Indo-US Relations

[RAM]

Hidden benefits of the brain drain

Cynics will call Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's US visit a non-event. Yet, it was a breakthrough in one respect: it was a major media event. Historically, visits of Indian prime ministers were virtually ignored by the US media. What changed this time? Well, India's economic success means it matters more today. But another reason is the rise of Americans of Indian origin in all fields including the media. This has raised India's profile in ways analysts often miss since it owes nothing to inter-governmental relations.


Manmohan Singh had a widely-watched CNN interview with Mumbai-born Fareed Zakaria , editor of Newsweek and columnist of the Washington Post. In earlier times, US media coverage of South Asia was coloured by Cold War politics, and by Pakistan's old friends in the Pentagon and State Department. Today, journalists like Zakaria have given India its appropriate place.


His latest Washington Post column was titled 'Don't neglect India.' Noting Obama's focus on China and Pakistan, Zakaria said India's long-term objectives were aligned with the US's while Pakistan's were not. "South Asia is a tar-pit filled with failed and dysfunctional states, save for one long-established democracy of 1.2 billion people that is the second fastest-growing major economy in the world, a check on China's rising ambitions and a natural ally of the United States. The prize is the relationship with India. The booby prize is governing Afghanistan." Raju Narsetti is managing editor of the Washington Post, and Rajiv Chandrasekharan is its Iraq expert. Ashley Tellis, a former National Security Council staffer, is another respected media analyst. This trend does not automatically make the US media pro-Indian: Indian Americans are Americans first and foremost. But they have helped reverse the old media bias of the Cold War.

The rise of Indians in the US is a story that keeps growing in the telling. Indian Americans are the fastest growing ethnic group (up 106% in the 1990s), now estimated at almost three million. They constitute the richest and best-educated ethnic group, wielding clout disproportionate to their numbers. More than 100,000 Indians study in the US, many of whom will stay and swell the Diaspora's size and influence. Three Indian Americans (Khurana, Chandrashekhar and Ramakrishnan) have won Nobel Prizes in the sciences. Indians are prominent in academia (Jagdish Bhagwati, Avinash Dixit); in management ( C K Prahlad, Pankaj Ghemawat); in business (Indra Nooyi, Amar Bose, Vinod Khosla); and medicine (Sanjay Gupta of CNN, Deepak Chopra).


Hidden benefits of the brain drain- Swaminathan S A Aiyar-Columnists-Opinion-The Economic Times

 

[bengalraider]

India lays to rest a Bush-era ghost​

By M K Bhadrakumar

The African thinker Theophile Obenga has a thesis that it is only through a profound "intellectual mutation" that the present with its attendant modes of cognition and perception can be truly understood, which in turn involves a revalorization of one's intellectual legacy. India is on one such root expansion of thought, breaking out of a cognitive closure.

Obenga argued that by way of its "intellectual mutation", Africa should travel all the way to the flowering of hominization in ancient Egypt - via the rock paintings of the Grotto-Apollo in Namibia dating back to 28000 BC. Fortunately for India, the perceptual matrix involves far less reaching back - a mere eight years encompassing the George W Bush era.

However much New Delhi tried to convince Washington in the recent months that the United States still had spunk in it as the lone superpower, the Americans remain unconvinced. Unsurprisingly, the most bizarre statement from the American side during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's entire visit this week to the US came from President Barack Obama's "AfPak" aide, Richard Holbrooke.

While Obama kept harping on the special importance of according to Manmohan the honor of being the first foreign dignitary to Washington on a "state visit" during his presidency, Holbrooke took the opposite direction to plead with the Pakistanis not to take it to heart.

Holbrooke held a two-hour press briefing to massage the Pakistani ego. He had this to say:

And no one in Pakistan, and no one in any other country, should read this [Manmohan's state visit] as a diminution of the importance we attach to them. It's entirely appropriate that someone has to have the first trip. And - it usually used to be in the past, a European ally, but they come over in informal trips ... It [the visit] in no way should be read as a diminution.

True, Delhi repeatedly ignored Holbrooke's urge to visit India. Delhi seems to think he is an adventurous climber in a pack of high-flying officials dealing with the Afghan problem in Washington, but on Monday he settled scores.

Ironically, though, he ended up highlighting Obama's Achilles' heel. Holbrooke virtually confirmed media reports that Saudi intelligence is engaging the hardcore Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. He admitted, "We would be supportive of anything that the kingdom chose to do in this regard."

The US has fought not fewer than 100 wars. But this is the first time Saudi Arabia has worked on an exit strategy for the US. To be sure, Manmohan's main problem also, as he arrived in Washington on Monday, was that compared to his previous visit in 2005, he was dealing with a US vastly denuded of its global influence.

The joint statement issued after the talks reaffirmed the US-India "global strategic partnership"; the deepening bilateral cooperation between the world's two largest democracies across a broad spectrum of human endeavors"; "common ideals and complementary strengths"; "the shared values cherished by their peoples and espoused by their founders". No reason to disbelieve any of this.

Yet Manmohan failed to realize the main objective of his visit, namely, the "operationalization" of the controversial US-India civilian nuclear deal concluded in the the Bush era. A gnawing worry remains as regards Obama's grit to implement the deal.

The deal was a leap in faith, promising India access to advanced ENR (enrichment and reprocessing) technologies. But negotiations are proving difficult. Delhi did everything to "incentivize" the American side by offering two sites where nuclear power plants imported from the US would be set up and showing willingness to legislate that the liability of the US companies would be limited in the event of accidents involving imported American reactors.

But the US side is just not ready to conclude an agreement on ENR. It is not that Obama is retracting. The US compulsions are twofold: any ENR agreement needs to be situated within the new nuclear non-proliferation architecture that the world community may agree on, and secondly, it may complicate Obama's strategy with regard to the analogous issue of Iran's right to have reprocessing technology.

On balance, Washington lacks the strength to assert it will have an ENR with India and will still enforce its writ on the non-proliferation regime.

Overarching this, Delhi harbors disquiet about Obama's "reset" of regional policies. The US's Afghan strategy remains predicated on Pakistan's cooperation. Washington needs a collegiate Beijing to cope with the crisis in the US economy, which precludes the scope for "containment strategy" towards China. In sum, Delhi feels disheartened that from a tall pedestal as an Asian "balancer" on which Bush installed India, Obama brings it down as a sub-regional power.

However, Manmohan's visit has been a creditable success. India and the US launched a wide-ranging counter-terrorism cooperation initiative and agreed on the "absolute imperative" to bring to justice the perpetrators of the Mumbai terrorist strikes last year.

Equally, the Obama-Manmohan joint statement echoes the Indian charge about Pakistani doublespeak on terrorism. It expressed "grave concern" about a continuing terrorist threat "emanating from India's neighborhood" and agreed that "resolute and credible steps must be taken to eliminate safe havens and sanctuaries that provide shelter to terrorists and their activities ... [which] undermine security and stability in the region and around the world."

