J20 Stealth Fighter

[shiphone]

latest J20 images by China Military enthusiasts...continued.
copyright by 白龙，保镖...etc...

 

[sorcerer]

Look Familiar? China Finally Unveils Its J-20 Stealth Fighter Jet, Thought To Be Based On Us War Plane Plans 'Stolen' By Hackers

China's new stealth fighter jet, the J-20 (pictured), is the country's first radar-evading combat aircraft and will make its first public appearance at an airshow in Zhuhai this week
by Ryan O'Hare

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencet...inese-stealth-fighter-shed-cloak-secrecy.html

 

[nongaddarliberal]

This plane will be no match for PAK FA, let alone F 22. It can barely be qualified as a stealth aircraft, and its engines are not even up to su 35 level, though the chinese are planning on buying su 35 for the very purpose of copying the engines. The only thing to worry about with this plane is the potential quantity. The chinese are sure to produce more of these than however many PAK FA's we're about to get.

 

[AmoghaVarsha]

What is the engine they are using?

 

[WolfPack86]

Major Implications For India : Pakistan Shows Interest In China J-20 Stealth Fighter
China on Tuesday unveiled its J-20 stealth fighter jet at its biggest air show which will have major implications for India as it is the first indigenously-made fifth-generation Chinese aircraft which Pakistan has shown interest in acquiring. Two J-20 aircraft which made waves in the Chinese media in the last few years flew at the Zhuhai city air show where the Pakistan Air Force is also taking part flying with its J-17 Thunder jets which are jointly manufactured with China.
This is the first, public show of the J-20 warplane. Pakistan, the largest importer of Chinese arms has said
earlier that it is in talks with China to buy the FC-31 – an export variant of the same aircraft. The FC-31 was briefly flown in the 2014 Zhuhai airshow. The stealth aircraft is regarded as major breakthrough for China which is otherwise mostly reliant on Russian aircraft including advanced versions of Sukhois.
India is yet to make stealth aircraft which can penetrate through enemy radars. The J-20 aircraft will fly over the week long show each day after taking off from an airfield in nearby Foshan, but visitors will not be able to view the aircraft close up on the ground. An official in the People’s Liberation Air Force (PLAF) told media in Zhuhai the aircraft will not be displayed in public because the “J-20 contains many of China’s top technologies in stealth aircraft plus other military secrets”.
“The secrets include the J-20’s body shape, the proportion of its wing and body and other secrets as aircraft experts can easily calculate its stealth parameters from its exterior,” Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post quoted the unnamed PLAF official as saying. The J-20 earlier made waves earlier as its picture covered in tarpaulin at an airport in Tibet. The J-20 has already created a buzz about its likely deployment on the India-China border though Chinese experts say it is unlikely.
A write-up in the China Military Online in September stated that “it is said that J-20 will be put into service
soon but the China-India border is apparently not the ideal place for its deployment”. “In addition, the world’s highest airport there does not have a complete set of supporting facilities and such shortage will impede the function of J-20”.
Experts added that if China is to deploy J-20 targeting India, it will do that only when the maintenance and operation of the aircraft in plain bases becomes mature. J-20 will not be deployed in Daocheng Yading airport (Tibet) as it is too close to the border, and it is vulnerable to India’s first-wave hit.
“If India is to deploy the BrahMos missile on the China-India border, then the Daocheng Yading airport will likely become its target,” the write up said.
http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2016/11/major-implications-for-india-pakistan.html

 

[SANITY]

China's New Jets Are Impressive. But Are They for Real?
BloombergView

(Bloomberg View) -- There was a brief but impressive show of new U.S. aircraft technology this week. The problem is that the planes belong to the Chinese military.

Aided in large part by espionage against the Pentagon and U.S. firms, the People's Liberation Army air force unveiled its new J-20 stealth fighter, which it says is a so-called fifth-generation fighter like the American F-22 and F-35. Two J-20s flew for just a few minutes at an airshow in Zhuhai on Tuesday, leaving military experts of two minds about what the J-20 is actually capable of.

While Bradley Perrett of Aviation Week warned it was "clearly a big step forward in Chinese combat capability," Greg Waldon of the consultancy FlightGlobal said the big reveal of the flyby was "we learned it was loud."

If the sparse details released by the Chinese and speculation of military insiders are accurate, the plane could present some problems should the cool war in the South China Sea heat up. The jet is said to have a longer range and more armament than the competing U.S. fighters, and while it doesn't likely have the computer systems to pose a threat to them, it could make easy targets of American refueling and surveillance craft.

But as far as U.S. officials are concerned, these capacities exist only in rumor. This is a common theme in all the Western fretting about China's cutting edge military prowess: Nobody knows whether any of it is real.

Consider the Chinese military's "carrier-killer missile," the DF-21D. It was unveiled last year, during China's celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, amid a hype campaign calling it the fastest missile in the world. In the U.S. military, there is speculation that it has radar that can see over the horizon and a maneuverable warhead that allows precision guidance as it nears its target. This has some experts warning that the age of the American aircraft carrier is over.

But, again, there is little proof that this missile is real or that China has any of the capabilities that so worry the West. The same can be said of the YJ-12 missile, which is said to fly just above the surface of the water to avoid radar tracking. While we've seen these weapons in parades, demonstrations and airshows, the real question is what's inside. "Chinese 'hardware' continues to improve dramatically, but the caliber of the 'software' supporting and connecting it remains uncertain and untested in war," noted analyst Andrew Erickson in the National Interest. "The missile components of the DF-21D already are proven through multiple tests, but China’s ability to use the missile against a moving target operating in the open ocean remains unproven."

