Indo-Pakistan War of 1965

Discussion in 'Defence & Strategic Issues' started by pyromaniac, Mar 25, 2009.

  1. pyromaniac

    pyromaniac Founding Member

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    The second Indo-Pakistani conflict (1965) was also fought over Kashmir and started without a formal declaration of war. The war began in August 5, 1965 and was ended Sept 22, 1965.

    The war was initiated by Pakistan who since the defeat of India by China in 1962 had come to believe that Indian military would be unable or unwilling to defend against a quick military campaign in Kashmir, and because the Pakistani government was becoming increasingly alarmed by Indian efforts to integrate Kashmir within India. There was also a perception that there was widespread popular support within for Pakistani rule and that the Kashmiri people were disatisfied with Indian rule.

    After Pakistan was successful in the Rann of Kutch earlier in 1965, Ayub Khan (by nature a cautious person) was pressured by the hawks in his cabinet (led by Z.A. Bhutto) and the army to infiltrate the ceasefire line in Kashmir. The action was based on the incorrect premise that indigenous resistance could be ignited by a few saboteurs. Ayub resisted the idea as he foresaw India crossing the international frontier in retaliation at a point of its choosing. The Bhutto faction, which included some prominent generals, put out the canard that Ayub's cowardice stemmed from his desire to protect his newly acquired wealth. It was boasted at the time that one Pakistani soldier was equal to four Indian soldiers and so on.

    On August 5, 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on August 15.

    The initial battles between India and Pakistan were contained within Kashmir involving both infantry and armor units with each country's air force playing major roles. It was not until early Sept. when Pakistani forces attacked Ackhnur that the Indians escalated the conflict by attacking targets within Pakistan itself, forcing the Pakistani forces to disengage from Ackhnur to counter Indian attacks.

    The largest engagement of the war occurred in the Sialkot region where some 400 to 600 tanks squared off. Unfortunately the battle was indecisive.

    By Sept 22 both sides had agreed to a UN mandated cease-fire ending the war that had by that point reached a stalemate.

    Overall, the war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

    Pakistan was rudely shocked by the reaction of the United States to the war. Judging the matter to be largely Pakistan s fault, the United States not only refused to come to Pakistan s aid under the terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, but issued a statement declaring its neutrality while also cutting off military supplies. The Pakistanis were embittered at what they considered a friend's betrayal, and the experience taught them to avoid relying on any single source of support. For its part, the United States was disillusioned by a war in which both sides used United States-supplied equipment. The war brought other repercussions for the security relationship as well. The United States withdrew its military assistance advisory group in July 1967. In response to these events, Pakistan declined to renew the lease on the Peshawar military facility, which ended in 1969. Eventually, United States-Pakistan relations grew measurably weaker as the United States became more deeply involved in Vietnam and as its broader interest in the security of South Asia waned.

    Iran, Indonesia, and especially China gave political support to Pakistan during the war, thus suggesting new directions in Pakistan that might translate into support for its security concerns. Most striking was the attitude of the Soviet Union. Its post-Khrushchev leadership, rather than rallying reflexively to India's side, adopted a neutral position and ultimately provided the good offices at Tashkent, which led to the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration that restored the status quo ante.

    The aftermath of the 1965 war saw a dramatic shift in Pakistan's security environment. Instead of a single alignment with the United States against China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan found itself cut off from United States military support, on increasingly warm terms with China, and treated equitably by the Soviet Union. Unchanged was the enmity with which India and Pakistan regarded each other over Kashmir. The result was the elaboration of a new security approach, called by Ayub Khan the "triangular tightrope"--a tricky endeavor to maintain good ties with the United States while cultivating China and the Soviet Union. Support from other developing nations was also welcome. None of the new relationships carried the weight of previous ties with the United States, but, taken together, they at least provided Pakistan with a political counterbalance to India.


    Indo-Pakistan War of 1965



    No one really talks about this war so here ya go....
     
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  3. SATISH

    SATISH DFI Technocrat Stars and Ambassadors

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    Raid on Badin

    English Electric Canberra and the Indian Air Force
    http://s188567700.online.de/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=175&Itemid=47





    The Indian Air Force (IAF) acquired the English Electric (EE) Canberra bomber starting in 1957. Three basic variants were operated: B(I).Mk.8, PR.Mk.7 and T.Mk.4, customized and purpose-built for the IAF as B(I).Mk.58, TT.Mk.418, PR.Mk.57 and PR.Mk.67. Additional aircraft were acquired from the Royal Air Force (RAF) and a smaller number from the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF). India eventually emerged as the biggest export customer for the type, and the 91 aircraft acquired were distributed between 7 different IAF squadrons over last 40 years. The IAF units flying Canberras are the No.5 Tuskers, No.6 Dragons, No.16 Rattlers, No.35 Rapiers, No.106 Lynxes Strategic Photo Reconnaissance (SPR) Squadron, the now-defunct Jet Bomber Conversion Unit (JBCU) and the No.2 Target Towing Unit, although there were never more than five units operating the type simultaneously.

    Among the salient features of this bird were a large payload with the choice of mixing and matching a suitable configuration. A 20 mm gun pack with no less but 500 rounds could be fitted in the belly and the aircraft featured weapon rails on the wings. Its extremely high endurance and range could be fully exploited due to its ability to carry a two or even a three member crew. The Canberra was also the first combat aircraft in the IAF to feature an autopilot and hence considerably reduced pilot fatigue for long missions. On one occasion in Congo, when the pilot had to go forward to aid the navigator injured by ground fire – he could do so only after setting the aircraft on autopilot.

    On the avionics front, a tail-facing radar-warning-receiver called ”Orange Putter” was mounted to provide early warning from chasing interceptors. This also proved to be helpful in actual combat since the pilot could undertake evasive maneouvers to avoid contact. The job of the navigator was far from easy and required excellent coordination between the crew: sitting behind a large plexiglas nose, exposed to the AAA and bird-hits, with no ejection seat, the navigator was extremely vulnerable and had to be completely confident about the pilot. Nevertheless, the Canberra was a very agile aircraft for its size. Its qualities added up nicely – and it is no surprise that the type holds the record for the longest serving aircraft type in the IAF.

