India Russia Relations
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Bahamut
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Pakistan lack the equipment to maintain these roads. So it's is China building and maintaining these roads but since the area is so disturbed the Chinese might deploy their forces to protect the infrastructure, so it will be a threat for India as China can block our oil imports from middle east.
sthf
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I read a better one, China Pakistan ko Economically Chodega.
piKacHHu
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The fate of Indo-Russia relationship hinges more on Donald Trump than our own efforts. Russia as of now has assumed its USSR era role to establish and spread its sphere of influence in central Asia and middle east. It will depend on Trump how he will react to this new realignment in the region where it has been dominant for so long. Most of the hawks in Pentagon and State Dept will not like to give away their domain of influence so easily. Adding China in this region will add complexity to the matter as its willingness to usurp and extend its own economic hegemony is no more a secret to anyone. This Afghan obsession of Russia has potential to go wrong badly by involving Pakis (There are many in Afghanistan who don't like Pak) and if any benefits what so ever it may achieve after that, will be reaped immediately by China-Pakistan Duo due to their proximity. Now, if Trump is able to convince Putin to disengage with China & Pak and work together to bring stability in the region, in that case it would be a big win for Indian interests which could result into a new US-Russia-India axis. Russia must understand that strategic aims of a powerful China will always be in continuous conflict with the strategic interests of its own whereas while engaging with India, it is not the case.
But as of now, nothing is clear from Trump's side which way he will choose. South block can do nothing but to wait and watch the events unfolding after 20th January.
But as of now, nothing is clear from Trump's side which way he will choose. South block can do nothing but to wait and watch the events unfolding after 20th January.
Cutting Edge
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India will not join CPEC because it passes through OUR KASHMIR, occupied by Porkis.
Its funny that Russia and China get really angry on slightest provocation but give us advice to have good relation with Pakis. Do you know how many times do we get nuke threats from pakistan in a year? Do you know how many innocent Indians get killed every year by Paki terrorists?
I am all for having good relations with Pak but their aggression and terrorism has to be checked. Unfortunately China for decades has fully supported Pak against India, they even support terrorists organisation like IM, JuD and Taliban. Now Russia has joined the Chinese train.
"US Control"??? Why do we care about that? We have no ideological beef with USA. America is a fellow secular democracy just like India. Only reason we had bad relation with US in the past is because of short sightedness of Nehruvian dynasty. Today India is a strong nation getting stronger every day. We don't need any sugar daddy like Pakistan. We will maintain our independent foreign policy in OUR INTEREST. If Russia doesn't like that its their loss.
Cutting Edge
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I agree with that. I too want to see a US - Russia - India alliance. This is the only way to contain China. Make no mistake about China's intention against Russia. Infact China is already behaving like big brother with Russia and rogue nation of Pakistan who already contributed massively to break USSR is not at all trustworthy. I hope some sense prevails in Kremlin so they can see this fact.
DingDong
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Russia and China settled their territorial dispute long time back.
Russia is US' tool (bogey man) to keep the Western Europe in check. If the Russian threat ends then most of the Europe will slip out of the hands of the US, NATO will cease to exist.
Normalization of US-Russia relation goes against US' interests.
India's strategic geo-location can be ascertained from the fact that major goal behind the great voyages during the colonial period was to discover an alternative ocean route to India. There is an ocean named after our country.
There cannot be a India-US-Russia alliance, in fact a resurgent India will become a threat in eyes of the established global powers which includes the US and Russia.
Why do you think India has refrained from openly siding with the US in the ongoing US-China tussle? Our goal must be to serve our end by taking advantage of these conflicts.
vinuzap
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when ashraf ghani took charge in 2010 in same course of event he ignored india the difference being u.s was chairing the so called talk and is being replaced by russia (earlier to chinki and porkis tried to meddle), what happened later the same guy became india's most trusted loyalist
just wait and watch tamasha
russia has 10 billion dollar defence agreement line with india which if india backtrack could destroy russian economy and do you think they can displease india
piKacHHu
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The point you raised about Russian bogey is partly valid in post Crimea scenario but it must be noted that that after USSR break up Russians moved much closer to USA under Boris Yeltsin than ever before, even then US didn't abandon or dissolved NATO. It's the changing times and US interests that keep NATO alive as it ensures that the member countries will shoulder its burden in military adventures like in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Moreover NATO nations are important customers of US arms industry so why would US let them go loose?
India's strategic geo-location in pre-colonial times was due to different reasons as India was major producer of spices,cotton, gems, and handicrafts at that time, in fact it was a major economic power at that time just like China has become today. Comparing it with today, we are not having much leveraging power vis-a-vis China and regarding strategic location issue, China has already by-passed it by devising an alternate route through land using CPEC.
