It belongs to China
- Thread starter ice berg
- Start date
Then I would assume your intensions are "b", that you agree on the points he is making.
before anything else, the Thai-Khmer dispute is a land border dispute which do not need to take into account any maritime laws.
Ancient maps IMO is irrelevant as anybody can make a map disregarding other's territoty unless the maps are ratified and acknowledged by parties involved in the dispute or any international arbitrating body. In this case both countries involved have ancient maps to validate their claim. So is it going to be who has the oldest map? then China should start claiming the whole philippines and most of the world as they have mapped pretty much of it during the ancient times.
About the international treaties involved. What is so stupid about the author's article was "But what takes the cake is the fact that China holds three international treaties in support of its claim over the territories in question—namely, the 1898 Treaty of Paris between the US and Spain, the 1900 Treaty of Washington between Spain and the US, and the 1930 Treaty between Great Britain and the US, all limiting Philippine territorial limits to the 118th degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich.". when actually, these treaties do not support China's claim directly, instead those treaties seek to prove that they state nothing about the shoal being part of the Philippines.
The article was correct to say that no treaties award the shoal to the philippines (although the spratlys are part of Philippine terriroty based on the Treay of Paris and note that the spratlys are different from scarborough shoal). But it does not mean that there are international treaties which award them to China. Even the treaties of surrender of japan does not give any of the diputed lands to China which the Japs has forcefully controlled during WW2.
None of the Philippine constitutions and maps drew the baselines to include scarborough as it is considered as rocks which cannot generate its own contigous zone and EEZ. But based on the baseline on western coast of Luzon The country's largest island, the shoal will fall into the country's EEZ which is 200NM from the coast. The Spratlys were not included in the baselines law under the Philippine constitution but declared the island as "regime" island which can generate their own territorial limits apart from the archipelagic baselines marking the country.
Another irresponsible remark from the author was "As far as I know, a mere "convention" cannot overturn or supersede a treaty or an agreement reached between colonial powers. And even if it were considered a "law", it cannot be made to take effect retroactively.
Whom are we fooling?" Actually the question was ..who is he fooling. Since like I have said the treaties do not award the shoal to China.
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Some points from UNCLOS:
1. Territorial sea
"PART II
TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE
xxx
SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Article 3. Breadth of the territorial sea
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention."
- So Chinese territory only includes up to 12 miles from its coastal low water mark.
2. Low Tide Elevations
"Article 13
Low-tide elevations
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own."
- Hence, the disputed shoal cannot be considered as a basis for drawing a baseline for the territorial sea of China.
3. EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone)
"PART V
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Article 55. Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone.
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
xxx
Article 57. Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
- The disputed shoal (which is merely a "Low Tide Elevation" under the UNCLOS) is within the 200-nm baseline of the Philippines (computed from its nearest baseline in the major island of Luzon) and hence is part of the Phiulippines' EEZ. It is however way beyond 200-nm from Chinese baseline.
4. Territorial Sea vs. EEZ
- As discussed above territorial sea is the sea within 12-nm distance from a coastal state's baseline (coast). A coastal state has full sovereignty over this area as it is part of its national territory.
- An EEZ is a special legal creation under the UNCLOS which is an area beyond the 12-nm territorial sea but only up to 200-nm distance from the coastal state's coast. Legally this area is not part of the territory of a coastal state. However, by UNCLOS a coastal state has special and exclusive economic jurisdiction (call it specific sovereignty) over this area for natural resources exploration.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
1. Territorial sea
"PART II
TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE
xxx
SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Article 3. Breadth of the territorial sea
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention."
- So Chinese territory only includes up to 12 miles from its coastal low water mark.
2. Low Tide Elevations
"Article 13
Low-tide elevations
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own."
- Hence, the disputed shoal cannot be considered as a basis for drawing a baseline for the territorial sea of China.
3. EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone)
"PART V
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Article 55. Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone.
