LOC, LAC & IB skirmishs

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hit&run

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The time has come to signal Nuclear posture changed to more alert levels.

If I may use this thread its time to discuss targeting main Chinese cities, manufacturing hubs, electricity grids, dams and other strategic and military installation.

@bennedose can you please post your videos that you have made to locate Chinese military installation located at LAC and IB with China.

A usual propaganda is thrown that Chinese won't lose anything in a nuclear attack. When Americans gave glimpse of their nuclear attack blue print the troll face Chinese General pissed in his pants.

Chinese will lose every thing if their main cities will be knocked down let alone targeting military installation/HQ.

Its been assured umpteen times that yield in not a problem as far as Indian nuclear capabilities are concern. Furthermore there is great ambiguity in the numbers of nuclear arsenal we have. The quantity of fissile material we have @LETHALFORCE (Massala) the numbers seems to be around 300-400.

Its time to shut Chinaman & its warning rhetoric. Han only learns when you pull your punch out; on street or at border.
 

Mikesingh

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Did they occupied 5.5 km in arunachal pradesh or just an intrusion?
All are temporary intrusions which are exaggerated by the media. There's no way the Chinks can come in so deep in Arunachal as the LAC there is well manned and fortified.
 

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An interesting and informative discussion on the stand-off:


Nirupama Rao's comments are mostly vapid bhai-bhai type, but she sets a good stage for the ensuing discussion.

Jeff Smith's comments are of course always of interest.
 

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Xi's warning amid standoff: PLA can defeat any intruder

Beijing:
TNN Jul 31 2017
In a rare appearance in military uniform as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chinese President Xi Jinping told a large gathering of troops that the People's Liberation Army was capable of defeating any intruder.

“I firmly believe that our heroic PLA has the confidence and capability to defeat any intruder,“ Xi said, without mentioning China's ongoing threats that include the border standoff with India at the Doklam plateau and the latest missile launch by its neighbour, North Korea.

“The world is far from tranquil and peace needs to be safeguarded,“ Xi said, ahead of the 90th anniversary of the PLA, at Zhurihe training base in China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on Sunday.“Today, we are closer than ever to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. And more than any time in history, we need to build strong armed forces of the people,“ Xi said.

“Our heroic PLA has the confidence and capability to safeguard the nation's sovereignty , security and development interests,“ he asserted.

Speaking soon after China established its first military base on foreign soil, Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, the Chinese president indicated that the country plans to expand the PLA's international role. Beijing is also investing heavily in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor which has military connotations.

The Zhurihe military base covers more than 1,000 sq km and the parade displayed J-20, China's newest generation stealth fighter, that could possibly rival the F-22 or F-25 with the US military . The PLA also displayed its nuclear warhead-capable DF-31AG mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, an upgraded version of the DF-31A introduced in 2009.State TV declared these to be “symbols of a major power“.

Xi did not respond to US President Donald Trump's complaints that China has not done enough to constrain its close ally , North Korea. More than a hundred planes flew past and displayed of almost 600 types of weaponry , nearly half of which were making their debut in public, according to the defence ministry .



http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/...id-standoff-PLA-can-defeat-any-31072017001045


A lot of hot air from 11 Jing Ping. The Chinese haven't a hope in hell to dislodge the IA from Doklam. Most of those silly gizmos they showed during the parade are meant for battle in the plains. Mountain warfare is a different ballgame altogether!

And if push comes to shove, they surely must be aware that Shanghai and Beijing are in our cross hairs! They'd be back in the stone age if these cities and a couple of other economic hubs are targeted.
 
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hit&run

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Xi's warning amid standoff: PLA can defeat any intruder

Beijing:
TNN Jul 31 2017
In a rare appearance in military uniform as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chinese President Xi Jinping told a large gathering of troops that the People's Liberation Army was capable of defeating any intruder.

“I firmly believe that our heroic PLA has the confidence and capability to defeat any intruder,“ Xi said, without mentioning China's ongoing threats that include the border standoff with India at the Doklam plateau and the latest missile launch by its neighbour, North Korea.

“The world is far from tranquil and peace needs to be safeguarded,“ Xi said, ahead of the 90th anniversary of the PLA, at Zhurihe training base in China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on Sunday.“Today, we are closer than ever to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. And more than any time in history, we need to build strong armed forces of the people,“ Xi said.

“Our heroic PLA has the confidence and capability to safeguard the nation's sovereignty , security and development interests,“ he asserted.

Speaking soon after China established its first military base on foreign soil, Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, the Chinese president indicated that the country plans to expand the PLA's international role. Beijing is also investing heavily in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor which has military connotations.

