the mid-1960s, but the key year in the history of the MIRV concept was 1962 when several of technological developments made it possible for scientists and engineers to conceive of multiple, separately targeted warheads that could hit a growing list of Soviet nuclear threat targets. One important innovation was that the weapons laboratories had designed small thermonuclear weapons, a necessary condition for deploying multiple reentry vehicles on the relatively small Minuteman. Equally significant were the ABLE-STAR and TRANSTAGE space vehicles which made it possible to place several space satellites on different orbits. Those vehicles were the "direct predecessors" of the MIRV "bus" used to propel the reentry vehicles to target.
A major event in MIRV history was a decision in 1966 to enlarge the Minuteman's third stage, thus creating Minuteman III (pages 19 and 43). This made it feasible to deploy MIRVs on the Minuteman because earlier versions had a relatively small throw- weight (payload) which limited the size of the weapons package and supporting equipment.
MIRV would be used to reduce collateral damage "by matching the yield to the target." MIRVs could hit point targets, such as a missile base or silo, so accurately that only a small nuclear warhead would be necessary to achieve the anticipated destruction. Collateral damage, therefore, would be less compared to that caused by larger, enormously destructive thermonuclear warheads. The yield of the Minuteman III MIRV is excised from this document but as of the early 1970s it approximated 170 kilotons, substantially less than the Minuteman I's 1.2 megaton yield. (Nevertheless, one Minuteman MIRV warhead would have had over eight times the yield of the 20 kiloton weapon dropped on Hiroshima, thus, collateral damage would still be extensive).
While some proponents of MIRVs argued that they would have a "stabilizing effect" on the U.S.-Soviet balance of power, the author acknowledges that they "probably contributed to an escalation of the arms race" to the extent that the Soviets perceived the "U.S. MIRV systems ... as strengthening the U.S. counterforce capability (high accuracy of low yields) and improving the first-strike capability (large number of warheads" (p. 6)
The version of "MIRV" which appears here does not include the appendix with notes, which is even more heavily excised. Apparently, the Department of Energy will be putting the complete document on "Opennet." The Archive will create a link between this document and the full version as soon as possible.
1See political scientist Ted Greenwood's significant study, Making of the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Ballinger. 1975).

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.filepie.us/?title=MIRV

A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warhead is a collection of nuclear weapons carried on a single intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Using a MIRV warhead, a single launched missile can strike several targets, or fewer targets redundantly. By contrast a unitary warhead is a single warhead on a single missile.

Contents

1 Purpose
2 Mode of operation
3 See also
4 References
5 External links
Purpose

The military purpose of a MIRV is fourfold:

Provides greater target damage for a given missile payload. Radiation (including radiated heat) from a nuclear warhead diminishes as the square of the distance (called the inverse-square law), and blast pressure diminishes as the cube of the distance. For example at a distance of 4 km from ground zero, the blast pressure is only 1/64th that of 1 km. Due to these effects several small warheads cause much more target damage area than a single large one. This in turn reduces the number of missiles and launch facilities required for a given destruction level.
With single warhead missiles, one missile must be launched for each target. By contrast with a MIRV warhead, the post-boost (or bus) stage can dispense the warheads against multiple targets across a broad area.
Reduces the impact of SALT treaty limitations. The treaty initially limited number of missiles, not number of warheads. Adding multiple warheads per missile provided more target destruction for a given number of missiles.
Reduces the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system that relies on intercepting individual warheads. While a MIRVed attacking missile can have multiple (3–12 on United States missiles and 3-10 on Russians) warheads, interceptors can only have one warhead per missile. Thus, in both a military and economic sense, MIRVs render ABM systems less effective, as the costs of maintaining a workable defense against MIRVs would greatly increase, requiring multiple defensive missiles for each offensive one. Decoy reentry vehicles can be used alongside actual warheads to minimize the chances of the actual warheads being intercepted before they reach their targets. A system that destroys the missile earlier in its trajectory (before MIRV separation) is not affected by this but is more difficult, and thus more expensive to implement.
MIRVed land-based ICBMs were considered destabilizing because they tended to put a premium on striking first. MIRVs threatened to rapidly increase the US's deployable nuclear arsenal and thus the possibility that it would have enough bombs to destroy virtually all of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and negate any significant retaliation. Later on the US feared the Soviet's MIRVs because Soviet missiles had a greater throw-weight and could thus put more warheads on each missile than the US could. For example the US MIRVs might have increased their warhead per missile count by a factor of 6 while the Soviets increased theirs by a factor of 10. Furthermore, the US had a much smaller proportion of its nuclear arsenal in ICBMs than the Soviets. Bombers could not be outfitted with MIRVs so their capacity would not be multiplied. Thus the US did not seem to have as much potential for MIRV usage as the Soviets. However, the US had a larger number of SLBMs, which could be outfitted with MIRVs, and helped offset the ICBM disadvantage. It is because of this that this type of weapon was banned under the START II agreement. However, START II was never ratified by the Russian Duma due to disagreements about the ABM Treaty.