Again, the US "appreciated" India's role in Afghanistan and "agreed to enhance their respective efforts", whereas Pakistan clamors for a roll back of the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Obama skirted India-Pakistan relations, whereas Islamabad alternatively beseeches and threatens that unless the US mediates on the Kashmir problem, Pakistan will not cooperate. Manmohan would have the double satisfaction that the US-China joint statement calling for mediation in India-Pakistan relations has been nullified.

An innocuous-looking reference in the joint statement may hold a vital clue, where the two leaders committed to "continue to pursue mutually beneficial defense cooperation", including "trade and technology transfer and collaboration". In a broader context, the US agreed to strengthen high technology trade "in the spirit of their strategic dialogue and partnership". Evidently, the US seriously intends to participate in India's massive arms procurement program. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called on Manmohan.

To quote Manmohan, "We have an expanding area of defense collaboration including the possibility of procurement of defense equipment from the US. Our domestic private sector defense suppliers are now allowed to have up to 26% foreign investment, opening a new avenue for Indo-US collaboration in defense-related activities."

Delhi can be trusted to undertake a thorough stocktaking of the US-India relationship after Manmohan's return. The compulsion to recalibrate India's single-most important relationship is at once obvious. The dramatic transformation of the relationship in the Bush era bred illusions. At the same time, the Delhi elite still believes that while Pakistan and China might be the US's current priorities, India is bound to figure in the long run as a top priority.

Obama made amends to the glaring omission of India in his Asia-Pacific speech delivered at Tokyo en route to China. He said:

India today is a rising and responsible global power. In Asia, Indian leadership is expanding prosperity and the security across the region. And the United States welcomes and encourages India's leadership role in helping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia.

Beyond Asia, as the world's largest multiethnic democracy, as one of the world's fastest-growing economies, and as a member of the G20 [Group of 20], India will play a pivotal role in meeting many challenges we face today. And this includes my top economic priority, creating good jobs with good wages for the American people.

The resounding words should allay Indian elites' apprehensions regarding the drift of the US-India partnership in Obama's watch. Actually, Obama offers a mature relationship, although it is not sexy enough for the daydreamers fixated on India's "great power status". What he offers is a forward-looking relationship that is sustainable, if only the Delhi elites had the requisite self-confidence regarding their country's strengths and options in an increasingly polycentric world order.

Manmohan is ahead of most Indians in realizing the country's inherent strength. As he put it:

Economic relationships are the bedrock on which social, cultural and political relationships are built. A strategic relationship that is not underpinned by a strong economic relationship is unlikely to prosper. On the other hand, a web of economic relationships intensifies other business-to-business and people-to-people contacts, promoting a deeper and better understanding ... That is the kind of relationship we wish to see with this great country, the United States.

The single-most enduring outcome of Manmohan's visit could be that the process of laying to rest the ghost of the Bush era, which kept butting into the Indian elitist consciousness, is finally being laid to rest.

India elites need to wake up to the Obama era, jettisoning false hopes and expectations that do not match the US's declining power and influence as a superpower. Manmohan's brief sojourn in Washington has kick-started this process. It needed an African-American president to bring home to the Indians Obenga's wisdom, which should have been easily accessible to an ancient civilization.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

Source: Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

 

[K Factor]

The Indo-US relationship at the time of Bush and now is totally different. Bush knew what he was doing and Oh-bummer looks like as if he hardly has a clue.

Most American presidents are from a military background and this is what happens when a non-mil prez appears on the scene.

While he needs Chinese support for the success of his economic reforms, his visit to China and acting according to the Chinese script gives me a sense of deja-vu (pre WW II situation anyone). Doesn't mention human rights, doesn't mention Tibet, doesn't meet HH Dalai Lama.

This is not doing India any good, and the unregulated rivers of American dollars are flowing freely into Pakistan everyday as well.

 

[RPK]

PM hopes US will get India nuke power state status


Washington: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hopes that the United States will help India get the official status of a nuclear weapons state, given its impeccable record in the field of non-proliferation.

"Well, I hope it will happen," he told Fareed Zakaria of the CNN when asked if he thinks that the US should try to press the issue and have India brought into the system as a nuclear weapons state.

The interview was taken in New Delhi, before Singh travelled to Washington last week. Its first part was telecast last Sunday, while the second part was aired yesterday.


It would be a positive development, the Prime Minister said when Zakaria asked if it is "fair to say that one of the ultimate objectives of India would perhaps be to become a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty system, but to be invited in as a nuclear weapons state in the way that China was." Despite its status as a nuclear nation, India has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Zakaria noted.

India's ultimate goal is actually to sign the treaty, but it does not have official nuclear state status. China got that in 1992, and that is what India wants, Zakaria said.

"Well, if we were to go that way, that would be a very positive development from our point of view," Singh said. "We are a nuclear weapons state, but we are a responsible nuclear power. We have an impeccable record of not having contributed to unauthorised proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction," he said.

"So, I think India does require, I think, greater consideration of the global community," Singh said. Last week, welcoming the Indian Prime Minister at the White House, US President Barack Obama had identified India as a nuclear power.

"As nuclear powers, we can be full partners in preventing the spread of the world's most deadly weapons, securing loose nuclear materials from terrorists, and pursuing our shared vision of a world without nuclear weapons," Obama had said.

The statement was viewed by many experts as a recognition by the US that India is a nuclear state.

"We should cooperate in addressing global challenges of combating terrorism, making our environment cleaner and moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons," the Prime Minister had said, adding that India supports the move of the Obama Administration to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons

 

[ppgj]

Paper no. 3525 30-Nov-2009

PM in US: The Spin & The Fizzle

By B. Raman

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The Washington pudding served by President Barack Obama to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the latter's visit to the US from November 23 to 26, 2009, is yet to be tasted, but if one is objective in analysing the outcome of the visit, one will have to concede that the spins put out by one of the PM's advisers from the PM's plane through obliging journalists before he landed in Washington DC have remained what they were----spins and nothing more.

2. Two of the pre-summit spins put out from the plane related to India's right to reprocess used nuclear fuel from US-supplied power stations and co-operation in counter-terrorism. The Indian public was given the impression that the agreement on the re-processing modalities had almost been finalised and would be a flagship outcome of the visit.

3. Hardly had the PM landed in Washington DC when Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary, had to unspin the spin put out from the aircraft. She told the journalists that while there was progress in the negotiations, an agreement was still away and may not be the outcome of the visit. We have now been told during a post-summit spin session on board the plane while the PM and his party were returning to New Delhi that barring one or two issues, the agreement has almost been clinched. It might not have been possible to initial it during the PM's stay in Washington DC, so what? It is a question of a wait of another seven to 10 days. So we are told now.

4. Another pre-summit spin from the PM's aircraft was that a memorandum of understanding on future counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries would be another important outcome. It was made out that the lightning visit of Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to New Delhi before the Prime Minister took off for Washington was an indicator of the importance attached by Obama to this subject.

