Indian Ballistic Missile Defense System

[sayareakd]

Now the target missile enter the picture

View attachment 8636

one other thing i notice is that at this stage AAD is at its max height or going downwards

guys sorry to say but its old video, someone posted to give impression that it was new one. Thanks @sukhish to pointing it out.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

with new middle range radar everything is visible at 400 kms range (i am not even talking about LRTR)

I think we need small missile for NASR rocket, DRDO did said that they are working for it.

What we need is Iron dome type small missile in numbers with good range.

How about testing on Prahar Missile?

 

[sayareakd]

How about testing on Prahar Missile?

Prahar is long range sniper missile. Exact equal would be pinaka rockets. NASR is guided rocket.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Prahar is long range sniper missile. Exact equal would be pinaka rockets. NASR is guided rocket.

Guided Version of Pinaka, the Pinaka 2(not to be confused with "Mk2").
It's far better than Nasr, will enter service in few months.

 

[sukhish]

guys sorry to say but its old video, someone posted to give impression that it was new one. Thanks @sukhish to pointing it out.

looks like the new AAD test video never came out.

 

[saagar943]

with new middle range radar everything is visible at 400 kms range (i am not even talking about LRTR)

I think we need small missile for NASR rocket, DRDO did said that they are working for it.

What we need is Iron dome type small missile in numbers with good range.

with new middle range radar everything is visible at 400 kms range (i am not even talking about LRTR)

I think we need small missile for NASR rocket, DRDO did said that they are working for it.

What we need is Iron dome type small missile in numbers with good range.

iron dom is not for ballistic missiles. its for shell and small to medium rockets.
and regarding using rv: it is good if we can get small rocket check but problem is small rocket does not follow ballistic path. while as name suggest BMD is mainly for ballistic.
for other type like guided or unguided rockets or curise missiles : QRSAM to LRSAM is the answer. not BMD.

 

[Bornubus]

Prahar is long range sniper missile. Exact equal would be pinaka rockets. NASR is guided rocket.

Prahar (IMO) is the replacement of Smerch.Also according to wikileaks Pritvi series missile won't be use to deliver nukes but long range artillery.

 

[harsh]

Interceptor never took off ??

SOURCE: THE HINDU

The interceptor missile mission, which took place on May 15, was a failure despite claims of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to the contrary. The interceptor never took off to intercept the incoming “enemy” missile which merely fell into the Bay of Bengal, informed sources said.

An agency report on May 16 said a modified Prithvi missile was launched on May 15 from a naval ship in the Bay of Bengal and it mimicked the trajectory of a missile coming from an enemy country.

‘Never took off’

Informed sources, however, said the interceptor missile never took off from the island; so no interception took place at all. “Post-flight analysis is going on. We do not know whether there was problem in detecting the missile, whether radars tracked it and communicated it to the interceptor,” said the sources.

The DRDO developed both the Prithvi missile and the interceptor.

2015 mission failed too

In April 2015, a similar mission failed after the interceptor dived into the Bay of Bengal a few seconds after lift off. In that mission, the DRDO planned to conduct the test against an electronic target missile. In April 2014, the warhead in the interceptor failed to explode, although the interception of the incoming “enemy” missile took place at an altitude of 120 km.

 

[harsh]

Ignore Yellow Journalism, Here's Why DRDO Matters?

The recent test-firing of the Indian supersonic Interceptor missile, which was part of the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO) multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defence system, was not successful, despite claims to the contrary by the organisation, The Hindu reported, citing informed sources. TS Subramanian who reported this story is a veteran journalist of considerable repute. It was shocking for me to note this story, naturally I wanted to get to the crux of the matter, so I quickly got in touch with some of my contacts in the Defence sector to verify this story, however, contrary to the report the officials stated that no such calamity had occurred and the test went of well just as DRDO had planned.