The Russian Federation claims to have developed the most advanced MIRV system as of 2006 for use in the RSM-56 Bulava.citation needed

Mode of operation

In a MIRV, the main rocket motor (or booster) pushes a "bus" (see illustration) into a freely-falling suborbital ballistic flight path. After the boost phase the bus maneuvers using small on-board rocket motors and a computerised inertial guidance system. It takes up a ballistic trajectory that will deliver a reentry vehicle containing a warhead to a target, and then releases a warhead on that trajectory. It then maneuvers to a different trajectory, releasing another warhead, and repeats the process for all warheads.

Minuteman III MIRV launch sequence: 1. The missile launches out of its silo by firing its first stage boost motor (A). 2. About 60 seconds after launch, the 1st stage drops off and the second stage motor (B) ignites. The missile shroud (E) is ejected. 3. About 120 seconds after launch, the third stage motor (C) ignites and separates from the 2nd stage. 4. About 180 seconds after launch, third stage thrust terminates and the Post-Boost Vehicle (D) separates from the rocket. 5. The Post-Boost Vehicle maneuvers itself and prepares for re-entry vehicle (RV) deployment. 6. While the Post-Boost Vehicle backs away, decoys and chaff are deployed (unlike the figure suggests this may be during ascent). 7. The RVs and chaff re-enter the atmosphere at high speeds and are armed in flight. 8. The nuclear warheads detonate, either as air bursts or ground bursts.
The precise technical details are closely-guarded military secrets, to hinder any development of enemy counter-measures. The bus's on-board propellant limits the distances between targets of individual warheads to perhaps a few hundred km1. Some warheads may use small hypersonic airfoils during the descent to gain additional cross-range distance. Additionally, some buses (e.g. the British Chevaline system) can release decoys to confuse interception devices and radars, such as aluminized balloons or electronic noisemakers.

Accuracy is crucial, because doubling the accuracy decreases the needed warhead energy by a factor of four for radiation damage and by a factor of eight for blast damage. Navigation system accuracy and the available geophysical information limits the warhead target accuracy. Some writers believe that government-supported geophysical mapping initiatives and ocean satellite altitude systems such as Seasat may have a covert purpose to map mass concentrations and determine local gravity anomalies, in order to improve accuracies of ballistic missiles. Accuracy is expressed as circular error probable (CEP). This is simply the radius of the circle that the warhead has a 50 percent chance of falling into when aimed at the center. CEP is about 90–100 m for the Trident II and Peacekeeper missilescitation needed.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.filepie.us/?title=START_II

START II

START II (for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was signed by United States President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993[1], banning the use of MIRVs on ICBMs. Hence, it is often cited as the De-MIRV-ing Agreement.

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many warheads and deliver them to separate targets and thereby possibly destroy more than one missile of an enemy who does not strike first in their silos. The LGM-118 Peacekeeper missile was capable of carrying up to 10 MIRVs. However, in 2001, President George W. Bush set a plan in motion to reduce the country's missile forces from 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200. Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to follow a similar plan and in October 2002 the deactivation of the Peacekeeper missile began and was completed by 19 September 2005.

The Minuteman III ICBM is the primary U.S. missile system and can carry up to 3 MIRVs. Hypothetically, if one were to assume that each side had 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side had a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo, then the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads and keeping the remaining 60 missiles in reserve. Thus the destruction capability is greatly increased by MIRVs but the number of targets does not increase.