5. What the spin-masters did not tell the Indian public was that the CIA chief had actually flown to Islamabad due to concerns over the growing isolation of President Asif Ali Zardari and had stopped over in India by the way.

6. Some New Delhi-based analysts, who always go lyrical on Indo-US relations, have extensively quoted from the Manmohan Singh-Obama joint statement to claim that the so-called joint counter-terrorism initiative mentioned in the statement was, in fact, the flagship outcome of the visit. In post-summit spin sessions on board the returning aircraft, one of the PM's advisers put out for all who might believe him that Obama himself was personally monitoring the FBI investigation into the activities of the Chicago cell ( David Coleman Headley--- Tahawuur Hussain Rana) of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and that on his instructions a high-level team of the FBI headed by its chief would be flying to India to share with us all the information collected by the FBI during the investigation.

7. What the Indian public was not told was that the programme for the New Delhi visit of the FBI chief was fixed long before the PM's visit to Washington DC and that in the US the President has no powers to monitor the FBI's investigation process which is independent. Indian Prime Ministers may as a matter of habit monitor the investigations of the CBI, but the US President can't monitor the FBI 's investigations.

8. Embarrassed by the statement of the US National Security Adviser, Gen. James Jones, when the PM was still abroad that the Indian investigators may not be able to join in the interrogation of Headley and Rana due to legal difficulties, the spin-masters told us that this was because the two suspects had not yet been indicted before a court. We were told that once they were indicted, our investigators would be able to interrogate them.

9. What we were not told was that once a suspect is indicted, he is transferred to judicial custody and no more interrogation is possible without a special court order. US courts are often hesitant to permit foreign investigators to interrogate suspects facing trial before them. That is what Gen. Jones meant when he talked of legal difficulties.

10. The so-called counter-terrorism initiative, which has been projected as path-breaking, is thin in substance and thinner in new ideas. Two ideas of considerable originality and significance were born out of Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation initiatives under the Bill Clinton and George Bush Administrations. The idea of a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism came out of the meeting between Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister, and Strobe Talbot, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, at London in January 2000 in the wake of the Kandahar hijacking. Now this has become a model for a similar mechanism with many other countries.

11. The Indo-US Cyber Security Forum was born post-9/11 during counter-terrorism interactions between security officials of the Bush and Atal Behari Vajpayee Governments. Compared to those ideas, not a single new idea has come out of the much-hyped summit between Manmohan Singh and Obama.

12. And yet we are asked to hail the so-called counter-terrorism initiative. We should gladly do so if someone could explain to us what this initiative is about. Yes, there has been an improvement in what is called mutual legal assistance between India and the US after the 26/11 terrorist strike in Mumbai. For the first time since counter-terrorism co-operation between the two countries started in the 1980s the FBI allowed its officers not only to share their forensic findings with their Indian counterparts, but also to help the Mumbai Police in its prosecution by allowing FBI officers to testify before the trial court through video-conferencing. In the past while the FBI had shared its findings with us, it had refused to allow its officers to testify before an Indian court.

13. There has been a welcome change in that attitude because of the enormity of the offence and the death of six US nationals at the hands of the terrorists. There was an improvement in intelligence-sharing under the Bush Administration. In December, 2008, Indian media carried reports about two timely warnings regarding the 26/11 strikes received by the Indian agencies from their US counterparts in September,2008. The US agencies were also of considerable assistance in the collection of technical intelligence during the terrorist strike which forced the Government of Pakistan to arrest some of the conspirators based in Pakistan and initiate action, however unsatisfactory, against them. All this was done between November 26, 2008, and January 20, 2009, when Bush was still the President.

14. One understands that under the Bush Adminisatration, the US agencies were helpful in collecting intelligence about the Pakistani involvement in the explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July, 2008, and sharing it with their Indian counterparts. They did it automatically on their own without the need for our PM having to take it up with Bush.

15. What has been our experience since Obama took over on January 20, 2009? One has not heard of any active US role in helping us in the investigation of the recent second explosion outside our Embassy in Kabul. Even though the FBI has reportedly already shared a lot of intelligence with our agencies in the Headley-Rana case, one has the impression that there has been some foot-dragging by the US authorities in respect of sharing with the Indian agencies information which could help them in identifying serving or retired Pakistani military and intelligence officials with whom Headley and Rana were in touch.

16. If we are given permission to interrogate them, our investigators will query them on the identities of the Pakistani officials. The officials of the Obama Administration are uncomfortable over the prospect of this.

17. There is an apparent strip-tease going on about Headley. There are wheels within wheels in the Headley case. Before he gravitated to the world of jihadi terrorism, he was in the world of narcotics smuggling. He was reportedly arrested once by US officials responsible for narcotics control.

18. Instead of being dealt with severely as one does normally with narcotics offenders, he seems to have been treated somewhat leniently. Did the narcotics control agency of the US recruit him as its agent in return for the lenient sentence? Was the FBI aware of this? We are all assuming that he was able to lead a high-profile life in India because of financial assistance from the LET and the Pakistani intelligence. Were payments from the US narcotics control agency also helping him lead a comfortable life in India and rub shoulders with film personalities and other high-flyers?

19. Will we get complete answers to these questions from the FBI ? The Obama Administration's counter-terrorism co-operation with India reminds one of the policy pursued by the Clinton Administration. Help India in preventing and investigating an act of terrorism originating from Pakistan, but avoid helping India in any matter which might prove detrimental to the State of Pakistan.

20. We ought to be more balanced in our assessment of US policies which have an impact on our core interests and more articulate in expressing our concerns and misgivings. Our relationship with the US is important, but that does not mean that we let ourselves be overawed into silence.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: [email protected])

PM in US: The Spin & The Fizzle

 

[RPK]

Manmohan's visit to Washington: success or failure?



Washington gazers have argued about whether the Prime Minister’s visit to the US was a success or a failure. Symbolism more than substance was the eventual consensus, with solace being extracted from President Obama’s reference to India as a nuclear power.


The disappointment that tinged this conclusion stems from a tendency to measure the success of visits in terms of big bang agreements. Phrases like “common ideals”, “shared values”, and “vibrant linkages” that filled the Obama-Manmohan joint declaration are considered useful preambles; but observers want the real stuff as well. However, this time round, with a “Global strategic partnership”; a “New framework for the U.S.- India defence relationship”; and the “US-India civil nuclear agreement”, already delivered, there wasn’t much left to sign.


The improbable speed with which Washington has warmed to New Delhi has created unrealistic expectations. In 1971, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were describing Indians as “*******s” and “aggressive goddam people”; and referring to Indira Gandhi as an “old witch” and a “*****” in turn. That said as much about Nixon and Kissinger as about US-India relations but, still, it was only a decade ago that India faced full-frontal sanctions from Washington after the nuclear tests of 1998. In less than a decade that relationship has flowered, yielding a defence framework agreement in 2005 and the civil nuclear agreement last year.