Interestingly, they also cited that this could probably be the handiwork of a senior disgruntled employee(s), as simmering discontent, corruption, nepotism, favoritism inflated egos and political dynamics has become the part and parcel of DRDO's work culture just as in any other organisation. In December 2014, the Parliament Standing Committee on defence had rapped up DRDO for its shoddy research, inordinate delays, corruption, nepotism and its fancy for reverse engineering

Three major complaints against Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) then Chief Avinash Chander, including two anonymous ones, were pending before the Prime Minister's Office in November 2014, when he was given a contract of 16 months on his retirement. It was reliably learnt that investigations into the complaints went against him and thus he was summarily sacked two months after the extension in service.

Misinformation is the common technique used by such disgruntled elements and it is sad that this was picked up by a reputed national publication very much in haste without proper verification. However, the damage has been minimal as the government has accepted the actualities. Besides, DRDO has been over the years completely reliable in their announcements and no suspicion can fall on them, if a planned test had been a failure they have reported it accordingly. At least, the current government will never accept such deceit from India's premier defence organisation, as this government to my mind believes in total transparency in its operations.


Defence Research & Development Organisation: Recent Achievements at a Glance

DRDO has made many significant achievements during the recent past, including the last year. Many important systems were inducted/accepted by the services. The production value of systems based on technologies developed by DRDO (inducted/accepted/orders placed) during the past one decade is well over Rs.1,10,000/- crores.

Agni, the 3500 km range ballistic missile was successfully launched with user’s participation. Training flights were held by the users for various missiles that are already inducted. These included two flight tests each of Agni – I, Agni – II and Dhanush (from naval ships) and Six flights of Prithvi II (P– II) which includes the latest being conducted on 18th May 2016 . Orders worth over Rs. 25,000 crores for surface-to-air missile- AKASH have been placed by the users. These include 8 squadron for IAF and 2 regiments for the Army.

Successful flight tests of Endo-Atmospheric Interceptor for 2,000 km class target were carried out and the most recent on 15th May, 2016. Each flight led to a direct target hit and disintegration of the target.

Capabilities of NAG, the third generation anti-tank missile, which is a vehicle mounted system was demonstrated in a series of user trials. Advanced versions of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, the only one of its kind in the world, were developed and flight-tested. Thus, BrahMos block II with target discrimination precision strike capabilities was test-fired. Similarly, BrahMos block III with capability for steep diving from high altitudes and high maneuvers at multiple points during supersonic flight. Development of advanced missile systems is a continuous effort and requires systematic development of more and more advanced technologies. RLG based Inertial Navigation System was developed, qualified and tested. Active Radar Seeker for advanced missions was developed. A Fibre Optics Gyro was successfully developed and tested on board.

In the area of Aeronautics, Tejas, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) concluded its extensive flight tests including weapon trials, dropping of bombs, jettisoning drop tanks and night flights; leading to its Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) on 10th January, 2011. Over 1640 flights covering a period of over 969 hours have been completed by Tejas Mark 01. The first prototype of LCA Navy was rolled out and its induction tests were concluded. In tune with changing war of scenario, major thrust has been given to develop Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Successful flight trials of RUSTAM-1, a UAV with endurance of 14 hours and altitude ceiling of 8,000 meters demonstrated the capabilities for automated / remotely piloted landing/ take-off and associated technologies. NISHANT, another UAV developed by DRDO was ready for induction by the Army. A medium sized aerostat based platform was developed for surveillance applications. A novel method was developed and flight-tested for an in-flight structural monitoring of the manned as well as unmanned aircraft structures. The scheme was flight tested on a NISHANT UAV.

Besides, over 100 test flights of a 3,000 gram Micro Aerial Vehicle (MAV) designed and developed by DRDO were carried out. A Laser Seeker Kit – ‘SUDARSHAN’, for 1,000 pound bombs was developed and initial demand for significant number of seekers kits has been received from the users.