START II followed START I and, although ratified, the treaty has never entered into force; in other words never been activated.1 On June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Russia withdrew from START II. The historic agreement started on June 17, 1992 with the signing of a 'Joint Understanding' by the presidents. The official signing of the treaty by the presidents took place on January 3, 1993. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate on January 26, 1996 with a vote of 87-4. However, Russian ratification was stalled in the Duma for many years. It was postponed a number of times to protest American invasion of Iraq and military actions in Kosovo, as well as to oppose the expansion of NATO.

As the years passed, the treaty became less relevant and both sides started to lose interest in it. For the Americans, the main issue became the modification of the ABM Treaty to allow the U.S. to deploy a national missile defense system, a move which Russia fiercely opposed. On April 14, 2000 the Duma did finally ratify the treaty, in a largely symbolic move since the ratification was made contingent on preserving the ABM Treaty, which it was clear the U.S. was not prepared to do. START II did not enter into force because the Russian ratification made this contingent on U.S. Senate ratifying a September 1997 addendum to START II which included agreed statements on ABM-TMD demarcation. Neither of these occurred because of U.S. Senate opposition, where a faction objected to any action supportive of the ABM Treaty. On June 14, 2002, one day after the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it would no longer consider itself to be bound by START II provisions.

The treaty was officially bypassed by the SORT treaty, agreed to by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at their summit meeting in November 2001, and signed at Moscow Summit on May 24, 2002. Both sides agreed to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 from 2,200 by 2012.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.filepie.us/?title=LGM-118_Peacekeeper

LGM-118 Peacekeeper

Type Intercontinental ballistic missile
Service history
In service 1986
Production history
Manufacturer Boeing, Martin Marietta, TRW, and the Denver Aerospace company
Unit cost approximately $70 million
Specifications
Weight 96.75 tons
Length 71 ft 6 in (21.8 m)
Diameter 7 ft 7 in (2.3 m)
Warhead up to 10 Avco Mk-21 re-entry vehicles each carrying a 300 KT (1.25 PJ) W87 warhead. (The Combined Explosive power of the MIRV for one ICBM is 3000 KT)
Detonation
mechanism Airburst
Engine * First Stage: 500,000 lbf (2.2 MN thrust) Thiokol SR118 solid fuel motor;
Second Stage: Aerojet General SR119 solid fuel motor;
Third Stage: Hercules SR120 solid fuel motor,
Post-Boost Vehicle: Rocketdyne restartable liquid fuel motor; storable hypergolic fuel
Operational
range 5,200 nmi (9,600 km; 6,000 mi)
Guidance
system Inertial (AIRS)
Accuracy 393 ft 7 in (120 m) CEP
Launch
platform Fixed silo

The LGM-118A Peacekeeper, initially known as the "MX missile" (for Missile-eXperimental), was a land-based ICBM deployed by the United States starting in 1986. A total of 50 missiles were deployed. They have since been decommissioned.

Under the START II treaty, which never entered into force, the missiles were to be removed from the U.S. nuclear arsenal in 2005, leaving the LGM-30 Minuteman as the only type of land-based ICBM in the U.S. arsenal. Despite the demise of the START II treaty, the last of the LGM-118A "Peacekeeper" ICBMs (but not their warheads) were decommissioned on September 19, 2005. Current plans are to switch 500 decommissioned Peacekeepers' W87/Mk-21 warheads to the Minuteman III.1 Among the reasons cited for decommissioning of the Peacekeeper ICBM was its failure to achieve the program's range objectives.2

The Peacekeeper was a MIRV missile; the MX could carry up to 10 re-entry vehicles, each armed with a 300-kiloton W87 warhead/MK-21 RVs (twenty times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II.3)

Contents

1 Development and deployment
2 Retirement and deactivation
3 Operator
4 See also
5 References
6 External links
Development and deployment


During the late 1970s, the Soviet Union fielded a large number of heavy, increasingly accurate, MIRV ICBMs (like the SS-18, defined by throw weight) which seriously threatened the survival of Minuteman III missiles in their silos. If the Soviet Union could have knocked out the majority of these missiles and the strategic bombers on ground, it would have left the United States with no counterforce capability for the second strike. The Poseidon and Trident I SLBMs were not accurate enough for counterforce strikes, and did not carry high enough yield. If the Soviet first strike would have avoided hitting civil targets, the US might have been forced not to retaliate against Soviet cities, because of similar Soviet countercity capabilities. So the United States needed weapons which could survive a Soviet first-strike and neutralize the remaining Soviet strategic arsenal, in order to avoid nuclear blackmail. However it was clear from the outset that this missile would be unable to neutralize at least the part of the Soviet strategic arsenal located on nuclear ballistic missile submarines on patrol.