While India has benefited from this new partnership --- in nuclear power generation, for example, or in access to US intelligence a la David Headley --- New Delhi has hardly had to walk the talk. It retains an independent foreign policy, even on US bête noir, Iran; and despite the allegations of the political left, India concedes little to the US in defence policy and procurements.


Compare this with America’s longstanding relationships with UK and Australia, whom Washington counts amongst its closest allies. When the US goes to war --- as in Iraq and Afghanistan --- London and Canberra go along too. America’s NATO allies face the same pressures. Japan, closely linked since World War II by a mutual security treaty, plays reluctant host to tens of thousands of US soldiers. Israel remains a longstanding partner, even if somewhat diminished under Obama. Over time, all these countries have generated political, bureaucratic and military goodwill in Washington. Even the so-called Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA), such as Pakistan and South Korea, with institutional linkages built over decades, command greater leverage amongst Washington’s political and bureaucratic class than India does.


Only in romantic relationships is the initial period the steamiest. Relationships between countries warm up more gradually as legislative frameworks are negotiated as the foundations for strategic partnerships. In the US-India relationship only the initial steps have been taken in this process. The defence partnership is no more than a framework, valid for ten years, with a formal agreement still in the future. With New Delhi playing negotiating hardball, it will take years to negotiate the agreements that are needed for real partnership. The End User Monitoring agreement, a political minefield for any Indian government, has been finalised painstakingly. Another political hot potato, a Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) remains to be hammered out; so does a Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). A formal defence pact can materialise only upon this foundation.


Only after that, for all its political impetus, will the US-India relationship begin to give India what it most urgently needs from the US: high technology. So far, the message has not flowed down from the top floors to the functional levels of the US State Department, the Pentagon and the Department of Commerce, which issue the licences needed for exporting sensitive technologies.


This is especially so with the inwardly focused Obama administration, which does not view India from the balance of power perspective of the Bush-Rice regime. India remains a fellow-democracy, something greatly cherished in the American psyche; and a lucrative market, something that America loves even better. But New Delhi remains marginal to Washington’s immediate foreign policy challenges.


The absence of high profile agreements between Obama and Manmohan could actually benefit India, allowing New Delhi the diplomatic space to reassure longstanding allies like Russia. Mere assurances that “the US-India relationship will not be at the cost of other countries” have cut little ice in Moscow. India can ill afford to jeopardise the strategic technology and assistance flowing in from Russia. But Defence Ministry officials have faced growing annoyance; their interlocutors in Moscow complain pithily, “We give you assistance that America will never consider. But, at the first opportunity, you jump into their laps.”


India remains free to pursue partnerships in its legitimate interest. But those must be harmonised with existing relationships and New Delhi has not yet expended the time and political and diplomatic effort needed for this. Realistically, therefore, the modest outcome of Dr Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington was not just predictable but has spared New Delhi some embarrassment in its relationship with other allies.

 

[ejazr]

America’s doormat? - Op Ed

America’s doormat?

By M K Bhadrakumar

Why can’t our foreign policy czars learn from Russia or China on how to extract something in return from the US?

The government’s stance on the resolution against Iran on Friday at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna rests on a lame excuse. The government claims it voted against Iran since the latest report of the IAEA Director-General Mohammed El Baradei is “difficult to ignore.”

But then, in 2006, India voted against Iran despite El Baradei's neutral position regarding referring the issue from the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council. At that time, the government came up with the excuse that India was behaving like a ‘responsible’ nuclear power - whatever that might mean. (Actually, the United States, which dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is the only ‘irresponsible’ nuclear power to date.)

The junior minister in the South Block Shashi Tharoor advanced the specious plea that Russia and China voted against Iran, and so did India. He was presumably covering the government’s backside from criticism by the Left parties. But since when is it that India began synchronising with Russia and China - two countries, which are signatories of the NPT and CTBT, both of which India rejects?

Simply put, the government has stretched its credulity. According to media reports, the National Security Council bosses of the US and India had a pow-vow in Washington and the Indian vote followed.

Abstaining vote

Curiously, Afghanistan and Pakistan abstained in the Iran vote. Although Kabul and Islamabad depend critically on the American largesse, they stood up to be counted as Iran’s friends. South Africa, Brazil, Turkey and Egypt abstained. Malaysia voted with Iran. They have ably shown it is possible to be key partners of the US and still be independent. In comparison, why are our czars such one-dimensional men?

Once again, India’s Achilles’ heel seems to be the nuclear deal with the US that stymies our foreign policy options. It has become a convoluted story. The nuclear deal cannot be ‘operational’ without a US-India agreement for transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology. The US pledged to do this before August 2010 but the co-relates of non-proliferation regime are changing.

Indeed, it is incorrect to say the nuclear deal cannot be ‘operationalised,’ as it is already operational. Except that without any agreement with the US, government cannot import nuclear reactors from America and may have to be content with Russian, French or Japanese reactors.

In other words, the government is seeking Obama administration’s goodwill and cooperation so that India can generate tens of billions of dollars worth business for the American nuclear industry. Does it sound funny? But it doesn’t end there. Now the government plans to ‘incentivise’ the US by legislating that the liability of the American companies will be limited if the imported nuclear reactors cause accidents.

That’s how the government’s ingenious foreign policy calculus works - generating lucrative business for American corporate sector, which would in turn create pressure points on the US establishment to do away with the ban on ‘dual-use’ technology transfer to India so that India can ultimately transform as a ‘counterweight’ to China. Doesn’t it sound absurd? It bucks the entire gory history of East-West dialectics.

Meanwhile, what happens to India’s relations with Iran? Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s recent visit to Delhi was expected to forge understanding and coordination between the two countries over Afghanistan, where Indian and Iranian interests converge. In retrospect, Delhi was merely playing the ‘Iran card’ to catch Obama’s attention in the warm-up to Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US.

Surely, Iranians won’t be amused that they have been had. It appears we weren’t serious about a prime ministerial visit to Iran - not in February, not in March. The Iranians can also keep on hold their offer to create a joint regional initiative with India on the Afghan problem. Indians will only mate with Americans.

Our czars are making the country a doormat for America. The geopolitics of the region remains highly complicated. The US regional policies are at a crossroads. They could go either way. From any conceivable angle, it is highly probable that Pakistan will continue to be a pivotal relationship for the US - even if the US were to cut and run from Afghanistan, which of course will not happen.

Pakistan’s interest

At some point, the US will recognise Pakistan’s interests and threat perceptions, which ultimately devolve upon its adversarial ties with India. These are not parameters that can be easily redrawn. It is extremely foolhardy to foreclose India’s options in a security paradigm of such complexity.

The great tragedy is that we don’t insist on reciprocity for favours shown. In fact, no sooner than Singh ended his Washington visit, the US State Department clarified that the ENR agreement negotiations were nowhere near conclusion.

Why can’t our czars at least learn from their peers in Russia or China how to extract something in return from America for all their dhobi work?