Then there is the new Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine, which some fear may be as deadly as the U.S. Navy's Los Angeles-class boats. "The 93B is analogous to our LA improved in quietness and their appearance demonstrates that China is learning quickly about how to build a modern fast attack boat,” according to Gary Hendrix of the Center for a New American Security. But high-ranking Navy officials are more sanguine, noting that in undersea warfare the Chinese approach has centered on quantity over quality -- Beijing is thought to have at least 70 attack subs, as compared to around 50 for the U.S. -- and the consensus among the top Pentagon brass is that China is unlikely to have made the leaps in technology some fear.

So what does this all mean for long-term U.S. strategy (beyond, of course, getting better at protecting our military secrets)? If we take the threat of Chinese advances seriously, the first step would be to take a tough look at plans to build 10 new Ford-class supercarriers, which would be quite vulnerable if the Chinese are really as far along as some fear. This doesn't mean giving up on carriers -- as forward-based platforms that don't rely on allies for hosting aircraft, they remain vital. But the wiser fiscal and preparedness choice may be stopping after the three supercarriers now under construction are completed and renovating five or so of the existing Nimitz-class, which are still far and away the terror of the seas. Through smarter management of maintenance and crew rotations, eight craft could conceivably do as effective a job patrolling the globe as the Navy's hoped-for 10. (Carriers will always, alas, be more vulnerable than fake islands.)

Another idea is to make the U.S. fleet more dispersed and effective through emphasizing "distributed-lethality warfare." This would involve making far more ships in the fleet -- including those responsible for reconnaissance, specialized missions such as mine dispersal, and protecting aircraft carriers -- capable of both striking the enemy and defending themselves. This gives the enemy more threats to protect against and more targets to eliminate. To some extent the Navy seems to be considering the approach; for example, it has upgraded the armor, weaponry and anti-torpedo capability of its troubled littoral combat ship.

Inevitably, long-term military thinking is an exercise in predicting what former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called known unknowns. The J-20 flyby showed only how little we know about China's drive to become a cutting-edge military.

 

[airtel]

Report: China's Military Is Growing Super Powerful by Stealing America's Defense Secrets (Like the F-35)

Bill Gertz
December 8, 2016


China has gained military benefits in recent years from stealing defense secrets through industrial and cyber espionage carried out by its intelligence services, according to a US congressional report.

“In recent years, Chinese agents have extracted data on some of the most advanced weapons and weapons systems in the US arsenal, such as jet fighters and unmanned submersible vehicles,” states the annual report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, released on November 16.

“The loss of these and other sensitive defense technologies undermines US military superiority by accelerating China’s military modernization and giving China insight into the capabilities and operation of US weapons and weapons systems,” the report adds.

The espionage operations are not limited to direct spying activities against the United States and include intelligence collection against US allies and friends in Asia, including Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand.

“The United States shares weapons, weapons systems, and operational plans with its allies and partners, many of whom China has targeted with espionage operations,” the report says. “These infiltrations also threaten US alliance stability.”

US intelligence agencies determined that China stole secrets relating to the F-35 jet fighter from a US contractor. The design secrets were detected in China’s new J-20 stealth fighter.

The stolen secrets included details of the F-35’s electro-optical targeting system, radar-absorbing coatings and engine nozzles.

Taiwan remains a major spying target of China and, since 2002, 56 Chinese agents have been arrested there after being caught obtaining sensitive information, including about US technology shared with Taipei.

The United States is committed to defending Taiwan from a Chinese military takeover and as a result shares sensitive defense information.

“Taiwan’s strategic position in the Western Pacific makes its defensibility an important aspect of the US alliance system and strategy for the region,” the report says.

Recent Chinese cyber intelligence operations include the July 2016 infiltration by China of networks at the Philippines Department of Justice which were involved in organizing the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Chinese hackers also broke into a law firm involved with the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the court that ruled against China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea.

In Australia, Chinese cyber spies were behind a massive intrusion into networks of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, which provides data to the Australian Defense Department, an American treaty ally.

“China-based actors have conducted extensive cyber operations targeting Japan,” the report says.

Japan’s National Institute of Information and Communications Technology reported that China was behind 40 percent of approximately 26 billion attempts to compromise Japanese information systems in 2014.

Chinese intelligence services have also recruited agents in Thailand and the Philippines, prompting the commission to warn that “China’s apparent shift toward more overseas recruitment and handling operations could create a greater espionage threat environment in these and other US partner countries.”

The spying activities could undermine US support for allies. For example, if Washington believes sharing information and equipment with its Asian partners comes with significant risk, the nation could hesitate to provide support in a future crisis or conflict.

Growing Threat:

The commission report for the first time devoted an entire chapter to Chinese intelligence services, which were outlined as including the Ministry of State Security — the country’s civilian spy agency — and several military intelligence services.

The report concludes that the Chinese intelligence threat is increasing as China reforms and centralizes its intelligence apparatus and gains experience conducting spying operations.

In particular, Chinese human spying, or HUMINT, activities, “already appear to be growing more aggressive and extensive,” the commission says.

“China’s intelligence processing and communication to decision makers is likely to become more effective and efficient as the moves toward joint, integrated intelligence operations,” the report says.

The military spy agencies were the subject of a major reform effort in late 2015 that moved them from the General Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army to a new military service-level group called the Strategic Support Force.