Still, the development of the Peacekeeper began with the intent of its being a counterforce, hard-target weapon. It was to be aimed at hardened enemy missile silos with first-strike capability. This required high accuracy, survivability, range and a flexibility that was not available in the Minuteman III.

Accuracy was an especially important issue, since the effects of the blast and heat from a thermonuclear detonation decrease very rapidly with distance from the impact point. The targets were hardened Soviet ICBM-silos, especially those housing the heavy SS-18, which were targeted at Minuteman missile silos.

Design work on the MX began in 1972. In 1976, Congress refused to fund a silo-based system on grounds of vulnerability and the project was halted until 1979 when President Carter authorized development of a system of multiple protective shelters linked by underground roads, the so called "Racetrack" proposal. President Reagan canceled the new shelter system calling it "a Rube Goldberg scheme", in 1981 and pushed for a "dense pack" solution to speed deployment. This "dense pack" idea involved building super-hardened silos that would withstand more than 10,000 psi (70 MPa) of overpressure and spacing them only 1,800 feet (550 m) apart. The reasoning behind this idea was that a nearby nuclear explosion would damage other incoming warheads in the same wave of attack and would allow a substantial portion of the missiles to survive. This "fratricide theory" was fundamentally flawed due to the relative ease with which the Soviets could modify their warheads and circumvent this design. Congress again rejected the silo-based system.

A compromise was developed in mid-1983, by which there would be swift deployment of 100 new missiles in existing Minuteman silos to show "national will", the removal of the venerable and accident-prone liquid fueled Titan II ICBM from use, and the later introduction of a new more mobile single-warhead ICBM (the Midgetman).


The new ICBM missile was originally planned to be called "Peacemaker", but at the last minute was officially designated the LGM-118A Peacekeeper. It was first test fired on June 17, 1983, by the Air Force Systems Command Ballistic Missile Office (Norton AFB, CA); 6595th Missile Test Group (Vandenberg AFB, CA); and Martin Marietta, from Vandenberg AFB, California Test Pad-01, traveling 4,200 nautical miles (4,800 mi; 7,800 km) to strike successfully in the Kwajalein Test Range in the Pacific. The first eight test flights were launched from an above ground cannister on TP-01, with the remaining test and operational Strategic Air Command flights from silo's (LF-02, -05, & -08) all located on North Vandenberg AFB. A total of 50 flight tests were accomplished. The operational missile was first manufactured in February 1984 and was deployed in December 1986 to the Strategic Air Command, 90th Strategic Missile Wing at the Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in re-fitted Minuteman silos. Fifty working missiles had been deployed at F.E. Warren AFB by December 1988. The planned deployment of one hundred missiles was canceled by the U.S. Congress in July 1985, again over the theoretical survivability issue. In that decision, Congress limited the deployment of Peacekeeper ICBMs to 50 missiles until a more "survivable" basing plan could be developed.

The survivability problem was to be solved by a "rail garrison" system whereby 25 trains, each with two missiles, would use the national railroad system to conceal themselves. It was intended that this system would become operational in late 1992, but budgetary constraints and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to its being scrapped.

The project had already cost around $20 billion up to 1998 and produced 114 missiles, at $400 million for each operational missile. The "flyaway" cost of each missile was estimated at 20 to 70 million dollars. The total combined firepower for all 114 ICBMs was rated at around 342 megatons, or 342 million tons of TNT.

Retirement and deactivation

Retired Peacekeeper garrison car prototype at the USAF National Museum.