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
xxx
Article 57. Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
- The disputed shoal (which is merely a "Low Tide Elevation" under the UNCLOS) is within the 200-nm baseline of the Philippines (computed from its nearest baseline in the major island of Luzon) and hence is part of the Phiulippines' EEZ. It is however way beyond 200-nm from Chinese baseline.
4. Territorial Sea vs. EEZ
- As discussed above territorial sea is the sea within 12-nm distance from a coastal state's baseline (coast). A coastal state has full sovereignty over this area as it is part of its national territory.
- An EEZ is a special legal creation under the UNCLOS which is an area beyond the 12-nm territorial sea but only up to 200-nm distance from the coastal state's coast. Legally this area is not part of the territory of a coastal state. However, by UNCLOS a coastal state has special and exclusive economic jurisdiction (call it specific sovereignty) over this area for natural resources exploration.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
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China's South Sea Claims: Fact or Fiction?
During ongoing negotiations over the past several years, rival claimants to the Spratly Islands have agreed loosely to 'increase cooperation' in the South China Sea. Officially, however, Beijing, the most powerful and least flexible claimant nation, remains adamant in its assertion that the Spratlys are "an inalienable part of the Chinese motherland". Under these circumstances, perhaps it is time to consider the historical foundations of China's claim - indeed, whether Beijing has legitimate interests in the region at all.
In July, 1977, when Teng Hsiao-ping first emerged as China's leader following the death of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua, reconfirmed that China's claim to the South China Sea was "non-negotiable" in the strongest terms. At the same time he commented:
The territory of China reaches as far south as the James Shoals, near Malaysia's Borneo territory... I remember that while I was still a schoolboy, I read about those islands in the geography books. At that time, I never heard anyone say those islands were not China's... The Vietnamese claim that the islands belong to them. Let them talk that way. They have repeatedly asked us to negotiate with them on the issue; we have always declined to do so... As to the ownership of the islands, there are historical documents that can be verified. There is no need for negotiations since they originally belonged to China.
In this statement Huang was simply restating the standpoint advanced by the People's Republic of China since the time of its inception in 1949, and repeated many times since: that Chinese ownership of the South China Sea was "historically proven" and therefore non-negotiable. More recently, since the Chinese seizure of Panganiban, or Mischief Reef, in waters close by the Philippines' island of Palawan, China's propaganda machine has vigorously repeated that its claim to ownership is based on "unquestionable historical evidence".
This may be so. Yet, if such is indeed the case, why does China not produce the evidence? Former foreign minister Huang Hua's geography books, doubtless written by the Nationalist KMT government which ruled China during his schooldays, would not be deemed admissible by any independent judicial authority. The KMT claimed both the Paracels and the Spratlys when they ruled the mainland, and they maintain this claim from their base on Taiwan today. To quote, again, from Huang Hua: "In this respect Taiwan's attitude is all right. At least they have some patriotism and would not sell out the islands". Clearly, if China's claim is to be entertained, something more substantive than politically suspect school text books will have to be produced.
Fortunately, traditional Chinese society was both ordered and highly literate. Imperial court annals are a rich source of history, not only for China, but for surrounding territories including Nan Yang [the "Southern Ocean", a generic Chinese term for Southeast Asia] as well. Without seeking to prove or disprove the validity of Chinese claims on disputed territories such as Tibet, Eastern Turkistan and Mongolia, the annals do at least establish that such claims have existed for many centuries.
In spite of shrill Chinese affirmations of historical control, it is much harder to establish evidence of any national interest in either the Paracels (now controlled entirely by China) or the Spratlys (still in dispute) much before the start of the present century. One obvious reason is that these islands in the South China Sea are uninhabited--or were until recently, when the surrounding states began setting up military outposts throughout the region.
Comprised mainly of tiny islets surrounded by treacherous reefs, the Spratlys have traditionally been seen by seamen as a hazard to be avoided. Only pirates, seeking havens remote from authority, paid them much mind until the mid-1840s, when they were systematically charted by the British Admiralty. Again, it is instructive that the British made no attempt to claim either archipelago as their territory--the sole purpose of the survey was to improve navigation.