Major milestones in the indigenous development of fighter aircraft engine was achieved with the completion of “Official Altitude Testing” (OAT) of Kaveri Gas Turbine Engine for simulated operating conditions. Subsequently, the flights of Kaveri engine were successfully carried out on a Flying Test Bed (FTB) proving the technological capability and maturity of the indigenous efforts. This is the first time that an indigenously developed gas turbine engine for fighter aircraft has been flown on a FTB board. DRDO has developed expertise in the field of testing and certification for various components sub-systems and systems as well as complete airborne platforms. Thus, Initial Operational Clearance of LCA and Advanced Light Helicopter MK – III were major activities in this area.

Advanced Active-cum-Passive integrated sonar system HUMSA NG was designed, developed and installed on various ships of Indian Navy. Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) capable of navigation was demonstrated at sea. A Carbon Dioxide Curtailment System for submarines was designed and developed. The system has been accepted by the user. SANJEEVANI MK II, a device designed and developed to locate victims trapped under the debris was handed over to National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and Kerala Govt. Fire Services.

An advanced facility was created to undertake full scale processing of large Rocket motors. The facility was commissioned and the casting of various motors commenced. Development of PINAKA – Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher System was achieved with the successful transfer of technology to production agencies, two regiments of PINAKA (worth Rs 1,300 crores) have been raised by Army which is likely to place orders for another two regiments. The Transfer of Technology (ToT) for multimode grenade was completed, for which Army has placed an order for 10 lakh grenades. Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) for INSAS and AK-47 rifle was introduced into service with order for 10,000 Launchers. The state-of-the-art microcontroller based system Instant Fire Detection & Suppression System (IFDSS) BMP-2/2K developed for providing protection against fire to the troops & engine compartment, was accepted by the Army. Production order worth Rs. 168 crores has been received.


MBT Arjun Mark I was successfully inducted in the Army and two regiments of Arjun Main Battle Tank have been raised. A Carrier Command Post Tracked (CCPT) vehicle was accepted by the Army for induction. A modified Armoured Amphibious Dozer (AAD) completed its user trials.

User trials of remotely operated vehicle (ROV DAKSH) were successfully carried out and LSP order for 20 numbers is being executed. Design of Snow Gallery for protection of personnel and equipment from avalanches and design of Instrumented Composite Tower for studies on avalanches were completed.

In the field of electronics and electro-optics, many systems were inducted/accepted by the services. 3D medium range surveillance radar - ROHINI and its naval variant REVATHI were inducted. 3D low-level light weight radar - ASLESHA (for IAF) as well as BHARANI (for Army) was accepted by the user. The engineered version of upgraded Weapon Locating Radar (WLR – SWATHI) was realized by the production agency. The electronic warfare system SAMYUKTA (naval variant) and SUJAV were inducted. Orders have been received for the Combat Net Radio (CNR) with anti-jamming features. A holographic sight for rifles/carbines was developed for aiming in closed quarter battle role and was accepted by the users.

Even with the most advanced weapon systems, the man behind machine is the most crucial factor in winning the war. The Life Sciences laboratories of DRDO continued to develop technology to maximize the operational efficiency of our soldiers and provide them with adequate support and protection. Some of the major achievements are highlighted. Three mobile laboratories for nuclear, biological and chemical defence were handed over to the user and rigorous training was imparted to them. An upgraded first-aid kit for protection against chemical and biological agents as well as the nuclear radiation were accepted by the services. Technology for producing DRDO developed kits for detection of swine flu was transferred to the production agency. The Combat Free Fall (CFF) protection system to meet the requirements of high altitude paratrooper’s mission requirements was designed developed and is under limited series production.

A Submarine Escape Set (SES) for escape from an abandoned submarine from depths of 100m was designed and developed. Navy has projected a requirement of over 400 suits.

A Computerized Pilot Selection System (CPSS) was designed, developed and accepted by the Air Force. Series production of systems for deployment at all the Air Force Selection Boards of the IAF is underway.