The missiles were gradually retired, with 17 withdrawn during 2003, leaving 29 missiles on alert at the beginning of 2004. At the start of 2005 only 10 remained on alert, scheduled to be retired by the end of the year. The last Peacekeeper was removed from alert on September 19, 2005 during the final deactivation ceremony when the 400th Missile Squadron was deactivated as well.4 The Peacekeeper rockets are being converted to the satellite launcher role by Orbital Sciences, as the Minotaur IV (OSP-2), while their warheads will be deployed on the existing Minuteman III missiles. Parts of the missile are reused for the Ares rocket, in the 'Roll Control System' (RoCS).

Operator

The United States Air Force was the only operator of the Peacekeeper. The missile is no longer in service.
Orbital Sciences: Will use the Minotaur IV civilian launch platform version.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.filepie.us/?title=SS-18
SS-18

Type Intercontinental ballistic missile
Place of origin Soviet Union
Service history
In service 1967
Used by Soviet and Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
Production history
Manufacturer Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant
Specifications
Weight 209,600 kg (462,000 lb)
Length 32.2 m (106 ft)
Diameter 3.05 m (10.0 ft)
Warhead Three stage fission-fusion-fission, over 20 Mt of TNT
Detonation
mechanism Airburst
Engine Two-stage liquid propellant
Operational
range 10,200–16,000 km dependent upon model
Speed up to 7.9 km/s
Guidance
system Inertial, autonomous
Accuracy 220–500 m CEP (depending on version)
Launch
platform Silo
The R-36 (Russian: Р-36) is a family of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space launch vehicles designed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The original R-36 was produced under the Soviet industry designation 8K67 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-9 Scarp. The modern version, the R-36M was produced under the GRAU designations 15A14 and 15A18 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-18 Satan; this missile was viewed by certain U.S. analysts as giving the Soviet Union first strike advantage over the U.S., particularly because of its very heavy throw weight and extremely large number of re-entry vehicles, with a maximum of over 10 warheads and up to 40 penetration aids on actually deployed missiles, and theoretically capable of deploying even greater numbers of warheads due to high throw-weight; U.S. missiles of the time, such as the Minuteman III carried, at most, three warheads.

Contents

1 Description
2 Development
3 Multiple warheads
4 Deployment
5 R-36orb
6 Elimination
7 Derivatives
8 Operators
9 Replacement
10 See also
11 References
12 External links
Description

The R-36 (SS-9) is a two-stage rocket powered by a liquid bipropellant, with UDMH as fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer. It carries one of three different warheads developed especially for this missile:

The Mod 1 and Mod 2 were single nuclear re-entry vehicles of 18 and 25 megatons of TNT yield respectively.
The Mod 4 was a three-warhead MIRV payload.
An additional warhead, the Mod 3, was proposed (it was to be a FOBS, a missile that travels through space in a low-earth orbit), but was not adopted due to the Outer Space Treaty. The R-36P missile was developed to carry the Mod 4 warhead, while the R-36O (the letter O) was to be for the Mod 3 FOBS. R-36 and R-36P missiles were hot launched from their silos.

The R-36M (SS-18) is similar to the R-36 in design, but has the capacity to mount a single warhead of up to 20mt (megatons) of TNT in yield, or a MIRV payload of 10 warheads, each with a 550–750 kt (kiloton) yield. Throw-weight of the missile is 8,800 kg. This makes the Soviet R-36 the world's heaviest ICBM; for comparison, the heaviest US MIRV-ed ICBM (the LGM-118 Peacekeeper) carried 10 much smaller warheads of 300 kT each, its throw-weight was less than half that of the R-36M, at 4,000 kg. The R-36M has two stages. The first is a 460,000 kgf (4.5 MN) thrust motor with four combustion chambers and nozzles. The second stage is a single-chamber 77,000 kgf (755 kN) thrust motor.

R-36M (SS-18) variants:

R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1): The SS-18 Mod 1 carried a single large reentry vehicle, with a warhead yield of 18-25 MT, a distance of about 6000 nm. In January 1971, cold-launch tests began during which the mortar launch was perfected. The actual flight tests for the single-RV Mod 1 began on 21 February 1973, though some sources suggest that testing began in October 1972. The testing phase of the R-36M with various different types of warheads was finished in October 1975 and on 30 December 1975 deployment began (though some Western sources suggest that an initial operational capability was reached in early 1975). A total of 56 were deployed by 1977, though all were replaced by Mod 3 or Mod 4 missiles by 1984. These high-yield weapons were assessed in the West as possibly developed to attack American Minuteman ICBM launch control centers.
R-36M (SS-18 Mod 2): The SS-18 Mod 2 included a post-boost vehicle and up to eight reentry vehicles, each with a warhead yield estimated at between 0.5 to 1.5 MT, with a range capability of about 5500 nm. The MIRVs were placed in pairs, and a post boost vehicle with a command structure and a propulsion system were contained in the nose cone of the R-36M. The flight tests of the MIRVed Mod 2 began in September 1973 (though some Western sources suggest that the initial flight test of the Mod 2 MIRV version occurred in August 1973), with IOC in 1975. Approximately 132 were deployed by 1978, but the post-boost vehicle design was seriously flawed, and the Mod 2 missiles were all replaced by the Mod 4 variant by 1983.
R-36M (SS-18 Mod 3): The SS-18 Mod 3 carried a single large reentry vehicle that was an improved version of the SS-18 Mod 1. On 16 August 1976, a few months after the R-36M entered service, the development of an improved modification of the R-36M (15A14) was approved. This missile subsequently received the designation R-36MUTTh (15A18) and was developed by KB Yuzhnoye (OKB-586) through December 1976. The R-36MUTTh was capable of carrying two different nose cones. On 29 November 1979, deployment of the improved R-36M with a single reentry vehicle carrying a 18-25 MT warhead (SS-18 Mod 3) began.
R-36MUTTh (SS-18 Mod 4): The SS-18 Mod 4 was probably designed to attack and destroy ICBMs and other hardened targets in the US. Its increasing accuracy made it possible to reduce the yield of the warheads and allowed an increase in the number of warheads from 8 to 10. According to some Western estimates, evidence suggested that the Mod 4 may be capable of carrying as many as 14 RVs (this may reflect observation of the deployment of countermeasures intended to overcome a ballistic missile defense, or to confuse American attack characterization systems). The flight-design tests of the R-36MUTTh began on 31 October 1977 and in November 1979 the flight tests of the MIRVed missile were completed. The first three regiments were put on alert on 18 September 1979. During 1980 a total of 120 SS-18 Mod 4 missiles were deployed, replacing the last remaining R-36 (SS-9) missiles. In 1982–1983 the remaining R-36M missiles were also replaced with the new R-36MUTTh and the total number of deployed missiles reached the maximum 308 ceiling established in the SALT-1 treaty. The SS-18 Mod 4 force had the estimated capability to destroy 65 to 80 percent of US ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. Even after this type of attack, it was estimated that more than 1000 SS-18 warheads would be available for further strikes against targets in the US. After 2009, the SS-18 Mod 4s were all eliminated in favor of the newer SS-18 Mod 5.
R-36M2 Voivode (SS-18 Mod 5): The newer, more accurate SS-18 Mod 5 version placed in converted silos allowed the SS-18 to remain the bulwark of the SRF's hard-target-kill capability. The Mod 5 carries 10 MIRVs, each having a higher yield than the Mod 4 warheads. The Mod 5 warheads have nearly twice the yield of the Mod 4 (approximately 750 KT to 1 MT) according to Western estimates, though Russian sources suggest a yield of 550-750 KT each. The increase in the Mod 5's warhead yield, along with improved accuracy, would, under the START treaty, help allow the Russians to maintain their hard-target-kill wartime requirements even with the 50 percent cut in heavy ICBMs the START agreement required. The technical proposals to build a modernized heavy ICBM were made in June 1979. The missile subsequently received the designation R-36M2 Voivode and the industrial index number 15A18M. The design of the R-36 M2 Voivode was completed in June 1982. The R-36M2 consisted of a series of new engineering features. The engine of the second stage is completely built in the fuel tank (earlier this was only used on SLBMs) and the design of the transport-launching canister was altered. Unlike the R-36M, the 10 warheads on the post-boost vehicle are located on a special frame in two circles. The flight tests of the R-36M2 equipped with 10 MIRVs began in March 1986 and were completed in March 1988. The first regiment with these missiles was put on alert on 30 July 1988 and was deployed on 11 August 1988.
R-36M2 Voivode (SS-18 Mod 6): The flight tests of the R-36M2 missile carrying a single warhead (SS-18 Mod 6) with a yield of 20 MT were completed in September 1989 and deployment began in August 1991. Ten Mod 6 missiles were deployed. These large warheads' targets included high altitude detonations to incapacitate electronics and communications through a very large electromagnetic pulse. The SS-18 Mod 6 missiles were all decommissioned by late 2009.
At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 SS-18 launch silos were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent Kazakhstan. The dismantling of 104 launchers located in Kazakhstan was completed in September 1996. The START II treaty was to eliminate all SS-18 missiles but it did not enter into force and the missiles remained on duty. Russia has steadily decreased the number of operational SS-18s and by July 2009, only 59 (all of the 10 MIRV Mod 5 version) remain. About 40 missiles will have their service lives extended so that they remain in service until about 2020. With the retirement of the 20 megaton SS-18 Mod 6 warheads, the highest yield weapon in service with any nation is the estimated 5 MT Chinese Dong Feng 5 (DF-5) ICBM (CSS-4) warhead.

