This link has inside out on out poor state of affairs
TRISHUL: Updated: RIP HTT-35, HTT-40, HJT-36 & LUH, Thanks To The Grifters' Long-Cons
RIP HTT-35, HTT-40, HJT-36 & LUH, Thanks To The Grifters' Long-Cons
The above three photos graphically illustrate both the missed opportunities for Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to deliver new-generation basic turboprop trainers (BTT) to the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy (IN) almost two decades ago. The first photo is that of the long-forgotten HTT-35 advanced turboprop trainer, in particular its full-scale mock-up, which was designed and fabricated in-house by HAL in the late 1980s and rolled out in the early 1990s—all in all a four-year effort. The objective at that time was to team up with a global avionics supplier (most probably THALES) and co-design the semi-glass tandem cockpits and offer the aircraft for evaluation by the IAF by 1998. However, after 1994 the HTT-35 disappeared, literally! One can only speculate on what exactly happened to this full-scale mock-up, or on why did the MoD or IAF HQ develop a coordinated 'memory loss' on the need to series-produce the HTT-35 almost a decade ago! For it was realised as far back as 1998 that the induction of fourth-generation combat aircraft such as the Su-30MKI, and the impending induction of Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (M-MRCA), Tejas Mk2 MRCA and the fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) would force the IAF sooner than later into undertaking a critical revision of its flying training practices that included primary/basic flying training, advanced flying training, and lead-in fighter training (LIFT). Despite this, the HTT-35 BTT was scrapped, and instead of calling for the development of the HJT-36 as a swept-wing advanced jet trainer, the IAF in its all-knowing wisdom wrongly decided 14 years ago to have the HJT-36 as an intermediate jet trainer (IJT), a decision it is now regretting and that perhaps explains why the IAF has, since 2008, been maintaining sustained silence over HAL's inability to develop the HJT-36.
And now that a precedent has been set by the MoD with the HTT-40, a similar fate now looks set to befall HAL's single-engined Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) project as well, since logic will henceforth dictate that it is indeed unwise to operate fixed fleets of aircraft that are intended to perform the same mission, UNLESS the MoD cancels the on-going tender evaluation process for off-the-shelf procurement of 197 single-engined reconnaissance-and-surveillance helicopters (RSH) from abroad and instead authorises HAL to upgrading almost 80 of the Army Aviation Corps' and IAF's existing SA.315B Lama/Cheetah LOHs into the Cheetal RSH configuration that will see such helicopters being equipped with glass cockpits, FLIR turrets and defensive countermeasures suites. The Cheetals will thus be able to serve for at least another decade, thereby giving HAL enough time to complete development of its homegrown LIH/RSH platform.
The MoD, which has a stated requirement for 384 LUH/RSH units, has split the order between a global tender for 197 2-tonne helicopters (of which 60 will be procured off-the-shelf and the remainder to be licence-built) worth US$550 million, and has asked HAL to develop and build 187 LUH/RSH units by 2017, which itself is an impossible target to achieve. The global tender is mired in uncertainty, with the MoD cancelling and re-issuing it more than once. Of the 197 LUH/RSH machines, 64 are for the IAF, and 133 for the Army. However, it is fairly logical to conclude that the MoD will sooner rather than later reach the same conclusion as that reached for the BTT project: it will be far cheaper to acquire only one type of LUH/RSH platform (i.e. procuring all 384 units from the chosen foreign OEM), instead of splitting the orders between an imported solution and an indigenous one.
Presently, HAL's in-house Rotary Wing R & D Centre (RWRDC) is going full steam ahead with fabrication work on the 3-tonne LUH/RSH's first prototype, which will be powered by a single Turbomeca/HAL Shakti/Ardiden 1H engine. Rollout of this prototype is targetted for late 2013, almost a year behind schedule, with flight-tests commencing a year later and deliveries beginning in early 2017 and lasting till 2019. While the RWRDC is designing the main rotor, tail rotor, gearbox, transmission and weapons-launch systems, the fuel control/supply system, environment control system, hydraulics/accessories and cockpit avionics will be outsourced from local and foreign suppliers. On paper, the LUH/RSH will feature a roof-mounted stabilised optronic turret housing an integrated long-range observation system comprising a thermal imager, laser rangefinder and daylight TV.