The units believed to be placed under the new force are 2PLA, the military’s espionage branch; the 3PLA — the group responsible for electronic spying and cyber attacks; and 4PLA, which is responsible for electronic warfare.

Chinese military technical intelligence capabilities also are growing. They include beefed up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment and platforms that will bolster China’s ability to fight regional conflicts and to monitor and target US military forces.

Regarding cyber attacks, Chinese intelligence have repeatedly gained access to email accounts of senior US government officials — infiltrations that provide Beijing with insights into highly sensitive US national security decision making, the report says.

The commission recommends that Congress direct the US State Department to develop educational material to alert people living and traveling abroad to Chinese intelligence activities.

The Pentagon is also directed to set up special counter-intelligence education to help US students studying in China under a Defense Department National Security Education Program to avoid Chinese intelligence recruitment efforts.



In addition, the commission calls for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide a secret report to Congress outlining the risks and threats posed by foreign information systems purchased by the US government.

“This report should identify information systems or components that were produced, manufactured, or assembled by Chinese-owned or -controlled entities,” the report says.

Chinese telecommunications companies, including Huawei Technologies and ZTE, have been identified by the US government as working with Chinese intelligence to provide equipment that can be accessed remotely and clandestinely.

China’s cyber espionage appears to be the most serious espionage threat, described by the commission as a major problem.

“China has a large, professionalized cyber espionage community,” the report says. “Chinese intelligence services have demonstrated broad capabilities to infiltrate a range of US national security (as well as commercial) actors with cyber operations.”

This first appeared in AsiaTimes here.

 

[Martian]

Chinese Chengdu J-20 is indigenous. Look at the differences from the American F-35.

As always, where is the proof of copying?

Show me the smoking gun.

It is a ridiculous allegation. An F-35 is a single-engine aircraft that was originally designed as a bomb truck (with current lateral maneuverability of 5G or less). A Chinese J-20 is a twin-engine long-range multirole fighter with lateral maneuverability of 9G.

The Chinese J-20 engines, radar, avionics, weapon systems, airframe design, etc. are completely different from the F-35. There is very little similarity between the Chinese J-20 and the American F-35.

Additionally, the anti-corrosion coating on the J-20 is yellow. The F-35 coating is green. They use different materials for their respective anti-corrosion coatings before applying the stealth coating.

China uses a yellow fuselage primer. This means the material used by China is different from the green primer on the American F-35. There is no proof that China is copying US F-35 technology. Most of the evidence point to an indigenous source of China-originated technology. For example, you can trace Chinese weapon systems to a lineage of earlier generations of weapons.

 

[tharun]

Chinese Chengdu J-20 is indigenous. Look at the differences from the American F-35.

As always, where is the proof of copying?

Show me the smoking gun.

It is a ridiculous allegation. An F-35 is a single-engine aircraft that was originally designed as a bomb truck (with current lateral maneuverability of 5G or less). A Chinese J-20 is a twin-engine long-range multirole fighter with lateral maneuverability of 9G.

The Chinese J-20 engines, radar, avionics, weapon systems, airframe design, etc. are completely different from the F-35. There is very little similarity between the Chinese J-20 and the American F-35.

Additionally, the anti-corrosion coating on the J-20 is yellow. The F-35 coating is green. They use different materials for their respective anti-corrosion coatings before applying the stealth coating.

China uses a yellow fuselage primer. This means the material used by China is different from the green primer on the American F-35. There is no proof that China is copying US F-35 technology. Most of the evidence point to an indigenous source of China-originated technology. For example, you can trace Chinese weapon systems to a lineage of earlier generations of weapons.

So change in color mean that thing is not copied...?

 

[Rushil51]

Chinese Chengdu J-20 is indigenous. Look at the differences from the American F-35.

As always, where is the proof of copying?

Show me the smoking gun.

It is a ridiculous allegation. An F-35 is a single-engine aircraft that was originally designed as a bomb truck (with current lateral maneuverability of 5G or less). A Chinese J-20 is a twin-engine long-range multirole fighter with lateral maneuverability of 9G.

The Chinese J-20 engines, radar, avionics, weapon systems, airframe design, etc. are completely different from the F-35. There is very little similarity between the Chinese J-20 and the American F-35.

Additionally, the anti-corrosion coating on the J-20 is yellow. The F-35 coating is green. They use different materials for their respective anti-corrosion coatings before applying the stealth coating.

China uses a yellow fuselage primer. This means the material used by China is different from the green primer on the American F-35. There is no proof that China is copying US F-35 technology. Most of the evidence point to an indigenous source of China-originated technology. For example, you can trace Chinese weapon systems to a lineage of earlier generations of weapons.

https://news.vice.com/article/man-who-sold-f-35-secrets-to-china-pleads-guilty

Man Who Sold F-35 Secrets to China Pleads Guilty

 

[Martian]

https://news.vice.com/article/man-who-sold-f-35-secrets-to-china-pleads-guilty

Man Who Sold F-35 Secrets to China Pleads Guilty

I read your stupid citation. A phishing attack allows you to access all of the F-35 secrets. It's garbage.

Do you want me to go through the history of the J-20 again? The J-10B was the test platform for the DSI and RAM-coated cockpit canopy. The WS-10A engine had been in research and development since the 1980s. China's J-20 has been 35 years under construction. It was not built in the last few years by phishing some ridiculous F-35 files.

