Indian Navy's Western Fleet Receives Stealth Frigate INS Teg

[john70]

Indian Navy's Western Fleet Receives Stealth Frigate INS Teg

While the Indian Navy awaits the induction of INS Sahayadri next month, a major boost has been given to its Western Fleet with the latest acquisition of INS Teg. It is the new stealth frigate with weapons and sensors for three-dimensional warfare built by Yantar Shipyard, Russia. INS Teg is the first of three Talwar Class follow-on ships ordered by the Indian Navy. INS Teg was built for the Indian navy by Russia has arrived in the port of Mumbai recently after its trials and crew training.

As for the ship's crew, they have been imparted training at naval training institutes in Russia. This was followed by extensive trials and testing on the frigate which was held in accordance with a specially appointed naval team for Delivery Acceptance. INS Teg was commissioned in April after the completion of trials and handed over to the Indian Navy.

INS Teg is an advanced version of Talwar class frigates that are fitted with an upgraded-suite of weapons and sensors. It is the first of three modified Krivak or Talwar III class guided missile frigates being built at the Yantar Shipyard under a $1.6 billion deal signed in 2006. INS Tarkash and INS Trikand are the remaining two frigates to be delivered under Project-17A by Russia.

INS Teg is a 3,970-tonne frigate that incorporates stealth technologies and is armed with eight 290-km BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. Besides the surface-to-air missile, INS Teg has upgraded medium range gun, optically controlled close-in weapon system, Torpedo tubes and anti-submarine rockets. With an operating range of 4,500 nautical miles, INS Teg is the first ship to have various unique capabilities in the Western Fleet.

INS Teg is 125-metre-long and can operate an anti-submarine or early-warning helicopter from its deck. The stealth frigate with its unique design ensures reduction in its radar cross-section, infra-red, magnetic and acoustic signatures as well as radiated underwater noise to heighten its stealth capabilities.

The Indian navy already has three Russian-built Talwar class frigates and the last of them, INS Sahayadri, is to be commissioned in July this year under the Project-17 of the navy. As for the new Talwar class stealth frigates, they fall under the new Project-17 A which are a follow-on order by India. The other two stealth frigates under Project 17-A are INS Tarkash and INS Trikand and they are expected to be ready by September 2012 and July 2013 respectively.


TEAM TEG

 

[john70]

SOME IMAGES FROM COLD WEATHER TRIALS OF TEG

 

[Apollyon]

3 Frigates of Talwar Class + anti-submarine assets + 1 Kolkata Class Destroyer for Air-Defence is enough for Pukes


P.S: I dont think Puke Navy have any SAM asset which an take down Brahmos AShM ....
Only Ships worth mentioning in PN is F-22p Frigates which carry 8 HQ-7 (Naval Varient) with a Range of 20km and 8 C-802A AShM ...

 

[sayareakd]

Teg kulfi ........................................

 

[sayareakd]

3 Frigates of Talwar Class + anti-submarine assets + 1 Kolkata Class Destroyer for Air-Defence is enough for Pukes


P.S: I dont think Puke Navy have any SAM asset which an take down Brahmos AShM ....

Indian navy air wing would be enough for PAF.

 

[john70]

FEW MORE PICS OF TEG

 

[sayareakd]

BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles in tube................:thumb:

 

[blueblood]

Only Ships worth mentioning in PN is F-22p Frigates which carry 8 HQ-7 (Naval Varient) with a Range of 20km

Try 8 mate. They wish it was 20km.

 

[Ray]

At the end of the day, all this acquisition boils down to this:


Blue water navy means capability to exercise what is said as 'sea control'.

One should understand 'sea control' and 'sea denial'

Sea Control

Sea Control is the condition in which one has freedom of action to use the sea for one's own purposes in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. There is likely to be a requirement for sea control across the spectrum of conflict. At the lower end of the spectrum, maritime forces may be used to ensure freedom of navigation by a deterrent presence in areas where illegal acts or constraints are being threatened or applied to merchant shipping. At the highest end it may be necessary to use a huge array of maritime power to eliminate an enemy's ability to challenge sea control over large areas of ocean. The need for sea control is not dependent upon the existence of a substantial threat. If there is any risk to freedom of action, sea control is necessary. If the risk is small, the capabilities that will be needed can be correspondingly modest.

Early achievement and retention of the necessary level of sea control will be a component of any major maritime operation or expeditionary campaign. However, there can be no absolute guarantee of protection from attack at sea unless command of the sea has been achieved. Sea control must be related to acceptable risk. For operations to take place, a working level of sea control must be achieved to provide sufficient freedom of action within an acceptable level of risk. If sea control remains in dispute in a certain area, each side will be forced to operate in the face of considerable risk.

However, sea control is most unlikely to be an end in itself; it is essentially a necessary condition to allow use of the sea for further purposes.

Sea Denial

Sea Denial is exercised when one party denies another the ability to control a maritime area without either wishing or being able to control that area himself. Classic means of achieving it are to lay a minefield or to deploy Sea Denial.

Sea Denial is exercised when one party denies another the ability to control a maritime area without either wishing or being able to control that area himself. Classic means of achieving it are to lay a minefield or to deploy submarines to threaten enemy surface forces; a more recent method, particularly appropriate in littoral operations, is to mount surface to surface missile batteries along the coast to pose an unacceptable level of risk to enemy surface units.

Sea denial and sea control operations are not mutually exclusive. The denial of the enemy's freedom of action is a consequence of effective sea control operations. Sea denial operations in one element or area of the maritime battlespace may be necessary to achieve sea control elsewhere.

However, the concept is only applicable when full sea control is not exercised by choice or out of necessity. At the operational and tactical levels, a zone of sea denial may be used as part of the outer defence of a force or area, or as a way of containing enemy forces.

At the strategic level, sea denial can be used in a guerre de course or sustained attack upon a nation's shipping to prevent reinforcement and to sap national morale and the ability to wage war.