Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawang

[Hari Sud]

B. Raman in its September 2012 post hinted that China is capable of mounting helicopter based special forces operation to capture Tawang and Itanagar . Tawang is 30 kilometer from Thagla Ridge - the border and line of actual control at 18,000 feet and Itanagar is 100 kilometers from McMohan line.

Since B Raman is an ex second most senior officer of RAW his opinions have to carry weight.

What is the likelihood of this scenario.

Can they humble India again like in 1962.

Does Indian army is capable of preventing it. Or if the Chinese are stupid to carry it out, can the Indian army isolate and surround the fools and make them surrender, forcing a defeat on China.

What would be required at Chinese disposal to mount such an operation.

His hint is that the attack would not come from Tibet but elsewhere in China. How many troops and how many helicopter would be required to mount such an operation. What would be logistics issue to supply the troops in Tawang or Itanagar.

Would Indian army welcome a move like this by China to force a defeat on them.

It is an interesting new issue drummed up by Raman.

Let the experts discuss it.

 

[sayareakd]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Itanagar and Tawang both have population of about 50,000 each.

this is Itanagar

and this is Tawang

after going through these pics i think Kargil was easy for Pakistani, this will be real hard for China.

BTW how many helicopters and force level will be needed to do this ??

at least 10,000 soldiers are need plus support staff for helicopters. That is too much even for China.

 

[Yusuf]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

If the attack does not come from Tibet, then where? I think the next nearest Chinese base is Chengdu. Thy have roads that lead to Tawang from Chengdu. Heliborne op to take Tawang is one, holding it is another. It will be a fire fight. And again it will be last man last bullet.

 

[sesha_maruthi27]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

No way for the chinese to come inside from Tawang, as it will be a big blunder......

 

[Payeng]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

If the attack does not come from Tibet, then where? I think the next nearest Chinese base is Chengdu. Thy have roads that lead to Tawang from Chengdu. Heliborne op to take Tawang is one, holding it is another. It will be a fire fight. And again it will be last man last bullet.

Lhasa, they got Rail lines, but that do not guarantee them the safe guard through out the McMohan line, yes we have an advantage

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Madness ?

plenty of manpads and AD guns, SA-6 are also there as medium range SAM..

----------------------
----------------------

Such assault can take place to drop off PLA SF in isolated areas from where they can mount surgical attacks..

 

[Hari Sud]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Thank you kunal Biswas

Let us assume for a moment that a 600 man para battalion is dropped near Tawang and they make 10 miles trip to reach its outskirts. By then they are fully exhausted to mount any operation. If it is air drop then it cannot stay hidden like their stealth passage thru the Bailey Trail in 1962. If it is heli operation then it would require at least 100 helicopters. None of the chinese helicopter could ferry men and supplies over 18000 feet by carrying more than six fully equipped soldiers. Hence it cannot stay hidden.

Indian garrison of 3,000 soldiers at Tawang fully prepared to meet them would make Chinese presence miserable. Another brigade of 3,000 soldiers at Thagla ridge, now much better equipped prevents chinese division to gain link up from McMohan line. Hence those miserable souls, air dropped but cut off and not supplied would have no choice but surrender.

Advantage Indian army.

Then why a so well informed B Raman is cooking a cock and bull story of Chinese making a dramatic story of Chinese capturing Tawang and Itanagar by a heli operation and repeat 1962 in the twenty first century.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

In my view, PLA can deploy small nibble teams ( 5-10 member ) which are suppose to surveillance Indian defense, Attack strategic post like field HQ, Missile batteries, SAM batteries, Or just mix with civilian population to gather intelligence with help of insiders in local areas..

Nothing on big scale..

 

[cloud_9]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Any info on the Mountain radars ?

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Madness ?

plenty of manpads and AD guns, SA-6 are also there as medium range SAM..

----------------------
----------------------

Such assault can take place to drop off PLA SF in isolated areas from where they can mount surgical attacks..

Cf. Operation "Market Garden"?

This thread could become part of a discussion started here.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

May be he knows some path or ways where AD is not active and a very possible way of insertion for PLA airborne troops..