This, of course, begs the question "if the Paracels and the Spratlys have belonged to China for untold centuries, why were they not mapped and described until their mid-19th century survey by the British?" It is indeed strange--analogous, perhaps, to Chinese vessels being the first to chart the Faeroes or the Shetland Islands. In fact the explanation is simple. China, in contrast to Britain, has always been a continental power, rarely--if ever--venturing to sea.
To be sure, local Chinese merchants knew of the reefs and shoals of the Spratlys long before Western shipping entered Asian waters. So, too, did other regional traders--Vietnamese and Thai, Malay and Filipino--as well as a handful of long-distance sailing peoples like the Japanese and the Arabs. But all alike--just as the British in the 19th century--considered the reefs and shoals hazards to steer clear of. The idea of claiming such semi-submerged, rocky outcrops as a national asset remained absurd--at least until 20th century technology made the sea-bed accessible.
China's long tradition as a continental power not withstanding, the Middle Kingdom did put to sea now and then. Undoubtedly the most famous, successful and far-flung such maritime expeditions were those launched during the Ming Dynasty by the Yung Lo Emperor, Ch'eng Tsu, in the mid-15th century. Between 1405 and 1433 this remarkable ruler sent no fewer than seven separate expeditions not just to Southeast Asia, but to the Indian Ocean as well.
These expeditions were no small-scale affair. Under the great admiral Cheng Ho, a Chinese Muslim of Yunnan province, fleets of more than sixty ships holding upwards of twenty-eight thousand officers and men carried the imperial banner as far afield as Jiddah in Arabia and Mombasa in East Africa. The coasts of India and Indonesia were explored and described, and the intervening seas mapped. China's prestige throughout the region was paramount, and countries as diverse as Siam and Sri Lanka, Java and Bengal vied in sending tribute to the Dragon Throne.
When the Yung Lo Emperor died in 1424 the Ming Dynasty had reached the apex of its achievement, and China was the paramount sea power of the Orient. Yung Lo's remarkable navy at its maximum strength included four hundred warships based at coastal guard stations, four hundred armed transports, and--pride of the Ming navy--two hundred and fifty "treasure ships", each capable of carrying five hundred men.
Yet hardly had this remarkable flowering of Chinese maritime might begun, than it all came to an end. One of the first actions of Yung Lo's inward-looking successor, the emperor Jen-tsung, was to suspend all overseas expeditions. From the mid-15th century onwards China turned away from the sea, establishing a great land-based empire in Central Asia under the Ch'ing. In this way the Middle Kingdom survived in "splendid isolation" until being forced open by Western gunboats in the 19th century.
Fortunately for posterity, the Ming maritime voyages bequeathed a wealth of information in the form of maps, charts and travel records. Most have been published in Chinese, and many--including the most famous--in English. Probably the best-known example of the genre is The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores, compiled by the annalist Ma Huan in 1433. Using Ma Huan's study, in conjunction with contemporary works by Kung Chen (1434), Fei Hsin (1436); earlier studies by Chao Ju-kua (1226), Wang Ta-yüan (1350); and the Ming Shih, or Ming dynasty annals, the British scholar J.V.G. Mills in 1970 published a study entitled 'China in Southern Asia, 1433'.
In this magnum opus Mills lists and identifies no fewer than 715 place names in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean which were known to the Chinese by the mid-15th century. In a painstaking piece of scholarship, compiled before the present conflict for the South China Seas flared up in 1973, and without any thought of contemporary political purpose, Mills shows that not one reef or bank belonging to the Spratly Islands is anywhere recorded. Yet the same list includes the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, no fewer than 8 individual Maldive Islands, the Laccadive Islands, islands in the distant Persian Gulf and the Red Sea--not to mention a wealth of islands of all shapes and sizes in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia.
