MMRCA News and Discussions - Part II

Discussion in 'Indian Air Force' started by Sridhar, Oct 9, 2009.

  1. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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    Link for Old thread

    http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/archives/2015-mmrca-news-discussions.html


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    MMRCA Trials schedule - courtesy Quickgun Murugan


    MMRCA Trials are being done in three phases:-

    • Phase 1 involves training and familiarization of the Indian Evaluation Team.
    • Phase 2 involves flying under extreme wet (Bangalore), cold (Leh) and hot conditions (Jaisalmer) conditions.
    • Phase 3 will include firing of specialist weapons from the aircraft.

    Two teams of two pilots each will carry out the tests on the five contenders, allowing for concurrent evaluations of two aircraft at a time. Four test pilots have already been trained for the job in supplier countries.

    The Indian Evaluation Team (IET) also has three flight test engineers and representatives from the Ministry of Defense, HAL, the DRDO, Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance and Air Headquarters.

    Phase 1 trials for F/A-18E/F, F-16IN, Rafale and MiG-35 will be done in Bangalore. The Indian evaluation team will go to Germany and Sweden in November for Phase I trials on the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Gripen JAS-39.

    Super Hornet F/A-18s completed their Phase 1 trials in Bangalore in August. Group Captain Dixit and Wing Commander Chauhan evaluated the Super Hornet. The aircraft is currently undergoing Phase 2 trials.

    Three F-16IN Super Vipers leased by Lockheed from the UAE Air Force arrived in Bangalore for their Phase 1 and 2 trials on September 1. The Block 60 aircraft are equipped with APG-80 AESA.

    The schedule for Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials is as follows : -

    • Super Hornet F/A-18E/F August 17
    • Super Viper F-16IN September 1
    • Rafale September
    • MiG-35 Late October, early November
    • Eurofighter Typhoon February 2010
    • Gripen JAS-39 March 2010

    Phase 3 Trials :-

    The MiG-35 will conduct live-firing tests of on-board weaponry on a testing range in southern Russia in March-April 2010.

    Flight trials for all the aircraft are scheduled to be completed by April 2010.

    Trial Emphasis Going by recent statements of IAF officers linked to the evaluation trial, the emphasis in the MMRCA selection process appears to be on attack potential and low cost of ownership, not air combat capability.

    Source: Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for IAF - a knol by Vijainder K Thakur
     
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  3. Quickgun Murugan

    Quickgun Murugan Regular Member

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    Thanks Vayusena1
    I assume you are from IAF :icon_salut:. I am actually surprised when you mentioned cabinet clearance for evaluation. Are'nt the planes like F-18 already under evaluation? I am sure quite a few IAF pilots have flown Mig 35.

    Ok, lets assume cabinet clears the evaluation procedure tomorrow, how long will it take for the IAF to give the final report?

    Do you think IAF would be allowed to take an independent decision on it or will IAF have to bend its back to foreign pressure on government?

    Also finally,if you don't mind whats your personal choice?:)
     
  4. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    Just read the gripen's mmrca offer. They offer to customise the aircraft to our needs like being able to fire russian weapons etc. While running into some news about ej-200 engines to be offered to lca tejas, i found that it was pitched as a better upgrade to gripen? But sweden ultimately chose the ge f414. With the swedes promising customisation, could we ask them to fit the ej-200 engine on gripen in, being offered to us, also co-developing the multi-mode radar that we built for tejas into a production aesa radar. So that both aircrafts would have lot of commonality and thus bring costs down considerably.
    We would also be able to demand 100% tot on ej-200 engine with this strategic and lucrative business proposition. The american component of gripen pegged at 30% would come down dramatically. I propose iaf would consider this route that let the manufacturer go through all the beauracratic process of 50% offsets, tender evaluation, accuse of bribes then getting blacklisted like singapore technologies and bofors etc and would spare the bad blood spilt by f-16 manufacturer lockheed ceo about gripen proposal of 100% tot. I personally pity the swedes lack of political clout they can offer us, but it would be in india's strategic interests to stand on its own.
    With eurojet gmbh, getting a prospective deal, we can ask them to offer technical expertise on tejas which is quite similar to the ej-200.
    If saab agrees, then it would be diwali for iaf, indian aerospace industry and swedes as well. As in the case of larsen and turbo, a swedish company that became wholly indian . Saab is a company looking to shift base to a different country that can support its r&d, manufacturing and be a customer for its high value added defence products. With sweden cutting gripen orders to 100, it would also be a strategically wise move for the company as well. It would help india emerge an independent aerospace major on footing with the best in the world.
     