Well the same argument can also be applied to China also. Why US and USSR/Russia allowed the rise of China under their noses? This case is peculiar with respect to US-China relationship where US an aggressive capitalist nation & sworn enemy of communism allowed the rise of communist China in a big way.So your argument doesn't hold good in this case. Even our economic rise is somewhat linked with US due to rapid rise of our service sector and software boom which was fueled by US companies in search of cheap technical work force. In post globalization world, our economic rise is not a threat till we provide a huge market to various MNCs based in US but when we start to interfere in their supposed strategic domain of influence then we become an actual threat. China, for example, has remained muted through all its journey to become economic superpower till it gained enough weight militarily as well as economically to challenge US. For us, we have no choice but to get aligned with US or Russia where our strategic and economic interests suits more and to remain muted till we acquire enough weight to pose a credible threat to it in case of any conflict of interests.
There are plenty of reasons for it. Our own boundary dispute issue with China is the main reason. We are trying hard to bargain with China to settle the boundary dispute in our favor by not aggressively supporting US over south China sea issue. In fact, by doing that, we are serving our own goal or interests. You must understand that China with over four times of our economy and roughly 5 times military spending is in the driving seat in any dealing of bi-lateral issue. This is even when we are having such a huge trade deficit with Chinese, we can't get a favorable deal with them. It's in Chinese interest to keep the issues unsettled and exploit it when the situation demands. The point is that its in our interest to keep US engaged in Asia-Pacific and middle east/Afghanistan and to keep China-Pak away from that region; at best India should strive to get partnership in security arrangement in Afghanistan with US-Russia so that the goodwill and money that we have invested into Afghanistan in last decade in hope of good strategic returns should not get evaporated in short time...
vinuzap
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https://thewire.in/89722/india-iran-russia-afghanistan/
With the entry of ISIS into the Afghanistan equation, Indian interests have diverged from those of Russia and Iran, who have said that ISIS is a much more dangerous threat than the Taliban.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani. Credit: PTI
Iran, Russia and India were the big three powers that acted in unison – in supporting the Northern Alliance – to prevent a complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban between 1996 and 2001. This experience of working together to resist the Taliban has largely shaped their actions in Afghanistan since then.
Cooperation between the three states, even in the overt domain, continued over the years and was evident recently as well. In November 2016, India completed the delivery of a batch of four Mi-25 Russian combat helicopters to Afghanistan. Earlier in March 2016, India and Iran signed a bilateral deal to develop the Chabahar port that would provide Afghanistan an alternate access to the sea, bypassing Pakistan. Such instances of collaboration involving Russia, Iran and India have given rise to a belief that these three powers have convergent interests regarding peace and stability in Afghanistan.
It is in light of this history of cooperation that Russia’s statements regarding the ISIS in Afghanistan have caused a stir in India. The Russian president’s special representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, went on record saying that the ISIS — not the Taliban — is a bigger threat in the region.
Similarly, Iran continues to make overtures towards sections in the Taliban. Afghanistan’s former intelligence chief, Rahmatullah Nabil, in November accused Iran of supporting the Taliban in order to counter the Daesh threat.
In sharp contrast, India still regards the Taliban and its sponsors as bigger threats to Afghanistan. Earlier this month, the Ministry of External Aaffairs spokesperson said regarding the Taliban, “They have to respect the internationally agreed red lines, give up terrorism and violence, sever all ties with al Qaeda, agree to follow democratic norms and not do anything which will erode the gains of the last 15 years. Ultimately it is for the government of Afghanistan to decide whom to talk to and how.”
So, the question before India is: with the ISIS brought into the Afghanistan equation, have the interests of Russia, Iran and India now diverged in Afghanistan? And, if yes, what are the implications of this development for India’s strategy?
Is there a divergence?
The question of parting ways has two disparate elements: one that involves the Taliban and the other involves the ISIS. On the Taliban question, it is safe to say that there is no major divergence between Russia, India and Iran. All three would settle for any Afghan-owned arrangement that ends the cycle of violence in the country. There are differences, however, in the desired means to achieve this goal. India regards that it is the prerogative of the Afghan government to decide the pace of talks with the Taliban. But Russia and Iran differ. With the war against ISIS in Syria heading towards a denouement, there is a sense of urgency for Russia and Iran to act which has lead them to make their own suo motu overtures towards the Taliban.
On the second question regarding the ISIS, there is definitely a divergence. Russia sees ISIS in Afghanistan from the prism of its involvement in the ongoing Syrian war. While the Russian government has chosen to support the Shia dominated Bashar al-Assad government, this move is seen to be extremely unpopular in the eyes of the Sunni Russian Muslims.