Then why a so well informed B Raman is cooking a cock and bull story of Chinese making a dramatic story of Chinese capturing Tawang and Itanagar by a heli operation and repeat 1962 in the twenty first century.

 

[Rage]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

They'd require a heck uva lot of helicopters to mount a helicopter-based special forces invasion and capture of Tawang. Apart from the fact that they'd have to get through Air Defense, if they did manage to land a significant number of troops on ground, they'd have to counter four Army divisions each with a combat strength of about 20,000 troops and a specialized Infrantry Unit called the Arunachal Scouts which is currently being raised for exactly this kind of counter insurgent-counter SF scenario.

 

[hit&run]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

B. Raman is rightly pointing at Chinese version of CSD. Let's not discuss long lasting seize of Itanagar by Chinese because it is not possible.

 

[Yusuf]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Then why a so well informed B Raman is cooking a cock and bull story of Chinese making a dramatic story of Chinese capturing Tawang and Itanagar by a heli operation and repeat 1962 in the twenty first century.

So that it prevents the government of going into a slumber. All kinds of scenarios of doom are given so that the men of our forces are provided all the equipment and infra needed.

 

[Hari Sud]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

What say "Daredevil" and "Lethalforce"?

I am looking for detailed analysis of this scenario from the strategic analysts.

 

[bengalraider]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

I believe the assault if it comes will have to come from Within the TAR, simply put it will have to be a surprise assault and a large number of helos flying high over the Tibetian plateau is going to light up every long range radar we have our there like it's diwali. i do not believe the chinese will take that risk . a heliborne assault will only have a slim chance of success if executed from whitin two hrs of flying time from the border by units "flying nape of the earth". such close quarter flying is exceedingly difficult in the high Himalayas and the Chinese piolts will have to pull feats of superhuman endurance in order to be able to pull that off .
Anyhoo sino-defence.com stated in 2009 that the region consisted of the:
13th Group Army (zh:中国人民解放军第13集团军) with the 37th Infantry Division, the 149th Division at Emei, Sichuan (near Mount Emei), an Armoured Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, an Air Defence Brigade, the 2nd Helicopter Regiment, a Special Operations Group, a Engineer Regiment, a Signal Regiment, and an Electronic Warfare Regiment. The 149th Division joined the reorganising 13th Group Army on on the disbandment of the 50th Army in 1985.
14th Group Army (zh:中国人民解放军第14集团军) with the 31st Infantry Division, the 40th Infantry Division, an Armoured Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, an Air Defence Brigade, a Signal Regiment, an Engineer Regiment, a Chemical Defence Regiment, and a Pontoon Bridge Regiment.
Tibet Military District with the 52nd Infantry Brigade, 53rd Infantry Brigade (which other sources report as Mountain Brigades), the 54th Infantry Regiment, a Signals Regiment, and three military sub-districts, the Shannan Military Sub-District, the Xigaze Military Sub-District, and the Nyingchi Military Sub District
Also reported are two Mobile Armed Police Divisions (38th and 41st), and the 2nd Army Aviation Regiment at Chengdu.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes the region with some 180,000 personnel, with four motorised infantry divisions, one artillery division, two armoured brigades, one artillery brigade, and two anti-aircraft brigades.

if there is to be a heliborne assault it will have to be conducted partly or in full by the 2nd helicopter regiment if the chinese wish to maintain surprise and o not to alert India by moving a large number of choppers to tibet
now the PLA Army Aviation 2nd Helicopter Brigade was established in 1991, with a total of 69 helicopters. The 2nd Helicopter Brigade has five flight groups. 1st and 2nd flight groups equipped with transport helicopters, contains five Mi-171 helicopters, 15 Mi-17V-5 and three Mi-17V-7. 3rd flight group's equipment is transport helicopters–19 S-70C2 helicopter. 4th flight group is equipped with transport helicopters, contains 15 Mi-171E helicopters. 5th flight group is equipped with attack helicopters, contains 12 the Z-9WZ helicopter.so a total of 38 Mi-17's assuming that 25 of these carry men while the rest carry heavy weapons and mortars etc to be airdropped we still have roughly 25x25 men that can be offloaded.

the mi-17 as we all know is a slow and lumbering beast the only way a flight of MI-17's could make it into Tawang without getting shout out of the sky by AA fire is if any helioborne assault was coordinated with a ground assault and a massive missile strike as well. even so this primary wave would have to be followed up by large number of paratroopers from fixed wing aircraft.I do not see any other way where such an assault could be envisaged.

