Kargil: A Poltical and Military Coup or a Huge Blunder?

Discussion in 'Indian Army' started by Ray, Feb 23, 2011.

  1. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

    Joined:
    Apr 17, 2009
    Messages:
    43,117
    Likes Received:
    23,545
    Location:
    Somewhere

    Ray Sir,

    I agree.

    Actually, there are valid points both in support of how Kargil was handled, and against.

    It depends upon what appeals to a person most, (1) international admiration for not crossing the LoC or (2) increased casualties among our jawans for not crossing the LoC to cut off the supply lines.

    Again, I am no military or diplomacy expert, so my understanding could be flawed.
     
  2.  
  3. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

    Joined:
    Apr 17, 2009
    Messages:
    43,117
    Likes Received:
    23,545
    Location:
    Somewhere
    Was Kargil a Political and a Military Success or a huge blunder?

    What was the political environment domestically and internationally?

    Was the Armed Forces operationally ready for an all out war on every border?

    If it was, then why was an all out war not started?

    If it wasn't then, what was the best option?

    How far did the matured political and diplomatic offensive and not escalating the conflict work towards reducing Pakistan's aggressive, irresponsible response of wanting to use nuke hurt Pakistan's case?
     
  4. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    India's Kargil Operations: An analysis

    India's Kargil Operations
    An analysis


    [​IMG]
    PATRON Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR FS LODI does a comprehensive analysis of the Indian side of the operations in and around Kargil

    The fighting in Kargil, in the Indian-occupied Kashmir has ended, and the guns across the L of C have fallen silent. The Kashmiri freedom fighters, the Mujahideen have vacated the Kargil heights on their own free will, and the Indian infantry is now in the process of moving up to occupy the heights unopposed. India has claimed a great victory in Kargil. Their clamour has been so hasty and loud that the reliability of their claims are in doubt and have been disputed by military experts.
    How did the large and well-equipped Armed Forces of India consisting of over a million and half men conduct themselves in the Kargil fighting. Where the opposition consisted of a few hundred Kashmiri Mujahideen fighting with small arms and no artillery, air or logistic support. This question is agitating the minds of knowing men in India and is the subject of an inquiry ordered by their government.

    It seems the Indian army in Kashmir became aware of the presence of Mujahideen on the Kargil heights on May 6, 1999, when they were informed by a shepherd, as reported by The Times of India, New Delhi in its issue of June 2, 1999. The paper goes on to say that it took six days for the information to reach the defence ministry in Delhi and another two days for the ministry to conclude that 'the infiltrators only occupied remote and unheld areas'. The paper bluntly suggests that 'there is something deeply wrong with our security decision making. The sudden switch from inaction to high-profile air strikes with their escalation potential testifies to the same flaws'.

    'On May 9 India launched a major assault to drive out some 400 or so Muslim guerrillas, allegedly trained by Pakistan from its side of the Line of Control (LoC) in the desolate, high-altitude Kargil sector of Kashmir' wrote M.R. Josse in the Rising Nepal of Kathmandu on June 9, 1999. This attack was apparently beaten back with heavy losses to the army which prompted a Colonel to remark 'we are dying like dogs here'. 'At this point, India lost three aircraft, two fighter jets and one helicopter gunship besides suffering 50 casualties' continued the paper. The initial Indian euphoria concerning the use of air power for the first time in Kashmir since 1971 has been dampened considerably'. The paper concluded by saying that, even a casual reading of Indian media accounts is enough to indicate that the Indian political and military leadership were 'caught completely off-guard by the Kargil militants'.

    Initially the Indian senior army officers in Kashmir seemed confident of crushing the Mujahideen and evicting them from the heights they were occupying overlooking Kargil and the strategic supply road from Srinagar to Leh. Consequently correct information was withheld from the ministry of defence in New Delhi. Often incorrect information was passed on. This is evident from a report published in The Times of India, New Delhi, in its issue of June, 12, 1999, which clearly stated, 'In fact, on the night of May 12, the Northern Area Commander, Lt. Gen. H. M. Khanna, had informed defence minister George Fernandes at the Siachin brigade headquarters at Partapur that a batch of about 100 intruders had occupied three ridges in the Batalik sub-sector and would be dislodged within two days'. This was a categorical statement by a senior officer of the Indian army, to the minister of defence, knowing fully that the statement was not correct.