China's AESA radar has a long lineage tracing back to early primitive ground-based AESA radars. Next, China developed ship-borne radars. A Chinese AESA radar did not magically pop out of a phished file from an F-35 computer folder.

The J-20 fly-by-wire system is an evolutionary version of the J-10A fly-by-wire control system.

All Chinese weapon systems can be traced to earlier primitive and less-capable missiles.

When you look at the long history over the last 50 years of the evolution of every Chinese sub-system for aircraft, it is clear that the J-10 and J-20 are indigenous designs with wholly indigenous subsystems.

 

[airtel]

Please Post Photos of J-20 Production Line .

 

[Rushil51]

I read your stupid citation. A phishing attack allows you to access all of the F-35 secrets. It's garbage.

Do you want me to go through the history of the J-20 again? The J-10B was the test platform for the DSI and RAM-coated cockpit canopy. The WS-10A engine had been in research and development since the 1980s. China's J-20 has been 35 years under construction. It was not built in the last few years by phishing some ridiculous F-35 files.

I read your stupid argument. NEITHER IT CLAIMS THAT ALL THE F-35 SECRETS WERE STOLEN NOR IT CLAIMS IT WENT FOR JUST FEW YEARS. Read the news. THE MAN HELPED THE CHINESE HACKERS. Back your bullshit assumptions. There no idea about that damage as well as secrets which stolen.

Oh really a civilian has complete knowledge of China's top secret project? That he claims went for 35 years? Don't throw your bullshit at me.


As for China, it is their worst kept secret on they steal steal data regarding foreign military projects and use it for their own projects.

 

[Martian]

I read your stupid argument. NEITHER IT CLAIMS THAT ALL THE F-35 SECRETS WERE STOLEN NOR IT CLAIMS IT WENT FOR JUST FEW YEARS. There no idea about that damage as well as secrets which stolen.

Oh really a civilian has complete knowledge of China's top secret project? That he claims went for 35 years? Don't throw your bullshit at me.

China's Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter is indigenous and not related to the F-35

The most important part of the jet fighter is the engine. The J-20 engine is a variant of the Chinese WS-10 turbofan engine and will be upgraded with an indigenous WS-15 turbofan engine.

The AESA radar is indigenous. It comes from a Chinese institute.

The airframe is indigenous. The J-20 canard-delta wing design is completely different from the quad-tail F-35.

The weapon systems, such as the PL-12 missiles, belong to a family of Chinese missiles.

The J-20 yellow primer is made of a different material from the F-35 green primer.

The J-20 fly-by-wire system is a variant of the J-10A fly-by-wire.

The J-20 RAM-deflecting cockpit canopy coating is probably Indium Tin Oxide and different from the gold-coating on the F-22.

What else is left? I've basically covered all of the important systems. The J-20 DSI was first seen when it was tested on the J-10B. That's indigenous too.

 

[J20!]

Please Post Photos of J-20 Production Line .

If any such pics exist, none have been made public so far.

A few official picture releases aside, most J20 pics have been taken by military enthusiast outside Chengdu's airfield or from outside the research and testing center. The J20 is still a highly classified project.

 

[airtel]

If any such pics exist, none have been made public so far.

A few official picture releases aside, most J20 pics have been taken by military enthusiast outside Chengdu's airfield or from outside the research and testing center. The J20 is still a highly classified project.

Ok post photos of Any Chinese production Line .

 

[Rushil51]

China's Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter is indigenous and not related to the F-35

The most important part of the jet fighter is the engine. The J-20 engine is a variant of the Chinese WS-10 turbofan engine and will be upgraded with an indigenous WS-15 turbofan engine.

The AESA radar is indigenous. It comes from a Chinese institute.

The airframe is indigenous. The J-20 canard-delta wing design is completely different from the quad-tail F-35.

The weapon systems, such as the PL-12 missiles, belong to a family of Chinese missiles.

The J-20 yellow primer is made of a different material from the F-35 green primer.

The J-20 fly-by-wire system is a variant of the J-10A fly-by-wire.

The J-20 RAM-deflecting cockpit canopy coating is probably Indium Tin Oxide and different from the gold-coating on the F-22.

What else is left? I've basically covered all of the important systems. The J-20 DSI was first seen when it was tested on the J-10B. That's indigenous too.

They being made in China does not mean that all the necessary R/D was carried out in China and no stolen info has been ever used. Obviously Chinese will claim that all was indigenous developed. Do you expect anyone to come out and say "Oh and this one was made with the help of data we stole from United States". And you are literally the last person from who I expect any rational non-biased discussion having witnessed your blind nationalism on this forum so you SAYING that everything subsystem is made in China (while scores of Chinese are arrested in western nations over stolen data, technologies and espionage) is not gonna help your discussion here.

So basically any aircraft is just air frame with an engine and a radar plus weapons? Do you know how many more subsystems go in an aircraft? Obliviously wh

The only facts we know are Chinese do make major investments in R/D of their weapons systems AND they are notorious for stealing data and technologies for foreign nations. How indigenous are subsystems of J-20 and other weapon systems is only something that top Chinese officials know.

 

[Martian]

They being made in China does not mean that all the necessary R/D was carried out in China and no stolen info has been ever used. Obviously Chinese will claim that all was indigenous developed. Do you expect anyone to come out and say "Oh and this one was made with the help of data we stole from United States". And you are literally the last person from who I expect any rational non-biased discussion having witnessed your blind nationalism on this forum so you SAYING that everything subsystem is made in China (while scores of Chinese are arrested in western nations over stolen data, technologies and espionage) is not gonna help your discussion here.