The Paracels, by contrast, receive two brief mentions, both derived from the archaic Mao K'un map held in the Library of Congress at Washington. This collection of folio charts, dated 1621 but thought to be based on information derived from the Yung Lo expeditions, identifies the Paracel Reefs [c. 15° 47' N, 111° 12'E] under the name Shih t'ang, or "Stone Reefs" as well as the nearby Macclesfield Bank [c. 19° 12' N, 113° 53'E], which is identified as Shih hsing shih t'ang, or "Stone Star Stone Reefs".
The Paracels are today under Chinese control--though this is still disputed by Vietnam. Whether the brief references to "stony reefs" in the Mao K'un map constitute any sort of evidence for China's territorial claim remains a moot point. Besides, it is entirely possible that these remote and uninhabited reefs, shunned by the sailors of the world until relatively recent times, may appear in Vietnamese historical records as well.
More importantly, a detailed analysis of all known Chinese knowledge relating to the South China Seas during the 15th century--that is, during the one period when Chinese shipping traversed the region on a regular basis and made systematic surveys of the seaways--reveals no mention whatsoever of the Spratly Islands. Thus the question must arise, just when did these far-flung islets become "an integral part of the Chinese motherland". What grounds are there for making such claims? Where are the proofs, the "incontrovertible historical evidence" on which China now bases its claims for hegemony in the South China Sea?
They may very well be there, locked in a museum cabinet or a university library somewhere on the Chinese mainland or, indeed, in Taiwan--which echoes China's claims.
One thing is clear. If such documents do exist, now would be an excellent time to produce them. The people of Southeast Asia, justifiably worried by the unfolding scenario in the disputed Spratly Islands, deserve no less.
CPAmedia.com: China's South Sea Claims -- Fact or Fiction?
During ongoing negotiations over the past several years, rival claimants to the Spratly Islands have agreed loosely to 'increase cooperation' in the South China Sea. Officially, however, Beijing, the most powerful and least flexible claimant nation, remains adamant in its assertion that the Spratlys are "an inalienable part of the Chinese motherland". Under these circumstances, perhaps it is time to consider the historical foundations of China's claim - indeed, whether Beijing has legitimate interests in the region at all.
In July, 1977, when Teng Hsiao-ping first emerged as China's leader following the death of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua, reconfirmed that China's claim to the South China Sea was "non-negotiable" in the strongest terms. At the same time he commented:
The territory of China reaches as far south as the James Shoals, near Malaysia's Borneo territory... I remember that while I was still a schoolboy, I read about those islands in the geography books. At that time, I never heard anyone say those islands were not China's... The Vietnamese claim that the islands belong to them. Let them talk that way. They have repeatedly asked us to negotiate with them on the issue; we have always declined to do so... As to the ownership of the islands, there are historical documents that can be verified. There is no need for negotiations since they originally belonged to China.
In this statement Huang was simply restating the standpoint advanced by the People's Republic of China since the time of its inception in 1949, and repeated many times since: that Chinese ownership of the South China Sea was "historically proven" and therefore non-negotiable. More recently, since the Chinese seizure of Panganiban, or Mischief Reef, in waters close by the Philippines' island of Palawan, China's propaganda machine has vigorously repeated that its claim to ownership is based on "unquestionable historical evidence".
This may be so. Yet, if such is indeed the case, why does China not produce the evidence? Former foreign minister Huang Hua's geography books, doubtless written by the Nationalist KMT government which ruled China during his schooldays, would not be deemed admissible by any independent judicial authority. The KMT claimed both the Paracels and the Spratlys when they ruled the mainland, and they maintain this claim from their base on Taiwan today. To quote, again, from Huang Hua: "In this respect Taiwan's attitude is all right. At least they have some patriotism and would not sell out the islands". Clearly, if China's claim is to be entertained, something more substantive than politically suspect school text books will have to be produced.