    It was only after all the Indian attacks which were supported by heavy artillery and air bombardment had failed, with heavy losses in men and material that the Indian Army was forced to admit the actual position on the ground. The Times of India goes on to say that the magnitude of the incursion came to light only around May 18. It took several more days for the Army to realise 'that the intrusion was actually spread over four large areas along the 140 km LoC from Zojila to Turtuk. The estimate of the number of infiltrators had by then risen to about 800'.

    The Times of India report continued by saying that, 'Painting a grim picture, the sources said the Pakistani intruders had come 6 km inside the LoC in Mushkoh Valley and the Drass sub-sector, 2 km in Kaksar and up to 7 km in the Batalik sub-sector. The Pakistanis, they said, were holding strategic peaks which gave them a dominating view of the areas around'. The paper also reported that 'Both the Brigadier and a Colonel of the Kargil Brigade were on Thursday (June 10) removed from Command for negligence'.

    Owing to the Indian army's inability to dislodge the Kashmiri freedom fighters from the Kargil heights inspite of the mounting losses and repeated attacks to clear the heights, India's defence minister George Fernandes offered the Kashmiri Mujahideen a 'safe-passage' if they left the Kargil heights. India the nuclear power was losing face, the public outcry was getting louder and the people of Indian-occupied Kashmir were taking out processions in the capital Srinagar and chanting 'Mujahideens of Kargil, we are with you.' In 11 years of the peoples uprising in Indian-occupied Kashmir against the suppressive and brutal Indian illegal occupation, the ministry of defence in New Delhi was forced into the humiliating position of offering a 'safe-passage' to where, they belonged to Kashmir which was illegally occupied by India.

    India started to concentrate more troops and guns in the area and eventually launched 'Operation Vijay' (victory) to dislodge the Kashmiri Mujahideen from the Kargil heights overlooking the main supply route. The attacks were supported by heavy artillery and air bombardment. The head of United Nations Observer Mission based in Srinagar (Indian-held Kashmir) General Joseph Bali, described the situation on the LoC as the worst. This was reported by Cable News Network (CNN) and quoted by The News of Islamabad on June 8, 1999. CNN Correspondent based in Srinagar added, that according to Defence analysts, India has deployed some 30,000 troops in the region (Kargil).

    As the fighting in Kargil escalated with more troops being rushed to the area, the casualties started to mount and alarming headlines appeared in newspapers, such as 'Army loses 15 more in Kargil', The Statesman, Delhi, June 12, 1999. 'Major among 17 Armymen killed in Tololing', The Hindu, Delhi, June 15. 'Intruders destroy ammunition dump', The Asian Age, New Delhi, June 18. This prompted the India government to ban journalists from going to the front, so that the flow of information could be controlled. India also banned the seeing of Pakistan Television in India. Efforts were being made to keep the news of reverses and the high rate of Indian casualties from public view.

    Inspite of these precautions The Hindu of Delhi reporting from Kargil in its issue of June 4, had said, 'Informed sources in Kargil say the offensive has not been much impressive so far considering the casualties'. Similarly The Telegraph of Calcutta reporting on June 27, said, 'Exactly a month after Operation Vijay was launched, the army has made little gain, finding only a toehold in a few peaks in the Drass sub-sector, while most of occupied Kargil remains in the hands of the intruders.... The Pakistanis are showing no signs of ceding territory ... By the army's own admission, the success percentage is low'. The paper goes on to say that the Indian military establishment is refusing to give a fair indication of the number of ridges they have been able to recapture and how much territory - either in terms of kilometres or in terms of percentage - remains to be regained.

    The Indian army justified their losses and inability to gain ground by saying. 'The intruders are mobile, shifting from one ridge to another and their supply lines are intact'. Another problem they mentioned was that troops cannot be provided overhead cover on the ridges from incoming artillery fire therefore the casualties mount. 'The troops are yet to come to terms with this difficulty', they mentioned. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi reporting in its issue of June 23, that to protect the 100 km stretch of the 434 km long Srinagar-Leh highway from the firing and the shelling and to reach the original position on the LoC is not as easy a task as it was initially anticipated or calculated by the Army Commanders.

    'The task remains as difficult as it was ever before, despite recapture of Chorbat La and point 5203 in Batalik sub-sector and Tololing pass and point 5140 in Drass'. The Army officials say that the pounding of these positions has helped the Indian troops to some extent. But the successes have not been to an extent which would force the 'intruders' to leave. 'The high casualties on the Indian side', reports The Hindustan Times on June 23, from Srinagar, 'has given them the reason to prolong their stay, hiding in the natural rock covers when jets hover over them and coming out when the sky is clear and targeting the Indian positions'. It went on to lament. 'It is in this scenario that the Army is finding it difficult to retrieve the bodies of the officers and soldiers from the high ridges'.