At the very least, why can't they get the US to ensure as Pakistan’s financier that Islamabad doesn’t prevaricate about the perpetrators of Mumbai attacks? When the Indian ambassador in Vienna voted against Iran, India was still in deep mourning on the first ‘anniversary’ of the Mumbai attacks.

The prime minister returned home empty-handed except for a few more Rockefeller fellowships in the kitty -- for which, too, India is paying in hard currency. And we are to regard all this to be realpolitik. The country feels short-changed.

(The writer is a former diplomat)

 

[enlightened1]

Thursday, December 3, 2009
Photos: Visit of the Commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Robert F Willard.

 

[rohanamz]

obama haas failed everyones' expectations. his foreign policies are confusing. he softens his stands on taliban, pak n china and he is avoiding india's interests..

 

[mattster]

While many of the articles posted by some of these writers in this thread have valid points, they seems to be a feeling of dashed expectations in all of them, except for the article by M.K. Bhadrakumar.

This feeling of dashed expectations is due to a lack of understanding of how the US system works and a lack of touch with the hard-nosed reality on the ground here in the US.

Indians need to be realistic and pragmatic about their relationship with the US.

Obama inherited one of the biggest messes that any president of the US has ever been handed. An economy that was imploding due to the sub-prime mess and the Lehman Bros collapse plus 2 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Af/Pak war in a serious state of crisis. Add to that he also had the unresolved Iran and North Korea situation and the US was losing about 300,000 jobs a month when he took over, and the budget deficit was getting worse, and health-care was going broke.

Given these conditions; No one should be suprised if Obama decided to put foreign relations with stable allies like India, Israel, Mexico, Brits, etc on the back-burner.

The Israelis, Brits and even Mexicans are all complaining about the same thing as Indians are - that Obama has not done much for relations between their countries or addressed their concerns.

For those of you who are waxing poetically about the good ol' days of George Bush, you need to remember that Bill Cinton actually handed Bush a budget surplus and a very healthy economy.

India does not need US nuclear technology, they can get equally good tech from France or Japan. As long as the US-India nuke deal is signed, India is free to shop for plants wherever it needs them.

The Indian vote on Iran may not only be about the US pressure, it may also have to do with India's relationship with Israel, UK, Europe and the rest of the world. The idea that India should extract some concession from the US for its vote against Iran in the UN is somewhat immature. A nuclear Iran is going to create a whole nuclear middle-east.

Does anyone with a brain on their head want to see an all-out nuclear Middle-East. The last time I checked, India is a lot geographically closer to the middle-east than the US.

Responsible mature democracies cannot expect to play the quid-pro-quo game every time they need to make a tough call at the UN !!

As for the China relationship, it is based on a much wider economic engagement with the US which makes it impossible for the US to ignore. India does not have that kind of economic engagement with the US.
As India grows its economy, it will receive more attention commensurate with its economic power.

 

[RPK]

Gates looks to bolster ties in India, eyes on Pakistan | Reuters

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates leaves for India on Monday seeking to strengthen military ties with the rising Asian giant, even as Washington focuses on rival Pakistan as a top foreign policy priority.

Barack Obama

The January 19-21 visit includes talks with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who has sought U.S. help getting Islamabad to crack down on Islamic extremists blamed for the attacks in Mumbai in 2008.

U.S. officials, briefing reporters ahead of the trip, acknowledged the meetings would likely touch on tensions between India and Pakistan as well as efforts by both U.S. and Indian militaries to work closer together, including counter-terrorism efforts.

"We obviously share an interest in protecting both of our homelands from attack from terrorist organizations," a senior U.S. defense official said.

The United States is also calling on allies like India to step up their roles in Afghanistan following President Barack Obama's decision last month to send an additional 30,000 troops to battle a resurgent Taliban.

"As we are doing more, of course we are looking for others to do more," the official said.

The trip comes as Washington attempts to bolster nuclear-armed Pakistan as it battles insurgents.

Last month, Gates told the U.S. Senate he believed al Qaeda wanted to provoke a conflict between India and Pakistan in order to destabilize Pakistan. He said it was providing Lashkar-e-Taiba militants with targeting information to help the group plot attacks in India.

The group is blamed for the Mumbai attacks, which killed 166 people and further strained relations between India and Pakistan. India sees Islamabad as unwilling to go after the insurgents.

DEFENSE SPENDING

Still, diplomats say the United States and India are enjoying their best relations in decades. U.S. defense officials have repeatedly described India as a global partner with common interests extending well beyond regional issues like Afghanistan.

One area closely watched by investors is India's growing appetite for arms purchases.

Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said bilateral trade would be a significant part of conversations in New Delhi.

Currently the world's 10th largest defense spender, India is looking to dole out more than $50 billion over the next five years to modernize its armed forces.

A U.S. official suggested such defense deals can often bring militaries closer together.

"Really the context is: how do you improve cooperation between our two militaries? Common equipment, common experiences create further opportunities to cooperate with India," the official said.

U.S. aircraft manufacturer Boeing Co said this month the Indian Air Force was interested in acquiring 10 C-17 aircraft, in a deal Indian defense ministry officials say is potentially worth more than $2 billion.

And last August, India started field trials to buy 126 multi-role fighter jets.

India's market reforms in the early 1990s led to a rapid expansion of trade ties with the United States, while the 2008 civil nuclear deal Singh signed with former U.S. President George W. Bush ended the long nuclear isolation imposed upon India after it tested an atom bomb in 1974.

 

[RPK]

India to hold wide-ranging strategic talks with US, Israel - India - The Times of India

Robert Gates and Israeli Navy chief Vice-Admiral Eliezer Marom slated to hold wide-ranging talks here over the next few days.

The discussions will range from regional security issues, especially with violence showing no signs of abating in the Af-Pak region, and its implications for India to counter-terrorism and intelligence-sharing.

Gates has meetings lined up with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, defence minister A K Antony and foreign minister S M Krishna, among others, on Tuesday and Wednesday.

"We will, of course, reiterate to the Obama administration that, even after 26/11, Pakistan is not doing enough to crack down on terrorism emanating from its soil against India,'' said an official. Gates, incidentally, will arrive here after quick trips to Kabul and Islamabad.

The Israeli Navy chief, in turn, will hold discussions with Antony and the three Service chiefs, among others, apart from visiting the South-Western Army Command at Jaipur and the Western Naval Command at Mumbai during his visit starting Tuesday.

Both US and Israel are eager to sell more and more military hardware and software to India. India, for instance, is already moving towards inking its largest-ever defence deal with US to acquire 10 C-17 Globemaster-III giant strategic airlift aircraft, each of which comes for over a whopping $220 million, as reported by TOI earlier.

This will overtake the $2.1 billion contract for eight Boeing P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft inked last year, which in turn came after the $962 million deal for six C-130J `Super Hercules' planes in 2007.

Having already finalised the End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA), India and US are now on course to seal the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). The two pacts are required under US domestic laws to ensure compliance with sensitive technology control requirements.

Israel, on its part, is already the second largest defence supplier to India after Russia, with New Delhi having done military business worth around $9 billion with Tel Aviv since the 1999 Kargil conflict.