The Zhurihe military base covers more than 1,000 sq km and the parade displayed J-20, China's newest generation stealth fighter, that could possibly rival the F-22 or F-25 with the US military . The PLA also displayed its nuclear warhead-capable DF-31AG mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, an upgraded version of the DF-31A introduced in 2009.State TV declared these to be “symbols of a major power“.

Xi did not respond to US President Donald Trump's complaints that China has not done enough to constrain its close ally , North Korea. More than a hundred planes flew past and displayed of almost 600 types of weaponry , nearly half of which were making their debut in public, according to the defence ministry .



http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/...id-standoff-PLA-can-defeat-any-31072017001045


A lot of hot air from 11 Jing Ping. The Chinese haven't a hope in hell to dislodge the IA from Doklam. Most of those silly gizmos they showed during the parade are meant for battle in the plains. Mountain warfare is a different ballgame altogether!

And if push comes to shove, they surely must be aware that Shanghai and Beijing are in our cross hairs! They'd be back in the stone age if these cities and a couple of other economic hubs are targeted.

He was talking about USA preparing to invade North Korea.
 

Akshay Fenix

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Chaps on other forums too are reporting movement of troops and equipments.
 

Kunal Biswas

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'I was, I am, and will remain anti-Chinese'

'I know by experience that they can put a dagger in our back at any time...'

'It was a state of total chaos. Nobody knew what was happening. The fog of war was so thick that nobody could see anything... It is an experience which marked everybody's life.'

Brigadier Amarjit Singh Behl (retd), then a second lieutenant, and his men fought to the end before being taken prisoners of war by the Chinese in the 1962 Indo-China war.

Then a 21 year old, the general looks back at a war fought in extremely difficult circumstances and life as a Chinese PoW in this interview to Rediff.com's Claude Arpi.


Did they capture a lot of arms and ammunitions?

They must have; also trucks and other equipment from south of Tawang till the Assam border. As far as the 7 Brigade is concerned, it was totally and entirely an on-foot battle. A battle of the fit men only!

From Tawang to Bridge III, it was between 5 and 7 days walk. You had to be strong and I was strong, I was only 21 years old.

With my boys, I walked from Ziminthang to Tsangdhar in 16 hours only.

On October 21, we were kept near the helipad and I saw the two officers who had been killed near their chopper. I went to the Chinese officers who had interpreters in English and Hindi (while in the Chinese prisoner of war camp, they also would speak Gorkhali and Punjabi).

I asked this officer, I want to bury these officers; after I insisted, he said 'Alright'. With two of my boys, we dug a 2-feet trench and buried Major Ram Singh and Squadron Leader Sehgal. We saluted them.

The next night (October 21-22) we stayed on there.

On the 22nd morning, we walked till Bridge III on the Namkha chu where we stayed for the night. Then we went to Khenzimane (the Indo-Tibet [ Images ] border) and the next day, we reached Le village on Nyamjiang chu in Tibet.

We stayed for two days in Le and moved to Marmang where we spent two nights before being taken in trucks to the PoW's camp near Tsetang in central Tibet.

Were you fed properly?

The Chinese were not well off themselves. I could see this. We had to eat rice and radish for breakfast, lunch and dinner. We had to survive with this.

From Marmang, it took us three days and nights to reach the camp. They had proper roads. After all, Tibet is a plateau. You remove a few stones and you can drive on it.

They kept the majors and the four lieutenant colonels in two blocks; the captains and JCOs were in other houses (though later, they were separated), all around the Chongye monastery (in Yarlung Valley). Nobody lived in the monastery itself.

Gorkhas were kept separately, so were the jawans.

There were 4 PoW camps in Tibet. Ours was only for the 7 Brigade. There were four companies (our boys [17 Parachute Field Regiment], 4 Grenadier, 2 Rajput and 9 Punjab [ Images ]).

The 1/9 Gorkhas were kept separately, they wanted to show that Chinese and Gorkhas are related, they were given a better deal. Brigadier John Dalvi was taken to a commune and kept in solitary confinement; he was a very isolated man.

For a few days, jawans kept pouring in the camp. There were some 500 jawans from the 7 Infantry Brigade, 10 JCOs, 3 majors, 4 lieutenant colonels and 9 other officers.

Did you have proper clothing?

When we received our marching orders on September 24, we had sent a detachment to Kanpur to get warm clothes. I had a parka. We suffered less that some others. There were troops with just an angora shirt, not even a jersey.

After a few weeks, the Chinese gave us padded cloth, what they themselves were wearing. All of us slept on the hay, but being an unmarried man, I could sleep anywhere. I did not worry about anything.

My family got two telegrams: '2nd Lt Behl missing, believed dead.' My uncle went to meet General P P Kumaramangalam (later thw army chief) who said 'Forget about that boy, he is dead.'