    Having failed to clear the Kargil heights the Indian army was preparing to cross the LoC. The Asian Age of New Delhi reported on June 15, that, 'The government is under tremendous pressure from the defence services to give them a 'free hand' to tackle the Kargil infiltration'. The defence Chiefs met President K.R. Narayanan without defence minister George Fernandes. The paper reports that the defence advice is against allowing the Kargil conflict to carry on indefinitely, as the 'winter will bring an automatic ceasefire leaving the occupied areas in Pakistan hands. The territory will be as good as gone if it remains with them till next year'. The paper goes on to say that the Army has pointed out that the terrain and the heights make it impossible to successfully flush out the infiltrators who are at positions of strategic advantage. 'The conflict will have to be taken across the LoC for a quick solution'. Indian military assessment was that the world powers would move in at some point of time, and it was imperative for the government to secure the borders as a first priority.

    The Army's inability to clear the Kargil heights was becoming apparent to the Indian government. The army's desire to cross the LoC was seen as a face-saving device by the Army Chief, General Ved Prakash Malik. In desperation the Government of India sent secret emissaries to Pakistan. Mr R. K. Mishra, Editor-in-Chief of the Business and Political Observer, accompanied by Mr Vivek Katju, Joint Secretary (Pakistan) in the Indian External Affairs Ministry travelled to Islamabad on June 1. The former Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr Niaz A. Naik left for New Delhi by a special aircraft on June 26 on a 'secret mission'. This was reported by The Hindu of Delhi on June 28. It seems the Indian team made a few more trips between June 1 and 26.

    India is an arrogant local bully who has treated her small neighbours with scant regard and would certainly not have sent secret emissaries if she was in a strong military position in Kargil. In fact her military position was somewhat perilous. The government was therefore forced to send other emissaries to Europe and the United States. The Asian Age, New Delhi reported on June 19. 'At the time of writing this, India is waiting with bated breath for the G-8 resolution. Principal Adviser to the Prime Minister and National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra has been sent post-haste to Paris to convince the member nations that India is in the right on the Kargil issue ... The visit has a touch of desperation as obviously the Vajpayee government requires the international community to bail it out of a situation that can otherwise lead to a military conflict, which India and Pakistan can ill afford'. In the end it was the United States that bailed out India.

    It is surprising to note that the Indian army was unable to evict the Kashmiri freedom fighters holding the Kargil heights. The Indian infantry battalions took a mauling and heavy casualties inspite of considerable fire support. Over 500, 155mm Bofor howitzers were firing day and night often in direct-fire role. But the infantry advance was slow and determination lacking.

    'Frontal attacks too have proved futile at several places'. In other places 'plans to encircle the intruders and 'starve them out' had met with only limited success because of the terrain'. The Asian Age, New Delhi said on June 15. 'Meanwhile the Army is getting restless with the casualties far higher than the results achieved. As the source pointed out, the infiltrators were in positions from where the Indian soldiers were easy targets as was the Leh-Srinagar road'.

    For the slow progress of Indian infantry or no progress and excessive casualties one often came across comments to indicate that 'it is a gradual process and will take time'. 'It will take another three months,' said an officer. 'It is difficult to fight in the hills, it is not like the plains'. The point is that the 3rd Division based in Leh and now moved to Kargil is a mountain division designed and trained to fight in the mountains. So are the brigades at Siachin, Kargil and the 70th Brigade at Ganderbal, now at Kargil. The 8th Mountain Division rushed to the area is also designed to fight in the high terrain.

    High casualty rates in Kargil is one of the main causes of faltering of the infantry attacks. The second major cause is their long employment in internal security duties where they had to deal with the unarmed civilian population. But whenever they came across the Kashmiri Mujahideen, they lost men. It is estimated that during the present uprising in Kashmir covering the period 1990 to 1998 the Indian security forces have lost over 6,000 officers and soldiers killed and double that amount wounded. It was reported in The Nation of Lahore on May 5, 1999 that General Ashok K. Mehta writing in The Sunday of September 19, 1998 had said 'The most stunning fact is the sudden and exceptional spurt in army casualties. 4 officers, 3 JCOs and 58 soldiers killed and 6 officers, 12 JCOs and 170 soldiers wounded, all in 40 days ending August 16, 1998. This is the highest 40 days toll of losses since the engagement began nine years ago'.