  5. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    Just tell me what u guys think about my previous post.
    Just think the lowest cost of gripen easily fitting within our 10.5 billion budget. The help that tejas could get from the gripen experience on future development. Like making the lca to take off from roads, being able to to turn the aircraft on the ground and its capability to be converted into a stealth aircraft in future. Etc.
     
  6. youngindian

    youngindian Senior Member Senior Member

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  7. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    Good strategy by saab

    Looks like saab wants to expand all over the world by building regional markets. In india for asia, and africa. In brazil for the americas. Europeon companies broke out of the nostalgia of nationalism long ago and are scouring the globe for business. As their home lands cut military spending they want to expand elsewhere even more exponentially and saab is one of such pioneers. Only such a company can offer so much with so little at hand(i mean their aircraft is small and light right).

    personally as an indian. i wish saab would fail in brazil. They We Would see at its true aggression in India's mmrca.

    As a common man. I wish to see companies like saab flourish bringing high tech knowledge to the rest of the world from the curfew of a previlaged few.
     
  8. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    The issue with american stuff is there would be no transfer of technology for either their keep up or local manufacture. U would have to look for the US for maintenance through out life.
     
  9. Arun

    Arun Regular Member

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    Well bro grippen in no ways going to win MMRCA , its either Rafale or Mig-35.So your saying that Grip is better than Mig and rafale ,just google it bro.Regarding tech transfer Russia is offering us everything and considering that we have previous "successful" experience with them ,most probably we will opt Mig.
    Besides when LCA is fully developed ,it will be at par with Grip.Also this will severely effect LCA's future possible foreign sales.
     
  10. nitesh

    nitesh Mob Control Manager Stars and Ambassadors

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    The best way to order MRCA is: Do some nuclear test and find how many remains in the race with whatever claims they have made while offering there planes. I bet it will be Rafale and MiG 35 (This will be for sure) :D
     
  11. StealthSniper

    StealthSniper Senior Member Senior Member

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    Nitesh I agree with what you said. The Russians won't say much and I can see the French won't say much either considering they have yet to sell the Rafale to any country.

    By the way, I will be counting on the US to put sanctions on us like they did in 1998.
     
  12. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    I did think of such a prospect that Gripen would affect ADA tejas development and export. But If we could standardise Engine and Radar along with Weapons we would have been able to save on logistics.
     
  13. icecoolben

    icecoolben Regular Member

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    I did give a thought that propping up gripen might land Ada tejas in trouble. But the prospect of commonality of Engine and radar along with weapons weighed better. v could arm twist Eurojet with the deal. the prospect of a major aerospace major entering and staying for good in India also made more sense than buying from overseas vendors.

    The mmrca could very well be India's last open fighter aircraft bid. With FGFA and MCA programmes in the pipeline. India would not be going this kind of a contract for 50 more years. So lets make the best of it.
     
  14. khatarnak

    khatarnak Regular Member

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    Indian Russian joint arms manufacture: Reality or farce?

    dear friends,

    i know this is irrelavent to this thread, but i want to point out that if we choose mig35, what can be done. i know and agree that russians are our biggest defence systems supplier, but, now-a-days they are not as much trusted as they were before.
     
  15. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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  16. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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    The M-MRCA Contest
    FORCE October 2009 [ www.forceindia.net]

    The M-MRCA Contest

    Capability for the IAF, an opportunity for India
    By Adm. Arun Prakash (retd)


    The selection process for short-listing a set of contenders for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (M-MRCA) competition seems to have finally reached the stage when flying trials are about to commence. Playing by the rules of the game, framed under the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2008, the IAF has to evaluate the performance of each competing machine over the full range of climatic, altitude and terrain conditions as well as many other environmental, maintenance and operational criteria laid down in the Air Staff Requirement (ASR).

    [​IMG]

    It will be as much of a challenge for the IAF to organise, coordinate and execute field trials for six competitors in diverse locations in a compressed time-frame, as for the aircraft vendors to finance and demonstrate their products under demanding conditions, miles away from factory support. A unique DPP clause requires that the trials be conducted at ‘no cost, no commitment’ to the government of India (GoI).