    In IAF service, Canberras have dropped weapon loads in four separate conflicts facing varying levels of complexity and quality of opposition. In the Kashmir War, 1965, the Canberra was also the only combat aircraft in the IAF inventory that could fight by night. The avionics, the payload, and the range enabled the IAF to launch bold strikes deep into the enemy airspace, including the PAF base in Peshawar. This involved flying across almost the entire breadth of Pakistan. In the post-1971 conflicts only recce missions have been flown. They have flown over Africa, India-Pakistan and Sri Lanka during war and peace keeping efforts by the Indian forces. Roles assigned to the Canberra crews included long-range reconnaissance, counter-interdiction, Electronic Warfare (EW), and as we will see later Suppression Of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)…The Canberra is also a member of an elite club of three IAF types that have survived a direct missile hit (the other two being Su-7 and An-32). Reconnaissance versions are still flown not only by the IAF but also by the RAF even today, and the last used them actively over Iraq in March and April 2003.


    An IAF Canberra B(I).Mk.66, seen during refuelling in Sharyah, in 1968. Note the wingtip tanks and anti-glare paint on the nose. The cover over the cokpit is for protection of the instruments from the sun. (Tom Cooper collection)



    War in 1965


    In 1965, Pakistan Army hatched a brilliant plan to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from India, by deploying hundreds of mercenary fighters across the Cease Fire Line (now known as the LoC - with some modifications) in civilian garb and cause an insurrection among the ”suppressed” people of Kashmir. The plan, code-named ”Operation Gibraltar”, was put into action in early August 1965. Unfortunately for the Pakistanis, the Kashmiri people refused to co-operate with the invaders, so the “Mujahids” went on to create arson, murder, rape and robbery in Kashmir and the Indian Army was called to save the people from the invaders. Desperate after the initial plan bust, the Pakistan Army then made a major armour-cum-infantry thrust into the Chhamb area and threatened the vital Akhnur bridge on the Jammu-Punch road, in turn causing the outbreak of the full-scale war.

    In 1965, Pakistan was still composed of two entities separated by India: West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971). For most of this war the action was to be concentrated to the border between West Pakistan and India, and there was only a very limited exchange between the two sides in the East. The Indian Air Force, at the time organized into the Western and Eastern Air Commands, had consequently to deploy its Canberra force over several widely separated airfields. The Squadrons No. 5, and 35, equipped mainly with Canberra B(I).Mk.58s were based at Ambala and Lohegaon AFS, and served – together with the Sqn No. 106, flying Canberra PR.Mk.57s from Agra AFS – with the Western Air Command. The Sqn No.16, equipped with Canberra B(I).Mk.58s, was based at Kalaikunda AFS, and subordinated to the Eastern Air Command.

    Theoretically, the Canberra was grossly outdated by the time, especially as the PAF operated a squadron of F-104A Starfighter interceptors, the only type on both sides equipped with a radar. Besides the Pakistani Starfighters – around 30 F-86F Sabres were armed with AIM-9B Sidewinders. While belonging to an early generation of AAMs they were still far more reliable than the R-13, a Soviet copy of the AIM-9B, with which the few Indian MiG-21F-13s were equipped. The sole MiG-21 Sqn, which held just nine aircraft in its inventory, was still working up when war started, and hence played an inconsequential role in the conflict.

    The IAF Canberras were difficult to operate by night due to poor light transmission of the wind screen, and hence flew bombing missions mostly by day. While there were considerable gaps in the Pakistani radar net, they were still vulnerable to all Pakistani fighters during the day and Starfighters by night. But perhaps due to the fact that the maximum fleet of the PAF was concentrated at PAF Sargodha, there was enough space for the IAF Canberra-fleet to play a significant role.


    IAF Canberra B.(I).Mk.58 "IF898" (originally built for RAF as XK959) of the No 5 Sqn IAF, "Tuskers", seen while staging through Khormaksar, in 1962. The aircraft belonged to the IAF detachment with the UN units in Congo - "Opération des Nations Unies au Congo" (ONUC). Note the belly gun pack and squadron crest. (Tom Cooper collection)



    16 Sqn Rattlers

    Interestingly enough, the unit picked to fly the raid against the PAF radar station at Badin was the No. 16 Sqn, known as “The Rattlers”, a unit flying Canberras since 1958. The Rattlers had already seen some action during the fighting against the Portuguese for the liberation of Goa and two other Portuguese colonies in India. Their war in 1965, however, was to become the first serious test of the unit.

    In 1965, the No. 16 Sqn was under command of Wing Commander (Wg. Cdr.) Peter M Wilson, and originally stationed at Kalaikunda AFS, in the eastern theatre. The war began for the No.16 Sqn with an order for a probe attack against the Chittagong airfield in the morning of 7 September, to neutralize any PAF aircraft on the ground. However, the intelligence turned out to be poor and the Canberras returned after attacking the airfield.

    After few other Indian strikes against targets elsewhere in East Bangladesh, the Pakistanis were swift to retaliate: at 0630hrs of 7 September, four Sabres lead by PAF Sqn. Ldr. Syed, penetrated the Indian airspace and attacked Kalaikunda. Arriving over their target just minutes after Wilson and his wingman landed, they achieved complete surprise and destroyed two 16 Sqn Canberras. In another raid the same day two more were destroyed bringing the total 16 Sqn losses on the ground to four. There was very little combat in the Eastern theatre for the rest of the war.

    The No. 16 Sqn was shifted to the West, to Bareli AFS, and from the early hours of 17 September it started flying operations against West Pakistan. The first targets – attacked along with the bombers from the No. 5 Sqn Tuskers – were PAF bases at Chak Jhumra, Akwal, and Sargodha. Five Canberras from the No.16 Sqn participated in the strike against Sargodha, where no enemy aircraft were sighted, following which all aircraft returned safely. After a single-ship recce mission, however, the unit was to get a far more important – but also complex and dangerous task: an attack against the Pakistani radar station at Badin.


    Port-side view of the IF898. The "Orange Putter" radar-warning-receiver of the IAF Canberras functioned excellently in the war 1965, and warned the crews several times of PAF interceptors, in turn enabling them to take evasive action. For a number of reasons, however, several IAF Canberra attacks during this war were not very successful: while the aircraft were relatively well-euqipped, their ordnance was obsolete, and many of the bombs failed to detonate. The heavy strike against the PAF radar station near Badin, however, was different in so far that all bombs detonated and caused considerable damage on secondary installations. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)



    The Target

    Badin is located in south-western Pakistan, on a flat and sandy terrain typical of Sindh, where post- independence availability of irrigation allowed cultivation of land for agriculture. Badin was home to a very effective radar station, operated by the No. 408 Sqn PAF. This was not just another radar node, but one of the two Sector Operations Centres (SOCs) of the Pakistani Air Defence Ground Environment system (ADGE), the other similar station being at Sakesar. The facility consisted of FPS-6 radar(s) with a search range of around 350 Km with a peak power of 3.5 MW. The technology available to the PAF was unique to the subcontinent and was a result the military assistance given by the USA as required in the SEATO treaty. From Badin the PAF could monitor air activity over Indian air bases like Bhuj, Jamnagar, Uttarlai and Jaisalmer. The nearest important PAF air base was at Mauripur (known as PAF Masroor since 1967).