    The Nation of May 5, 1999 goes on to say that the fatigue factor was discussed in the Indian Annual Army Commanders Conference in Mhow, over which the incumbent Chief of Army Staff, General V.P. Malik presided. The infantry commanders complained that 203 infantry battalions out of a total of 365, were engaged in suppressing insurgency all over India and stress was beginning to bite. A major chunk comprising 37 per cent of total Indian infantry were employed in Kashmir. The infantry commanders prevailed upon the Indian Chief to induct half a dozen of mechanised infantry and armour regiments in Kashmir so that the overstretched infantrymen get reprieve. The prolonged employment in an internal security role is having adverse effects on the fighting capability of the Indian army. As Field Marshal Montgomery was to write about Southern Ireland, were troops were engaged in internal security duties in 1920, in his memoirs that such employment 'developed into a murder campaign in which in the end, the soldiers became very skilful. But such a war is thoroughly bad for officers and men; it tends to lower their standards of decency and chivalry.

    After the Kargil fighting India has inducted more troops and raised another Corps for Leh the 14th under Lt. General A.B. Masih. It is initially to consist of 3 Mountain Division already in Leh and an additional 9 Mountain Division moved up during fighting. An additional 100 battalions of army and paramilitaries were later on sent into Kashmir, some under the pretext of election duties. Prior to the Kargil fighting the ratio of troops and paramilitaries to ground was 15 per sq km in Kashmir and 13.3 per sq km in Jammu, with 1.3 per sq km in Ladakh. Military experts consider this very high. With the induction of more troops the ratio will rise. Will the induction of more troops improve their fighting capability or is India planning a short and sharp operation across the LoC in Kashmir to raise morale.

    Source: http://www.defencejournal.com/nov99/india-kargil.htm
     
  5. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    ASEAN backs India's stand

    ASEAN backs India's stand

    SINGAPORE, July 24 (UNI) — India today received yet another shot in the arm in its continuous run on international diplomacy as the Foreign Ministers of the 10-member ASEAN grouping supported the principle of inviolability of the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and called for bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute.

    A joint communiqué issued at the end of the two-day ASEAN ministerial meeting said: "We welcome the agreement reached by India and Pakistan to end hostilities along the Line of Control and urge both sides to resolve the dispute through dialogue."

    External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, who arrived here this morning to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, which gets underway tomorrow evening, said the ASEAN statement had upheld the sanctity of the LoC, endorsing the Indian stand.

    He said this year’s meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers also did not refer to India by name on the issue of non-proliferation as they did last year in Manila after the Pokhran tests.

    Asked to comment on Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz’s reported statement that trust was lacking in the 52-year-old history of India-Pakistan relations, he said he was disappointed by his remarks and asked angrily: "What did we sign in Simla in 1972? If this was not a document based on trust, what was it?"

    About whether the Lahore bus journey by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was a mistake, the External Affairs Minister said "Let us not reduce India-Pakistan relations to the level of a school debating society. Lahore was a process towards correcting the mistakes of previous years."

    He said the whole world now recognised Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil. "The world stood up because of the Lahore initiative by India", he added.

    Mr Jaswant Singh said: "India is a power that acts with restraint and responsibly. This has worked immensely to our advantage."

    Asked about resumption of dialogue with Pakistan, he said: "We are the initiators of the dialogue. We do not stand in the way of a dialogue."

    About his meeting with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright tomorrow, the External Affairs Minister said a variety of subjects would come up for discussion and India had welcomed the US approach on terrorism.

    Source: http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99jul25/world.htm#6
     
  6. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

    Joined:
    Apr 17, 2009
    Messages:
    43,117
    Likes Received:
    23,545
    Location:
    Somewhere
    Thanks for giving me a Pak analysis.

    Kashmiri freedom fighters? That is the first lie!

    On their own free will?

    The reliability of the India claims is in doubt? True, in Pakistan, but in the world at large!

    The man is a loony. He is a Lt Gen of the Pak Army? Do a million Army just storm into Kargil against ‘a few hundred Mujahideens’? Did he say ‘Mujahideens’? So , the NLI and SSG are Mujhs? No arty etc


    I find it very tiresome to go through such garbage and beyond.
     
  7. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    Apparently Pakistani supply lines shown as tiny black arrows (apologies for the tiny size):

    [​IMG]

    Source: http://www.oocities.com/vinswasre123/kargil.htm

    Would it have been a good idea to cross the LoC, cut off these supply lines and 'starve' the intruders sitting atop the heights. Could we have managed to reduce our casualties had we done this?

