India's Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT) Capability
Following the successful test launch of Agni V missile, the DRDO chief, Dr. VK Saraswat said that the launch has ushered in fantastic opportunities in building ASAT weapons. He was however quick to point out that India does not believe in weaponisation of space and that his reference was only to capability development. These comments, while being seen as a reaction to the ASAT tests carried out by the Chinese on their own satellite in 2007, have also been criticised in some quarters for their potential of adversely affecting regional stability.
The exploration of space, which till a few years back was restricted mainly to the two superpowers, has added many new players since. These include not only the space faring nations but also those who piggy back on them for their own usage of space based assets. Starting from the first Gulf War, the military uses of space expanded from the strategic to the tactical sphere and this usage continues to grow. While space has not been used to store or launch weapons, the medium is being used to control and coordinate the ground war. The Outer Space Treaty which came into force in October 1967 bans placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of earth, installing them on the moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. The Treaty however does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit. As per the Treaty, a state that launches a space object retains jurisdiction and control over that object but is liable for damages caused by their space object and must avoid contaminating space and celestial bodies. Consequently, if space based assets are to be used to gain an edge in conventional military operations (or even in nuclear ones) the use of weapons by another contender to destroy them is possible and may even be justified.
Today, the varied civilian and commercial applications through space based assets have a huge bearing on all activities of these states and such applications will see ever increasing growth in the future. The security and survival of these systems has thus become vital for these nations. While this can be achieved through a variety of methods, one of the means being projected by the major powers is through space control or space dominance. ASATs were born out of this policy. Both US and the former Soviet Union tested ASATs, which eventually became a part of their strategy of deterrence, very similar to nuclear deterrence. The Chinese ASAT test in 2007 is widely seen to be challenging the dominance of the US in space. However, for India, these have a regional bearing as they threaten Indian satellites in orbit. While India presently does not have any designated military satellites which can be potential targets, any future war scenario, heavily dependent on space assets for information and communication, will heighten dependence as also vulnerability to potential disruption of space-based assets. Even suspected dual use satellites may be targeted. Collateral damage to civilian satellites thus cannot be ruled out. India has to take steps to ensure an assured use of its assets in space under all conditions. The options available are both active and defensive measures. Active measures that take the logic of developing a credible deterrent entail development of ASATs, either for hard kill or soft kill. The ASAT technology being talked of after the Agni V tests is the hard kill Direct Ascent KE weapon. Defensive measures can involve passive measures like manoeuvring the satellites away from the test orbit and shielding against debris, radiation etc. All such measures will be fruitful only after heightened space situational awareness. Information on Indian technological progress and application in these fields is very restricted.
Dr Saraswat's comments underpin the fact that India is wary of Chinese ASAT capability. Even earlier, he has spoken of India's interest in building capability that could then be used for developing ASATs, stating that these would be demonstrative technologies to be tested through simulation rather than actual tests. It needs to be emphasised that a major shortcoming of a hard kill ASAT test is the creation of space debris which then could potentially damage any other satellite in that orbit. ASAT tests therefore have a lot of political and diplomatic ramifications, besides threatening the very use of the affected orbit space.
It is clear that India has the technology to make an ASAT but will not take it to the next level of actual testing. This perhaps fits in with India's non proliferation record while at the same time giving India the option to develop whatever capability is required for its own security and interests when required. The government has rightly stayed away from making any statements, so as not to give any legitimacy to the Chinese tests or spark any discussion on escalation of a 'regional arms race'. The Indian stand is also in line with the advanced nations' policy on testing. Michael Krepon in his essay, "A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space Faring Nations", has highlighted this aspect by stating:
'Advanced space-faring nations are also pursuing hedging strategies ... Hedging strategies take the form of research and development programmes; the flight testing of multi-purpose technologies that could be used for peaceful or for war fighting purposes in space; ... Tests of dedicated ASAT weapons have been relatively infrequent phenomena during the space age'
Presently, there is an apparent contentment with the existing space laws and treaties, the justification being that they are sufficient to cater to contemporary security concerns. There is a perception that any new laws or definitions will restrict the larger nations from using space as freely as they are used to. Sooner or later, with proliferation of technology, this situation is bound to change, forcing all nations to the negotiating table. The threat of an asymmetric attack on existing assets by smaller nations with very little interests in space is also a grave possibility. There are heightening prospects in future wars, of smaller states using every potential asymmetric tool possible. These probabilities may force nations with existing capabilities to lay down stringent conditions for the newer entrants. With this in mind, whenever such multilateral treaties or formal agreements are debated, India would prefer to be a part of it as a 'have' rather than a 'have-not'. The sanctions that it had to endure as a result of its nuclear tests (by the haves) are a lesson not easily forgotten.
Clear declaration of India's ASAT capability will act as a credible deterrence to any misadventures. To give credence to the hedging strategy, India now needs to develop passive measures that would include better space situational awareness, strengthening its satellites, greater resilience to jamming, satellite redundancy and at a later stage, backup satellite capability. India also needs to develop its soft kill options like laser blinding, communication jamming etc. Only these will ensure safeguarding of India's interests in the realm of space.
The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