Later, the Chinese gave the names of the prisoners to the Indian Red Cross. My name was in it. My parents knew then that I was alive; it was around New Year. About that time, we received parcels from the Red Cross (tooth paste, tooth brush, a sweater and sweets, etc).

Did they try to demoralise you?

They thought that they knew everything, but they only wanted to find out what they liked to hear. The interpreters would brainwash us daily. They asked questions like this: "What is the relation between generals and officers or officers and jawans?"

We always answered that our relations were good. I say with pride that my 38 boys, though they were not staying in the same block in the PoW's camp, obeyed my orders 100 per cent from day 1 till the last day.

For example, I had not cut my hair nor did my boss Captain Talwar. My boys would once in the month secretly bring hot water to have a bath at 2 am. One of my jawans brought me tea (without milk and sugar) every day during the time we were prisoners. He knew I was fond of my tea.

He would come: "Ram, Ram, Sahib" and give me my tea. The Chinese did not know about it. Our house was near the kitchen and he was working there.

In the mornings, the Chinese gave us, Atta Chapati with some radish. For lunch and dinner, the menu was radish with rice. We survived. And 2 or 3 times, they gave us tins of pork. It was cooked with the rest and we were quite happy.

Did they try to make you admit that India [ Images ] attacked China?

There was an interpreter, Lieutenant Tong who used to say: "You attacked us." I answered: "No, we had nothing (to attack you)". He pushed me around and that was it.

The Chinese interpreters are like robots. If, in the morning, they are told, 'You should be nice with the prisoners', they would befriend us; if they were told, 'Be rude', they were very rude.

The Chinese have a very peculiar way of discussion or brainwashing. They would read out some news and ask us, "What you have to say?" We would answer: "I have nothing to say". They would then ask us to write our comments. The officers and men remained very stubborn and did not believe what they said.

I was anti-Chinese, I am and will remain anti-Chinese because I know by experience that they can put a dagger in our back at any time.

During my stay, I planned for an escape with Captain Talwar and Captain Kohli. I would report sick every day and collect medicine.

Some other PoWs mentioned that there was a beautiful lady doctor.

Yes, everybody used to report sick to see her. But my objective was only to collect medicines. The Chinese had basic medicines, further they were practicing acupuncture. We planned to take the direction of the sun and then follow the route that we had taken to escape.

When did you learn about the cease-fire?

Two or three days after the cease-fire through the public address system. They used to give their own news in Hindi. They used to play songs: 'Everywhere it is resounding that Indians and Chinese are brothers'.

How were you repatriated?

We were taken by the same road, except that we crossed at Bumla where we were handed over to the Indian Red Cross. By that time the Chinese had built a road between Bumla and Tawang. They built it in one month.

The point is that there is no mercy, no feelings, no democracy in their books: they brought people from Tibet and along with local Monpas, they made them work. They must have known the topography of the place by taking air photos. They knew the area well.

How do you explain that there is no photograph of the operations from the Indian side?

Obviously the Chinese being the winners had all the time to take pictures and use it for their propaganda.

Were the PoW camps ready months in advance to receive prisoners?

No, they were not. These houses had no windows and no door. They put some hay and that was it. No preparation was required. We had 2 or 3 mugs of water by day. The river was located at about 1 1/2 km.

Captains, lieutenants and other ranks had to carry water once in ten days. Senior officers were exempted.

What about the decorations? Some say that many were not merited.

It is not that all people who are decorated are brave and those not decorated are cowards.

But I want to tell you that NOBODY from the 7 Infantry Brigade received an order to withdraw to the best of my knowledge. Whosoever has withdrawn, withdrew on their own.

Some have been decorated, some not, it proves nothing. It is true that some people may not have deserved it, but that was it. The government probably wanted to show the nation, that the army fought well, therefore decorations were given.

Remember that it was a state of total chaos. Nobody knew what was happening. The fog of war was so thick that nobody could see anything.

It is an experience which marked everybody's life.

In the Western sector, 13 Kumaon gave the Chinese a good fight in Chushul (Ladakh).

Though I was a carefree man, it was a harrowing experience. But even when people were running away, neither I nor my jawans thought of abandoning our post. We kept fighting, fighting.
 

Kunal Biswas

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Himalayan conflict forges artillery doctrine

Himalayan Conflict Forges Artillery Doctrine


A former major who served in the Indian artillery recounts India's experience of fire support operations in difficult terrain here. It is based on a paper presented at Jane's 21st Century Fire Support Conference.

The Indian Army's artillery has adopted a pivotal role in the country's military planning for future operations against its principal adversaries - Pakistan and China. Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles has forced Indian doctrinal thinking away from maneuver warfare.