    Apparently, India gained a lot diplomatically by not crossing the LoC. However, was it worth it given that we could have possibly kept our casualties lower?
     
  8. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    Missed Gauging The Strategic Environment

    There was an "interim government" in India which emboldened the Pakistani army hierarchy to assume that it would be "indecisive" and not be in a position to tackle with the exigency. With political instability, the Indian army should have been on high alert. But it was not. According to the assessment, Pakistan's army hierarchy was "banking on the fact" that since it was also "overtly nuclear" India would not want a full-fledged war.

    There were also fears in the Pakistan army that the ongoing Lahore peace process in February 1999 could "dilute Pakistan's stand on Kashmir". This gave "further impetus to their plans to occupy strategic heights in the Kargil sector". Finally, the stated policy of the Indian government, up to the conclusion of the Bangladesh war in 1971, was that if there were any incursions across the LoC then the Indian armed forces had the right to cross the international border. Since then there has been no stated policy on this. The BJP government went in for a policy of restraint for diplomatic gains. This forced the army to take on virtually impossible objectives like high mountain peaks which were "found to be unsound militarily".In one such operation Major Vikram Batra was killed.

    Lessons: The security set-up has been revamped—the National Security Council secretariat was established which now publishes a security review. Drawing extensively on inputs from intelligence agencies, it looks at economic and political factors. The review is disseminated within the security establishment in the hope that it can prevent "another Kargil".

    To see complete article: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?226606
     
  9. well it is a well known fact that in kargil india has thrashed the pakistani intruders.only pakistani is in the false thinking that they have won the war in 99 and also in 71.yes indian infantry took a major toll about 532 casualties but they have acheived 10 times more casualties on pakistani side with about 5000-6000 total casualty including muslim guerillas
     
  10. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    The Kargil Conflict does not qualify to be called a War

    The Kargil Conflict does not qualify to be called a War

    By Air Marshal RK Nehra
    Issue: Book Excerpt: Hinduism & its Military Ethos | Date: 29 July, 2010


    Only the relevant portion is quoted here:

    To read complete article: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/...lict-does-not-qualify-to-be-called-a-War.html
     
  11. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    Officers question NDA govt not allowing LoC crossing in Kargil

    Officers question NDA govt not allowing LoC crossing in Kargil

    NOV 05, 2006; Outlook

    New Delhi, Nov 5 (PTI) Two former officers who had commanded forces during the Kargil conflict have questioned the then NDA government's decision not to allow armed forces to cross the Line of Control (LoC) and said it had resulted in considerable losses and operational problems.

    Lt Gen (retd) Mohinder Puri, then General Officer Commanding of 8th Mountain Division, and Air Marshal (retd) Narayan Menon, then Air Officer Commanding of Jammu and Kashmir, said the decision led to "strategic and tactical losses" for the army and "considerable problems" for the IAF.

    In separate articles on the 1999 conflict in the forthcoming issue of Indian Defence Review, the two officers said while the army lost the option of conflict termination in an earlier timeframe and taking large number of prisoners of war by encircling them, the caveat of not crossing the LoC under any circumstances restricted the attack profiles of fighter aircraft.

    Asking whether it was correct to politically lay down stringent restrictions of not crossing the LoC, Puri said "While we may have earned some brownie points, but strategically and tactically we lost more than we gained.

    "By accepting, under international pressure to restrict operations to our side of the LoC, we have willy-nilly given de facto recognition to the LoC as the international border. Statements made by political leaders that there will be no redrawing of borders merely reinforces this hypothesis," said the officer who was given charge of the volatile Drass sector. (More)



    Puri said "Tactically, by not crossing the LoC we closed our options of conflict termination in an earlier timeframe and perhaps lost the opportunity to take a large number of prisoners who would have got entrapped by our encirclement".

    This led to prolonging the operations and suffering avoidable casualties while recovering territory by evicting the enemy from the dominating heights of Kargil, he said.

    By the time ceasefire was declared, "we had the enemy on the run, but by accepting it we offered them the easy route to withdraw to their country".

    "As expected, the enemy did not respect the terms of the ceasefire and planted anti-personnel mines along their route of withdrawal: a route along which we had to move to clear the area upto the LoC," Puri said, adding the army suffered a large number of casualties due to such move which reflected the "unsoldierly qualities of the Pak Army".

    In his article, Menon said he had received on May 25, 1999, "the codeword to commence offensive operations from the next day" but with a caveat that under no circumstances should any aircraft cross the LoC.