Fortunately, traditional Chinese society was both ordered and highly literate. Imperial court annals are a rich source of history, not only for China, but for surrounding territories including Nan Yang [the "Southern Ocean", a generic Chinese term for Southeast Asia] as well. Without seeking to prove or disprove the validity of Chinese claims on disputed territories such as Tibet, Eastern Turkistan and Mongolia, the annals do at least establish that such claims have existed for many centuries.
In spite of shrill Chinese affirmations of historical control, it is much harder to establish evidence of any national interest in either the Paracels (now controlled entirely by China) or the Spratlys (still in dispute) much before the start of the present century. One obvious reason is that these islands in the South China Sea are uninhabited--or were until recently, when the surrounding states began setting up military outposts throughout the region.
Comprised mainly of tiny islets surrounded by treacherous reefs, the Spratlys have traditionally been seen by seamen as a hazard to be avoided. Only pirates, seeking havens remote from authority, paid them much mind until the mid-1840s, when they were systematically charted by the British Admiralty. Again, it is instructive that the British made no attempt to claim either archipelago as their territory--the sole purpose of the survey was to improve navigation.
This, of course, begs the question "if the Paracels and the Spratlys have belonged to China for untold centuries, why were they not mapped and described until their mid-19th century survey by the British?" It is indeed strange--analogous, perhaps, to Chinese vessels being the first to chart the Faeroes or the Shetland Islands. In fact the explanation is simple. China, in contrast to Britain, has always been a continental power, rarely--if ever--venturing to sea.
To be sure, local Chinese merchants knew of the reefs and shoals of the Spratlys long before Western shipping entered Asian waters. So, too, did other regional traders--Vietnamese and Thai, Malay and Filipino--as well as a handful of long-distance sailing peoples like the Japanese and the Arabs. But all alike--just as the British in the 19th century--considered the reefs and shoals hazards to steer clear of. The idea of claiming such semi-submerged, rocky outcrops as a national asset remained absurd--at least until 20th century technology made the sea-bed accessible.
China's long tradition as a continental power not withstanding, the Middle Kingdom did put to sea now and then. Undoubtedly the most famous, successful and far-flung such maritime expeditions were those launched during the Ming Dynasty by the Yung Lo Emperor, Ch'eng Tsu, in the mid-15th century. Between 1405 and 1433 this remarkable ruler sent no fewer than seven separate expeditions not just to Southeast Asia, but to the Indian Ocean as well.
These expeditions were no small-scale affair. Under the great admiral Cheng Ho, a Chinese Muslim of Yunnan province, fleets of more than sixty ships holding upwards of twenty-eight thousand officers and men carried the imperial banner as far afield as Jiddah in Arabia and Mombasa in East Africa. The coasts of India and Indonesia were explored and described, and the intervening seas mapped. China's prestige throughout the region was paramount, and countries as diverse as Siam and Sri Lanka, Java and Bengal vied in sending tribute to the Dragon Throne.
When the Yung Lo Emperor died in 1424 the Ming Dynasty had reached the apex of its achievement, and China was the paramount sea power of the Orient. Yung Lo's remarkable navy at its maximum strength included four hundred warships based at coastal guard stations, four hundred armed transports, and--pride of the Ming navy--two hundred and fifty "treasure ships", each capable of carrying five hundred men.
Yet hardly had this remarkable flowering of Chinese maritime might begun, than it all came to an end. One of the first actions of Yung Lo's inward-looking successor, the emperor Jen-tsung, was to suspend all overseas expeditions. From the mid-15th century onwards China turned away from the sea, establishing a great land-based empire in Central Asia under the Ch'ing. In this way the Middle Kingdom survived in "splendid isolation" until being forced open by Western gunboats in the 19th century.