So basically any aircraft is just air frame with an engine and a radar plus weapons? Do you know how many more subsystems go in an aircraft? Obliviously wh

The only facts we know are Chinese do make major investments in R/D of their weapons systems AND they are notorious for stealing data and technologies for foreign nations. How indigenous are subsystems of J-20 and other weapon systems is only something that top Chinese officials know.

I'm going to say this one last time. There is a mountain of evidence to support the claim that China's jet fighter technology advances are indigenous. They extend back 35 years.

Let's look at the most technologically-challenging part of the aircraft: the nickel superalloy for the variant WS-10 turbofan engine blades. If you do the research, a similar trace that extends back decades can be made for each important Chinese system on the J-20 stealth aircraft.

For example, China's stealth coating for its aircraft is almost 20 years old. "At the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show, the [Chinese] Seek Optics Company displayed information of its stealth coating and software for stealth shaping.[63]" (Source: Modernization of the Chinese Air Force » Indian Defence Review)

China was building DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys by the late 1980s or early 1990s and the indigenous WS-10 engine was tested in 1992.
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China built indigenous DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys prior to 1995

Fig. 1. Microstructure of the DD3 single-crystal superalloy, respectively, solidified at undercooling of (a) 130 K; (b) 155 K; (c) 170 K; (d) 180 K; and (e) 210 K. (Source: Recrystallization mechanism for the grain refinement in undercooled DD3 single-crystal superalloy)

Most people seem to be unaware that China has been building DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys for about twenty years.

The indigenous WS-10 turbofan engine project started in 1986 (see reference below). By 1992, the "first test engine [was] completed and bench testing began." Therefore, we can deduce China was probably building DD3 single-crystal superalloys a few years prior to 1992.

The earliest English citation (see article below) that I found for China's DD3 single-crystal superalloy was in 1995. Also, the earliest English citation that I found for China's DD6 second-generation single-crystal superalloy was in 2003 (see second article below).

The point of these citations is to match the known dates for China's DD3 and DD6 single-crystal superalloys with the known dates for China's first tests of the WS-10 and WS-15 turbofan engines. They match almost perfectly.

China was building DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys by the late 1980s or early 1990s and the indigenous WS-10 engine was tested in 1992.

Also, GlobalSecurity reported that China successfully tested its WS-15 engine prototype in 2005 (see second reference below). Based on the citation, we can place the approximate date of China's manufacture of DD6 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys around the early to mid-2000s.

The timeline for the DD3 and DD6 superalloys fits the dates for testing the WS-10 and WS-15 turbofan engine prototypes.

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Advanced Performance Materials, Volume 2, Number 3 - SpringerLink

"Advanced Performance Materials
Volume 2, Number 3 (1995), 217-229, DOI: 10.1007/BF00705445
Some recent developments of advanced titanium alloy and nickel base superalloys in BIAM

M. G. Yan, Y. F. Han, C. X. Cao and Z. T. Wu

Abstract

A brief review of recent research and development works of some advanced Ti alloys and Ni base superalloys in the Institute of Aeronautical Materials, Beijing (BIAM) is reported. In which, the tensile deformation and fracture characteristics in an agr-beta Ti alloy, the creep behavior of Ti3Al intermetallic alloy and effect of heat treatment and crystal orientation on the creep properties of a single crystal Ni base alloys DD3, are presented. The applications of the above mentioned alloys in aeronautic industry are described.

Fulltext Preview

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Mechanisms of Low Cyclic Fatigue of DD6 Alloy at Elevated Temperature--

"《Journal of Aerospace Power》 2003-06
Mechanisms of Low Cyclic Fatigue of DD6 Alloy at Elevated Temperature
LI Ying,SU Bin(Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials,Beijing100095,China)
Low cycle fatigue mechanism of a single crystal nickel-base superalloy,DD6,has been investigated at 760℃ and 980℃.It was found that there were two kinds of sites where crack initiates,one being the surface of the specimens and the other being the sub-surface.Microcracks and oxide layer on the specimen surface are potential crack initiation sites in this superalloy.Secondary crack,reared ridge, and microcrack in the front of the main crack tip can all hinder crack propagation during low cycle fatigue.
【Key Words】： aerospace propulsion system single crystal superalloy low cycle fatigue crack initiation crack propagation
【CateGory Index】： V232
【DOI】： CNKI:SUN:HKDI.0.2003-06-005"

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DD6 is China's second-generation nickel-based single-crystal superalloy

1. China's first generation nickel-based single-crystal superalloy was called DD3. This technology was probably used in the WS-10A and WS-13 turbofan engines.

2. China's newer second-generation nickel-based single-crystal superalloy is named DD6. This latest technology will probably be incorporated into the WS-15 turbofan engine.

Figure 1. (a) HAADF image of alloy DD6 before the creep test. (b) Element mapping images of major constituents corresponding to the area denoted by a white rectangle in (a). (c) Distribution of elements Re and W along the direction perpendicular to the interfaces. The dashed vertical lines show schematically the γ/γ′ interface.