Advanced materials have been always at the core of weapon systems and military hardware. Significant milestones were achieved in this critical area. A low-alloy steel “DMR-1700” with ultrahigh strength and high fracture toughness was developed as a cost effective replacement of 250 grade maraging steel. The alloy was successfully proven by successful demonstration in the intended application.

A 500 ton per annum capacity Titanium Sponge Plant based on DRDO technology was set up at Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited (KMML).

Light-weight composite armor for Mi-17-IV helicopter of IAF has successfully undergone integration and flight-trials. Technology developed for vacuum investment casting of gas turbine blades for Kaveri engine was extended for making high pressure turbine blades for land-based gas turbine for power generation.

A dedicated team of DRDO engineers executed highly specialized nature of Civil works at some of the most difficult and hazardous area within the stipulated time frame. Agreements for co-operation / co-development in frontline areas of science, technology and engineering were signed with several countries.

This extensive report will quell all doubts about the capabilities of DRDO despite its underlying and rather regular shortcomings of a technology developer.

 

[The Last Stand]

lol wut?

--30 chars--

please be vigilant. Free "monitoring systems" -- I don't want my computer to get ebola.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

India's Need For A Ballistic Missile Defense Deterrent

Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) Exo-Atmospheric Ballistic Missile Interceptor​

by Lieutenant General Balraj Nagal (Retired)
Introduction

During the Cold War, mutual vulnerability emerged as a central pillar of strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both states took steps to maintain mutual vulnerability by engaging in arms control talks that produced many agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The treaty ensured that mutual vulnerability and maintaining an offensive capability would still be the basis of nuclear deterrence.

Since the United States left the ABM Treaty, Russia’s missile defense systems too have become more technologically advanced. Moscow is creating its own equivalent of the U.S. missile defense systems—THAAD and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense—which are likely to deploy in the very near future. Russia is creating an analogue of the missile defense system THAAD, which helps intercept medium-range ballistic missiles and some warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The testing of this system will begin in the very near future. Russia is creating an analogue of a different U.S. missile defense system, BMD, which is equipped with GBI missiles. A series of tests has already been performed on this system.

China conducted an anti-satellite test in 2007, destroying a satellite with a kinetic kill vehicle. Although China has not said much about its BMD programs, it publicly announced ground-based, midcourse BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014. Chinese state media stated that such tests are defensive in nature and are not targeted at any country. China’s three successful interceptor tests suggest it is on a path to deployment in the near future. Technological developments by the United States, Russia, and China will continue, and are beyond India’s control. These systems are a result of each country’s security policies and are competition- and technology-driven. In light of BMD development by other countries, India’s pursuit of a functional BMD program appears to be a logical continuation of the BMD policies of major powers.

The United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in the early 2000s was likely cause for optimism in India. Some believe that India used the opportunity to place itself in a position to obtain BMD technology and raise its profile as a nuclear power.

Indian Views on Ballistic Missile Defense
Proponents of Missile Defense

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) "Ashwin" Endo-Atmospheric Ballistic Missile Interceptor​

BMD has strong proponents in India, who argue for development of an Indian BMD capability in light of the security environment in the region, conceptual issues, nuclear doctrine, and technology drivers.

Threats in India’s neighborhood pose challenges to India and are the primary drivers for the development of new nuclear technology. Nuclear weapons and missiles have already proliferated in India’s neighborhood, and the policies being followed by India’s adversaries combined with the new facilities they are building collectively point to inevitable and fast-paced growth of the nuclear environment in South Asia. The development and growth of new nuclear technologies continues unabated and is rapidly being fielded in new weapon systems in both the conventional arsenals and the nuclear arsenals of India’s neighbors. As India sees it, any delay in developing countermeasures like BMD will result in a technology gap that may not close as easily as it opens, leaving India at a long-term disadvantage.