    Modern AirForces, including the present IAF, operate autonomous missiles that can attack enemy locations such as Badin from standoff ranges. Even today, the so-called SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) missions are considered the most difficult of military air operations: at the time, however without any anti-radar missiles or sophisticated electronic countermeasures (ECM), attacking targets of this type so deep inside the enemy airspace was an extremely complicated task, especially as the high value assets like such long-range radars are always fiercely protected, with a matrix of ground-based air defences and manned interceptors deployed around them. Yet, in 1965 the IAF had to rely on simple weaponry that was not too different from those required in other, “safer”, missions.

    The target-intel for the strike on the radar station in Badin was provided by a reconnaissance sortie flown by a single Canberra PR.Mk.57 of the No.106 Squadron, piloted by Sqn. Ldr. JM Nath, the CO of this unit. Before the 1965 war, Sqn Ldr JM Nath already had the honour of a Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), which he had earned in the 1962 Canberra operations against the Chinese. The photographs from this mission unveiled two large domes, mounted on towers 80ft high: the intelligence crews informed Wg. Cdr. Wilson that the azimuth antenna – which was considered the most important, and therefore assigned as a main target for the coming strike – was mounted on the top of the eastern tower. A decision was taken the strike to be lead by a single Canberra, which would be equipped with 68mm rockets and the gun-pack. Four other aircraft would carry free-fall bombs while one would act as decoy. All aircraft were to operate from Agra: although much closer to Badin than Bareli, the distance was still over 1,000 Km to the target. The aircraft were all to approach the target at a very low level. Then the leader would mark it with rockets for four bomb-armed aircraft that were to meanwhile climb and then bomb from a medium level. This was in accordance to the standard IAF tactics of the time that called for marking the target in order to increase the precision of medium-level bomb-attacks.

    Wg. Cdr. Wilson, who flew this strike with his wartime navigator Sqn. Ldr. ON “Shanks” Shankaran, later recalled:



    “The fourth and last mission flown by the squadron was against Badin on the 21st September and mounted from Agra. There were no staging airfields though the aircraft landed for fuel on the way back. The mission consisted of 6 aircraft and was mounted at 10:00 hrs. on target with no escorts of any description.

    The aim of the mission was to destroy the eastern dome of the SU, which was wrongly thought to be the azimuth radar, and to damage supporting installations. Since level bombing was not accurate enough to destroy the dome, it was decided to use 68mm rockets, which had sufficient velocity to approach the accuracy of gun fire.

    The plan of attack required one aircraft to climb to 10,000 feet - 80 miles short of target to act as a decoy in case of fighter pressure over target. This aircraft returned to base after a brief exposure.

    Four aircraft at two-minute intervals approached at very low level and then climbed to 7000 ft. AGL for bomb runs. The first two aircraft carried 2 x 4000 lb bombs (World War II vintage) and the next two aircraft 6 x 1000 lb bombs each. The ballistics of the 4000 lbs. bombs were unknown and the first two bombs fell short, causing the crew to call for correction. The second aircraft was more accurate and the other two aircraft had no problem.

    The rocket firing aircraft carrying 2 x 19/68 mm pods approached from the south at 30 feet AGL and fired upwards at the dome. Only one pod fired and the rockets were seen to splash the dome. The aircraft exited the area eastward.

    There was considerable smoke on target and flak bursts were numerous. Since not a single 20mm round was fired, Badin village could only have been hit by fire from the Pakistani A-A guns."



    While starting from Bareli AB, the Canberras of the No.16 Sqn staged through Agra while underway to Badin, in order to refuel: the distance to the target was still over 1.000km - on a direct course, and it is certain that Wg.Cdr. Wilon took care to fly around the nearest radar stations in eastern Pakistan.


    Wilson’s original plan called for an attack after a direct approach from the east, and egress towards west. On the final approach, however, he misidentified another feature as his target and altered his course accordingly. Realizing his mistake only in the final moments he aborted and turned around for a second pass. Still at a very low level – some 30ft AGL – but now on a south-north axis, he acquired the target and rocketed it successfully. The eastern tower of the Badin radar station was completely obliterated by no less but 19 hits of 68mm rockets fired from his Canberra – and then additionally pulverized by 28.000lbs of high explosive bombs dropped from the five other bombers. At least one Pakistani NCO was killed on the ground: Leading Aircraftman Muhammad Anwar Hussain Khan reportedly died of his injuries sustained while attempting to extinguish fire.

    The Pakistani AAA was heavy but ineffective, and the PAF also failed to scramble or vector any interceptors against neither the strike package nor the decoy - so the Pakistani claim that Gnat F.Mk.1 fighters escorted the Indian bombers, which were engaged by PAF Sabres lacked any basis. The Pakistanis also claimed that the IAF strafed the Badin village, however, Wg. Cdr. Wilson dismissed any such claims: during the mission only two bombers carried guns, one of which was his own – which did not fire even a single round - and the other was the decoy aircraft that never even approached the target area. Nevertheless, the claim for the Gnat escorts has ever since been repeated in quite a few books, including those published by John Fricker and Victor Bingham.

    Except for Wg. Cdr. PM Wilson and his navigator, Sqn. Ldr. ON Shankaran, only two other names from the crews that participated in the Badin strike are known: “Kaddu” Rajput and PP “Pooky” Singh. Rest of the names and ranks remain unknown at this point, this should not imply, however, that they deserve lesser credit.

    It was only after the war that the IAF was to learn about the dome on the destroyed eastern tower in Badin to have actually contained the antenna for the height finding and the GCI radars, and not the azimuth unit they expected there. This fact, however, could not diminish the success of the strike: quite on the contrary, the loss of the GCI-aperture and the supporting installations was a severe blow for the PAF.