Sources:
Mi-17/171 Hip Multirole Helicopter - SinoDefence.com
List of People's Liberation Army Air Force airbases - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The PLA Army helicopter number close to 600 | China Defense Mashup

 

[Ray]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Any link to B Raman's contention?

Without reading what he has written, one would not know the issues raised by him and the logic behind the same.

 

[Hari Sud]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Here is the full paper from B. Raman; published in September this year: I have highlighted the the portion under discussion in this thread.


Wishful thinking over China's military capabilitiesSeptember 18, 2012 15:43 IST

If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a replication of the 1962 war, warns B Raman

Our national trait for wishful thinking often worries me.

A rationally argued assumption is an important part of strategic thinking. A wishful thought with no rational basis is not. I had pointed out in some of my articles in the past how we often confuse wishful thinking for strategic analysis. Some, if not many of those, who have made a name in our country as strategic analysts, are actually wishful thinkers. There are many wishful thinkers even in our security bureaucracy.

These observations have been triggered by some e-mailed comments received by me on my article of September 17, asking whether our humiliation of 1962 by China can repeat itself. The majority of those who have argued that the question of another incident like 1962 does not arise have given two reasons, both of which appear to me to be nothing but wishful thoughts.

The first is that the Chinese are no longer in a position to spring a trans-Himalayan surprise on us as they did in 1962. The second is that the strong navy that we have built up since 1962 will act as a deterrent to any more trans-Himalayan adventurism by the People's Liberation Army. According to them, our navy is in a position to disrupt Chinese energy supplies across the Indian Ocean and without assured energy supplies, the Chinese would not be able to indulge in any adventurism across the Himalayas.

I feel uncomfortable with both these wishful thoughts. Before October 1962, our political leaders had so convinced themselves about the superiority of our army over the PLA that they thought that all they had to do was to order our army to throw out the illegal Chinese posts in our territory in the north-east and it would do so without any problems. Then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] and then defence minister VK Krishna Menon were living in a world of wishful thinking. Nehru openly went around saying that he had asked the army to throw out the Chinese. The Chinese took note of his statements, which proved to have been irresponsible in retrospect, and launched a pre-emptive act of retaliation to neutralise our army's capability for throwing out the Chinese posts and inflict humiliation.

That kind of wishful thinking about the relative strengths of the two armies and air forces is fortunately not there now. We take each other's trans-Himalayan capabilities with a lot of realism. Realistic thinking and analysis are the foundation of good strategic thinking.

But I notice a new wishful thought clouding our strategic thinking presently and that is about the perceived superiority of our navy over the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean. I am confident that the Chinese navy will not be able to disrupt our energy supplies across the Indian Ocean but I do not share the confidence of those who have commented on my article -- that our navy would be able to disrupt Chinese energy supplies and that the realisation of this will deter any trans-Himalayan adventure by the Chinese.

The Chinese are realistic geo-strategic thinkers and planners. They know energy inadequacy could turn out to be their weak point in any future military confrontation with any external power. They have been trying to build up their strategic reserves and diversifying their sources of supply and means of having the supplies reach them. Their energy security diversification plan speaks well of their strategic foresight. I wish we had similar foresight.

So, to think and argue that our navy has become a deterrent to Chinese designs and intentions would be unwise. Moreover, in our thinking, we should try to visualise what role the Pakistani navy will seek to play in the event of another military conflict between India and China. We should be prepared with a contingency plan for the eventuality that the Pakistani navy will try to keep some of our ships bottled up near the western ports so that we can't use them against the Chinese.

If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a replication of the 1962 war. The PLA is not going to move into our territory on foot and motor vehicles and occupy territory after overpowering our posts, as they did in 1962.