All R-36 variants were designed to be launched from silos in dispersed and hardened locations. The R-36M is placed into its 39 m deep silo in a tubular storage/launch container. Upon launch the missile is shot out of the tube, mortar-fashion, by a piston, driven by the expansion of gases from a slow-burning black powder charge inside the piston. The missile's main engine is ignited tens of metres above the ground, preventing any damage to the internal equipment of the silo itself from the rocket engine's fiery efflux.citation needed
Development



Development of the R-36 was begun by OKB-586 (Yuzhnoye) in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine in 1962, and built upon the work of the R-16 program. The Chief Designer was Mikhail Yangel. Initial development was of light, heavy, and orbital versions, with flight testing from 1962 through 1966, at which time initial operational capability was achieved. News of the development of the orbital version caused alarm in the West with the possibility that the Soviets would be able to launch a large number of nuclear weapons into orbit where there was no capability to intercept them. The prospect of orbital nuclear weapons led both sides to agree a treaty banning the use of weapons of mass destruction in space.

In 1970, development of a fourth version, capable of delivering multiple warheads, was developed, and test flown the next year.

Further improvement of the R-36 led to the design of the R-36M, which provided a theoretical first-strike capability—the ability to destroy the United States's LGM-30 Minuteman ICBM silos and launch control centers before they could retaliate. However, neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation have ever publicly delineated the missile's particular role in their arsenal. The initial design of the R-36M called for a single massive 12-Mt warhead to be delivered over a range of 10,600 km. The missile was first tested in 1973 but this test ended in failure. After several delays the R-36M was deployed in December of 1975. This "Mod-1" design was delivered with a single 18–20 Mt warhead and a range of just over 11,000 km. This new version was given a new identity by NATO: SS-18 Satan.

The SS-18 has gone through six separate modifications, with the first modification (Mod-1) being phased out by 1984. The final modification (Mod-6) designated R-36M-2 "Voevoda" was deployed in August of 1988. This missile could deliver the same 18–20 Mt warhead 16,000 km. Modifications prior to Mod-6 mainly introduced MIRV (Multiple independent reentry vehicles) warheads. These missiles (Mods-2, 4, and 5) surpassed their western counterpart the US LGM-118 Peacekeeper in terms of megatons delivered, range, and survivability, but were inferior in terms of accuracy (CEP).

Control system for this rocket was designed at NPO "Electropribor"1 (Kharkiv, Ukraine).

Multiple warheads

Missiles of the R-36M/SS-18 family have never been deployed with more than ten warheads, but given their large throw-weight (8.8 tonnes as specified in START), they have the capacity to carry considerably more detonation power. Among the projects that the Soviet Union considered in the mid-1970s was that of a 15A17 missile—a follow-on to the R-36MUTTH (15A18).2 The missile would have had an even greater throw-weight—9.5 tonnes—and would be able to carry a very large number of warheads. Five different versions of the missile were considered. Three of these versions would carry regular warheads—38 × 250 kt yield, 24 × 500 kt yield, or 15–17 × 1 Mt yield. Two modifications were supposed to carry guided warheads ("upravlyaemaya golovnaya chast")—28 × 250 kt or 19 × 500 kt.2 However, none of these upgraded models were ever developed. The SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979, prohibited increasing the number of warheads ICBMs could carry. Equally, from a strategic point of view, concentrating so many warheads on silo-based missiles was not seen as desirable, since it would have made a large proportion of the USSR's warheads vulnerable to a counterforce strike.