    Epilogue

    Sqn. Ldr. JM Nath, CO of the 106 SPR Sqn flew many recce sorties over deep in hostile territory, generally single aircraft formations. Accordingly he was awarded with the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), becoming one of only five pilots awarded this medal during the whole war: thus earning the rare distinction of receiving this medal twice.


    JM Nath seen already with the rank of Wing Commander. When the Kashmir War began, in 1965, he already earned one MVC, for his feats during the 1962 campaign against China. (Jagan Pillariseti, via A. Gupta)


    For the daring daylight raid against Badin, Wg. Cdr. Wilson was awarded the Vir Chakra (VC), one of the highest Indian military decorations in war. During the 1971 War he was the Station Commander of Jamnagar AFS where the Armament Training Wing (ATW) was operating. Now with the rank of Group Captain, he put his combat-experience to a good use: for participating in the planning of daring strikes against the petroleum facilities in Karachi, Masroor, and Badin he was to receive the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM). He retired from the IAF as Air Commodore (Air Cmde).


    Gp Capt PM Wilson. As Group Captain he served as Base Commander of ATW, Jamnagar during the 1971 conflict. (Courtsey Jagan Pillarisetti)


    Despite a relatively poor start, the No. 16 Sqn IAF was to prove its worth and capability later during the fighting. The No.16 Sqn returned with Canberras to fly combat sorties over Pakistan in 1971, but today operates Jaguar IS fighter-bombers. The Canberra even today equips one flight of the 106 Sqn, and are expected to soldier on with the IAF for a few more years.

    On the Pakistani side, Leading Aircraftman Khan was posthumously awarded the Tamgha-e-Juraat medal: he was buried near the Main Guard room of the Badin complex. The radars of the No. 408 Sqn PAF at Badin were later upgraded to the FPX-89/100 standard before being decommissioned at an unknown point in time, and replaced by the long-range, three-dimensional radars of the TPS-43G family.

    Shocked by the devastation caused to Badin, the PAF made amendments by constructing numerous dummy sites in the area. During the 1971 war radar stations at both Badin and Sakesar were repeatedly attacked by the IAF: that, however, is a completely different story…
     
  4. SATISH

    SATISH DFI Technocrat Stars and Ambassadors

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    On September 22/23, 1965, Ichhogil Bund was captured by the 9th battalion of Madras Regiment, under the command of Lt Col BK Satyan in a terrific hand-to-hand fight. The fight ended with the annihilation of approximately two Pakistani companies which attempted to re-occupy the eastern bund of Ichhogil Canal.

    Arms and ammunition recovered in the battle of Ichhogil Bund


    A company was sent away for a different task only that evening. The battalion had three rifle companies at its disposal. Orders were given in no time. But there was hardly any time for the Company Commanders to pass the orders. However, they knew their Thambis. With brief orders, companies went in the following order : ‘D’ company was given the task to clear the bund upto KG Hut; ‘C’ company to clear from KG Hut to Centre Hut and ‘B’ company upto Broken Hut. The whole of divisional artillery and mortars opened up at ‘H-20’. The tanks also lined up in front of village Barka-Kalan and started pounding on the bund and kept the enemy pinned down with their Brownings. ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies reached their positions without much casualties. But when ‘C’ company got out of its position, it was caught up in enemy’s cross-fire. Fifty per cent got wounded including the Company Commander, Maj Dharam Pal.

    Young Uniyal, a gallant fighter from Tehri Garhwal, and a school teacher before joining the Army, was the first to lead his platoon into the battle. With a bayonet fixed on his sten, he led his men right into the bund in the face of thousands of tracers from enemy MMGs. When he reached two hundred yards short of the objective, heavy MMG and LMG fire came from a pill-box north of the KG Hut and the platoon was held up.

    Thambis at Bakri in Pakistan

    Uniyal knew that clearing of this position was very important for the success of the whole operation. He crawled forward with his men. Two gallant young volunteers of his platoon, Sep Narayanan and Sep Bhaskaran came forward to silence the enemy guns. They crawled under the cover of tall grass and within twenty minutes those guns were silenced. No one knew what Thambis’ Triumph Arms and ammunition recovered in the battle of Ichhogil Bund happened to them in the thick of the battle. Uniyal and his platoon rushed forward, cleared the enemy and occupied the pill-box, and from then onwards, charged and cleared trench after trench. Sometimes, the Thambis lifted the enemy out physically and pushed them into the water. It was a hand-to-hand fight. A good number of Pakistani soldiers, leaving their arms, jumped into the canal in an attempt to cross, but hardly anyone reached the other side as they were swept away in the fast current of the canal. The rest were found dead in the trenches with shell or bayonet wounds.

    The battalion captured one officer and ten ORs in this operation. The bund was echoing with war cries of Adi Kollu for one hour. Killing, firing and hurling of grenades across the canal went on unceasing till 3 am. The way battalion’s stretcher- bearers evacuated and treated casualties during the battle put everybody in awe. A good piper, Reddy, was hit by an enemy MMG and he fell dead. When the ambulance jeep attached from the advance dressing station went out of action, the medical NCO, Thankappan known as Rasam in the battalion, took the wheel of the Medical Inspection Room truck and made at least ten trips, evacuating the casualties throughout that night. The battalion had killed fortyeight Pak soldiers and presumably eighty Pak soldiers were washed away in the canal while attempting to cross. This figure was verified by the Pak Commanding Officer who came to collect the dead after the ceasefire.

    The outstanding feature of this battle was that an attack was launched by one battalion less a company against a well co-ordinated defence position occupied by approximately two Pak companies with a complex of MMGs and pill-boxes. The attack was launched within the minimum time with brief orders. In the morning of September 23, when the Pakistani CO met his counterpart, he did not speak a word. He came with a grim look accompanied by a company commander and a few men, collected the dead bodies and rowed across the canal.

    In the wee hours of September 23, Sep Narayanan and Sep Bhaskaran of the leading platoon were found dead in a pool of blood. Sep Narayanan was within a few feet of the pill-box, presumably after throwing a grenade through the slit of the pill-box which held three Pak soldiers—a machine gunner, a light machine gunner and a rifleman with unlimited quantity of ammunition. Sep Narayanan had six bullets across his face.

    Mother of Late Sep Bhaskaran Nair receiving Vir Chakra

    The whole battalion was able to sweep past only because of gallant fighters and the supreme sacrifices of men. Sep Mallappan was sitting dead holding his MMG tight and Sep Ramachandran was dead with a big splinter in his stomach. The concrete pill-box and the bund, splashed with the blood of young heroes, twisted telephone poles with traces of blood and shell holes were evidence of the heroic actions of Thambis.