Instead, it is now concerned with an ability to inflict heavy attrition in a war limited in time and space. A deep counter-offensive inside Pakistan is neither desirable nor achievable. As a result, India's primary military aim is to degrade as much of Pakistan's standing forces in as short a time as possible.

Against China, however, India has adopted a strategy of counter-attack only: to foil a Chinese offensive on a broad front. A limited counter-attack capability using air power and ballistic missiles (primarily in a deterrent role) is considered an adequate response to Chinese aggression.

Indian military plans are prepared around the necessity to wage what is effectively a war on 'one-and-a-half fronts': that is, to fight a full-fledged conflict with Pakistan in order to decimate its military prowess, and to hold China by means of limited counter-attacks and through diplomatic channels.

Although Pakistan and China are both nuclear weapon states, the nuclear factor is being excluded from this examination. Indian military thinking opines that contrary to its declared policy, Pakistan is unlikely to employ nuclear weapons unless its very existence as a state is threatened. To remove such an eventuality, or the possibility of its occurrence, Pakistan needs to maintain parity at a conventional operational level with India (which it presently enjoys). On the other hand, a Chinese threat of low-yield nuclear weapons usage on the Himalayan battlefield is real.

India's artillery, which includes ballistic missiles, is the only organic arm of the country's army that possesses an ability to switch between a general support role and close support of the tactical battle, and to move firepower from one front to another in acceptable time. In operational terms, the role of the artillery is being redefined from that of a combat support arm to a combat arm in its own right.

The Indian artillery operates in varied terrain that includes desert, glaciers, high altitude, jungle, mountainous, semi-mountainous, and plains. The thrust of this article will focus on the Himalayan battlefield that has a mix of jungle, mountainous, and high altitude terrain; and on the Siachen glacier.

The guiding philosophy of India's field artillery is to standardize the caliber of weapons in service, to seek ammunition compatibility with guns of the same caliber but of different regional origin, to give equal importance to both projectile and projector, and to utilize optimally the imminent induction of ballistic missiles.



This philosophy has been influenced by five considerations:

· The changes in potential targets inside Pakistan since linear defenses and supporting field works along the border with India are heavily reinforced with concrete fortifications. A successful engagement of hardened defenses is possible only with heavier caliber shells with high terminal velocities;

· The expansion of mechanized forces within the armies of India and Pakistan has underscored the need for large caliber artillery systems and higher rates of fire;

· A determination to reduce the logistics complexities of operating guns of 14 different caliber, through a program of rationalization;

· The development of better roads and tracks in India's mountains means that many mountain guns can be dispensed with, although some systems which can be transported by pack animals will be retained;

· Between India and Pakistan, an induction of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads will force a change of doctrines and affect basic principles of war (such as 'concentration of mass') which are essential for a 'break-out' of strike formations through the opponent's linear defenses. A fear of collateral damage without any accompanying territorial gains would limit the use of ballistic missiles. On the other hand, ballistic missiles such as the indigenous Prithvi missile are ideal for use on a Himalayan battlefield against China where there is little fear of collateral damage.
At present, the artillery has about 760 130mm M-46 field guns in 36 regiments (battalion-equivalent) and plans to have 60 regiments equipped by 2000. There are 410 Bofors 155mm FH-77B howitzers for general support and counter fire. In the plains, all regiments equipped with the 105mm Indian Field Gun are earmarked to convert to the M-46. The 105mm Light Field Gun regiments in the mountains will remain in place until 2010. A regiment each of 7.2in and 5.5in field guns (for general support), and the 105mm Abbot self-propelled howitzers, are expected to be phased-out before next year.

The 75mm Pack Gun-Howitzer is used for close support in mountains. While the splinter effect of the latter's shell is unsatisfactory, as a portable equipment some examples are likely to be kept in service beyond 2010.



Retiring regiments

The few regiments equipped with 122mm D-30 towed howitzers are expected to retire by 2010. The single 160mm M58 Tampella heavy mortar regiments is likely to be phased out later this year. The 120mm AM-50 Thomson Brandt smoothbore mortars, which are effective to a range of 9,000m with PEPA/LP extended range ammunition, will stay in service.

Under the field artillery's rationalization plan by 2010 the towed artillery will be based primarily on the 130mm M-46, the 155mm FH-77B, and a select number of M-46s upgraded to 155mm caliber. The 105mm Light Field Gun, which is of limited effectiveness in offensive operations or against concrete bunkers, will continue to be employed in the mountains.

The 15-year war (see IDR 12/1997, pp58-61) being fought between India and Pakistan on the Siachen glacier is a localized middle-intensity conflict. It occurs at an altitude of 10,000-21,000ft across a battlefield that is 76km in length and varies between 2-8km in width.