The focus in Indo-Israeli military partnership is now on having more joint R&D projects, with New Delhi keen to ensure that the ongoing ones fructify within specified timeframes.

The Rs 2,606 crore project between DRDO and Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) to develop a supersonic 70-km range Barak-NG (next generation) missile defence system for Indian Navy, for instance, is slated for completion by May 2011.

IAF, too, wants to induct nine air defence squadrons under the mammoth Rs 10,075 crore DRDO-IAI project to develop a medium-range surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) system, capable of detecting and destroying hostile aircraft at a 80-km range, at the earliest.

 

[enlightened1]

US defence secretary meets PM, discusses military cooperation​

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-defence-secretary-meets-PM-discusses-military-cooperation/articleshow/5478043.cms​

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-defence-secretary-meets-PM-discusses-military-cooperation/articleshow/5478043.cmshttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-defence-secretary-meets-PM-discusses-military-cooperation/articleshow/5478043.cms

NEW DELHI: In a clear push for closer bilateral military cooperation in the face of the "greatest common challenge of terrorism", visiting US defence secretary Robert Gates in talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Tuesday sought bolstered Indian role in promoting security in Afghanistan and stability in the entire South Asia.

Besides the expanding defence cooperation between New Delhi and Washington in training, exercises and trade, the two sides focused on the fight against insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan during Gates' talks with Manmohan Singh and external affairs minister S M Krishna.

Gates arrived Tuesday afternoon on a two-day visit to India after the Taliban staged one of their most audacious attacks in Kabul Monday, setting off explosions and engaging security forces close to the presidential palace and seizing ministry building.

After his arrival, Gates met the prime minister and appealed for closer military cooperation between America and India to bring stability to South Asia.

In an opinion piece published in the Times of India ahead of his visit here, Gates said that the two nations have been drawn together by their shared values and should push for greater cooperation in consulting new security threats.

"We must seize this opportunity because the peace and security of South Asia is critical not just to this region but also to the entire international community," he said.

Gates would meet his Indian counterpart defence minister A.K. Antony and is expected to discuss how New Delhi and Washington can extend its cooperation in counter-terrorism. He will also be meeting Indian Army chief Deepak Kapoor Wednesday.

He is expected to sign a bilateral Logistics Support Agreement and a communication sharing pact, said officials in the Prime Minister's Office here.

During his discussion with the political establishment, he is expected to focus on regional security, Afghanistan and relations between India and Pakistan.

This will be the first high-level talks between the two countries since the prime minister visited Washington in November last year at the Obama administration's first state visit.

His visit was preceded by another senior official in the Barack Obama administration, US special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who was here Monday to confer with Indian officials ahead of the London conference on Afghanistan.

Gates came to India ahead of his trip to Pakistan. He had last visited the Indian capital February 2008.

Earlier, speaking to reporters on his flight to New Delhi, Gates said he sees his visit to India as another step toward expanding the two countries' solid defence relationship, particularly in light of the common threats they face.

"It will be a further review of progress we are making in expanding the relationship - whether it is training, exercises or defence trade," he said.

"All these things have grown significantly since the two countries signed a defence framework agreement in 2005," he said calling terrorism the greatest common challenge the two countries face.

Gates also cited strides the US and India have made in developing a stable defence trade, most recently with India's decision to buy US transport aircraft and other military equipment.

Besides, he will explore with Indian leaders ways to expand the already-robust military-to-military relationship, deepen counter-terrorism cooperation and bolster India's role in promoting security in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the entire South Asia region.

The talks undoubtedly will address tensions between India and Pakistan. However, defence officials said they are gratified by both countries' growing recognition that their biggest threat is radical extremism, not each other.

Gates had also praised India's restraint after the Mumbai terror attacks, terming it "statesman-like".

"I believe that the Indians responded subsequently with a great deal of restraint and have conducted themselves in a very statesmanlike manner since that attack," he told reporters.

Military trade is likely to be discussed, but Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell emphasised that Gates' visit is intended to deepen relations with a growing global economic, political and security leader, not to sell weapons.

"The secretary is travelling to India because we have strong bilateral relations with that country and need to nurture and grow those," he said. "That is a priority."

Military exercises between the US and India have increased in size and scope every year since 2002, the defence official noted.

 

[ppgj]

The United States on Wednesday characterised "syndicate of terror’’ operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a threat to the region with the Lashker-e-Taiyba, being part of the Al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus, targeting India and Pakistan.

"The syndicate of terror [is] operating to destablise the region and it for each one to understand its magnitude and engage to reduce and eliminate [these threats] …requiring high degree of cooperation’’, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said here at a press conference.

The Hindu : News / National : "Syndicate of terror'' threat to the region: Gates

 

[Pintu]

US Secretary of Defence Dr. Robert Gates arrives

PIB Press Release

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

India and US discuss defence cooperation
16:58 IST
The US Secretary of Defence Dr. Robert N Gates met the Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in New Delhi, today. Dr. Gates was accompanied by senior officials from the US Department of Defence. The Defence Secretary Shri Pradeep Kumar and other senior officials from the Ministry of Defence were also present during the meeting.

During the meeting, both sides exchanged views and perspectives on a number of issues including the regional security situation and global security challenges. Shri Antony and Dr Gates both expressed satisfaction about the improvement in bilateral defence relations since the signing of the bilateral cooperation agreement in 2005. Both sides also expressed optimism about the prospects for enhancement of bilateral defence relations in all areas, including military to military interactions and in the area of defence trade. The two Ministers also discussed prospects for cooperation between both sides in the protection of the global commons and in the area of maritime security and counter-terrorism.

Shri Antony conveyed to Dr. Gates the Indian concerns regarding denial of export licenses for various defence related requirement of the Armed Forces and also regarding the inclusion of some Indian Defence PSUs and DRDO labs in the ‘Entity List’ of the US Government. Shri Antony expressed the view that such restrictions were anomalous in the context of the steady improvement in the bilateral defence relations between both countries. The US Secretary of Defence informed Shri Antony that President Obama has intiated a comprehensive reform of US export control regulations and assured that this would involve facilitation in the supply of defence technology and equipment to India.

Defence Minister Shri AK Antony convyed the view that the bilateral defence trade relations between India and the USA should move from a purely buyer-seller relationship to a more comprehensive relationship covering transfer of technology and co-production. Further referring to the US Government’s proposal to conclude certain umbrella agreements like CISMOA, etc. Shri Antony expressed the view that the proposed agreements would need to be assessed from the view point of the benefits which would accrue to India.

Samir /RAJ

 

[Pintu]

AFP: Al-Qaeda could provoke new India-Pakistan war: Gates

Al-Qaeda could provoke new India-Pakistan war: Gates

(AFP) – 8 hours ago

NEW DELHI — Al-Qaeda is seeking to de-stabilise the entire South Asia region and could trigger a war between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates told reporters on Wednesday.