    In this heroic action, 27 Terrors made supreme sacrifice. The battalion was honoured with one Vir Chakra, two Sena Medals, twelve mentioned -in- despatches and theatre honour - Punjab.

    http://mod.nic.in/samachar/april15-04/body.html
     
  5. WaleedGilani

    WaleedGilani Regular Member

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  7. Singh

    Singh Phat Cat Administrator

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    The Guns of August - Myths of 1965 War, a Pakistani perspective.

    SOME of the writing about the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965 borders on mythology. It is no surprise that generations of Pakistanis continue to believe that India was the aggressor and that one Pakistani soldier was equal to 10 Indian soldiers.

    A few have argued that the war began in August when Pakistan injected guerrillas into the vale of Kashmir to instigate a revolt and grab it before India achieved military dominance in the region. That was Operation Gibraltar.

    When it failed to trigger a revolt and drew a sharp Indian riposte along the ceasefire line, Pakistan upped the ante and launched Operation Grand Slam on Sept 1. Infantry units of the army backed by armour overran the Indian outpost in Chamb, crossed the Tawi river and were headed towards Akhnur in order to cut off India’s line of communication with Srinagar.

    In the minority view, the Indian response on Sept 6 across the international border at Lahore was a natural counter-response, not an act of aggression.

    I asked Sajjad Haider, author of the new book, Flight of the Falcon, to name the aggressor. He retired as an air commodore in the Pakistan Air Force. A fighter pilot to the bone, he does not know how to mince words: “Ayub perpetrated the war.”

    In April, skirmishes had taken place in the Rann of Kutch region several hundred miles south of Kashmir. In that encounter, the Pakistanis prevailed over the Indians. Haider says that the humiliation suffered by the Indians brought Prime Minister Shastri to the conclusion that the next round would be of India’s choosing.

    The Indian army chief prepared for a war that would be fought in the plains of Punjab. Under ‘Operation Ablaze’, it would mount an attack against Lahore, Sialkot and Kasur. Of course, the trigger would have to be pulled by the Pakistanis.

    On May 12, says Haider, an Indian Canberra bomber flew over the Pakistan border on a reconnaissance mission. To quote him: “The PAF scrambled interceptors which got within shooting range of the intruder. Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s permission was sought to bring down the intruder. He sought clearance from the president on the newly installed direct line but Ayub denied permission fearing Indian reprisal.” Laments Haider, “If this was not an indication of Indian intentions, what else could have been?”

    Oblivious to what had just taken place in the skies above Punjab, and failing to anticipate how India was gunning to equalise the score, Ayub gave the green light to Operation Gibraltar on the advice of his foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (later president and prime minister). Bhutto had sought out the opinion about Indian intentions from Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi during a meeting at the Karachi airport and concluded from the latter’s body language that India would not respond.

    So Ayub gave the green light to send 8,000 infiltrators into Indian-held Kashmir. These, says Haider, were mostly youth from Azad Kashmir who had less than four weeks of training in guerrilla warfare. The entire plan was predicated on a passive Indian response, evoking Gen Von Moltke’s dictum: “No war plan survives the first 24 hours of contact with the enemy.”

    It is also worth recalling what the kaiser said to the German troops that were heading off to fight the French in August 1914: “You will be home before the leaves have fallen off the trees.” The three-month war turned into the Great War which lasted for four years.

    Operation Grand Slam abruptly ground to a halt. An Indian general cited by Haider says in his memoirs: “Akhnur was a ripe plum ready to be plucked, but providence came to our rescue.” The Pakistani GHQ decided to switch divisional commanders in the midst of the operation. The new commander, Maj-Gen Yahya (subsequently army chief and president), claimed later he was not tasked with taking Akhnur.

    I asked Haider whether the Pakistani military was prepared for an all-out war with India, a much bigger country with a much bigger military. He said it was the army’s war, since the other services had been kept in the dark. The army was clearly not prepared for an all-out war since a quarter of the soldiers were on leave. They were only recalled as the Indian army crossed the border en route to Lahore, a horrific sight which Haider recalls seeing from the air as he and five of his falcons arrived on the outskirts of Lahore.

    Maj-Gen Sarfraz was the general officer commanding of the No.10 Division which had primary responsibility for the defence of Lahore. Along with other divisional commanders in the region, he had been ordered by GHQ to remove all defensive landmines from the border. None had been taken into confidence about the Kashmir operation. The pleas of these generals to prepare against an Indian invasion were rejected by GHQ with a terse warning: “Do not provoke the Indians.”

    Haider notes that the gateway to Lahore was defended by the 3rd Baloch contingent of 100 men under the intrepid Major Shafqat Baluch. He says, “They fought to the last man till we (No.19 Squadron) arrived to devastate the invading division. There could have been no doubt even in the mind of a hawaldar that an Indian attack would come. But the ostriches at the pulpit had their heads dug in sand up to their necks.”

    In the 1965 war, the Pakistani Army repeated the mistakes of the 1947-48 Kashmir war, but on a grander scale. No official history of the 1965 war was ever written even though President Ayub wanted one. Gen Yahya, his new army chief, just sat on the request until Ayub was hounded out of office by centrifugal forces triggered by the war.

    Pakistan’s grand strategy was flawed. None of its strategic objectives were achieved. And were it not for the tactical brilliance of many mid-level commanders, the country would have been torn apart by the Indians. Ironically, in Ayub’s autobiography, one would be hard pressed to find any references to the war of 1965. One is reminded of De Gaulle’s history of the French army which makes no reference to the events that took place in Waterloo in 1815.

    War, as Clemenceau put it, is too serious a business to be left to the generals.
    The writer has authored Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan.

    The Guns of August Pak Tea House
     
  8. marcos

    marcos New Member

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    Is it true that USA sent their pilots to Pakistan to work as their advisor and strtegist during the war 1965...(forgive me if I missed the information in any previous posts)
     
  9. hit&run

    hit&run Elite Member Elite Member

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    @ waleedgilani:

    Can you please elaborate your point of view on 1965 indo pak war, I have seen your Posts/videos most of them are very generalized and without sense of explaining anything coherent and are less feasible to discuss.
    Are you suffering from YouTube syndrome or these are just trolls?
    Please share your original views about that war. I will definitely contribute to your thoughts.
    Regards
     
  10. Vinod2070

    Vinod2070 मध्यस्थ Stars and Ambassadors

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    The same propaganda video of some pilots bragging in their base, played endlessly by the Pakistanis!