Source: ScienceDirect.com - Scripta Materialia - Distribution of rhenium in a single crystal nickel-based superalloy

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DD6 single crystal alloy TLP diffusion bonding process

"DD6 single crystal alloy TLP diffusion bonding process
发表于 2012/08/17 由 admin

DD6 is China's second-generation nickel-based single crystal superalloy with high temperature strength, good overall performance, and organizational stability. With the first generation of nickel-based single crystal superalloy DD3, Cheng Wen capacity increase of about 40 ° C; compared with foreign widely used second-generation single crystal alloys, tensile properties, long-lasting performance, oxidation resistance and heat corrosion all reached and even some more than its level, and containing rhenium low low-cost advantage. Of the alloy is suitable for the production of work below 1100 ℃, gas turbine blade and other high temperature parts with complex cavity [1-3]. Apparently alone casting technology to manufacture the hollow blades with complex cavity is very difficult, even impossible, only the casting and welding the two processes combining to make it a reality. The single crystal alloy as a single crystal highly efficient gas-cooled modular blade manufacturing process, the most important one of the key technologies, foreign countries have to conduct more studies, transient liquid phase diffusion bonding (TLP diffusion bonding) on ??the single crystal turbine blades connection shows a clear advantage and feasibility [4,5]. P & W Company has adopted the TLP diffusion bonding technology to produce outside the compound single crystal blades, and is used on the F100 engine [4]. Developed in our second-generation nickel-base single crystal superalloy DD6 for the study, TLP diffusion welding head the organization and performance analysis.

A test of materials, methods and equipment
Test the parent material for the DD6 single crystal alloy, its composition and typical rupture properties shown in Table 1, the standard heat treatment specifications for the 1290 ° C, 1h from +1300 ° C, 2h +1315 ° C, 4h, air-cooled +1120 ° C, 4h, air-cooled +870 ° C , 32h, air-cooled. TLP diffusion bonding intermediate layer alloy is prepared for DD6 are basically the same, the main component DD6 base metal, adding a certain amount of B as the melting point depressant elements, use the form -150 purpose powder.

Surface preparation before welding in order to prevent the machining stress lead to recrystallization in the base metal in the welding thermal cycle, using the + wire cutting + sanding base metal heat treatment processing. Before welding, all samples with acetone ultrasonic cleaning to oil.

Diffusion welding temperature used to match the temperature of solution treatment with the base metal, ie, 1290 ° C, holding time requirements through tests to determine in accordance with the joints lasting performance.

Docking sample connector metallographic sample and performance samples are first 0.1mm thick stainless steel gasket sandwiched between both ends of the specimen connected surface, and TIG welding positioning, then as usual brazing fill plus brazing powdery intermediate layer alloy is placed in the sample above the binder positioning. Connection, the intermediate layer alloy melt into the cracks in the formation of joints. In order to ensure that the two matching samples of crystal orientation consistent to avoid or reduce the formation of the joint to reduce the mechanical properties of grain boundaries in the test specimen strict matching processing and precise positioning of assembly and welding to ensure that two specimens relative position.

Figure 1 shows the form of the specimen measured the lasting high temperature mechanical properties, optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, energy dispersive analysis by means of diffusion welding the head of the organization of different holding time were observed and analyzed."

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Reference for WS-10 and WS-15 turbofan engine test dates:

Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production | China SignPost

WS15

 

[Rushil51]

I'm going to say this one last time. There is a mountain of evidence to support the claim that China's jet fighter technology advances are indigenous. They extend back 35 years.

Let's look at the most technologically-challenging part of the aircraft: the nickel superalloy for the variant WS-10 turbofan engine blades. If you do the research, a similar trace that extends back decades can be made for each important Chinese system on the J-20 stealth aircraft.

For example, China's stealth coating for its aircraft is almost 20 years old. "At the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show, the [Chinese] Seek Optics Company displayed information of its stealth coating and software for stealth shaping.[63]" (Source: Modernization of the Chinese Air Force » Indian Defence Review)

China was building DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys by the late 1980s or early 1990s and the indigenous WS-10 engine was tested in 1992.
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China built indigenous DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys prior to 1995

Fig. 1. Microstructure of the DD3 single-crystal superalloy, respectively, solidified at undercooling of (a) 130 K; (b) 155 K; (c) 170 K; (d) 180 K; and (e) 210 K. (Source: Recrystallization mechanism for the grain refinement in undercooled DD3 single-crystal superalloy)

Most people seem to be unaware that China has been building DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys for about twenty years.

The indigenous WS-10 turbofan engine project started in 1986 (see reference below). By 1992, the "first test engine [was] completed and bench testing began." Therefore, we can deduce China was probably building DD3 single-crystal superalloys a few years prior to 1992.

The earliest English citation (see article below) that I found for China's DD3 single-crystal superalloy was in 1995. Also, the earliest English citation that I found for China's DD6 second-generation single-crystal superalloy was in 2003 (see second article below).

The point of these citations is to match the known dates for China's DD3 and DD6 single-crystal superalloys with the known dates for China's first tests of the WS-10 and WS-15 turbofan engines. They match almost perfectly.

China was building DD3 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys by the late 1980s or early 1990s and the indigenous WS-10 engine was tested in 1992.

Also, GlobalSecurity reported that China successfully tested its WS-15 engine prototype in 2005 (see second reference below). Based on the citation, we can place the approximate date of China's manufacture of DD6 nickel-based single-crystal superalloys around the early to mid-2000s.

The timeline for the DD3 and DD6 superalloys fits the dates for testing the WS-10 and WS-15 turbofan engine prototypes.