Russia’s 20 million-strong Muslim minority has become a major recruitment centre for the ISIS. Russian Muslims have joined the ISIS in Syria and there have been reports indicating that the Russian authorities even encouraged some to go to Syria way back in 2011, with the hope that these ‘trouble-makers’ would never return. Today, there are an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Russian citizens with the ISIS, putting it far ahead of other European countries. Another 2,000 are Russian-speaking, making Russian the second most common language in the ISIS, after Arabic.
This strategy of wishing away its problems seems to have failed, though. In October 2015, Putin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, acknowledged that many of the Russians who fought for ISIS have “returned home, presenting a direct threat.” This fear was also articulated by Putin in his speech at the UN General Assembly last September. Two months later, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev revealed that “many thousands of Russian citizens and individuals from other post-Soviet republics are fighting in Syria. These completely brainwashed people return home as professional murderers and terrorists. And we don’t want them to stage something similar in Russia after their Syrian stints expire.”
Now, this is where Afghanistan comes into the equation. Russia fears that these Russian-speaking ISIS members will set base in Afghanistan, particularly in the north, along the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is also feared that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has much in common with the Russian Muslims in ISIS and is already present on Afghan soil, could gravitate towards ISIS and help them secure a foothold. Russia crucially sees any organisation under the ISIS flag as a global threat. Hence, its endeavour to portray the Taliban – a local, Afghanistan-based movement in Kabulov’s words – as a lesser threat.
Iran’s fears are somewhat similar. It is concerned that an influx of Sunni ISIS militants from Iraq and Syria will pose problems not only for the large Shia minority in Afghanistan but also for its own security. Another problem on its eastern borders would only add to its insecurities. And hence, Iran sees the ISIS as the irreconcilable enemy and Taliban as a secondary threat.
India sees the situation differently, and for good reasons. The Indian perception is based on an understanding that the ISIS in Afghanistan or Wilayat Khorasan is merely made up of rump factions of the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban and assorted drug and crime syndicates, all with a markedly anti-Pakistan orientation and with no global aspirations. Moreover, India is far more comfortably placed than Russia or Iran in this regard because of the buffer that is provided, paradoxically by Pakistan.
One view in India is that a singular focus on ISIS in Afghanistan will derail the fight against Taliban which has now killed over 6,000 Afghan soldiers and over 30,000 civilians in 2016 alone. Another reason for the Indian scepticism is that the focus on ISIS would bail out Pakistan, which today is internationally questioned for abetting terrorism. A ‘global’ threat would be used by Pakistan to create a new narrative, a new set of friends and to secure more funding. It would then be a sense of deja vu for India, with the ISI making overtures to elements within this group, providing sanctuaries in return for assurances that they would not be targeted and then manoeuvring to bring Kashmir into the equation.
An Afghan National Army soldier stands guard after the inauguration of the reconstruction project to restore the ruins of historic Darul Aman palace, in Kabul, Afghanistan May 30, 2016. Credit: Reuters/Omar Sobhani
Where does this leave India?
With Russia and Iran moving towards an overly anti-ISIS focus in Afghanistan, India is broadly left with three options.
One, continue to back the Afghan National Unity Government’s (NUG) peace efforts and anti-terrorism resistance. This would mean urgent and sustained collaboration with the US under the Afghanistan-India-US trilateral to strengthen the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and rebuild the Afghan economy.
Two, become a part of Russia and Iran’s efforts in talking to the Taliban. As a part of one such effort, Russia, China and Pakistan are meeting in Moscow on December 27 to discuss the ISIS threat in Afghanistan, crucially without any representation from the NUG. Future meetings of this working group are expected to involve Iran as well.
Three, open direct channels with elements in the Afghan Taliban that are not under Pakistan’s influence.
The first option is highly dependent on the NUG’s own successes. It has been a disappointment thus far – mired in allegations of misgovernance, corruption and disunity. An Asia Foundation survey indicated that 66% of the Afghan population is now pessimistic about the direction the country is heading in, with insecurity indicated as the major factor. This strategy is also dependent on how the Donald Trump administration views Afghanistan. If the US were to reduce focus on Afghanistan, India would find supporting this option on its own untenable.
The second and third options would mean that India will have to look beyond the NUG. Apart from establishing contacts with sections within the Taliban, it would mean reviving contacts with provincial leaders, an enterprise which may lead to problems with the NUG.
The three options are not mutually exclusive. For the moment, India would do well to keep abreast of developments in both camps – the Russia, Iran overtures to the Taliban and the Trump administration’s future plans for Afghanistan. There are dangers, no matter what, in both sets. The Russia, Iran initiative in talking to the Taliban would, inevitably, mean giving Pakistan a larger than merited role shaping the future of the region.