    What does it prove, nothing at all!

    They bragged and were shown up in just six years when they raised their hands in the air at the first sight of Indian soldiers, without even giving a proper fight.
     
  11. nitesh

    nitesh Mob Control Manager Stars and Ambassadors

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  12. 1.44

    1.44 Member of The Month SEPTEMBER 2009 Senior Member

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    Check the description given by the poster of this video.Nothing but propaganda.
    Try youtube videos from Pakarmychannel or zealost.I think there's a documentary as well
     
  13. WaleedGilani

    WaleedGilani Regular Member

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    you wont believe....in every war....both sides are at fault both of them could have stopped it but they didnt....in 1965....the largest tank attack ever was made on the lahore...600+ tanks were used at the time......
     
  14. WaleedGilani

    WaleedGilani Regular Member

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    what propaganda??? dsnt the video say it all???
     
  15. Rage

    Rage DFI TEAM Stars and Ambassadors

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    Did the Pakisthanies say they won the Air War in 1965? I give you: the truth in military-anthological perspective.


    1965 war: A reality check

    October 17, 2005

    The Rediff Special


    Part I: The wrong lessons

    Some of the lessons learnt from the 1965 war pertain to the use of the air force by the two sides.

    Pakistan propaganda, our army's perceptions and expectations, and the Indian Air Force's own reticence were some of the factors for mythologies that emerged from that war which at least four decades later we should be able to judge all but dispassionately.


    As noted in the earlier part, our defence forces were in the process of a major expansion and re-organisation at that time, and Pakistan had far superior technology weapons and equipment. For example, it had been equipped with supersonic interceptor F-104 Starfighters since 1960 and modern air defence radars since 1958, compared to our older, slower, aircraft and very thin radar cover.

    To begin with, in almost every war that we had to fight, air power tilted the balance of success between victory and loss in our favour in all except one war.

    Our land forces (and naval forces in 1971) have performed admirably in wars, often against severe odds. But we need to recognise that air power played a key role in each and every one of them, mostly providing the critical factor that created the opportunities for land forces to defeat the aims of the enemy.


    This reality is often ignored even by the air force itself because in most cases this role was performed not so much by combat air power, but by airlift. For our defence, airlift at crucial periods of history has been more significant than the Berlin Airlift for their strategic implications.

    One only has to look at the empirical evidence to grasp the reality that the defence of Srinagar (and hence Jammu and Kashmir) would not have been possible if the transport aircraft had not managed to put some troops down on the airfield on October 27, 1947.

    If the airlift had not made the landing of the troops possible Kashmir would have been lost before we gained it, and the map of the sub-continent would have been different. Subsequent history of the airlift to Leh only repeated the same scenario except under even more exacting circumstances.

    Poonch was another crucial episode where transport aircraft flown by young pilots had even to cut the engines on final approach at night to ensure they could land in the restricted field constantly under hostile artillery fire.


    Attempts to support Skardu unfortunately remained weak for a variety of reasons. But it also proves the point that adequate airlift could have made the crucial difference in saving Skardu, and today's map of J&K would have been totally different.

    Chushul in 1962 is another case in point of successful defence in the nick of time.


    Similar situations arose in the defence of Siachen and its maintenance since 1983 till date.

    It is in this context that we need to view the lessons of 1965.

    The very first is that superior technology provides a critical competitive advantage in war in general, and air warfare in particular since the latter by definition is technology intensive.

    There are two dimensions that are relevant in the actual conduct of that war. The first concerns the struggle for dominance in air, or the classical struggle for air superiority, and the second relates to the IAF's support to our army.


    Pakistan has been claiming that it rapidly won air superiority and hence was able to support its army more effectively. This view seems to have received some endorsement by the Official History of the 1965 War produced by the Government of India.

    Two reasons can be identified for this assessment by the official historians of the ministry of defence. One is that they tended to rely heavily to Pakistani literature, and even more so on one book, John Fricker's Battle for Pakistan and less on our own records.

    It is possible that our records were inadequate for the task in hand. But that throws up the larger question of the very existence and functioning of the Historical Division of the ministry of defence and the role it is supposed to play.



    Facts are crucial in coming to objective conclusions; and assessment of those facts is crucial for the right lessons to be learnt. Unfortunately, this is where our system has been lacking.

    The official history took pains to work out the comparative losses of aircraft of aircraft during the 1965 War. But the fatal flaw is that, contrary to accepted international norms in such matters, losses were calculated as a proportion of the total inventory of the two air forces, instead of working out the attrition rate in relation to the sorties undertaken by them.

    The quantum of air effort itself is an indication of the freedom of action enjoyed by the contestants. Even more important, the higher the attrition rate, the less that side can sustain combat, even if the size of the two air forces is equal.


    But where the attrition rate is significantly higher in a smaller air force, as indeed was the case of the Pakistan Air Force, it is already down the defeat slope.

    The most accurate estimate that we can put together from accounts of both sides is the attrition rate of Pakistan Air Force losses in the air-to-air warfare was 0.9 percent (that is, 9 aircraft lost for every 1,000 sorties flown) compared to 0.6 percent for the IAF.

    This actually points to the IAF being the superior force in air warfare progressively gaining dominance.

    But during the war the IAF lost a significant number of aircraft to enemy action on the round, especially in the eastern sector. The total attrition rates during the war including losses to enemy action in the air and on the ground work out to 2.16 percent for the Pakistan Air Force and 1.49 percent for IAF, that is, Pakistan was losing combat aircraft in the war nearly one-and-a-half times faster than India.



    This ratio would have undoubtedly tilted much more in our favour if the IAF had not been ordered by the ministry of defence not to retaliate against the PAF in East Pakistan after the Pakistanis had destroyed a large number of our aircraft on the ground parked in the open (in spite of World War II blast pens being available)!

    And Pakistan expected this to happen. That is why President Ayub despatched Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the former air chief, urgently by special aircraft, to China, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran to seek arms, especially combat aircraft, with a message of help in what Ayub's letter called Pakistan's 'dire need' (Asghar Khan, The First Round).



    The Chinese leadership, according to Asghar, was uncertain of Pakistani resolve, and sent him on to Indonesia. Air Marshal Nur Khan, the PAF air chief during the war, according to Altaf Gauhar (Ayub's information secretary), 'wanted the unequal contest to end as quickly as possible.'