Groups under Al-Qaeda's "syndicate" in Afghanistan and Pakistan are trying "to destabilise not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially the whole region by provoking a conflict perhaps between India and Pakistan through some provocative act," Gates said during a visit to New Delhi.

"It's important to recognise the magnitude of the threat that the entire region faces," he said following talks with his Indian counterpart, A.K. Antony.

Gates cited three main groups operating under Al-Qaeda's "umbrella," the Taliban forces fighting in Afghanistan, Taliban elements targeting Pakistan's government and the Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan focused on India.

Although he praised India for exercising restraint after the 2008 Mumbai attacks -- which Delhi blamed on LeT -- Gates suggested India could not be expected to remain restrained if it was attacked again.

"I think it's not unreasonable to assume India patience would be limited were there to be further attacks," he said.

The Mumbai assault left 166 dead and India has demanded Pakistan come under more international pressure to rein in militant groups on its soil.

Gates described India as a vital partner in the struggle against extremist threats, expressed appreciation for its economic aid to Afghanistan and said that he discussed how to bolster US-India military cooperation.

 

[enlightened1]

Antony conveys India''s concern over listing of defence firms by US​

​

New Delhi, Jan 20 (ANI): Defence Minister A K Antony on Wednesday conveyed India''s concerns regarding denial of export licenses for various defence- related requirements of the Armed Forces by the U S Administration to visiting U S Defence Secretary Robert Gates.

The US has included some Indian Defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) labs in the ''Entity List.''

Antony said such restrictions were anomalous to improvement of bilateral defence relations between both countries. Gates and Antony discussed matters related to military-military co-operation. During the meeting, both exchanged views and perspectives on a number of issues including the regional security situation and global security challenges.

Both Antony and Gates expressed satisfaction about improving defence relations since the signing of the bilateral cooperation agreement in 2005.

Gates informed Antony that President Obama has intiated a comprehensive reform of US export control regulations and assured that this would involve facilitation in the supply of defence technology and equipment to India.

Antony conveyed the view that the bilateral defence trade relations between India and the USA should move from a purely buyer-seller relationship to a more comprehensive relationship covering transfer of technology and co-production.

Antony expressed the view that proposed agreements like CISMOA would need to be assessed from the viewpoint of benefits accruing to India. They expressed optimism about prospects for enhancing bilateral defence relations in all areas. (ANI)

 

[ppgj]

US and india defence cooperation -

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kveSh724nR0&feature=player_embedded#

 

[ppgj]

Paper no. 3618 21-Jan-2010

Gates' Visit to Delhi: Strategic Course-Correction

By B. Raman

The contours of the strategic course correction in its relations with India, Pakistan and China, which the administration of President Barack Obama has undertaken since it assumed office a year ago, became evident once again during the just-concluded two-day visit of Dr.Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, to New Delhi coinciding unintentionally with the end of Mr.Obama's first year in office.

2. The conventional wisdom that the Pentagon and the State Department look at India through two different prisms, with the Pentagon under Mr.Obama visualising a much larger role for India than one confined to the sub-continent as seen by the State Department, would have fewer takers after Dr.Gates' visit. Dr.Gates is in the unique position of having served as the Defence Secretary during the last two years of the second term of Mr. George Bush, and continuing in the same position under Mr.Obama.

3. Under Mr.Bush, he was a supporter of the multi-dimensional strategic relationship with India, covering civilian nuclear co-operation, military supply relationship, networking between the armed forces of the two countries, a high-profile role for India in maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism and an important role for India as a respected interlocutor of the US in assessing the implications of China's rise as a modern military power in the wake of its rise as an economic power aspiring for a parity of status with the US.

4. Under Mr.Bush, the interactions of Dr.Gates, his predecessor (Mr.Donald Rumsfeld) and their advisers and officials in the Pentagon with their Indian counterparts used to have a rich agenda with a much larger arc of vision---- with Indo-Pakistan tensions forming only a small part of it. During Dr.Gates' just-concluded stay in Delhi, one saw the transition that he has made in adjusting himself to Mr.Obama's vision of India as the pre-eminent power of South Asia, whose role will be important for the success of Mr.Obama's Af-Pak strategy. He has also adjusted himself to Mr.Obama's objective of quietly ridding the developing Indo-US strategic relationship of the preoccupation with China, which was an important characteristic of the India-related policies of the Bush Administration. Dr.Gates came to India as a supporter of the mid-course correction in the Obama Administration's policies towards India which have been underway for a year now.

5. China seems to have figured as expected in Dr.Gates' talks with Indian leaders and officials and in his interactions with the media, but not as a driving force of the Indo-US strategic relationship. As one reads and analyses the various comments made by Dr. Gates, one is at a loss to understand whether there is any driving force at all under the Obama Administration----except perhaps Washington's anxiety to prevent any escalation in Indo-Pak tensions due to terrorism from derailing Mr.Obama's objectives in the Af-Pak region.

6. "The Hindu" of January 21, 2010, has quoted Dr.Gates as having remarked as follows during his interactions with the media on January 20: "While the discussions with the Indian leaders on China were generic in nature, both sides talked about Beijing's military modernisation plan. In the same breath, he said Washington preferred to engage more with China to avoid any miscalculation. "

7. Pakistan-centric issues ---- strategic as well as tactical--- received a disproportionately large attention as compared to broader issues which used to figure more prominently in the past. India's relevance as a US partner in a much larger geopolitical context hardly found mention. We in India cannot escape part of the responsibility for the reversion to the past practice of looking at India in a restricted Indo-Pakistan context. By refusing to rid ourselves of our consuming fixation with Pakistan, we have unwittingly created an impression that what matters to India is keeping Pakistan under control---- a few statements supportive of India and critical of Pakistan on the terrorism issue and the Indians will be happy. That is the prevailing reading in Washington DC----whether in the White House, the State Department or the Pentagon and we saw that reflected during Dr.Gates' visit.

8. We have not yet realised the full implications of the mid-course corrections in Washington DC and we have not yet examined whether in the face of the unmistakable signs of a much narrower definition of the Indo-US strategic relations by the Obama Administration, any mid-course corrections of our own policies are called for. There is definitely a need for such an examination in respect of our relations with China.

9. As the scope for convergence of Indo-US perceptions and policies relating to China gets increasingly reduced during Mr.Obama's term in office, it is important for us to strike out on our own in re-fashioning our policies towards China. There is a need for examining the wisdom of enlarging our engagement with China beyond trade to strategic security related issues of common concern and interest to the two countries. Maritime counter-terrorism is one such issue. Co-operation between India and China against maritime terrorism and in ensuring sea lane security is of much greater importance than co-operation in maritime counter-terrorism with the US. Our continuing differences and unhappiness with China over the border issue and the alleged Chinese troop intrusions into Indian territory should not come in the way of identifying new areas of convergence with China.

10. Even in respect of Pakistan, the time has come to have a re-look at our policies to decide to what extent our fixation with certain issues has served us well. Is it possible to give a strategic depth to our relations with Pakistan? How to go about it? These are questions which need to be posed.