Many strategic experts agree that the security environment in East Asia and South Asia is complex and uncertain. India has to contend with two nuclear states simultaneously: China, with an inventory of more than 250 nuclear weapons and hundreds of missiles, and Pakistan, with more than 100 nuclear weapons and a rapidly growing arsenal controlled by the army. India believes these threats justify the creation of a BMD capability. The sustained growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and missile inventory, plus China’s modernization of its nuclear forces and both nuclear and conventional missiles, presents an unprecedented complication for India’s security. Further, China is developing new technologies to implement its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Western Pacific. These technologies also impact targets on the mainland and in Indian waters, so robust BMD is necessary for India to defeat China’s A2/AD capability. From Pakistan, the primary threat is that its proxy war through terror could spiral out of control, escalating into a conventional conflict. If India has BMD in place, the prospect of limited war is more feasible.

The specter of an unauthorized or accidental launch of a nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out completely, especially when forces are deployed during a crisis situation. Pakistan in particular poses a threat of accidental launch because it has short-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, for which launch authority can be predelegated to field commanders. Without more specific knowledge about the types of positive and negative controls installed on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, it is only prudent for India to develop defensive measures. More worrisome still is the possibility of a suicidal launch based on strategic miscalculations.16 Ballistic missile defense capability will allow space and time for India to evaluate Pakistan’s intent in the event of an unauthorized or accidental launch and, in the event of a suicide strike, may also provide an opportunity to resolve and reconcile, rather than escalate.

India should also not count out the possibility of a bolt-from-the-blue strike. If disorder, strife, or civil war were to engulf Pakistan, launching a strike against India would divert focus from domestic problems. This threat can be redressed with even limited BMD to assuage concerns about survival and retaliation. Rajesh Basrur writes, “More importantly, a limited BMD can also deter a state with revisionist intentions that would want to carry out a bolt-from-the-blue strike. In other words, if generating dissuasion in the mind of the aggressor is central to nuclear deterrence, a limited BMD shield could potentially achieve that in the South Asian context.”

India must also account for other contingencies, like irrational actions by Pakistan and the growing importance of nonstate and transnational actors in South Asia. There are often debates about the probability of situations such as Pakistan losing its weapons or losing control of the weapons to jihadi or radical elements in the army. Missile technology loss, in particular, is a possibility, given the past efforts of nonstate actors to acquire missile technology from radicalized elements within Pakistan. The A. Q. Khan proliferation network demonstrated the ease of proliferation and remains a great concern. One of the greatest threats to the entire world, and especially to India, is Pakistan losing nuclear weapons that are then used against India by nonstate actors or radical elements in Pakistan. That sensitive nuclear installations have been attacked by such elements in the past is only too well-known. AQ. Khan’s proliferation of nuclear technology demonstrated the dangers that confront nations in the region. These capabilities falling into the hands of inimical elements would haunt the world.

Ballistic missile defense increases public and government confidence, while simultaneously making an adversary aware that a nuclear first strike may not yield the intended results. This awareness enhances the deterrence capability of a no-first-use state like India. While offensive deterrence is essential for strategic stability, a defensive deterrent like BMD multiplies the deterrent effect and protects against irrational or unreasonable states. BMD protection increases stability and gives India the choice of keeping weapons at lower states of readiness—perhaps even demated—sanguine in the belief that India’s leadership and nuclear forces will survive to launch a retaliatory second strike. Keeping weapons demated, at a lower state of readiness, is a significant confidence-building measure and contributor to deterrence stability.

Having a BMD system in place would also help India negate nuclear coercion or blackmail while still maintaining a no-first-use policy. The concept of mutually assured destruction does not apply perfectly to states like India and Pakistan because they have much smaller nuclear arsenals than the United States and Soviet Union maintained at the height of the Cold War. Further, a Cold War understanding of mutual vulnerability may not be acceptable to states with a no-first-use policy because they have already displayed extreme restraint, and may see no reason not to undertake defensive actions and eliminate their vulnerability to first strikes. The first-strike capability of nuclear-weapon states with smaller arsenals can be negated by BMD, and because the arsenals of no-first-use states are relatively small, protecting a second-strike capability is an absolute necessity. Kumar writes that “missile defenses were initially seen as an ideal way out of the Mutually Assured Destruction trap. While threats of assured destruction and massive retaliation have primarily guided deterrence equations between nuclear powers, the propriety of leaving space for mutual vulnerability is now finding few takers.”