    "Given that the known intruded area was about 140 km along the LoC with depths varying between one to eight km, the constraint of not crossing the LoC posed considerable problems, the most severe being the restrictions on attack profiles of fighter aircraft," he said. (More)

    Source: http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?427240
     
  12. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

    Joined:
    Mar 24, 2009
    Messages:
    24,274
    Likes Received:
    11,290
    Location:
    BANGalore
    The "analysis" by the General loses credibility in the first para itself when he uses the terms "freedom fighters" and "mujahideen" without no air, arty and supplies.
     
  13. anoop_mig25

    anoop_mig25 Senior Member Senior Member

    Joined:
    Aug 17, 2009
    Messages:
    5,195
    Likes Received:
    2,223
    who is this PATRON Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR FS LODI indian or pakistani. i think he is form pakistan and bloody heel who made him lt.gen in pal army.in first place itself how such stupids are selecyed in pak army.

    my single question is if pak was winning(according to them) then why did they left strategic heights are they stupids
     
  14. A chauhan

    A chauhan "अहिंसा परमो धर्मः धर्म हिंसा तथैव च: l" Senior Member

    Joined:
    Oct 10, 2009
    Messages:
    4,930
    Likes Received:
    4,564
    Location:
    Raipur
    These words are highly ridiculous , No Indian can say these words.
     
  15. A chauhan

    A chauhan "अहिंसा परमो धर्मः धर्म हिंसा तथैव च: l" Senior Member

    Joined:
    Oct 10, 2009
    Messages:
    4,930
    Likes Received:
    4,564
    Location:
    Raipur
    Another article from 1999 by retd. Major General Ashok Mehta which tells the truth which was highly reported by media.

    The Rediff Special/Major General Ashok Mehta (retd)
    July 15, 1999

    The Kargil victory

    A ready reckoner to the Kargil conflict.

    Defence Minister George Fernandes was visiting Partapur and Siachen on May 7 when intrusions in Kargil were 'suspected', reported by civilians in Batalik. Patrols sent towards the intrusions went missing. Another patrol disappeared in Drass. On May 12, Fernandes was told by field commanders in Srinagar (as he was in Partapur) that infiltrators had occupied some ridges across the LoC and would be cleared in two to three days. This was, however, not reflected in the army sitrep the next day. The incident was taken lightly.

    Fog of War

    Whenever any army is surprised by the enemy it takes time to digest the fact and unravel the event. This is what happened in Kargil. The fog of war immediately enveloped the area of intrusions. On May 26, Operation Vijay was formally launched across the fog and cloud over Kargil. The ground situation was no doubt less confused but no clear picture of the scale and size of the intrusions was available till the middle of June.

    Nearly one infantry brigade of soldiers from Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry regiments and about 2,000 mujahideen armed with heavy machineguns, anti aircraft guns, Stinger missiles and God's edict, had occupied formidable posts across the LoC.

    Their mission: draw the Indian army into these traps and draw international attention on J&K.

    By and by, India turned this military master stroke into a misadventure. Pakistan's military gamble boomeranged.

    The Counter-attack


    The fourth largest in the world, lumbrous Indian military machine, took its time to recoil. In the beginning it got a severe beating. Ideally, a war should start with a victorious battle. For India, the reverse happened. Till three weeks later, the army registered its first win in Drass on the Tololing heights.

    Being key sectors, both Drass and Batalik had to be cleared first. At heights of nearly 18,000 feet, the army was up against the most complex and difficult mission it has faced since Independence -- launching sledgehammer attacks in tandem.

    Key Battles


    First capturing neighbouring ground on heights equivalent to those occupied by the enemy, understanding mountaincraft and grasping enemy intention and plans were key to victory. All this took time to happen. The seizure of Tololing heights, Tiger Hill and Point 4875 in Drass. Jubar, Khalubar and Point 5203 in Batalik unhinged enemy defences and intrusions in these sectors.

    Spurs near Tiger Hill and Tololing which were recaptured placed jawans behind Mashkoh and Kaksar. This unnerved the enemy. Also unnerving for him was India's stunning successes and the unstoppable momentum of onslaught. After Tiger Hill, it was the deluge.

    The White Flag

    Running short of water, supplies, motivation and morale, the Pakistani will to fight cracked when news of the 'appeal' for withdrawal reached them. Confusion was compounded by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's declaration of victory on July 10. This was a first strike in spy-war.

    Not only did Pakistani officers at places abandon their soldiers, they also abandoned their dead, worse disowned them. This is an even greater ignominy than rout and retreat.