    But a second issue which became far more contentious and whose vibrations can still be felt four decades later concerns the matter of air support by IAF to our land forces.


    No other single issue has vitiated the atmosphere of army-air force relations than the perceived conduct of the air force during the 1965 War. The war itself escalated rather gradually from the action in the Rann of Kutch in April of that year to the covert war beginning on August 1 with a strong Force Gibraltar infiltrated by Pakistan into the Kashmir valley.


    This was followed by Pakistan's overt armoured offensive launched on the morning of September 1, 1965, codenamed 'Grand Slam' in the Akhnoor sector of J&K where the Pakistan army held strategic advantages due to terrain and initiative of offensive action.

    The Pakistan Air Force had been brought into the operational plans and was ready over the area for any eventuality. The IAF also anticipated action and had moved a couple of fighter squadrons up front. What remains surprising is that given the tactical situation and the expected Pakistan offensive, prior approval of the Cabinet for using all elements of military power was not obtained.

    In fact, one whole day would elapse with our ground forces fighting out under severe handicap, before the army chief sought air support. But this was the general who as officiating army chief in 1961 had ordered the planning for military action to take Goa, but had given orders to the Operations branch not to tell the IAF and Indian Navy, according to General D K Palit (War in the High Himalayas)!



    The failure of the higher defence organisation is apparent since neither the Chiefs of Staff Committee nor the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (which had replaced the Defence Committee of the Cabinet) seem to have met.

    The defence minister authorised the use of the IAF based on the request of the army chief. In the late hours of the day the air force put in whatever it had and took losses. But the end result was that Pakistani advance to Akhnoor, its immediate objective was stalled.

    Why Pakistan did not advance and take Akhnoor in spite of heavily degraded Indian Army capability to defend has never been explained, though the issue has been raised by many Pakistani military writers since.

    The only explanation that fits the facts is that the IAF had imposed a heavy attrition on Pakistani armour even against the setting sun, and it would have been suicidal for it to proceed further. Akhnoor was saved and so was a crucial military-logistics key point.



    Of course Pakistan's second strategic blunder was to have stopped short on the way to the objective of Grand Slam -- Akhnoor. This has never been explained adequately in the otherwise extensive Pakistani literature.


    After its initial gains with a force of an infantry division against and two regiments of Patton tanks against a truncated infantry brigade (as per General Harbaksh Singh) on the 1st September, they hardly moved forward to toward Akhnoor, less than 20 km away on near-flat terrain. The only given reason in Pakistani military writings has been that the commander of the infantry division was changed mid-stream.

    But obviously it was also the objective that was changed rather than just the commander. The question is, why?


    In the absence of any plausible explanation even four decades later, we are forced to conclude that Indian Air Force strikes (especially by Mystere aircraft) on their armour and artillery had caused enough damage (in spite of the PAF's superior combat aircraft) to make the Pakistan leadership rethink about their ability to get up to Akhnoor and capture the bridge on Chenab which would have cut off the Rajouri-Poonch sector creating serious problems for India to defend this bitterly fought for area in 1947-1948.



    But what became the real source of contention was the Indian counter-offensive on September 6, 1965 into Pakistan. The Indian Army's 15 Division decided to launch the offensive at daylight along a major road --without informing the air force!

    The army commander, Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh (A Soldier Remembers), has been scathing in his criticism of the divisional commander on this count and for exposing the Division (on the Grand Trunk road, 'bumper to bumper,' according to the general) to enemy air strikes while the IAF practically knew nothing.

    The Pakistan Air Force, naturally had a field day. But the fact that we had not established adequate organisation and communications for responsive close support seems to have aided the problem.

    Unfortunately, the impression grew, recycled by ignorance that the IAF failed to provide air support to the army, and the rhetorical question of 'where was the air force?' continues to be raised till now.


    Conventional wisdom would have us believe that Pakistan provided better and more air support to its army than ours.


    But this is not supported by facts which indicate that the IAF destroyed as many as 123 Pakistani tanks during the war compared to our losses of just 3 due to PAF strikes; and the PAF could destroy only five pieces of our artillery compared to IAF knocking out 56 of theirs, according to General Harbaksh Singh (War Despatches 1965).

    The Indian Air Force destroyed 72 railway wagons including our Hunter aircraft formation blowing up a trainload of ammunition adding to the Pakistan army's acute shortages, except that this was beyond the visual range of our troops.



    What needs to be remembered is that our own system of providing air support to the land forces had not been built up adequately. For example, a delay of as much as a day or two would take place for the air force units to receive the demand for air support after it was originated by the army formations due to weaknesses in communications system.


    This was rectified by the 1971 war.


    1965 war: A reality check
     
  16. LaBong

    LaBong Regular Member

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  17. Hawk

    Hawk New Member

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    Underestimating India

    The origins of many a war in history remain disputed to this day. The 1965 War between India and Pakistan, however, has the unique distinction of there being utter confusion over the date on which it began. For Pakistan this happened only on September 6 of that year, when the Indian army started its march on Lahore. Remarkably, this date is still observed as the “Defence of Pakistan Day” every year. For many Indians the war started on September 1 and lasted 22 days. For, at the beginning of September a taskforce of Pakistani tanks had attacked the Chhamb-Jaurian sector in a bid to make a dash for Akhnoor, the fulcrum of the supply line from the rest of India to Jammu and Kashmir. The assault was thwarted by this country’s use of air power.

    It is a different matter that all the resolutions of the UN Security Council demanded of both countries to withdraw their troops to the “positions they had occupied on August 5”. Most significantly, exactly this was the basis of the Tashkent Declaration that Lal Bahadur Sashtri and Field-Marshal Ayub Khan signed in the Central Asian city under the Soviet auspices on January 10, 1966. The prime significance of August 5 is that on that day were detected massive infiltrations of Pakistani troops in Mufti and other irregulars into Kashmir. As in 1947, so 18 years later this was Pakistan’s first step towards wresting Kashmir from this country.
    The infiltrations, code-named Operation Gibraltar, were the brainchild of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister, assisted by the veteran and hawkish foreign secretary, Aziz Ahmed, Defence Secretary Nazir Ahmed and Major-General Ahktar Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding of Pakistan’s 12 Division. The general drew up the operational plan. Ayub Khan, a cautious man, was most reluctant to risk a war with India. But Bhutto and his cohorts talked him into it. If Pakistan wanted to wrest Kashmir by armed force, Bhutto argued, 1965 was the “last chance”. The opportunity would vanish once the expansion and reorganisation of the Indian Army was complete in a few years’ time. At the opportune time, said Bhutto, India was badly shaken by its “humiliating” defeat in the 1962 War with China, Nehru’s death, his successor Shastri’s “ineffectualness”, acute food shortage and a virulent anti-Hindi agitation in the South. “It was now or never”. Bhutto’s logic did appear persuasive. But both he and Ayub failed to realize that its two fundamental assumptions — that the arrival of “raiders” would start a revolt in the “discontented” Kashmir valley, and that because of “fear of China”, India “would not dare” extend the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir into a “general war” — could be dangerously wrong.