In my view, the most likely scenario is that copter-borne, specially trained units of the PLA will take our armed forces by surprise by undertaking an occupation of Tawang and Itanagar in Arunachal Pradesh. They will then try to force us to concede Chinese sovereignty over Tawang in return for their conceding our sovereignty over Itanagar and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh. I also expect the copter-borne PLA forces will come not from the Tibet [ Images ] Autonomous Region, but from Qinghai, Gansu or Sichuan.

We are now in a better position than we were in 1962 to detect Chinese preparations for a classical military strike from the TAR. Are we in a position to detect and neutralise a copter-borne invasion from bases outside the TAR? What are the other scenarios possible? What would be the options available to us?

Those are the questions that we in governmental and non-governmental circles should examine with our feet firmly on the ground and without any wishful thinking.

My articles on the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the 1962 humiliation should not be misinterpreted to mean that I have probably lost faith in the possibility of a negotiated solution of the border dispute with China. I have not. I greatly respect the pragmatism of the Chinese political and military leadership.

When China initiated the military conflict with India in 1962, they were a poor country with a primitive economy. They did not have to worry about the likely impact of a military conflict on their economy and on the livelihood of their people.

Today, China is a major influential economic and military power, itching to catch up with the United States. Any military conflict with India could have a worrisome impact on their economy. Their interest in keeping their economy sustained and flourishing has made them a cautious power -- more cautious than they were in 1962. They would avoid a military confrontation as far as possible.

At the same time, I am disturbed to notice the doggedness with which they have been pursuing their territorial sovereignty claims -- whether with us in Arunachal Pradesh or with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations powers about the South China Sea islands or with Japan [ Images ] about the East China Sea islands.

This doggedness should forewarn us that if an opportunity presented itself, they may not hesitate to seek a military solution to the border dispute.

Chinese strategic thinking is marked by a mix of pragmatism and opportunism. We should not unwittingly create a tempting opportunity for them by our lack of military preparedness.

B Raman

 

[agentperry]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Itanagar and Tawang both have population of about 50,000 each.

this is Itanagar

and this is Tawang

after going through these pics i think Kargil was easy for Pakistani, this will be real hard for China.

BTW how many helicopters and force level will be needed to do this ??

at least 10,000 soldiers are need plus support staff for helicopters. That is too much even for China.

as per a report china can mobilize 50000 troopers via helicopter and aircrafts within 24 hours. even if they dont venture into indian territory this is enough to shake mod by roots because india takes days to mobilize a single brigade

 

[agentperry]

Re: Is China capable of mounting helicopter operation to capture Tawan

Here is the full paper from B. Raman; published in September this year: I have highlighted the the portion under discussion in this thread.


Wishful thinking over China's military capabilitiesSeptember 18, 2012 15:43 IST

If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a replication of the 1962 war, warns B Raman

Our national trait for wishful thinking often worries me.

A rationally argued assumption is an important part of strategic thinking. A wishful thought with no rational basis is not. I had pointed out in some of my articles in the past how we often confuse wishful thinking for strategic analysis. Some, if not many of those, who have made a name in our country as strategic analysts, are actually wishful thinkers. There are many wishful thinkers even in our security bureaucracy.

These observations have been triggered by some e-mailed comments received by me on my article of September 17, asking whether our humiliation of 1962 by China can repeat itself. The majority of those who have argued that the question of another incident like 1962 does not arise have given two reasons, both of which appear to me to be nothing but wishful thoughts.

The first is that the Chinese are no longer in a position to spring a trans-Himalayan surprise on us as they did in 1962. The second is that the strong navy that we have built up since 1962 will act as a deterrent to any more trans-Himalayan adventurism by the People's Liberation Army. According to them, our navy is in a position to disrupt Chinese energy supplies across the Indian Ocean and without assured energy supplies, the Chinese would not be able to indulge in any adventurism across the Himalayas.