    The last time Pakistani soldiers showed the white flag was in Dhaka in 1971. Twenty-eight years later it has waved it again in Kargil. Now, as then, the story is repetitive -- tales of Pakistani barbarity reciprocated by civilised and dignified Indian military behaviour. The Pakistani army mutilated and fouled the Indian dead. The Indian army buried their dead with full military honours.

    But Pakistani intruders were given an exit corridor and a qualified ceasefire: no air, artillery and mortar strikes in Kaksar and Mushkoh. The Indians advanced reclaiming ground right up to the LoC as the Pakistanis fled. It is not in the jawan's methods and culture to shoot at a withdrawing enemy.

    The army is jubilant and angry. Its morale is sky high. It has taught Pakistan a second lesson in this half century. The anger is over the necessary but qualified ceasefire. But soldiers have to remember that sometimes it is prudent to win part of the war without fighting it, not the least because it saves lives.

    Higher direction of war

    The government gave a simple task to the armed forces -- eviction of intrusions and restoration of LoC without crossing it. The government also gave a free hand to General V P Malik, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to fight the campaign with no pressure of time or other riders. Some diversion was sought to be created by Opposition parties by drawing a distinction between the army and the government. This was resented by the army high command.

    The Cabinet Committee on Security attended by the service chiefs met regularly, at times on a daily basis. The chiefs were consulted and/or informed at each stage before any political or diplomatic initiative was taken. Operation Vijay is really a triumph of politico-military diplomacy with the military in the driving seat.

    Conduct of Battle


    Air-land operations in the mountains took time to jell. Never before had offensive air operations been integrated with low intensity conflict. In-fight innovation and adaptation of IAF tactics sharpened the sting of air strikes. For the IAF this was its first live experience in close support of the army in the mountains. It allowed the testing of different aircraft, attack techniques and employment of precision-guided weapons. Jointsmanship came to the fore during attacks on Tiger Hill and other major attacks.

    Artillery has worked wonders with its equipment and observation post officers despite the deficiency of gun-locating radars. The Bofors gun has proved a battlewinner. Along with the multibarrel rocketlauncher, 105 mm IFG, these guns have been used in direct fire at enemy hideouts. Nearly 70 per cent of causalities on both sides are due to artillery.

    Infantry, the queen of battle, has lived up to its title, rolling back intrusions with finesse and fire. The infantry jawan has again proved he's a rare blend of royalty, son of the soil and salt of the earth. Nothing more needs to be said of him.

    The air-ground campaign fought in Kargil will go down as epic battles in the high mountains against extreme odds. Everester Santosh Yadav was right in volunteering to guide jawans on to Tiger Hill, so stiff are the heights.

    People and Media support


    This war would not have been won in record time it has been without the combined support of the people and the media. This is quite unprecedented.

    Diplomacy

    The decision of the government backed by the armed forces not to cross the LoC was the trump card. The display of restraint in the face of aggression and provocation have reinforced India's bonafides as a responsible, rational, nuclear-weapons state. In sharp contrast, Pakistan has won its badge as a rogue and irrational state, routed diplomatically by an irresponsible army.

    Continuing the Lahore process must be contigent upon Pakistan's assurance to respect the LoC in future after restoring it completely now.

    China tapes

    This was an intelligence coup by RAW. Anyone who has studied intercepts of telephone conversations between Army Chief General Parvez Musharraf in Beijing and his Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz in Islamabad, would have known the losing game Pakistan army was playing with India especially after it failed to cut the Leh road and seize Zojila Pass.

    Post script

    To the several prophets of doom in India who violated the LoC intellectually, votaries of crossing the LoC, supporters of the Bleeding India-victims syndrome and Kargil-is-a-bigger-Siachen, conscientious objectors of 'safe passage and Kabab diplomacy, all one can suggest is what the proverbial ustad tells the jawan: Look Before You Leap (especially in the mountains).

    source:-
    July 15, 1999
    http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/jul/15ashok.htm
     
  16. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    Not all Pakistanis are like that though. I pretty much like Asghar Khan, ex-Chief of Air Staff of Pakistan Air Force, because, I think he has the courage to speak the truth.

     
  17. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

    Joined:
    Apr 17, 2009
    Messages:
    43,117
    Likes Received:
    23,545
    Location:
    Somewhere
    The Kargil Sector can be divided from the Pakistani point of view into two - The Gultari Sector and the Batalik Sector. They were divided by the Shingo River and the Indus River and the mountain ranges between them.