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Advanced Performance Materials, Volume 2, Number 3 - SpringerLink

"Advanced Performance Materials
Volume 2, Number 3 (1995), 217-229, DOI: 10.1007/BF00705445
Some recent developments of advanced titanium alloy and nickel base superalloys in BIAM

M. G. Yan, Y. F. Han, C. X. Cao and Z. T. Wu

Abstract

A brief review of recent research and development works of some advanced Ti alloys and Ni base superalloys in the Institute of Aeronautical Materials, Beijing (BIAM) is reported. In which, the tensile deformation and fracture characteristics in an agr-beta Ti alloy, the creep behavior of Ti3Al intermetallic alloy and effect of heat treatment and crystal orientation on the creep properties of a single crystal Ni base alloys DD3, are presented. The applications of the above mentioned alloys in aeronautic industry are described.

Fulltext Preview

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Mechanisms of Low Cyclic Fatigue of DD6 Alloy at Elevated Temperature--

"《Journal of Aerospace Power》 2003-06
Mechanisms of Low Cyclic Fatigue of DD6 Alloy at Elevated Temperature
LI Ying,SU Bin(Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials,Beijing100095,China)
Low cycle fatigue mechanism of a single crystal nickel-base superalloy,DD6,has been investigated at 760℃ and 980℃.It was found that there were two kinds of sites where crack initiates,one being the surface of the specimens and the other being the sub-surface.Microcracks and oxide layer on the specimen surface are potential crack initiation sites in this superalloy.Secondary crack,reared ridge, and microcrack in the front of the main crack tip can all hinder crack propagation during low cycle fatigue.
【Key Words】： aerospace propulsion system single crystal superalloy low cycle fatigue crack initiation crack propagation
【CateGory Index】： V232
【DOI】： CNKI:SUN:HKDI.0.2003-06-005"

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DD6 is China's second-generation nickel-based single-crystal superalloy

1. China's first generation nickel-based single-crystal superalloy was called DD3. This technology was probably used in the WS-10A and WS-13 turbofan engines.

2. China's newer second-generation nickel-based single-crystal superalloy is named DD6. This latest technology will probably be incorporated into the WS-15 turbofan engine.

Figure 1. (a) HAADF image of alloy DD6 before the creep test. (b) Element mapping images of major constituents corresponding to the area denoted by a white rectangle in (a). (c) Distribution of elements Re and W along the direction perpendicular to the interfaces. The dashed vertical lines show schematically the γ/γ′ interface.

Source: ScienceDirect.com - Scripta Materialia - Distribution of rhenium in a single crystal nickel-based superalloy

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DD6 single crystal alloy TLP diffusion bonding process

"DD6 single crystal alloy TLP diffusion bonding process
发表于 2012/08/17 由 admin

DD6 is China's second-generation nickel-based single crystal superalloy with high temperature strength, good overall performance, and organizational stability. With the first generation of nickel-based single crystal superalloy DD3, Cheng Wen capacity increase of about 40 ° C; compared with foreign widely used second-generation single crystal alloys, tensile properties, long-lasting performance, oxidation resistance and heat corrosion all reached and even some more than its level, and containing rhenium low low-cost advantage. Of the alloy is suitable for the production of work below 1100 ℃, gas turbine blade and other high temperature parts with complex cavity [1-3]. Apparently alone casting technology to manufacture the hollow blades with complex cavity is very difficult, even impossible, only the casting and welding the two processes combining to make it a reality. The single crystal alloy as a single crystal highly efficient gas-cooled modular blade manufacturing process, the most important one of the key technologies, foreign countries have to conduct more studies, transient liquid phase diffusion bonding (TLP diffusion bonding) on ??the single crystal turbine blades connection shows a clear advantage and feasibility [4,5]. P & W Company has adopted the TLP diffusion bonding technology to produce outside the compound single crystal blades, and is used on the F100 engine [4]. Developed in our second-generation nickel-base single crystal superalloy DD6 for the study, TLP diffusion welding head the organization and performance analysis.

A test of materials, methods and equipment
Test the parent material for the DD6 single crystal alloy, its composition and typical rupture properties shown in Table 1, the standard heat treatment specifications for the 1290 ° C, 1h from +1300 ° C, 2h +1315 ° C, 4h, air-cooled +1120 ° C, 4h, air-cooled +870 ° C , 32h, air-cooled. TLP diffusion bonding intermediate layer alloy is prepared for DD6 are basically the same, the main component DD6 base metal, adding a certain amount of B as the melting point depressant elements, use the form -150 purpose powder.

Surface preparation before welding in order to prevent the machining stress lead to recrystallization in the base metal in the welding thermal cycle, using the + wire cutting + sanding base metal heat treatment processing. Before welding, all samples with acetone ultrasonic cleaning to oil.

Diffusion welding temperature used to match the temperature of solution treatment with the base metal, ie, 1290 ° C, holding time requirements through tests to determine in accordance with the joints lasting performance.

Docking sample connector metallographic sample and performance samples are first 0.1mm thick stainless steel gasket sandwiched between both ends of the specimen connected surface, and TIG welding positioning, then as usual brazing fill plus brazing powdery intermediate layer alloy is placed in the sample above the binder positioning. Connection, the intermediate layer alloy melt into the cracks in the formation of joints. In order to ensure that the two matching samples of crystal orientation consistent to avoid or reduce the formation of the joint to reduce the mechanical properties of grain boundaries in the test specimen strict matching processing and precise positioning of assembly and welding to ensure that two specimens relative position.

Figure 1 shows the form of the specimen measured the lasting high temperature mechanical properties, optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, energy dispersive analysis by means of diffusion welding the head of the organization of different holding time were observed and analyzed."