The future of the US in Afghanistan is also uncertain. Afghanistan has been a bad experience for the Americans and they too may choose to view the Taliban menace as a localised insurgency and not one which is a global terrorist threat. If it feels that the US is seeking an exit, Pakistan can hasten it by sacrificing the Haqqani network at an appropriate time, thereby making a re-entry into the good books of the US.
There are no easy choices in the Afghanistan war. Unless the NUG, or the government succeeding it, backed by well-wishing international actors, can regain control of important districts in Afghanistan, other countries are likely to take the cue from Russia and Iran. It will effectively lead to a return of the nineties – only the aftershocks will travel further this time around.
With the entry of ISIS into the Afghanistan equation, Indian interests have diverged from those of Russia and Iran, who have said that ISIS is a much more dangerous threat than the Taliban.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani. Credit: PTI
Iran, Russia and India were the big three powers that acted in unison – in supporting the Northern Alliance – to prevent a complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban between 1996 and 2001. This experience of working together to resist the Taliban has largely shaped their actions in Afghanistan since then.
Cooperation between the three states, even in the overt domain, continued over the years and was evident recently as well. In November 2016, India completed the delivery of a batch of four Mi-25 Russian combat helicopters to Afghanistan. Earlier in March 2016, India and Iran signed a bilateral deal to develop the Chabahar port that would provide Afghanistan an alternate access to the sea, bypassing Pakistan. Such instances of collaboration involving Russia, Iran and India have given rise to a belief that these three powers have convergent interests regarding peace and stability in Afghanistan.
It is in light of this history of cooperation that Russia’s statements regarding the ISIS in Afghanistan have caused a stir in India. The Russian president’s special representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, went on record saying that the ISIS — not the Taliban — is a bigger threat in the region.
Similarly, Iran continues to make overtures towards sections in the Taliban. Afghanistan’s former intelligence chief, Rahmatullah Nabil, in November accused Iran of supporting the Taliban in order to counter the Daesh threat.
In sharp contrast, India still regards the Taliban and its sponsors as bigger threats to Afghanistan. Earlier this month, the Ministry of External Aaffairs spokesperson said regarding the Taliban, “They have to respect the internationally agreed red lines, give up terrorism and violence, sever all ties with al Qaeda, agree to follow democratic norms and not do anything which will erode the gains of the last 15 years. Ultimately it is for the government of Afghanistan to decide whom to talk to and how.”
So, the question before India is: with the ISIS brought into the Afghanistan equation, have the interests of Russia, Iran and India now diverged in Afghanistan? And, if yes, what are the implications of this development for India’s strategy?
Is there a divergence?
The question of parting ways has two disparate elements: one that involves the Taliban and the other involves the ISIS. On the Taliban question, it is safe to say that there is no major divergence between Russia, India and Iran. All three would settle for any Afghan-owned arrangement that ends the cycle of violence in the country. There are differences, however, in the desired means to achieve this goal. India regards that it is the prerogative of the Afghan government to decide the pace of talks with the Taliban. But Russia and Iran differ. With the war against ISIS in Syria heading towards a denouement, there is a sense of urgency for Russia and Iran to act which has lead them to make their own suo motu overtures towards the Taliban.
On the second question regarding the ISIS, there is definitely a divergence. Russia sees ISIS in Afghanistan from the prism of its involvement in the ongoing Syrian war. While the Russian government has chosen to support the Shia dominated Bashar al-Assad government, this move is seen to be extremely unpopular in the eyes of the Sunni Russian Muslims.
Russia’s 20 million-strong Muslim minority has become a major recruitment centre for the ISIS. Russian Muslims have joined the ISIS in Syria and there have been reports indicating that the Russian authorities even encouraged some to go to Syria way back in 2011, with the hope that these ‘trouble-makers’ would never return. Today, there are an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 Russian citizens with the ISIS, putting it far ahead of other European countries. Another 2,000 are Russian-speaking, making Russian the second most common language in the ISIS, after Arabic.
This strategy of wishing away its problems seems to have failed, though. In October 2015, Putin’s chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, acknowledged that many of the Russians who fought for ISIS have “returned home, presenting a direct threat.” This fear was also articulated by Putin in his speech at the UN General Assembly last September. Two months later, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev revealed that “many thousands of Russian citizens and individuals from other post-Soviet republics are fighting in Syria. These completely brainwashed people return home as professional murderers and terrorists. And we don’t want them to stage something similar in Russia after their Syrian stints expire.”