The mismatch between Pakistan’s first-use willingness and India’s no-first-use policy creates a dilemma for India, which it addresses by relying on technology, including BMD, that enhances survivability. Absorbing nuclear strikes without protection is not a prudent strategy, so a defensive system is a necessity. During a conflict, India must be able to defeat Pakistan’s initial nuclear strikes by using BMD. India needs to protect both its retaliatory capability and the command and control elements necessary to launch a second strike.

Any form of BMD has value compared to no protection, despite debate among experts about the degree of protection afforded by different forms of BMD. Any successfully tested BMD system, though, will guarantee survivability and defense to some extent. U.S. scholar Christopher Clary argues that “Indian policymakers must be willing to make the calculation that whatever safety comes from missile defenses of dubious effectiveness outweighs the risk that come from a Pakistani nuclear arsenal that is larger than it would be without Indian missile defenses.”

Alternatively, some argue that Pakistan and China will increase their arsenals to suit their deterrence requirements regardless of whether or not India installs a BMD system. The fissile material and delivery means available to China could, theoretically, be put toward building over 1,000 weapons. Pakistan’s fissile material enrichment capabilities at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and Khushab plutonium reactors were planned well before India decided to develop BMD. The capability of these facilities indicates Pakistan’s designs for a large arsenal, which India must prepare to address appropriately. India’s BMD plans should not be considered in isolation, especially given the nuclear developments of China and Pakistan. India’s trajectory is a response to the plans of its adversaries.

Opponents of Missile Defense

Those who oppose BMD argue that it is destabilizing and that it could cause a nuclear arms race in South Asia. They argue that BMD can change the nuclear order and alter strategic stability, and can encourage states with BMD to engage in offensive actions, or first strike, on the premise that they are invulnerable to retaliation. BMD increases risk and fuels massive defense spending, and it might not even protect against a nuclear attack.

The principal practical objection is that BMD upsets the concept of mutual vulnerability by making the efficacy of a first strike uncertain. As a consequence, adversaries will likely develop technology to thwart BMD systems and restore mutual vulnerability. These technologies could take the form of larger arsenals, penetration devices, or countermeasures against BMD systems. In short, BMD disturbs the strategic balance by inciting an arms race for more warheads and newer technology to overcome the effects of BMD. This seems to be the track that Pakistan has adopted. For an unstable and fragile state like Pakistan, India’s BMD could indeed be destabilizing, as it would substantially reduce the value of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile arsenal. In response, Pakistan may be tempted to increase the size of its arsenal.

Conceptual opposition to BMD principally revolves around the idea that the existence of any missile shield encourages the shielded state to take offensive actions on the false assumption that it is completely invulnerable to retaliation. Rajesh Basrur writes: “One critic observes that missile defense is not a truly defensive system, but is in fact a ‘means for bolstering offense’ with no design for disarmament, and Indian support for it shows that ‘[w]e have now deflected sharply from the elimination goalpost and are now adrift in the uncertain and dangerous course of a new weapon system.’” The offensive capabilities said to be inherent in missile defense are a source of discomfort for several critics. The same critics are troubled by the possibility that the United States, made less vulnerable by BMD, may become a more aggressive power.

From Pakistan’s point of view, with an Indian BMD system, Pakistan would be forced to respond in some way in order to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent. . . . A less costly and more effective option for Pakistan could be a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy. This would entail an increase in the number of missiles, both Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) and single warheads.”

The introduction of BMD would intensify the arms race between India and Pakistan. The central argument is that BMD compliments India’s Cold Start/Proactive operations, which is a serious concern for Pakistani strategists.