    All one can say is that we have come a long way from the bad old days when the Indian armed forces used less sophisticated methodology for selecting aircraft (as well as other systems) for induction into service.

    Evaluations Then & Now


    In case of the Soviets, our exclusive purveyors of defence equipment in the past, they invariably pre-selected the hardware and offered what they thought was best for us. Since they indiscriminately transferred arms to an array of Left-leaning customers, from Algerians and Angolans to Egyptians and Eritreans, it remains a mystery how they decided what to offer whom. However, once the Soviets gave the nod, an Indian trials team would conscientiously evaluate the system and render a report on its capabilities and limitations. Under the circumstances, this report did not really matter because, by then, the deal would have already been struck on a government-to-government basis, and the concerned Service had to live with the equipment – for better or for worse.

    a ‘paper evaluation’ would first be carried out in the Service HQ, on the basis of which a short-list was made out. Teams would thereafter head out abroad to undertake limited trials to the extent considered necessary (and affordable) by the equipment manufacturer. On return, the Service HQ would examine the evaluation report and draw up a merit list of the contending equipment. The rest was up to the government.

    The new Defence Procurement Procedure, which has undergone four revisions since its unveiling in 2002, however, makes an earnest attempt to remove all elements of arbitrariness and introduce transparency into the selection and procurement process. The selected vendors get six months after receipt of the request for proposals (RFP) to submit their bids. Selection involves a technical evaluation process for compliance with IAF operational requirements and other RFP conditions. This is followed by extensive field trials to evaluate aircraft performance, before the commercial proposals of the short-listed vendors are compared to decide the lowest bidder or ‘L-1’, who wins the competition.

    Lacunae in Our System


    The Indian system, conditioned by politicians to look only as far as the next parliamentary or assembly election/bye-election has, so far, discouraged a long-term approach to defence planning. This political short-sightedness has bred a corresponding myopia in the armed forces. They find it infructuous to look too far beyond the next financial year because not only are perspective-plans invariably consigned by the MoD to musty cupboards, but even the annual budget remains full of uncertainties.

    Moreover, the armed forces are now reasonably sure that neither the DRDO nor the defence PSUs are interested in working alongside them to achieve common goals. Therefore, forecasting operational imperatives, and seeking to develop timely capabilities is not a pursuit that the three Services have, so far, found productive; unlike others world-wide.

    For example, the Royal Air Force (RAF), on perceiving a likely threat, undertakes a study which results in an Air Staff Target (AST) for a system or platform embodying the attributes necessary to create counter-capabilities. The AST, in turn, sets off a participatory process involving the Service, R&D and industry.

    As an illustration, AST 396, issued in the early 1970s, called for an enhanced RAF ground-attack capability in Europe and sought a single aircraft which could replace the Jaguar as well as Harrier in this role. A rethink gave rise to AST 403 calling for an air superiority fighter with a secondary STOVL and ground-attack capability. A few years later, this became AST 409 leading, on one hand, to the Harrier GR Mk5, and on the other, to (after dropping the STOVL requirement) the development of the multi-nation Eurofighter.

    The RAF Air Staff Targets are backed by a set of comprehensive Air Staff Requirements which set out, in minute detail, the performance standards expected from the aircraft, moderated by industry inputs about what is achievable by the current state of the art. The aircraft industry then makes bids against this AST. The process may lead to a single prototype or to a ‘fly off’ between two or more competitors, of which the final winner is selected for acquisition.

    This is not to say that our Service HQs do not follow similar procedures to draw-up Staff Requirements in many cases. In fact, DPP 2008 now methodically lists out every single step of the process, but the MoD needs to guard against any attempts, by DRDO or other agencies, to circumvent the due processes.

    The IAF Force Level Dilemma

    The 1980s were a bounteous decade for the IAF, with as many as eight or nine types including the Jaguar, MiG-23-MF/BN, Mirage-2000, MiG-29, MiG-25, An-32, Il-76, Do-228, Mi-17 and Mi-26 joining its order of battle. By the 1990s, the IAF had possibly attained a strength of over 80 air squadrons, of which half were combat, and the remaining transport or helicopter units. A major subsequent addition has been the Su-30, of which the IAF will eventually have around 270.