Now, this is where Afghanistan comes into the equation. Russia fears that these Russian-speaking ISIS members will set base in Afghanistan, particularly in the north, along the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is also feared that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has much in common with the Russian Muslims in ISIS and is already present on Afghan soil, could gravitate towards ISIS and help them secure a foothold. Russia crucially sees any organisation under the ISIS flag as a global threat. Hence, its endeavour to portray the Taliban – a local, Afghanistan-based movement in Kabulov’s words – as a lesser threat.
Iran’s fears are somewhat similar. It is concerned that an influx of Sunni ISIS militants from Iraq and Syria will pose problems not only for the large Shia minority in Afghanistan but also for its own security. Another problem on its eastern borders would only add to its insecurities. And hence, Iran sees the ISIS as the irreconcilable enemy and Taliban as a secondary threat.
India sees the situation differently, and for good reasons. The Indian perception is based on an understanding that the ISIS in Afghanistan or Wilayat Khorasan is merely made up of rump factions of the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban and assorted drug and crime syndicates, all with a markedly anti-Pakistan orientation and with no global aspirations. Moreover, India is far more comfortably placed than Russia or Iran in this regard because of the buffer that is provided, paradoxically by Pakistan.
One view in India is that a singular focus on ISIS in Afghanistan will derail the fight against Taliban which has now killed over 6,000 Afghan soldiers and over 30,000 civilians in 2016 alone. Another reason for the Indian scepticism is that the focus on ISIS would bail out Pakistan, which today is internationally questioned for abetting terrorism. A ‘global’ threat would be used by Pakistan to create a new narrative, a new set of friends and to secure more funding. It would then be a sense of deja vu for India, with the ISI making overtures to elements within this group, providing sanctuaries in return for assurances that they would not be targeted and then manoeuvring to bring Kashmir into the equation.
An Afghan National Army soldier stands guard after the inauguration of the reconstruction project to restore the ruins of historic Darul Aman palace, in Kabul, Afghanistan May 30, 2016. Credit: Reuters/Omar Sobhani
Where does this leave India?
With Russia and Iran moving towards an overly anti-ISIS focus in Afghanistan, India is broadly left with three options.
One, continue to back the Afghan National Unity Government’s (NUG) peace efforts and anti-terrorism resistance. This would mean urgent and sustained collaboration with the US under the Afghanistan-India-US trilateral to strengthen the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and rebuild the Afghan economy.
Two, become a part of Russia and Iran’s efforts in talking to the Taliban. As a part of one such effort, Russia, China and Pakistan are meeting in Moscow on December 27 to discuss the ISIS threat in Afghanistan, crucially without any representation from the NUG. Future meetings of this working group are expected to involve Iran as well.
Three, open direct channels with elements in the Afghan Taliban that are not under Pakistan’s influence.
The first option is highly dependent on the NUG’s own successes. It has been a disappointment thus far – mired in allegations of misgovernance, corruption and disunity. An Asia Foundation survey indicated that 66% of the Afghan population is now pessimistic about the direction the country is heading in, with insecurity indicated as the major factor. This strategy is also dependent on how the Donald Trump administration views Afghanistan. If the US were to reduce focus on Afghanistan, India would find supporting this option on its own untenable.
The second and third options would mean that India will have to look beyond the NUG. Apart from establishing contacts with sections within the Taliban, it would mean reviving contacts with provincial leaders, an enterprise which may lead to problems with the NUG.
The three options are not mutually exclusive. For the moment, India would do well to keep abreast of developments in both camps – the Russia, Iran overtures to the Taliban and the Trump administration’s future plans for Afghanistan. There are dangers, no matter what, in both sets. The Russia, Iran initiative in talking to the Taliban would, inevitably, mean giving Pakistan a larger than merited role shaping the future of the region.
The future of the US in Afghanistan is also uncertain. Afghanistan has been a bad experience for the Americans and they too may choose to view the Taliban menace as a localised insurgency and not one which is a global terrorist threat. If it feels that the US is seeking an exit, Pakistan can hasten it by sacrificing the Haqqani network at an appropriate time, thereby making a re-entry into the good books of the US.