Some point out that even successful BMD could never guarantee a 100 percent interception rate. Therefore, they argue, BMD is not worth the sizable costs or the potentially deleterious effects on deterrence stability in the region

Cost, in fact, is by itself a common argument against BMD. Indian Air Marshal Narayan Menon described the costs as follows:

The BMD system is a complex entity and many other components are required to make it operational. The financial and strategic costs also have to be calculated to determine if alternatives to BMDs are available to the country. A comparison with the U.S. BMD system would also be useful. The U.S. has the most elaborate BMD system being put in place and there is a plan to extend it further into Europe. The U.S. continental system is estimated to have cost about $100 billion from 2002 till date. The Indian system will cost less but the amount involved will be between Rs 50,000 crores to Rs 250,000 crores. However, even this staggering level of expenditure will not guarantee complete protection. No BMD can assure 100 percent interception and destruction of incoming missiles.

Even if the DRDO could deliver on the capabilities it promised, India’s BMD technology might still not be advanced enough to keep up with Pakistan and China’s development of new offensive capabilities. The balance of nuclear technology strongly favors the offensive, which has cheaper, far superior technology that can quickly be deployed to defeat India’s nascent BMD. Compared to India’s defensive system, penetration aids like deception and saturation decoys are relatively easier to make and mount on both single- and multiple-warhead missiles. One Chinese analyst, for example, assessed India’s 2012 interceptor test as capable of defeating vintage Chinese missiles from the 1990s.

As debate among experts endures India continues its quest for BMD. India began developing technologies for BMD shortly after declaring itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998. Progress accelerated in the 2000s, when key technology for tracking, fire control, and interceptor guidance became available from Israel, France, and Russia. The program commenced during the administration of former Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and continued thereafter during the decade-long United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, indicating that support for BMD existed across the entire Indian political spectrum. As with India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, the effort for a BMD system has continued despite changes of political leadership and ideology in New Delhi. None of the governments in India that have been in power since 1995 have given any reason why they seek missile defense, and, at times, the issue caused dissent within coalition governments, notably the UPA government, which included communist parties strongly opposed to the idea of buying a U.S.-built system based on the Patriot PAC-3.

India’s Missile Defense Needs

The argument that India’s BMD lacks political guidance is not supported by facts. In India, political clearance is required for spending on projects like BMD development, but publicizing those projects is not mandatory. Until BMD moves from development to deployment, political announcements about BMD should not be expected. It would not be advisable for India to publicize all of its strategic thinking.

BMD should move from technology demonstrators to a physical system soon, but reports conflict on exactly how soon. Press reports suggest it may be in place by 2016, but the failure of the test on April 6, 2015, has likely invalidated that target date. Vinod Anand writes: “The technology revolution of the past few decades has enabled India to reach a state where it can deploy short-range missile defense. In addition to the indigenous efforts, India has launched an extensive technology cooperation program with Israel to develop air defense systems.”

Given the ongoing missile proliferation in Pakistan and China, the challenge for India’s BMD is to intercept only nuclear-tipped missiles. The adversary will use saturation strikes, mixing of conventional and nuclear missiles and extensive use of decoys to confuse the interceptors, and will attack space, cyber, and ground systems to defeat India’s BMD. The problem of differentiating between nuclear and conventional missiles adds a new and challenging technical dimension to India’s BMD development.

A review of ideas promoted by experts in the science and strategic community provides useful insight to help understand India’s BMD. “Indeed, an effective missile defense network, covering all major military, infrastructure and civilian targets could render the specter of Indian cities being incinerated by a lunatic regime in Pakistan somewhat less likely and would offer a considerable buffer for India when considering the nuclear asymmetry vis-à-vis China,” argues Sanjay Badri Prasad. Further, O’Donnell and Joshi recommend a lesser scope:

Development of a pan-national missile interception capability is beyond India’s economic means. Still, it is important to acknowledge that a midcourse interception capability, which is India’s primary intention, can also be employed at a broader level. With increasing competencies in the booster strength of its ballistic interceptors and of ground radars, it is hard not to foresee mission creep in India’s ballistic missile interception program. Logically, only a limited missile defense complements India’s nuclear doctrine, which relies on “assured retaliation” for the purposes of nuclear deterrence.