With the stabilization of the military held line, called the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), the Siachen war has become an artillery battle. India is confronted by more problems than Pakistan because its troops are encamped at higher altitudes - 18,000-21,000ft - upon the Saltoro Ridge, the western edge of the glacier facing Pakistan.

Typical locations on the Saltoro Ridge comprise 'nests' of medium machine guns and automatic grenade launchers, with nearby detachment shelters and fighting positions. A preferred item for shelters is parachute material; there are common cases of cold-arrest of small arms and support weapons, which are overcome by a combination of the wrapping of arms, body heat, and partially successful lubricants developed by the DRDO.

Pakistani artillery includes OTO Breda 105mm Model 56 pack howitzers, 122mm howitzers in troop strengths, 5.5in gun/howitzers deployed as single pieces, and 82mm and 120mm mortars employed in section or troop strength. Pakistan has four independent routes to the Saltoro Ridge from its Dansum garrison, and each has its quota of fire support. Guns at Baltoro take care of the area of Sia La to Khondus, and others have been placed to bring down accurate fire on Indian positions on the AGPL.

Early deployments of Indian artillery were of 81mm and 120mm mortars. It was realized that the Pakistani gun deployments on the Baltoro glacier firing across Convey Saddle-Concordlia at Sia La, and the positioning of artillery to fire at Gyong complex, had to be taken-on by strengthening India's own artillery assets. Moreover, with a stabilization of the AGPL, there arose a need for more artillery for counter-fire purposes.

The initial artillery deployments on the Siachen glacier were of 105mm Indian Field Gun and 130mm M-46 guns. After being broken down into split loads, the guns were dropped on the glacier by Indian Air Force Mi-17 helicopters, where technicians re-assembled them at surveyed locations.

The 105mm guns were deployed at the forward logistics base (called Kumar) and north of it to support Sia La. The heavier 130mm guns were deployed at the base camp. Parachute drops on the Siachen glacier carried out a substantial strengthening of artillery guns and ammunition in 1987. It must be pointed out that if India and Pakistan agree to the withdrawal of their forces from the Siachen glacier, India will have to destroy the artillery guns and huge amounts of ammunition kept along the 76km glacier length, as it cannot be retrieved.



Consistent delivery

ZU-23 twin anti-aircraft guns are being used in a direct fire mode, and Russian shoulder-fired 'Igla' (SAM-16) missiles are available to troops in sufficient numbers.

With the completion of a Class 40 road on the east bank of the Nubra river, between Partapur and Siachen Base, one battery of six Bofors FH-77B howitzers was introduced in Siachen in 1987. Once stabilized, the FH-77B has shown itself to be both accurate and consistent, achieving a range of 42km from altitudes of 12,000ft using High Explosive Extended Range (HEER) base bleed ammunition. The battery is deployed at Siachen Base, and it is interesting to note that India's 150km-range Prithvi missile can be deployed at any location the FH-77B can reach.


Some of the problems faced by artillery at the Siachen glacier are:

· paucity of gun areas, which are extremely limited; given the lack of space, guns are deployed in troops and at times even singly;

· Pillaring' effect, because the gun pits are covered with tarpaulin to prevent slush from dirtying the guns. This does not allow direct sunlight to fall on the gunpit beneath the guns. As a result, unlike surrounding areas, snow under tarpaulin does not melt which results in guns being perched on a pillar;

· freezing of fluids due to sub-zero temperature, hence special arrangements for cleaning the equipment are required;

· survey is difficult as most of the glaciated area is not well mapped;

· shells land in snow and as a result they either do not burst, or their splinter effect is reduced;

· visibility remains restricted making observation difficult;

· in blizzard conditions the surrounding environment becomes 'whited out' and visibility is reduced to a few meters, making navigation difficult and causing personnel to lose their sense of direction;

· The range tables produced for the various guns were not tested at high operating altitudes, and the demonstrated ranges in this region are notably higher then those given in the tables. Firing data has to be extrapolated, and predicted fire may not be accurate;

· Guns are a lucrative target for the enemy; hence security of gun areas assumes greater importance. Guns are deployed in troops which means manpower is limited for local defense;

· Performance of signal equipment is poor because of the climatic conditions. Maintenance of telephone lines is problematic, compounding communications difficulties. It is not uncommon to find the Indian brigade headquarters lacking contact with up to 30 of some 110 posts on the Saltoro Ridge at any given time in clear weather;

· Extreme climatic conditions reduce efficiency of both men and equipment. Wear and tear on equipment is amplified, and it needs to be noted that at heights above 18,000ft no acclimatization of the human body is possible.On the Himalayan battlefield facing China, the artillery has problems of mountainous and jungle terrain. Some of the important ones are:

· again, gun areas are limited which restricts deployment of guns to a few places;

· the presence of terrain features creates problems of crest clearance - guns are required to fire at a high angle;

· ground observation is restricted to the next crest, and visibility is restricted;

· mountains are generally not well mapped, and there is a need for physical reconnaissance of ground at all levels;

· Road communications are limited in extent and poor in quality. The available roads and tracks can become easily blocked as a result of bad weather or enemy action. Extensive engineering efforts, good movement planning, traffic control, and recovery arrangements are needed to maintain the flow of movements. During operations, the security and protection of the land communications assumes great importance;

· Mechanized transport cannot move cross-country, and the fire support and logistic requirements of infantry units conducting wide out-flanking movements have to be met using animal transport or porters. Sufficient topographical information should be available to determine the best routes for cross-country movement of troops. It must include information about soil formation, characteristics of land forms, drainage and cover;

· Broken ground, irregular mountain topography, and reverse slopes provide numerous places for concealment and cover. The soil is generally thin or stony and the bedrock hard; this makes digging difficult. Observation is variable and range estimation is particularly deceptive. At lower altitudes, there is considerable vegetation that provides cover but restricts observation. As altitude increases, vegetation becomes thinner that reduces concealment but increases observation until the tree line is reached. Above the tree line, broad areas of observation are available in clear weather;

· The mountain air is relatively dry and thin. Dryness increases with the altitude but atmospheric pressure registers a corresponding decrease. These cause a great strain and other adverse biological reactions on human bodies.In jungles it is hard to provide effective artillery support because observation is poor, gun positions are few, deployment of guns is difficult, and the supply of ammunition is a major problem. Ammunition must be strictly controlled as the supply route would be overburdened. A large expenditure of ammunition on unwarranted targets may result in shortage of ammunition at a critical time.In this terrain, hostile infantry patrols and small task forces find it comparatively easy to maintain themselves and to operate from bases that are easily concealed. Raids may be expected from any quarter. Gun areas are particularly vulnerable to such attacks.If the hostile defensive system is based on a network of bunkers or dugouts on the sides of hills, this presents a formidable objective as the bunkers are difficult to locate and hard to neutralize except by a direct hit. The best method of destroying such strong points is by use of anti-tank weapons and by direct fire of tanks, provided a field of fire at safe distance is available. Use of artillery guns in a direct role poses problems and is not very effective. However, the lines of communication of the enemy are usually clearly defined and harassing fire directed against enemy supply organizations can be particularly effective.



High-angle advantages

Crest clearance problems and the need to fire on reverse slopes increase the value of weapons capable of firing at a high angle. It will be difficult for artillery detachments to accompany units moving off from the main axis, on flanking maneuvers or special tasks, to give close and intimate support.

However, artillery systems with long range can cover - from existing gun positions - an advance both along the main axis and on an outflanking maneuver. As gun positions are few, long-range artillery has the additional merit of reducing the number of artillery units required. The ideal gun is one that has a high trajectory, and can be towed by a jeep or carried by mules. It should be air transportable and capable of being air dropped.

The number of observation parties required will be large. These parties will need additional aid in carrying their equipment and for close defense. Good vantagepoints for artillery observation may have to be held and included in the forward defended localities of the infantry. Since it may not always be possible to provide the desirable number of observation post parties, it is necessary for infantry officers to be trained to conduct shoots so that every opportunity to engage targets is seized.

The meteorological conditions will vary considerably and will change constantly. The availability of accurate meteorological data becomes important especially for the engagement of defensive fire tasks.

Positions for radar will be difficult to find and sound ranging equipment is not effective owing to the difficulty of laying out the bases, deflection of sound by hills, and its muffling by trees and undergrowth. For counter bombardment, airborne observers should be used; they should be sent out during an enemy bombardment in order to locate and engage hostile batteries accurately.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the time infantry will take to reach the objective; hence, artillery fire plans will more often be 'on call' rather than on a measured times program. Greater reliance will thus be placed on effective signal communications. 'On call' fire plans would also assist in control of ammunition expenditure that is essential in jungle terrain; control of fire should be vested with the forward observation officers. The fire plan must be very flexible and capable of being modified quickly.

Due to the close country, map reading poses problems. Observation post officers and gun position officers must carry out continuous map reading while on the move. Up-to-date maps need to be made available to units and formations operating in such terrain.

Survey in jungle terrain is problematic and time consuming. Due to close country and inter-visibility problems 'linking up' and establishing a common grid for all fire units involved in a particular operation would be difficult. Since gun areas would likely be few, it would be pertinent to have them compact, thereby assisting in survey and ensuring coordinated local defense of the gun areas. Time allocated for survey tasks should also be increased.