What needs to be noted is that HAL, by being a wholly-owned MoD military-industrial entity, cannot undertake any R & D project aimed at producing an indigenous weapon system or sub-system without receiving authorisation from the MoD. What this means is that HAL's management has neither the financial nor managerial autonomy to develop even a single product that is not required by any Indian end-user. Therefore, when HAL took up the task of developing the HTT-35 BTT, it was only after being instructed by the MoD to do so at the IAF's behest. For it was a fairly well-known fact since the early 1980s that the HAL-developed piston-engined ab-initio primary HPT-32 'Deepak' was not what the IAF wanted and HAL consequently had been mandated to develop the HTT-34 turboprop trainer with side-by-side seating, and a flying prototype was indeed built. The IAF then changed its mind and asked HAL via the MoD to develop a tandem-seat BTT (probably after watching the advent of Pilatus PC-7As and PC-9As, and Embraer/ShortsTucanos since the mid-1980s), to which HAL responded with the HTT-35. What happened next is that sometime in 1995, HAL was instructed by the MoD at the IAF's behest that this project was not a priority and was told to cease all further R & D activity, probably due to India's reduced defence spending-levels in the period 1989-1999 (the so-called 'lost decade') as a result of the 1990 financial crisis.
Similarly, HAL began developing the HJT-36 IJT in 1997 after being told by the MoD to do so at the IAF's behest, since no one from the IAF was expecting any Govt of India to have the guts to recommence significant military hardware procurements from non-Russian OEMs after the unearthing of Bofors and HDW scams. Consequently, the IAF, faced with the prospect of not receiving its long sought-after AJTs, instead settled down for an IJT as part of a compromise formula. It was only in March 2004 that the initial 66 Hawk Mk132 AJTs were ordered (to the IAF's utter surprise) from BAE Systems and when this happened, the IAF realised that the requirement for IJTs had become totally irrelevant and what had become more important was the procurement of BTTs and LIFTs, with deliveries commencing by 2010 (this being expected by IAF HQ in order to have a three-stage flying training curriculum comprising BTTs, AJTs and LIFTs, as is the universal norm). This is where things got very murky, since even by 2004 no one from the MoD or IAF HQ asked HAL to resurrect the HTT-35 project and complete its R & D cycle. Had this been done, then by 2007 a few HTT-35 prototypes would have been airborne for flight-tests. Instead, six more years were allowed to go waste before IAF HQ refloated its requirement for a BTT (even though the HPT-32 was found unsuitable since the early 1980s!) and given the urgency of requirement, the only option then left on the table was the direct importation route. Therefore, someone or some party who/that is obviously adept at doing the math and is a grifter beyond match when it comes to playing the long-con, came up with a plan that would, on the surface, seem great, but in reality would be totally ludicrous (and thereby be a self-defeating and financially unviable exercise), i.e. splitting the BTT procurement exercise into two by importing a little less than half of the requirement (75 units) and developing an indigenous alternative for the rest (106 units). Now, imagine a fleet of PC-7 Mk2 BTTs powered by PWC turboprops/Hamilton Sunstrand propellers having to co-exist with a fleet of HTT-40 BTTs powered by Honeywell (Garrett) turboprops/Hartzell propellers, which will only serve to double the BTT fleet's annual MRO budget for the IAF's Training Command. Therefore, it was a known fact since 2009 that there can be only one BTT in service and at the same time (June 2011) that the PC-7 Mk2 was selected by the IAF as its BTT of choice, the BTT-40 project should have been terminated. In fact, I'm highly surprised that both the MoD and the IAF took such a long time to come clean by admitting that the project to develop the HTT-40 was, after all, just a con-job.
In order to get down to the bottom of this rip-off/con-job, the MoD's archives need to be declassified so that one can get to the root of the decision-making process prevailing in the period 1992-2010. Only after this is done will one be able to zero in on the true culprits/wrongdoers within both the MoD and IAF HQ. However, there are strong indications that the HTT-35 project was terminated by 1995 at the IAF's behest, with the MoD having a minimal say in this matter. One must also note that it is not just the IAF that will be procuring the PC-7 Mk2 BTTs, but also the IN (which requires 30 BTTs), just as both the IAF and IN have also procured the Hawk Mk132 AJTs. However, between the two armed services, the IN seems to have come out as the wiser one since, unlike the IAF, it never got involved in the con-job of supporting either the HJT-36 IJT project (despite the fact that the IN too has been using HAL-built HJT-16 Mk2 basic jet trainers) or the HTT-40 BTT project.
And the same type of long-con is now being played out for the RSH procurement project (for the Indian Army and IAF) and thus it is only a matter of time before HAL's LUH R & D project too will meet the same fate as that of the BTT. For, in today's world of competing priorities for defence funding allocations (given the ever-increasing costs of procuring new-generation platforms), even countries like China or India cannot afford the luxury of procuring two almost-identical platforms for doing the same job—that's the elementary and cold-blooded truth. Those who choose to believe otherwise are only deluding themselves and residing in a make-believe world.