There are no easy choices in the Afghanistan war. Unless the NUG, or the government succeeding it, backed by well-wishing international actors, can regain control of important districts in Afghanistan, other countries are likely to take the cue from Russia and Iran. It will effectively lead to a return of the nineties – only the aftershocks will travel further this time around.
vinuzap
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to quote
"Well the same argument can also be applied to China also. Why US and USSR/Russia allowed the rise of China under their noses? This case is peculiar with respect to US-China relationship where US an aggressive capitalist nation & sworn enemy of communism allowed the rise of communist China in a big way.So your argument doesn't hold good in this case. Even our economic rise is somewhat linked with US due to rapid rise of our service sector and software boom which was fueled by US companies in search of cheap technical work force. In post globalization world, our economic rise is not a threat till we provide a huge market to various MNCs based in US but when we start to interfere in their supposed strategic domain of influence then we become an actual threat. China, for example, has remained muted through all its journey to become economic superpower till it gained enough weight militarily as well as economically to challenge US. For us, we have no choice but to get aligned with US or Russia where our strategic and economic interests suits more and to remain muted till we acquire enough weight to pose a credible threat to it in case of any conflict of interests."
because china was cheap manufacturing capital and occasionally provide hollywood import and yes it was passive during this period it was humiliated by west on many front till the time it found its voice
on the contrary :
india enjoy a very good relation with both u.s and russia and can play cards when required
yes it is fully aware that CPEC is an alternative route to indian ocean and a millitary tool by china to enslave pakis completely but you forgot india and china share multi billion in trade and even if it become sucessful which is highly unlikely through this route china will only will try to trade india only
"Well the same argument can also be applied to China also. Why US and USSR/Russia allowed the rise of China under their noses? This case is peculiar with respect to US-China relationship where US an aggressive capitalist nation & sworn enemy of communism allowed the rise of communist China in a big way.So your argument doesn't hold good in this case. Even our economic rise is somewhat linked with US due to rapid rise of our service sector and software boom which was fueled by US companies in search of cheap technical work force. In post globalization world, our economic rise is not a threat till we provide a huge market to various MNCs based in US but when we start to interfere in their supposed strategic domain of influence then we become an actual threat. China, for example, has remained muted through all its journey to become economic superpower till it gained enough weight militarily as well as economically to challenge US. For us, we have no choice but to get aligned with US or Russia where our strategic and economic interests suits more and to remain muted till we acquire enough weight to pose a credible threat to it in case of any conflict of interests."
because china was cheap manufacturing capital and occasionally provide hollywood import and yes it was passive during this period it was humiliated by west on many front till the time it found its voice
on the contrary :
india enjoy a very good relation with both u.s and russia and can play cards when required
yes it is fully aware that CPEC is an alternative route to indian ocean and a millitary tool by china to enslave pakis completely but you forgot india and china share multi billion in trade and even if it become sucessful which is highly unlikely through this route china will only will try to trade india only
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A few roads connecting a few industrial zones can't change fate of a nation.
For India? We have bigger corridors.
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You mean India should should Join Porkies in CPEC even though they take the head of Indian troops and paraded as trophies.
Pakistan is a failed state neither China nor Russia which itself no longer a world power could revive Pak.
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Joining CPEC is like giving legal certification to Pakistani occupation of PoK. India will never do it.
Cutting Edge
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Russia-India relations entering a “difficult phase”: Analyst
30 December 2016 Nilova Roy Chaudhury, Russia & India Report
The relationship between India and Russia is entering a ‘difficult phase’ despite the leadership of both countries being committed to a strong strategic partnership, feels C.Raja Mohan, one of India’s leading strategic analysts and the Director of Carnegie India. Responding to questions for an exclusive interview with RIR, he also said BRICS was losing relevance for India.
RIR: Is 2017 and the arrival of Donald Trump as President of the United States likely to see global realignments? Is the US- Russia relationship likely to assume centre-stage in global politics?
CRM: The election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States and his declared commitment to improve relations with Russia opens the door for a global realignment. To be sure, there is considerable resistance in Washington and skepticism in Moscow about the prospects for a potential rapprochement between America and Russia. But some early and decisive moves by Trump and (Russian President Vladimir) Putin could provide the basis for a restructuring of relations between the two countries and make the partnership between the two a critical element of global politics.
RIR: Do you think that would render the current rising emphasis on multi-polarity in the world, embodied in groupings like BRICS, increasingly irrelevant? Because a closer US-Russia relationship could throw BRICS out of sync. Is the BRICS likely to survive as an entity?
CRM: The idea of multi-polarity at the end of the Cold War emerged as a result of the widespread fears of America as a hyper power and its unilateralism. The passing of the uni-polar moment after the 2008 global economic crisis and the failure of American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the logic for the second tier powers to band together has weakened. Anti-Western agenda is losing its relevance.
If we exclude anti-Westernism, and take into account all the other contradictions – on what basis will we keep this organization together? I have no confidence in the viability of the BRICS.
There are problems, and these are very serious. The Chinese are pressing us on the border issues, and support Pakistan, which India sees as a direct terrorist threat. China's dominance over the BRICS and its deteriorating relations with India has made the forum less attractive to Delhi.