    Peacetime aircraft attrition and creeping obsolescence are the twin spectres which haunt every Air Chief, and make him ask for more. In the case of the IAF the problem has been aggravated by the fact that a significant proportion of the IAF combat strength consists of MiG-21s (in marks ranging from FL, M and bis to Bison). Of the 750 Mig-21s inducted into the IAF, over 500 were produced by HAL, and it is a reflection of the lack of vision on the part of this PSU that it failed to evolve and propose to the IAF, a modernisation programme for the MiG-21 fleet. Started early enough, such an indigenous programme would have given this aircraft enhanced life as well as capability. It may have also pre-empted the alarming rise in MiG-21 accident rate, which came to be ascribed to poor quality control by HAL. The indigenous Tejas LCA, which was to have been the MiG-21 replacement, has suffered huge slippages, further upsetting the IAF force-planning process.

    This IAF dilemma is compounded by the re-equipment plans of neighbouring China and her ‘all-weather’ ally, Pakistan, which happen to be significantly complementary. The PLA Air Force deploys a formidable force of 2,300 aircraft, of which over 300 are Chengdu J-10 MRCA and Shenyang J-11 air superiority fighters; both 4th generation machines. The PLAAF also deploys 175 Su-30MKK and Su-27SK air superiority fighters. The Pak Air Force is slated to receive 36 J-10s and aims to acquire 10-12 squadrons’ worth (200-250) of the lightweight multi-role JF-17 ‘Thunder’. The Thunder, a collaborative project of the Chengdu Aircraft Industries and the Pak Aeronautical Complex, will become the future mainstay of the PAF.

    Against this opposition, the IAF fields approximately 700-800 combat aircraft, only some of which can be classified as 4th generation. Coupled with the newly inducted air-to-air refuellers as well as the airborne early-warning AWACs, this represents a formidable capability for homeland defence, close support and limited trans-national operations. Plans are also afoot for India to collaborate in a derivative of the Russian PAK-FA 5th generation fighter programme, under development by the Sukhoi Bureau.

    While technology may have compensated, to a large extent, for the run-down in IAF squadron strength, the Service has to ensure it can field adequate numbers too, for the day it has to fight a war on two fronts. This is not an easy proposition when the replacement for a MiG-21, worth Rs two crores, is likely to cost a hundred times as much. However, that is a tight-rope all Services will have to walk in the current and future environment.

    A False Start

    It was in the early years of this decade when the IAF decided that the logical answer to its problems of obsolescence, attrition and declining strength was to induct additional numbers of the Mirage-2000. This aircraft had an excellent safety and serviceability record and played a decisive role in the Kargil conflict. With a few changes and upgrades, Vayu Bhavan felt that, it could become the future multi-role aircraft; not only bridging the gap between the heavy-weight Su-30 and the light-weight Tejas (when inducted) but also compensating for the eventual de-induction of the non-Bison MiG-21s. However, there was a flaw in this plan.

    For one, M/s Dassault Aviation were now producing the more advanced and definitive Mirage-2000-5 version, which was a substantially different machine. They were also on the verge of closing down the Mirage-2000 production line, unless some firm orders were forthcoming soon. Moreover, the MoD was aware of these factors and consistently refused to treat the IAF proposal as merely a ‘repeat order on a past supplier’ envisaged in the ‘Fast Track Procedure’ of DPP 2006. They insisted that since this was going to be a new aircraft, the IAF should follow the standard process of drawing up an ASR and then floating an RFP.

    Displaying misplaced optimism in the face of steadfast MoD opposition, the IAF persevered and, possibly, lost a precious two-three years in its futile quest for additional Mirages. In hindsight, following due processes, in this time-frame the Service could have gone well down the M-MRCA acquisition route by now, and mitigated its problems.

    The RFP for M-MRCA

    The recently retired Air Chief is quoted by a magazine as having summed up M-MRCA request for proposals in the following words: “Broadly speaking, we want a medium weight, multi role combat aircraft that can undertake air defence, ground attack, maritime attack (anti-ship) and reconnaissance roles with ease. We want the aircraft to have adequately long-range and endurance to meet our operational requirements with additional mid-air refuelling capability and ease of maintenance and low life-cycle costs.” Additionally, the IAF has indicated its preference for the active electronically scanning array (AESA) radar, in preference to the earlier less capable mechanically scanning sensors.