Engagement of targets by observation post officers is difficult because of a lack of observation, target acquisition and indication, and tree bursts. Smoke rounds would be useful in assisting observation, and may be resorted to salvo ranging where necessary. Time for engagement and ammunition expenditure for ranging would be more than in other terrain. Air observation posts would also be useful in registering targets.


Future trends

Seeds of a future conflict between India and China lie in the disputed eastern sector. India has a disputed 3,054km border with China, which occupies 38,000km of Indian territory and claims another 90,000km in this eastern sector, an area of jungle and mountainous terrain.

Purely in terms of artillery, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has a few groups of M-9 and M-11 missiles in Tibet, which can be fired to strategic ranges or for counter-air and interdiction roles.

The Indian artillery has an edge over the PLA, since the latter suffers from across-the-board restricted high-angle capability. Both sides possess comparable infantry firepower with direct-fire application. The rough mountainous terrain will force both sides to use old anti-tank recoilless guns, rocket propelled grenades, and automatic grenade launchers in direct-fire applications during advance as massing of artillery weapons would slow movement or get diluted because of inadequate deployment space.

To overcome the problems of artillery mentioned above, the following future trends are likely. With improvements in metallurgy and recoil options, guns could become lighter with an automatic high angle and 360 traverse capability. The 105mm Light Field Gun would be replaced completely by longer ranging 155mm guns. Considering that tactical redeployments and inter-sector movements of the FH-77Bs are limited, the strategic reserves would have to be of a high order. More accurate mortars would be inducted into service.

High-altitude tables would need to be more accurate and the meteorological data of a high order, based on airborne instrumentation.

Smart ammunition is likely to be produced in India with technology transfer from friendly countries. Future 155mm shells could be fitted with unjammable proximity fuses, and include guided (laser, radiation or IR homing) and dual-purpose (anti-tank and anti- personnel types) improved conventional munitions types, or remotely delivered mines. The artillery would also be looking at ramjet shells with a range of up to 70km, and more effective projectiles with a long shelf life.

In operational terms, top priority would be accorded to better communications and surveillance, including intelligence gathering and interpretation. Inputs would be based on data gathered from satellite, remotely piloted vehicles, and thermal imagers. Effective remotely placed sensors would assist in salvo firings.



Heliborne units on the horizon

While development of an Indian strategic airlift capability is a distinct possibility, a heliborne tactical operations capability is likely by 2020. Heliborne rapid action forces would possess organic firepower and would be capable of airborne delivery of mines. The Siachen theater is likely to receive such a capability on a priority basis for ammunition re-supply and for local redeployments with several days' ammunition autonomy. There would need to be a quantum jump in communications capability based on airborne relays for fast-moving battles and ground towers for static defensive battles.

On the Siachen glacier, there is a need for infrared camouflage nets for concealment of equipment from enemy air observation. There is also a need for better ground-based radar to replace the current line-of-sight types, and later on for airborne radar.

The maps of the northeast region with China and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir are inadequate. There is a need for digital maps with an appropriate scale that can be used with present guns. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle would be an important asset in order to scan large areas for later artillery exploitation. Finally, more indigenous Prithvi missiles would be allocated to the Chinese front than the western theater with Pakistan.

========================

The article is outdated but have some real gud points ..
 

Kunal Biswas

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Wishful thinking over China's military capabilitiesSeptember 18, 2012 15:43 IST

If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a replication of the 1962 war, warns B Raman

Our national trait for wishful thinking often worries me.

A rationally argued assumption is an important part of strategic thinking. A wishful thought with no rational basis is not. I had pointed out in some of my articles in the past how we often confuse wishful thinking for strategic analysis. Some, if not many of those, who have made a name in our country as strategic analysts, are actually wishful thinkers. There are many wishful thinkers even in our security bureaucracy.

These observations have been triggered by some e-mailed comments received by me on my article of September 17, asking whether our humiliation of 1962 by China can repeat itself. The majority of those who have argued that the question of another incident like 1962 does not arise have given two reasons, both of which appear to me to be nothing but wishful thoughts.

The first is that the Chinese are no longer in a position to spring a trans-Himalayan surprise on us as they did in 1962. The second is that the strong navy that we have built up since 1962 will act as a deterrent to any more trans-Himalayan adventurism by the People's Liberation Army. According to them, our navy is in a position to disrupt Chinese energy supplies across the Indian Ocean and without assured energy supplies, the Chinese would not be able to indulge in any adventurism across the Himalayas.