A reset of relations between Moscow and Washington, and the American push back against China will make BRICS more important for Beijing and less important for other members. Brazil and South Africa practically do not actively participate in its activities, being completely absorbed with their internal problems.
Even before the Trump election, the BRICS project had become a two-wheeled cart. Russia and China were pulling it more and more towards their own goals, while Brazil, India and South Africa are gradually moving away.
Russia needed an anti-Western front. The Chinese have cleverly taken advantage of this to achieve their economic goals. They have created a supposedly common, but in fact completely Chinese, bank, thus raising the status of their own currency. Russia assumed that the proposed agenda would be beneficial to all participants, but China has used this organization to increase its own weight. Russia was used as a battering ram; it became the recipient of all the counter-attacks of the West, while China was getting all the benefits.
RIR: How would you categorize the current state of Russia–India relations? What would your outlook be on the trajectory of this particular relationship?
CRM: Russia-India relations have entered a difficult phase. Despite strong commitment to the strategic partnership from (Prime Minister Narendra) Modi and Putin, Russia's dalliance with China and Pakistan has begun to undermine the genuine popular warmth for Moscow in Delhi. Moscow's alignment with Beijing and Islamabad in Afghanistan is likely to make matters worse in the near term. There will be much political work to do to preserve the essence of this partnership in the new era.
The Russian military exercises with Pakistan came as a shock. Everyone in India was very surprised with the exercises. Russia was considered a loyal ally of India in the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the Kashmir. We have had problems with Washington and the Europeans over this issue, while Russia has always clearly supported the Indian position. And in India, this is always very much appreciated. The most negative thing was that these exercises came during a very bad week for Indo-Pakistani relations (after the terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Uri in September) and Russian support of Pakistan inflicted a serious blow to Moscow’s reputation in India.
RIR: Is the India–Russia relationship a limited one, with undue emphasis on strategic (defence and nuclear) issues? Or is it one of the defining relationships that will determine the course of events, particularly in this part of the world?
CRM: The relationship is a limited one, despite the strong strategic quotient. There are two main problems in Russian-Indian relations. Firstly, we are not developing cooperation outside the military, nuclear and the oil and gas sectors. Human ties between our peoples are insufficient, and this is bad. To ensure that our bilateral relationship is not unduly influenced by our relations with third countries, we need to step up our bilateral economic base.
Secondly, India is seeing an increasing threat coming from a rising China. For Russia, China is a partner when it comes to its confrontation with the West. This may, of course, give rise to some discord in the future. Similarly, in this regard, India is committed to maintaining good relations with the United States, which can also cause dissatisfaction on the part of Russia.
In recent years the Chinese have supported Pakistan, and are pushing Russia in the same direction. For example, this applies to the RD-93 engines, which are used in the Chinese JF-17 fighter jets. Russia does not sell these directly to Pakistanis, but sells them to China, which then resells them to Pakistan. Russia must know that this is happening. The China factor is starting to play a disproportionately large role in our relations.
Mr. Modi is continuing on the course that India has been followed since 1991 – economic reforms and building cooperation with the USA and Japan, while maintaining good relations with Russia. The contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant with Russia was initiated by the previous government, but Narendra Modi is successfully continuing it. He feels confident that he can build good relations with everyone. Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Narendra Modi in Goa went well.
http://in.rbth.com/russian_india_ex...ons-entering-a-difficult-phase-analyst_672171
30 December 2016 Nilova Roy Chaudhury, Russia & India Report
The relationship between India and Russia is entering a ‘difficult phase’ despite the leadership of both countries being committed to a strong strategic partnership, feels C.Raja Mohan, one of India’s leading strategic analysts and the Director of Carnegie India. Responding to questions for an exclusive interview with RIR, he also said BRICS was losing relevance for India.
RIR: Is 2017 and the arrival of Donald Trump as President of the United States likely to see global realignments? Is the US- Russia relationship likely to assume centre-stage in global politics?
CRM: The election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States and his declared commitment to improve relations with Russia opens the door for a global realignment. To be sure, there is considerable resistance in Washington and skepticism in Moscow about the prospects for a potential rapprochement between America and Russia. But some early and decisive moves by Trump and (Russian President Vladimir) Putin could provide the basis for a restructuring of relations between the two countries and make the partnership between the two a critical element of global politics.
RIR: Do you think that would render the current rising emphasis on multi-polarity in the world, embodied in groupings like BRICS, increasingly irrelevant? Because a closer US-Russia relationship could throw BRICS out of sync. Is the BRICS likely to survive as an entity?
CRM: The idea of multi-polarity at the end of the Cold War emerged as a result of the widespread fears of America as a hyper power and its unilateralism. The passing of the uni-polar moment after the 2008 global economic crisis and the failure of American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the logic for the second tier powers to band together has weakened. Anti-Western agenda is losing its relevance.