    The comprehensively drawn up 211-page RFP released in August 2007 has taken as long as six years to formulate after the request for information (RFI) was sent out in 2001. It, perhaps, started life with a focus on the Mirage-2000, and then evolved due to a number of other factors. For one, a deal as lucrative as this must have invoked pressure from many countries, especially our new found ally USA, to include their candidates. Secondly, India’s strategic environment as well as her posture has been undergoing change, and trans-national operations now no longer seem unthinkable. And finally, the need to refine and clarify the new complex industrial offset rules must have contributed a great deal to the delay. In spite of its long gestation period, this RFP contains certain features which are likely to create headaches for decision-makers.

    Intriguingly, and perhaps for geo-political reasons, the RFP seems to have cast its net too wide; including two distinctly different categories of aircraft in the same competition. Firstly, new 4th generation machines (MiG-35, Gripen, Eurofighter and Rafale) have got mixed up with aircraft which first flew in the 1970s and now are in the ‘sunset phase’ of their service life (F-16 and F/A-18). Secondly, single-engined lightweight fighters in the USD 30-50 million cost range (F-16, Gripen and MiG-35) will be vying with larger twin-engined heavy-weight fighters in the USD 60-120 million range (F/A-18, Rafale and Eurofighter).

    This is like trying to select a winner from a mixed box of ‘apples and oranges’; a difficult and hazardous task akin to treading a legal and political minefield.

    Twin Vs Single


    It is obvious that notwithstanding its higher weight, a twin-engined aircraft will generally deliver greater performance in terms of payload, range, versatility and often even agility. The biggest advantage endowed by two engines is that of survivability; whether it loses an engine due to malfunction, enemy action or merely a bird-strike, this aircraft has substantial chances of getting home, perhaps with its payload. Its single-engined counterpart will simply crash.

    It is presumed that the M-MRCA, on induction, will become the IAF’s primary nuclear delivery vehicle; and given a choice it would be most imprudent to risk nuclear weapons on a single-engined platform which could be brought down on either side of the border with catastrophic consequences

    However, the performance benefits of a twin-engined aircraft come at a much higher initial cost. When pitted in a competition where the ‘minimum laid down criteria’ are likely to be met by both twin and single-engined machines, it is the latter which will come out as L-1. In which case one wonders why the twin-engined competitors are going through the expensive and time-consuming ritual of trials, unless they have been assured of bonus points for better than minimum performance, as well as for twin-engine safety?

    Russia Vs USA Vs Europe


    Six decades of import dependency in the arms arena has taught us the bitter lesson that every weapon system comes with strings attached; and can, in time, become a powerful instrument of political blackmail. It is, therefore, imperative for us to objectively examine the track record of countries in the M-MRCA fray, so that our national interests are not compromised.

    The USSR was, no doubt, our most reliable and steadfast friend as well as supplier of weaponry so advanced that no one else would even contemplate offering it to us. However, the same cannot be said about the Russian Federation, into whose coffers India has pumped billions of dollars when the former was in dire straits. The new Russian arms vendors, after extracting international prices, supply defective systems, renege on contracts and fail to provide even basic product support in a reasonable time-frame, hobbling our armed forces. Going by their past track record, the Russian bid could be rejected instantly, but the M-MRCA deal may be India’s last chance to leverage the Russian arms lobby into changing their attitude.

    As far as the USA is concerned, we need to remind ourselves that for 62 years the Indian armed forces have fought many wars and managed quite well, largely without the benefit of US technology. In the past, our Navy has also suffered the penalty of US sanctions gratuitously imposed on us through their loyal British allies.

    While the GoI may make light of the End Use Monitoring Agreement recently signed with the USA, it certainly constitutes a curb on our freedom of action as far as deployment of the equipment, and any modifications that we may wish to undertake are concerned. Moreover, the Damocles sword of sanctions will forever hang over us and become a pressure point for the GoI. In this context, one must never lose sight of the fact that the US Administration, no matter how powerful, must often defer to the Congress, and US laws once made are impossible to change or modify.

    Superficially, Europe may appear to be a better entity to deal with, especially, since the selection of a European aircraft would appear to be a ‘neutral’ decision as far as Russia and the USA are concerned. However, the very expensive Eurofighter is built by a consortium of four nations, whose policies may or may not be convergent. Should even one of them succumb to external pressures, it could jeopardise the programme. The Gripen, on the other hand, makes liberal use of US origin equipment, and threatening noises are already being heard from that quarter. Moreover, it happens to be very close in performance to our own Tejas LCA.