    The Gultari Sector had only one road - From Skardu and then turning into a Class 9 to Burzil Bai Pass to Gultari and to Shaqma and then Class 5 to Dalunang. Thereafter, Indian Dalunang started. There was no North South roads from Skardu into the Gultari Sector.

    The Batalik Sector of Pakistan had a Class 9 road along the Indus and then Class 9/5 to areas behind Sangruti.

    Burzil Bai Pass opens in Jun and closes by Oct.

    The Skardu road to the Batalik sector was open.

    So, choke what supply line?

    And how?

    It maybe mentioned that in the High Altitude where one is located on posts, one does what is known as Winter Stocking in ammunition, food etc. This caters for sustenance till the Mountain Passes open, not only for peace time, but also in combat. It also has inbuilt that this sustenance also cranks in the period it will take to resupply in the event of war and thus blockages by war.

    Therefore, to be honest, even if the supply lines were cut off, it would not matter. More so, when it is a well known fact that the international powers that be does not allow an indefinite war to be fought by India and Pakistan.

    As far as casualties, it is indeed sad that people have to die. Wilfully, no one plans to have casualties. Yet, one being focussed on the aim, one is not deterred by casualties. It is fact of life that every war will have casualties. Even one dead is can be termed as More than acceptable!

    To win a war under adverse conditions one cannot start counting how many shall die. It is inherent in any planning that the best plan is made and wins the war with the minimum loss not only in men, but also in equipment and effort.

    Then, one has to understand fighting in High Altitude. It is not a cake walk. Not only are the problems on High Altitude debilitates the physical aspects but the rarefied air slows the mental and physical reactions. Therefore, it is obvious that casualties may be higher than fighting in the plains.

    However, it is conceded (and I am not meaning you, but the drawing room chatterati) that it is fashionable to take the American tack and worry and highlight bodybags without analysing the combat and the physical and mental environment.

    If I may add that those who died in Kargil were not counting on whether they will live or die. It is the training that makes the man go for the aim, irrespective of his personal safety. If one feels it is stupid a thought, then fair enough. The Armymen rather be stupid than let down their training and loyalty to the country.

    I wonder why the same concern is not shown by the chatterati of those who have laid down their lives in the CI. The bodybags are more!!
     
  18. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

    Joined:
    Apr 17, 2009
    Messages:
    43,117
    Likes Received:
    23,545
    Location:
    Somewhere
    He was never inhibited by anyone from doing what he wanted to do or was he?

    As far as I know, the plan that won the war was totally his and without prompting and he did a good job if I may say so.

    I am sure he will clarify that if he is asked.

    In so far as the air bombardment, this much I know, is that he asked them to quit it since the bombing was erratic and endangering own troops since we were in close proximity with the enemy and the IAF was not quite trained in High Altitude bombing.
     
    Last edited: Feb 23, 2011
  19. pmaitra

    pmaitra Moderator Moderator

    Joined:
    Mar 10, 2009
    Messages:
    31,663
    Likes Received:
    17,163
    Location:
    EST, USA
    ^^ Good post (post #16).

    So, in summary, and if I understand correctly, cutting off supply routes would not have had much effect on the intruders sitting atop the peaks because they would in all likelihood have had enough stocks to last several months. Thus, dragging the war for months would not have been beneficial for India as foreign powers would have pressed the belligerents (India and Pakistan) to cease fire.

    That is a very convincing reply.

    However, from a pure military point of view, let me ask you a question.

    If India was a superpower and did not care about international diplomatic fallout, or if there was no diplomatic fallout in the event IA crossed the LoC, wouldn't the military planners call for crossing the LoC, cutting off supply lines and encircling the peaks rather than climbing them?
     
    Last edited: Feb 23, 2011
  20. p2prada

    p2prada Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

    Joined:
    May 25, 2009
    Messages:
    10,233
    Likes Received:
    3,896
    Location:
    Holy Hell
    Hitting supply lines makes sense if the enemy is bringing along tanks and artillery to the FEBA. Cutting off even one consignment would give some respite especially if the particular supplies were quite important. No point wasting troop's lives over a couple of boxes of ammo and some cigarretes on a mule.
     
  21. p2prada

    p2prada Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

    Joined:
    May 25, 2009
    Messages:
    10,233
    Likes Received:
    3,896
    Location:
    Holy Hell
    Sir. After Kargil war, there were news reports of IAF not going to provide CAS to the army from now on. Is this because of the IAF's lack lustre involvement in Kargil with respect to gunships?

    Also, wasn't it after Kargil that army was highly inclined to build thier own air arm with possible future orders of LCH?
     

Share This Page