The operational deployment of the R36M/SS-18 consisted of the R-36MUTTH, which carried ten 500 kt warheads, and its follow-on, the R-36M2 (15A18M), which carried ten 800 kt warheads (single-warhead versions with either 8.3 Mt or 20 Mt warhead also existed at some point). To partially circumvent the treaty, the missile, utilizing the capacity unused due to 10 warhead limitation, was equipped with 40 heavy decoys.3 These decoys would appear as warheads to any defensive system, making each missile as hard to intercept as 50 single-warhead, rendering potential ABM systems ineffective.

Deployment



At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 R-36M launch silos were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent Kazakhstan. In the next few years Russia reduced the number of R-36M launch silos to 154 to conform with the START I treaty. The missiles in Kazakhstan were all deactivated by 1995. The subsequent START II treaty was to eliminate all R-36M missiles but it did not enter into force and the missiles remained on duty.

R-36orb

The development of the R-36 missile complex for use with the 8К69 fractional-orbit missile ("FOBS") began on April 16, 1962. Such a missile provides some advantages over a conventional ICBM. The range is limited only by the parameters of the orbit that the re-entry vehicle has been placed into, and the re-entry vehicle may come from either direction, compelling the enemy to build considerably more expensive anti-missile systems. Due to the possibility of placing the warhead in orbit and keeping it there for some time, it is possible to reduce the time required to strike to just a few minutes. It is also very much more difficult to predict where the warhead will land, since while the re-entry vehicle is on orbit, it is a very small object with few distinguishing marks and is hard to detect; moreover, since the warhead can be commanded to land anywhere along the orbit's ground track, even detecting the warhead on orbit does not allow accurate prediction of its intended target.

The structure and design of the fractional-orbit bombardment system were similar to a conventional P-36 ICBM system. A two-stage rocket was equipped by the liquid rocket engines using storable propellants. The silo launcher and command point were hardened against a nuclear explosion. The basic difference from a conventional ICBM consists of the design of the re-entry vehicle, which is fitted with a single 2.4Mt warhead, de-orbit engine and control block. The control system uses independent inertial navigation and radar-based altimeter which measures orbit parameters twice—in the beginning of an orbital path and just before de-orbiting engine firing.

Flight testing consisted of 15 successful launches and four failures. During test launch #17, warhead was retrieved with a parachute. Flight tests of a rocket have been completed by May 20, 1968 and on November 19 of the same year it entered service. The first (and the only) regiment with 18 launchers was deployed on August 25, 1969.

The R-36orbs (8К69) were retired from service in January, 1983 as a part of SALT II treaty (they were considered "space-based" nuclear weapons).

The Tsyklon series of civilian space launchers is based on the R-36orb (8К69) design.

Elimination


In the last decade Russian armed forces have been steadily reducing the number of R-36M missiles in service, withdrawing those that age past their designed operational lifetime. About 40 missiles of the most modern variant R-36M2 (or RS-20V) will remain in service until 20194 and will be then replaced by newer MIRV version of Topol-M.5 In March 2006 Russia made an agreement with Ukraine that will regulate cooperation between the two countries on maintaining the R-36M2 missiles. It was reported that the cooperation with Ukraine will allow Russia to extend the service life of the R-36M2 missiles by at least ten to 28 years.6

In December 2008 Strategic Rocket Forces had 75 R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 operational missiles.

Derivatives

Several remaining SS-18 missiles have been modified for surface launch and now carry lightweight satellites to low earth orbit, including many foreign payloads.

Ukraine's Yuzhnoe Design Bureau continues to manufacturecitation needed a launch vehicle based on the SS-18, named Dnepr.

Operators

Soviet Union and Russia
The Strategic Rocket Forces have been the only operator of the R-36.
Replacement

Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces Lt. Gen. Andrei Shvaichenko announced in December 16, 2009, that Russia planned to "develop a new liquid-propellant ICBM to replace the Voyevoda (SS-18 Satan), capable of carrying 10 warheads, by 2016."7