    While these are not factors that would figure in the decision-making by the evaluation teams, they will certainly weigh on the minds of the IAF leadership and the GoI. The eventual selection may well turn out to be a political compromise or a choice of the ‘least of all evils’.

    The Offsets Clause

    Offsets are a formal trading practice whereby a nation undertaking a major foreign purchase requires the supplier to compensate it for the outgo of resources involved in terms of procurement expenditure. In India offsets have, so far, not been resorted to in any sector other than defence, possibly because MoD is the only ministry which undertakes major expenditure abroad and also has a captive industry in the form of defence PSUs.


    Courtesy : Austin of Key pub.
     
  17. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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    Defence offsets are not meant to provide compensation through counter-trade, but as DPP 2008 says, they may be in the form of ‘direct purchase of, or execution of export orders for, defence products and components manufactured by, or services provided by, Indian defence industries’. For offsets to be beneficial to the recipient, they must be selectively chosen to fill known technological gaps or provide a boost to the industry and economy of the host country in specific areas. The effort of the supplier, on the other hand, is to get away as cheaply as possible through pro-forma orders on local industry for low-tech common use products.

    Although a Defence Offset Facilitation Agency has been established, there is a view that the MoD may have bitten off more than it can chew, because it does not yet possess the expertise or wherewithal to manage offsets worth billions of dollars, to the country’s advantage.

    Far more serious is the unforeseen impact that vendors’ offset proposals are likely to have on their respective commercial bids, and the further complexities that this issue will inject into an already intricate competitive matrix.

    Conclusion

    Starting with the putative Bofors gun scandal, allegations of corruption have dogged every major arms deal in India, during the past two decades. Whether real or concocted and whether made in public interest or inspired by vested interests, such allegations have served to seriously retard the modernisation plans of India’s armed forces.

    Regrettably, allegations of kick-backs are now so commonplace that corruption is becoming a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Even reputed companies are now convinced that no defence contract can be won in India without greasing palms, and will stoop to do so. One of the more serious consequences of this phenomenon has, understandably, been a paralysis in the MoD, with no functionary willing to put his name or signature to any significant decision, for fear of the CBI enquiry that is bound to follow.

    The M-MRCA contract is going to be one of the largest in India’s history and influence-peddlers must be salivating in Delhi’s back-alleys. Even a whiff of scandal could set back by many years this overdue acquisition programme which has enough inherent complexities. One can only hope that patriotism and good sense will prevail; and greed and political opportunism will not jeopardize the IAF’s plans and national security.

    (The writer is a member of the National Security Advisory Board and a former chief of naval staff)
     
  18. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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    Eurojet proposes thrust-vectoring upgrade for Typhoon

    BY: Flight International
    [​IMG]
    Eurofighter and engine supplier Eurojet are stepping up their efforts to interest Typhoon customer nations in a thrust-vectoring upgrade that promises to bring substantial operational benefits and pay for itself through lifecycle cost reductions.
    Equipping the twin-engined Typhoon’s EJ200s with thrust vectoring nozzles (TVN) could reduce fuel burn on a typical mission by up to 5%, while increasing available thrust in supersonic cruise by up to 7%, the engine consortium says.
    Eurojet partner ITP benchtested a TVN several years ago, and EADS earlier this year equipped its Typhoon cockpit simulator to emulate the performance enhancements offered by the technology.
    The industrial partners are now looking for funding to launch a flight-demonstrator programme.
    Thrust vectoring could provide a virtual control surface when coupled with the Typhoon’s flight-control system, improving survivability, manoeuvrability and the aircraft’s ability to carry an asymmetric weapons load. It also reduces trim drag and therefore fuel consumption by “unloading” aerodynamic control surfaces.


    http://idrw.org/?p=1262
     
  19. Sridhar

    Sridhar House keeper Moderator

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  20. SATISH

    SATISH DFI Technocrat Stars and Ambassadors

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    Well I dont support TVC for EF...It is already a delto so it bleeds more energy...TVC might make it go into a stall sooner than ordinary engines...
     
  21. ahmedsid

    ahmedsid Top Gun Senior Member

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