    Ironically, after the Bhutto cabal had succeeded in convincing him, Ayub suddenly put his finger on Akhnoor on the sand model during a briefing, and said: “Why don’t you go for the jugular and cut Kashmir off from India”? He sanctioned more men and money for this assault that was code-named Operation Grand Slam. He also declared: “Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited”. The crowning irony is that — in the words of his information secretary, confidant, biographer and indeed alter ego, Altaf Gauhar — while Ayub uttered these words he “did not know that Gibraltar had failed”. By then Indian troops and paramilitary forces had not only driven the infiltrators out but also seized Pakistani strategic heights, most famously the Haji Pir Pass.

    In order to cover up this stark failure, those who had kept the Field-Marshal in the dark immediately launched Grand Slam though it was meant to begin only after the infiltrators had succeeded in “setting the Kashmir valley on fire”. By this time, Major-General Akhtar Malik had become thoroughly discredited among his peers. The Army Chief, General Musa, relieved him of the command of Grand Slam and appointed swash-buckling Major-General (later general and army chief and later still president) Yahya Khan in his place.

    Grand Slam was still stuck when at first light on September 6,Shastri did what he had publicly told Pakistan he would do. He sent the Indian Army into Pakistan’s heartland in Punjab in the direction of the prized city of Lahore. In a memorable phrase, Altaf Gauhar says in his biography of Ayub Khan that when “India attacked Pakistan the most surprised person was Ayub Khan”. He adds: “Ayub’s surprise was shared by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army (Gen. Musa) — Ayub was now facing the moment of truth”.

    In the fog of war, as fortunes changed, both sides made mistakes. Pakistan had occupied the Indian village of Khem Karan just across the border on September 8. From there it launched its counter-offensive with its second armoured division in the vanguard. Strangely, the Indian side was unaware of the existence of this formation. Probably in a moment of panic the chief of the army staff, General J. N. Chaudhury, ordered the Western Army Commander, Lt.-General Harbaksh Singh, to withdraw to the east of the Beas river. To his credit, Harbaksh refused. Meanwhile Pakistanis were overconfident of cutting through Indian defences because they felt that their state-of-the-art Patton tanks would get the better of India’s outdated Shermans and Centurians. Precisely the opposite happened. After an epic battle, Asal Uttar, not far from Khem Karan, became the “graveyard of US-supplied Pakistani Pattons”.

    Let Gauhar tell the rest of the story of “September 11, a fateful day”. Ayub had taken his acolyte into his office and showed him “on a map how the counter-offensive personally ordered by him was progressing and was extremely optimistic about its outcome”. At that precise moment, Ayub’s Military Secretary, General Rafi, “walked into the room in a state of great agitation and almost shouted that the Indians had breached the Madhupur canal — The Khem Karan counter-offensive had run aground, and with that had collapsed Pakistan’s entire strategy. For Pakistan the war was over”.

    Yet it took 12 more days before the UN-sponsored cease-fire came into effect. Why and how will have to be narrated later.
    http://www.indianexpress.com/news/underestimating-india/512676/0
     
  18. RPK

    RPK Indyakudimahan Senior Member

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    Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

    LAHORE: Former national security adviser Mahmood Ali Durrani has said that the Indian Army crossed the international border to launch full-fledged war against Pakistan in 1965 because “low-level skirmishes were started from this side”.

    “We started the intrusions on the borders, and I think we should think about the Indian response at that time,” said Durrani while talking to Daily Times Editor-in-Chief Najam Sethi on his Dunya News programme on Sunday. He said the high-level military command was not involved in “a strategy to disturb India”, but politicians knew about what was happening along the border. He said then foreign affairs minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also had no idea that India would cross the international border.

    Durrani said he had participated in two wars, and “I now think Pakistan did not achieve anything from these wars”.

    “We should extend [a hand of] friendship towards India, and start peace talks to settle disputes,” he said.

    Durrani said former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice had arranged negotiations between Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. He said he was “very sad” over Benazir’s assassination in Rawalpindi.

    Durrani said he accepted President Asif Ali Zardari’s invitation to join his government as the national security adviser after taking Musharraf into confidence. He said he had floated an idea in India that the neighbours should soften their visa regimes, but the Indians had some “security-related reservations”.

    Durrani, also a former ambassador to the US, said there had only been speculation about Israeli and Indian involvement in Ziaul Haq’s plane crash. He also rejected the statement by former president Ghulam Ishaq Khan that the presidential plane was blown up in the air. He said Zia’s plane was destroyed while landing.
     
  19. RPK

    RPK Indyakudimahan Senior Member

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    HC concerned over Indian POWs in Pak, seeks report from Centre :: Samay Live

    New Delhi: The Delhi High Court today expressed concern over a prisoner of war (POW) languishing in a Pakistan jail for the last 44 years and asked the Centre to file a report on the number of POWs in jails there.

    "It's pathetic. A person who has lost his memory and has become of unsound mind, is languishing in jail for the last 44 years," a bench comprising Chief Justice A P Shah and Justice Manmohan said while hearing a PIL seeking a direction to the government to take steps for the release of Anand Patri who has been in Pakistan jail since 1965.

    The Court asked the government to file an affidavit wthin four weeks and put the matter for next hearing on october, 21.

    The Court passed the order on a petition filed by M K Paul, a human right activist, who contended that the government is not taking keen interest to take care about the life and liberty of Patri and also asked for compensation to his surviving legal heirs.

    The PIL contended that legal heirs of Patri, who fought in the 1962 war with China and 1965 war with Pakistan and went missing just thereafter, has not been paid any legal due since then.

    "The government has not done any serious effort to trace Patri who is in Pakistan for the last 44 years," the petitioner alleged.
     

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