11. India's relevance and acceptability as a major Asian power will be determined not by our continuing to hang on to the US coattails, but by our chartering our own independent course based on our national interests and future aspirations. While the US has been steadily doing its course-corrections, we should not remain glued to our past policies.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: [email protected])

Gates' Visit to Delhi: Strategic Course-Correction

 

[Daredevil]

Indo-US Relations: Obama looking for something more tangible than Indo-US nuke deal

US woos India back to the Bush era
By M K Bhadrakumar

United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates is not new to the field of diplomacy in the South Asian region. The "Gates Mission" in 1990 to defuse a cascading wave of India-Pakistan tensions is the stuff of legends. Historians are still in two minds whether Gates deserves to be credited for having conceivably averted the world's first nuclear war.

In comparison, Gates' mission to New Delhi and Islamabad last week wasn't breathtaking but it stood out as a pivotal moment. He was choreographing the US's global strategy.

Gates charms Indians ...

Delhi faces an existential dilemma: it needs to determine how far it is prepared to go with Uncle Sam down the path into the garden where it has never been before. Gates made it clear the enterprise could be rewarding. He said, "India can be an anchor for regional and global security ... this will be a defining partnership for the 21st century." In the Barack Obama presidency, India has never heard such heady thoughts.

There were three vectors to Gates' visit - Afghanistan, India-Pakistan relations and the US-India security partnership. Gates upheld India's legitimate interests in Afghanistan. He praised the Indian role and in turn received an Indian offer on an enhanced role strictly within the parameters of the overall US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy - "frankly, the kind of support and extraordinary support that India is providing in Afghanistan now is really ideal".

India will not complicate the US's diplomacy in Islamabad by seeking any role in the build-up of the Afghan armed forces or police. Beneath that threshold, Delhi will play a role in the "Afghanization" process. Nor is Delhi inclined to raise dust about US plans regarding the "reintegration and reconciliation" of the Taliban. The Indian position was dogmatic but nuances have crept in. This is partly tactical, as it is clear Indian opposition will not stall the process of integrating the Taliban into Afghan political life.

But Washington assured Delhi that the established Afghan government would spearhead the peace process and the United Nations would endorse and promote it. The bottom line for Delhi is that the US should not cut and run from the Hindu Kush. As long as the US remains the supervisor-cum-custodian of the peace process with the Taliban, Delhi feels that a takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban leader Mullah Omar won't be in the cards. Again, the US no longer buys the Pakistani thesis about "Pashtun alienation". Delhi considers that any broad-based government in Kabul that reflects Afghanistan's plural society will be a bulwark against the return to Taliban rule.

In sum, Delhi has opted to hitch its wagon to Washington's strategy. Delhi's choice is limited. Pakistan has done everything possible to keep India out of any regional frameworks, such as Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan, Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan or the Organization of Islamic Conference initiative. Other like-minded countries that abhor religious militancy such as Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran have their own agenda born out of national interests.

... by piling on Pakistan

Delhi's most important consideration is that Washington has at long last accepted the Indian interpretation that the forces of al-Qaeda and the Taliban as well as the Pakistan-based terrorist organizations operating against India are birds of the same feather.

What pleases Delhi no end is that Gates underlined it forcefully during the Islamabad leg of his tour. He said:
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani network - this is a syndicate of terrorists that work together. And when one succeeds they all benefit, and they share ideas, they share planning. They don't operationally coordinate their activities, as best as I can tell. But they are in very close contact. They take inspiration from one another, they take ideas from one another.

Delhi's comfort level with the Obama administration has been rapidly rising since Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the US last November. Following up on Washington's repeated assurances that it had no intention to "mediate" India-Pakistan differences, Gates went one step further and took note that if there was another terrorist attack on India by Pakistan-based groups, it was entirely conceivable that India might not exercise restraint, as in the past, and may retaliate. "But no country, including the United States, is going to stand idly by if it's being attacked by somebody," he point-blank told a Pakistani interviewer.

Gates also was dismissive of Pakistani criticism regarding US arms sales to India. In essence, Washington has quietly reconfigured its AfPak strategy. Gates repeatedly bracketed Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the US. Delhi's earlier apprehensions that the US sought a pretext to talk about the Kashmir issue have given way. Whereas Delhi had sought exclusion from the AfPak strategy while Pakistan insisted on India's inclusion, a reversal of roles is happening.

Gates' hidden agenda

Why is the US accommodating India to this extent? Clearly, the US has hardly any non-NATO allies - other than Georgia, perhaps - that endorse its Afghan war effort so enthusiastically as India does. Japan has just rolled back logistic support. Indeed, the Indian role also serves as a pressure point on Pakistan.

However, beyond Pakistan and Afghan-related concerns, Gates went to Delhi with a hefty agenda with regard to military sales and security cooperation with India. He attached strings to the transfer of "dual-use" US technology to India. He linked it to Delhi signing the Logistics Support Agreement and the Communications, Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement, which are pending. Gates said the Indian prime minister told him that Delhi needed to be convinced that the agreements brought India substantial advantage.

Gates' message was simple: India must decide quickly whether it is willing to move forward as a fully fledged ally of the US. He underlined the two countries' "common interest in security of the Indian Ocean and security of the global commons, and the global commons meaning the air, sea, space, and if you're talking about the Internet, the ether."

Arguably, China - and the US missile defense system - couldn't have been far from his mind. Though he pro forma said he "didn't talk about China at length" with Indian officials, he added, "There was a discussion about China's military modernization program and what it meant and what the intentions of that military buildup were." Significantly, in the same breath, Gates drew a parallel between the US policy to engage China in a strategic dialogue and the strategic arms talks with the former Soviet Union.

To be sure, China is back with a bang in the US strategic calculus. That was also the thrust of Gates' mission. The Obama administration is reverting to the George W Bush-era doctrine regarding the potentials of an unbound India as a junior partner in the US's geostrategy. By accommodating India's interests in Afghanistan and by expressing support and understanding for India's security concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan, the US is "freeing" India to play a bigger role.

The US is losing ground to China in the Asia-Pacific. What the Americans call Southwest Asia (which includes the Indian Ocean) becomes the US's "Maginot Line". It must be held if the US is to stay embedded in the Asian region at a time when it is showing unmistakable signs of decline. Gates sought to assess what role India could play in the US's tug-of-war with Beijing.

Suspicion of China runs deep in India, as also does resentment over China's perceived "assertiveness". But a parallel normalization track also runs, which the pro-US lobby in Delhi has not been able to derail. No matter what Gates said, Delhi will have no choice but to keep its fingers crossed as to the fate of the US's AfPak strategy; the best-laid plans have gone awry in the tangled Hindu Kush mountains.

As a leading Pakistani editor mildly put it, "The Pakistani military has no cogent reason to change its strategic paradigm." Gates was still in the region when news broke that Obama had suffered a setback in the election in Massachusetts and it may be that the US is dealing from a weak hand.