Fortunately for posterity, the Ming maritime voyages bequeathed a wealth of information in the form of maps, charts and travel records. Most have been published in Chinese, and many--including the most famous--in English. Probably the best-known example of the genre is The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores, compiled by the annalist Ma Huan in 1433. Using Ma Huan's study, in conjunction with contemporary works by Kung Chen (1434), Fei Hsin (1436); earlier studies by Chao Ju-kua (1226), Wang Ta-yüan (1350); and the Ming Shih, or Ming dynasty annals, the British scholar J.V.G. Mills in 1970 published a study entitled 'China in Southern Asia, 1433'.
In this magnum opus Mills lists and identifies no fewer than 715 place names in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean which were known to the Chinese by the mid-15th century. In a painstaking piece of scholarship, compiled before the present conflict for the South China Seas flared up in 1973, and without any thought of contemporary political purpose, Mills shows that not one reef or bank belonging to the Spratly Islands is anywhere recorded. Yet the same list includes the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, no fewer than 8 individual Maldive Islands, the Laccadive Islands, islands in the distant Persian Gulf and the Red Sea--not to mention a wealth of islands of all shapes and sizes in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia.
The Paracels, by contrast, receive two brief mentions, both derived from the archaic Mao K'un map held in the Library of Congress at Washington. This collection of folio charts, dated 1621 but thought to be based on information derived from the Yung Lo expeditions, identifies the Paracel Reefs [c. 15° 47' N, 111° 12'E] under the name Shih t'ang, or "Stone Reefs" as well as the nearby Macclesfield Bank [c. 19° 12' N, 113° 53'E], which is identified as Shih hsing shih t'ang, or "Stone Star Stone Reefs".
The Paracels are today under Chinese control--though this is still disputed by Vietnam. Whether the brief references to "stony reefs" in the Mao K'un map constitute any sort of evidence for China's territorial claim remains a moot point. Besides, it is entirely possible that these remote and uninhabited reefs, shunned by the sailors of the world until relatively recent times, may appear in Vietnamese historical records as well.
More importantly, a detailed analysis of all known Chinese knowledge relating to the South China Seas during the 15th century--that is, during the one period when Chinese shipping traversed the region on a regular basis and made systematic surveys of the seaways--reveals no mention whatsoever of the Spratly Islands. Thus the question must arise, just when did these far-flung islets become "an integral part of the Chinese motherland". What grounds are there for making such claims? Where are the proofs, the "incontrovertible historical evidence" on which China now bases its claims for hegemony in the South China Sea?
They may very well be there, locked in a museum cabinet or a university library somewhere on the Chinese mainland or, indeed, in Taiwan--which echoes China's claims.
One thing is clear. If such documents do exist, now would be an excellent time to produce them. The people of Southeast Asia, justifiably worried by the unfolding scenario in the disputed Spratly Islands, deserve no less.
CPAmedia.com: China's South Sea Claims -- Fact or Fiction?
Last edited:
panduranghari
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Actually a 2 year old kid draws some funny lines on paper with crayons. Mummy and Daddy admire what little Timmy has drawn. Little Timmy happens to be a princeling of some middle kingdom and when he grows up he looks at these strange drawing and thinks this is a long lost map of another land that used to be Chinese. And lo behold that story repeats itself every decade. No wonder China claims everything.Kids ...ppppffftt!!
How funny it is, Uh?
" Apparently China has one of the longest articles detailing transnational issues! And territorial/border disputes with almost everyone."
What does longest indicate? did you count the countries out? pathetic!
What do you mean almost everyone?
With US, with Italy?
All territory claims are based on a continuous basis. PRC was founded in 1949, and based on continuous basis territories near that time should be regarded as the territory now. Do you have enough IQ to understand that?
In a map 14XX ancient China marked all world, it does not indicate anything. You can travel around the world and mark every place and let people 2000years behind to discover. Also in Yuan Dynasty the whole China was governed by Hu bilie from nowadays Russia. Do you know that? Illiterates.
The disputes only araises when a country was founded with unsettled territory problems, and claimed territory was invaded after that. All the world follow the logic. You phillipines did not acquire the Huangyan Dao until recent years, you know that?