I feel uncomfortable with both these wishful thoughts. Before October 1962, our political leaders had so convinced themselves about the superiority of our army over the PLA that they thought that all they had to do was to order our army to throw out the illegal Chinese posts in our territory in the north-east and it would do so without any problems. Then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] and then defence minister VK Krishna Menon were living in a world of wishful thinking. Nehru openly went around saying that he had asked the army to throw out the Chinese. The Chinese took note of his statements, which proved to have been irresponsible in retrospect, and launched a pre-emptive act of retaliation to neutralise our army's capability for throwing out the Chinese posts and inflict humiliation.

That kind of wishful thinking about the relative strengths of the two armies and air forces is fortunately not there now. We take each other's trans-Himalayan capabilities with a lot of realism. Realistic thinking and analysis are the foundation of good strategic thinking.

But I notice a new wishful thought clouding our strategic thinking presently and that is about the perceived superiority of our navy over the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean. I am confident that the Chinese navy will not be able to disrupt our energy supplies across the Indian Ocean but I do not share the confidence of those who have commented on my article -- that our navy would be able to disrupt Chinese energy supplies and that the realisation of this will deter any trans-Himalayan adventure by the Chinese.

The Chinese are realistic geo-strategic thinkers and planners. They know energy inadequacy could turn out to be their weak point in any future military confrontation with any external power. They have been trying to build up their strategic reserves and diversifying their sources of supply and means of having the supplies reach them. Their energy security diversification plan speaks well of their strategic foresight. I wish we had similar foresight.

So, to think and argue that our navy has become a deterrent to Chinese designs and intentions would be unwise. Moreover, in our thinking, we should try to visualise what role the Pakistani navy will seek to play in the event of another military conflict between India and China. We should be prepared with a contingency plan for the eventuality that the Pakistani navy will try to keep some of our ships bottled up near the western ports so that we can't use them against the Chinese.

If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a replication of the 1962 war. The PLA is not going to move into our territory on foot and motor vehicles and occupy territory after overpowering our posts, as they did in 1962.

In my view, the most likely scenario is that copter-borne, specially trained units of the PLA will take our armed forces by surprise by undertaking an occupation of Tawang and Itanagar in Arunachal Pradesh. They will then try to force us to concede Chinese sovereignty over Tawang in return for their conceding our sovereignty over Itanagar and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh. I also expect the copter-borne PLA forces will come not from the Tibet [ Images ] Autonomous Region, but from Qinghai, Gansu or Sichuan.

We are now in a better position than we were in 1962 to detect Chinese preparations for a classical military strike from the TAR. Are we in a position to detect and neutralise a copter-borne invasion from bases outside the TAR? What are the other scenarios possible? What would be the options available to us?

Those are the questions that we in governmental and non-governmental circles should examine with our feet firmly on the ground and without any wishful thinking.

My articles on the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the 1962 humiliation should not be misinterpreted to mean that I have probably lost faith in the possibility of a negotiated solution of the border dispute with China. I have not. I greatly respect the pragmatism of the Chinese political and military leadership.

When China initiated the military conflict with India in 1962, they were a poor country with a primitive economy. They did not have to worry about the likely impact of a military conflict on their economy and on the livelihood of their people.

Today, China is a major influential economic and military power, itching to catch up with the United States. Any military conflict with India could have a worrisome impact on their economy. Their interest in keeping their economy sustained and flourishing has made them a cautious power -- more cautious than they were in 1962. They would avoid a military confrontation as far as possible.

At the same time, I am disturbed to notice the doggedness with which they have been pursuing their territorial sovereignty claims -- whether with us in Arunachal Pradesh or with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations powers about the South China Sea islands or with Japan [ Images ] about the East China Sea islands.

This doggedness should forewarn us that if an opportunity presented itself, they may not hesitate to seek a military solution to the border dispute.

Chinese strategic thinking is marked by a mix of pragmatism and opportunism. We should not unwittingly create a tempting opportunity for them by our lack of military preparedness.

B Raman
 

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i think i now know the reason behind troop movements in uttarakhand
from report:

Chinese soldiers transgressed into Uttarakhand's Barahoti on 27 July & came into Indian territory upto 800m to 1 km
 

captscooby81

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Chinese troops had entered border area in Uttarakhand: Report

Chinese troops had entered nearly 800 meters into Barahoti border in Uttarakhand on July 25th, media reports said.

The Chinese troops, however, went back after two hours, reports added.
 

Cutting Edge 2

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i think i now know the reason behind troop movements in uttarakhand
from report:

Chinese soldiers transgressed into Uttarakhand's Barahoti on 27 July & came into Indian territory upto 800m to 1 km
looks like this is true, Zee News and Times now are reporting on this.

EDIT:




Looks like they applied pressure tactic before Doval meet.
 
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