If we exclude anti-Westernism, and take into account all the other contradictions – on what basis will we keep this organization together? I have no confidence in the viability of the BRICS.
There are problems, and these are very serious. The Chinese are pressing us on the border issues, and support Pakistan, which India sees as a direct terrorist threat. China's dominance over the BRICS and its deteriorating relations with India has made the forum less attractive to Delhi.
A reset of relations between Moscow and Washington, and the American push back against China will make BRICS more important for Beijing and less important for other members. Brazil and South Africa practically do not actively participate in its activities, being completely absorbed with their internal problems.
Even before the Trump election, the BRICS project had become a two-wheeled cart. Russia and China were pulling it more and more towards their own goals, while Brazil, India and South Africa are gradually moving away.
Russia needed an anti-Western front. The Chinese have cleverly taken advantage of this to achieve their economic goals. They have created a supposedly common, but in fact completely Chinese, bank, thus raising the status of their own currency. Russia assumed that the proposed agenda would be beneficial to all participants, but China has used this organization to increase its own weight. Russia was used as a battering ram; it became the recipient of all the counter-attacks of the West, while China was getting all the benefits.
RIR: How would you categorize the current state of Russia–India relations? What would your outlook be on the trajectory of this particular relationship?
CRM: Russia-India relations have entered a difficult phase. Despite strong commitment to the strategic partnership from (Prime Minister Narendra) Modi and Putin, Russia's dalliance with China and Pakistan has begun to undermine the genuine popular warmth for Moscow in Delhi. Moscow's alignment with Beijing and Islamabad in Afghanistan is likely to make matters worse in the near term. There will be much political work to do to preserve the essence of this partnership in the new era.
The Russian military exercises with Pakistan came as a shock. Everyone in India was very surprised with the exercises. Russia was considered a loyal ally of India in the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the Kashmir. We have had problems with Washington and the Europeans over this issue, while Russia has always clearly supported the Indian position. And in India, this is always very much appreciated. The most negative thing was that these exercises came during a very bad week for Indo-Pakistani relations (after the terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Uri in September) and Russian support of Pakistan inflicted a serious blow to Moscow’s reputation in India.
RIR: Is the India–Russia relationship a limited one, with undue emphasis on strategic (defence and nuclear) issues? Or is it one of the defining relationships that will determine the course of events, particularly in this part of the world?
CRM: The relationship is a limited one, despite the strong strategic quotient. There are two main problems in Russian-Indian relations. Firstly, we are not developing cooperation outside the military, nuclear and the oil and gas sectors. Human ties between our peoples are insufficient, and this is bad. To ensure that our bilateral relationship is not unduly influenced by our relations with third countries, we need to step up our bilateral economic base.
Secondly, India is seeing an increasing threat coming from a rising China. For Russia, China is a partner when it comes to its confrontation with the West. This may, of course, give rise to some discord in the future. Similarly, in this regard, India is committed to maintaining good relations with the United States, which can also cause dissatisfaction on the part of Russia.
In recent years the Chinese have supported Pakistan, and are pushing Russia in the same direction. For example, this applies to the RD-93 engines, which are used in the Chinese JF-17 fighter jets. Russia does not sell these directly to Pakistanis, but sells them to China, which then resells them to Pakistan. Russia must know that this is happening. The China factor is starting to play a disproportionately large role in our relations.
Mr. Modi is continuing on the course that India has been followed since 1991 – economic reforms and building cooperation with the USA and Japan, while maintaining good relations with Russia. The contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant with Russia was initiated by the previous government, but Narendra Modi is successfully continuing it. He feels confident that he can build good relations with everyone. Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Narendra Modi in Goa went well.
http://in.rbth.com/russian_india_ex...ons-entering-a-difficult-phase-analyst_672171
gadeshi
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What about to force porkies to accept Indian forces to protect CPEC infrastructure?
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Cutting Edge
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Sir, that would be a dream come true. If that ever happens.What about to force porkies to accept Indian forces to protect CPEC infrastructure?
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Bahamut
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I had a talk with my army friends if changing how we interact with Pak. We do investment like building power plants railway to connect India and Pakistan so that the trade increase and economic cost for them supporting the Kashmir issue rises. Also the pak public will look towatds India as a friend and we can reduce the influence of the army by supporting the civil government.
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Or force them to give back PoK.What about to force porkies to accept Indian forces to protect CPEC infrastructure?
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We are more than enough to take care of them thereafter.
gadeshi
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I think, Putin's way (non-military) is far more effective
And it is not only me (but your govt as well) who accepts this
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