It is not a question whether it is near or far from mainland. Russia have a territory far from their mainland, also does the USA. Do not set any point from your narrowed, myopic eyesight, many things are more objective than your thought.
China by far had shown no sign of expansion. Why some guys point out Hitler? Do we acclaim the whole Asia?
We are not invading anyone. The only issue is that you cannot follow some ridiculous logic like near from you like far from China, it must follow a traceable historical basis.
It indicates nothing but your kids need grown up to have some basic geographic information. Give him a map of China in early years since after WWII， give him a map of Vietnam published by itself before 1975, give him a map of your own country 20 years ago!
A wreck indicates nothing. Would you believe where the Titanic sinks is a territory of UK????
Historically like N/S Korea, India, Thailand... all are affiliates of China in 1800s, China don't want to be leaders. One of china's core develop value since made by Deng xiaoping is to develop economy, not to bother, not to trouble, not to be the bellwether, Hujintao restates that many times. That is why many insults are tolerated by China, we want prosperity, not war. It is not allegation, it is truth.
It is indeed your lack of historical information and too long took many wrong things as granted. Territory is not a joke.
Adux
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Chicom,
Historically, it is the other way around.
Thailand, China, Tibet , Indoensia, Malaysia, etc are affiliates of India.
We do face many problems inside China, some Chinese are arrogant, lack of basic quality. some Chinese had lots of money with low quality doing bad things home and abroad. Many Chinese in your country grab money, exploit people and show off high-profile which cause you guys anger.
We do need political reform to eradicate corruption.
But we are not arrogant to foreign countries from a whole country's aspect.
You feel us arrogant because of your in-confidence and jealousy.
Also, from the very initial time, China and India are from different cultural origins. China are from the Yangzte River or Yellow River(I could not remember exactly), which is naturally barricaded by the Everest from India. It is useless to talk about that.
Last edited:
Arches wrote the article in a traceable time basis,
The only reason of philippines' anger is that the majority knows little history and are easily instigated by government who just want to enforce their power by transfering public notation.
Chinese government also use such tricks when human rights issues aggravated in 2008 before Olympic Games while the rescue of Sichuan Earth quakes successfully divert public attention.
The only reason of philippines' anger is that the majority knows little history and are easily instigated by government who just want to enforce their power by transfering public notation.
Chinese government also use such tricks when human rights issues aggravated in 2008 before Olympic Games while the rescue of Sichuan Earth quakes successfully divert public attention.
China Intensifies Quarantine on Philippines Fruit Imports
2012-05-09 17:14:57 Xinhua Web Editor: Zhangxu
China's quality watchdog on Wednesday ordered intensified quarantine on fruit imports from the Philippines after harmful organisms were found in several shipments.
Harmful insects or bacteria have been found in pineapples, bananas and other fruits imported from the Southeast Asian country since last year, and the Chinese authorities have notified the Philippine side and asked them to make improvements, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine said in a statement on its website.
The Chinese administration urged local quarantine authorities to increase examinations and food safety risk monitoring on fruits from the Philippines.
Once harmful organisms are found, the goods should be returned or destroyed, it said.
China Intensifies Quarantine on Philippines Fruit Imports
2012-05-09 17:14:57 Xinhua Web Editor: Zhangxu
China's quality watchdog on Wednesday ordered intensified quarantine on fruit imports from the Philippines after harmful organisms were found in several shipments.
Harmful insects or bacteria have been found in pineapples, bananas and other fruits imported from the Southeast Asian country since last year, and the Chinese authorities have notified the Philippine side and asked them to make improvements, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine said in a statement on its website.
The Chinese administration urged local quarantine authorities to increase examinations and food safety risk monitoring on fruits from the Philippines.
Once harmful organisms are found, the goods should be returned or destroyed, it said.
China Intensifies Quarantine on Philippines Fruit Imports