I feel uncomfortable with both these wishful thoughts. Before October 1962, our political leaders had so convinced themselves about the superiority of our army over the PLA that they thought that all they had to do was to order our army to throw out the illegal Chinese posts in our territory in the north-east and it would do so without any problems. Then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru [ Images ] and then defence minister VK Krishna Menon were living in a world of wishful thinking. Nehru openly went around saying that he had asked the army to throw out the Chinese. The Chinese took note of his statements, which proved to have been irresponsible in retrospect, and launched a pre-emptive act of retaliation to neutralise our army's capability for throwing out the Chinese posts and inflict humiliation.

That kind of wishful thinking about the relative strengths of the two armies and air forces is fortunately not there now. We take each other's trans-Himalayan capabilities with a lot of realism. Realistic thinking and analysis are the foundation of good strategic thinking.

But I notice a new wishful thought clouding our strategic thinking presently and that is about the perceived superiority of our navy over the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean. I am confident that the Chinese navy will not be able to disrupt our energy supplies across the Indian Ocean but I do not share the confidence of those who have commented on my article -- that our navy would be able to disrupt Chinese energy supplies and that the realisation of this will deter any trans-Himalayan adventure by the Chinese.

The Chinese are realistic geo-strategic thinkers and planners. They know energy inadequacy could turn out to be their weak point in any future military confrontation with any external power. They have been trying to build up their strategic reserves and diversifying their sources of supply and means of having the supplies reach them. Their energy security diversification plan speaks well of their strategic foresight. I wish we had similar foresight.

So, to think and argue that our navy has become a deterrent to Chinese designs and intentions would be unwise. Moreover, in our thinking, we should try to visualise what role the Pakistani navy will seek to play in the event of another military conflict between India and China. We should be prepared with a contingency plan for the eventuality that the Pakistani navy will try to keep some of our ships bottled up near the western ports so that we can't use them against the Chinese.

If there is another military conflict between India and China, it is not going to be a replication of the 1962 war. The PLA is not going to move into our territory on foot and motor vehicles and occupy territory after overpowering our posts, as they did in 1962.

In my view, the most likely scenario is that copter-borne, specially trained units of the PLA will take our armed forces by surprise by undertaking an occupation of Tawang and Itanagar in Arunachal Pradesh. They will then try to force us to concede Chinese sovereignty over Tawang in return for their conceding our sovereignty over Itanagar and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh. I also expect the copter-borne PLA forces will come not from the Tibet [ Images ] Autonomous Region, but from Qinghai, Gansu or Sichuan.

We are now in a better position than we were in 1962 to detect Chinese preparations for a classical military strike from the TAR. Are we in a position to detect and neutralise a copter-borne invasion from bases outside the TAR? What are the other scenarios possible? What would be the options available to us?

Those are the questions that we in governmental and non-governmental circles should examine with our feet firmly on the ground and without any wishful thinking.

My articles on the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the 1962 humiliation should not be misinterpreted to mean that I have probably lost faith in the possibility of a negotiated solution of the border dispute with China. I have not. I greatly respect the pragmatism of the Chinese political and military leadership.

When China initiated the military conflict with India in 1962, they were a poor country with a primitive economy. They did not have to worry about the likely impact of a military conflict on their economy and on the livelihood of their people.

Today, China is a major influential economic and military power, itching to catch up with the United States. Any military conflict with India could have a worrisome impact on their economy. Their interest in keeping their economy sustained and flourishing has made them a cautious power -- more cautious than they were in 1962. They would avoid a military confrontation as far as possible.

At the same time, I am disturbed to notice the doggedness with which they have been pursuing their territorial sovereignty claims -- whether with us in Arunachal Pradesh or with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations powers about the South China Sea islands or with Japan [ Images ] about the East China Sea islands.

This doggedness should forewarn us that if an opportunity presented itself, they may not hesitate to seek a military solution to the border dispute.

Chinese strategic thinking is marked by a mix of pragmatism and opportunism. We should not unwittingly create a tempting opportunity for them by our lack of military preparedness.

B Raman

i would like to confront on just one aspect that is china now has pipelines from CAR and russia. moreover CPC is rich enough to buy gas from CAR countries at higher prices for war time. it is also known that china has many big emergency reserves of oil which can be used in war.

irrespective of energy needs and supplies we know that CPC can stop entire china for routing oil to plaaf plan and pla.