----------

Reference for WS-10 and WS-15 turbofan engine test dates:

Jet Engine Development in China: Indigenous high-performance turbofans are a final step toward fully independent fighter production | China SignPost

WS15

Hmmm very interesting read. Thanks for sharing this.

 

[indiazain]

Report: China's Military Is Growing Super Powerful by Stealing America's Defense Secrets (Like the F-35)

Bill Gertz
December 8, 2016


China has gained military benefits in recent years from stealing defense secrets through industrial and cyber espionage carried out by its intelligence services, according to a US congressional report.

“In recent years, Chinese agents have extracted data on some of the most advanced weapons and weapons systems in the US arsenal, such as jet fighters and unmanned submersible vehicles,” states the annual report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, released on November 16.

“The loss of these and other sensitive defense technologies undermines US military superiority by accelerating China’s military modernization and giving China insight into the capabilities and operation of US weapons and weapons systems,” the report adds.

The espionage operations are not limited to direct spying activities against the United States and include intelligence collection against US allies and friends in Asia, including Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand.

“The United States shares weapons, weapons systems, and operational plans with its allies and partners, many of whom China has targeted with espionage operations,” the report says. “These infiltrations also threaten US alliance stability.”

US intelligence agencies determined that China stole secrets relating to the F-35 jet fighter from a US contractor. The design secrets were detected in China’s new J-20 stealth fighter.

The stolen secrets included details of the F-35’s electro-optical targeting system, radar-absorbing coatings and engine nozzles.

Taiwan remains a major spying target of China and, since 2002, 56 Chinese agents have been arrested there after being caught obtaining sensitive information, including about US technology shared with Taipei.

The United States is committed to defending Taiwan from a Chinese military takeover and as a result shares sensitive defense information.

“Taiwan’s strategic position in the Western Pacific makes its defensibility an important aspect of the US alliance system and strategy for the region,” the report says.

Recent Chinese cyber intelligence operations include the July 2016 infiltration by China of networks at the Philippines Department of Justice which were involved in organizing the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Chinese hackers also broke into a law firm involved with the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the court that ruled against China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea.

In Australia, Chinese cyber spies were behind a massive intrusion into networks of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, which provides data to the Australian Defense Department, an American treaty ally.

“China-based actors have conducted extensive cyber operations targeting Japan,” the report says.

Japan’s National Institute of Information and Communications Technology reported that China was behind 40 percent of approximately 26 billion attempts to compromise Japanese information systems in 2014.

Chinese intelligence services have also recruited agents in Thailand and the Philippines, prompting the commission to warn that “China’s apparent shift toward more overseas recruitment and handling operations could create a greater espionage threat environment in these and other US partner countries.”

The spying activities could undermine US support for allies. For example, if Washington believes sharing information and equipment with its Asian partners comes with significant risk, the nation could hesitate to provide support in a future crisis or conflict.

Growing Threat:

The commission report for the first time devoted an entire chapter to Chinese intelligence services, which were outlined as including the Ministry of State Security — the country’s civilian spy agency — and several military intelligence services.

The report concludes that the Chinese intelligence threat is increasing as China reforms and centralizes its intelligence apparatus and gains experience conducting spying operations.

In particular, Chinese human spying, or HUMINT, activities, “already appear to be growing more aggressive and extensive,” the commission says.

“China’s intelligence processing and communication to decision makers is likely to become more effective and efficient as the moves toward joint, integrated intelligence operations,” the report says.

The military spy agencies were the subject of a major reform effort in late 2015 that moved them from the General Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army to a new military service-level group called the Strategic Support Force.

The units believed to be placed under the new force are 2PLA, the military’s espionage branch; the 3PLA — the group responsible for electronic spying and cyber attacks; and 4PLA, which is responsible for electronic warfare.

Chinese military technical intelligence capabilities also are growing. They include beefed up intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment and platforms that will bolster China’s ability to fight regional conflicts and to monitor and target US military forces.

Regarding cyber attacks, Chinese intelligence have repeatedly gained access to email accounts of senior US government officials — infiltrations that provide Beijing with insights into highly sensitive US national security decision making, the report says.

The commission recommends that Congress direct the US State Department to develop educational material to alert people living and traveling abroad to Chinese intelligence activities.

The Pentagon is also directed to set up special counter-intelligence education to help US students studying in China under a Defense Department National Security Education Program to avoid Chinese intelligence recruitment efforts.



In addition, the commission calls for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide a secret report to Congress outlining the risks and threats posed by foreign information systems purchased by the US government.

“This report should identify information systems or components that were produced, manufactured, or assembled by Chinese-owned or -controlled entities,” the report says.

Chinese telecommunications companies, including Huawei Technologies and ZTE, have been identified by the US government as working with Chinese intelligence to provide equipment that can be accessed remotely and clandestinely.

China’s cyber espionage appears to be the most serious espionage threat, described by the commission as a major problem.

“China has a large, professionalized cyber espionage community,” the report says. “Chinese intelligence services have demonstrated broad capabilities to infiltrate a range of US national security (as well as commercial) actors with cyber operations.”

This first appeared in AsiaTimes here.

The Americans are just way to smart for the Chinese.The would have intentionally released flawed designs which the Chinese will use to develop a flawed a aircraft.They will make up or it by selling them to Pakistan and other similar countries .

Simple logic will establish this fact,as early as Nov 2015 they bought 24 su 35 aircraft's worth 2 billion.