Debalina Ghoshal proposes an even smaller system: “[Defend] counterforce targets so that India is able to conduct successful retaliatory launch and also a second strike should the need arise. Moreover, defending countervalue targets reduces the efficacy of the mutually assured destruction strategy on which nuclear deterrence is based.” Arguing for a limited cover, Happymon Jacob writes:

A limited BMD system increases deterrence by denial. The deterrent effect of BMD is not only applicable between rational state actors but also when nonstate (rational or irrational) actors target state actors. For instance, if Pakistan-based nonstate actors or rogue elements from the Pakistani armed forces target India with nuclear weapons, New Delhi, considering that such an attack is most likely to be very limited, will be able to properly comprehend and analyze the situation before contemplating an appropriate response. This is only possible if the political decision-making mechanisms and nuclear command and control in New Delhi survive such an attack.

Continuing, Jacob writes that “the argument then would be that since the country is only going in for a limited BMD (as opposed to going in for a National Missile Defense system which would have given it invulnerability), if it ever becomes a success, it does not want to secure itself completely and then engage in a first strike. In other words, a limited BMD can reinforce India’s NFU [no-first-use] posture as well as make it more credible. Those in India who critique the Indian NFU posture as an inadequate response to Pakistan can be assuaged by the argument that a limited BMD will provide the country with the necessary wherewithal to retaliate in all certainty thereby increasing its deterrence credibility.”

India’s Menu of Options

Notwithstanding the uncertainty about whether or when the BMD system will pass testing, it is still possible to compare the future deployment options. India can deploy BMD in one of five different configurations. The first option is to deploy a land-based system across the entire country, as well as sea-based deployment for defense against all types of threats. Second, India could deploy BMD to protect critical population centers, command and control centers, nuclear forces, and vital economic zones. The third option is selective coverage of command and control centers, nuclear forces, and important metropolitan cities. The fourth option protects command and control centers, nuclear forces, and New Delhi. Finally, India could deploy BMD only around command and control centers and New Delhi.

The first option is impractical for many reasons, including the diversity and range of missiles fielded by China and Pakistan, and the enormous cost of designing and operationalizing a country-wide BMD. Further, BMD systems deployed near the border regions with China and Pakistan will be vulnerable to ground and air attacks, in addition to missile strikes. Most importantly, though, BMD does not defend against cruise missiles. China and Pakistan, both with large inventories of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, could negate any BMD installations close to the borders. The second deployment option is, like the first, too costly for India to pursue. In reality, India’s choice is between options three, four, and five. India will choose among those options on the basis of both political and strategic imperatives. From a strategic stability perspective, option four makes the most sense for a number of reasons. It will not be destabilizing, it will provide protection to political leadership, and it will ensure continuity of government and military operations. Without requiring unreasonably large expenditure, it leaves adequate vulnerability to maintain strategic stability with other nuclear-weapon states while protecting vital retaliatory nuclear forces against both an unauthorized or accidental launch and from bolt-from-the-blue strikes by radical army elements or jihadists.

India’s BMD system, once deployed, will include sensors, space-based surveillance, monitoring and detection systems, ground- and space-based tracking systems, intelligence assessment centers, command and control centers, and interceptor units. The particular deployment option India chooses will determine the size and scope of the system. Technological gains from BMD have secondary applications in conventional and subconventional conflict that add to the value of developing BMD.

Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability

Experts raise the important question of how BMD will affect strategic stability. Strategic stability can be assessed along three axes: first, the idea of peaceful and harmonious relations in the region; second, the probability of armed conflict between any two nuclear weapon states; and third, the ability of a nuclear-weapon state to deter a preemptive first strike.

The remainder of this publication proceeds under the assumption that India should choose, according to this author, the fourth of those five possible BMD deployment strategies: deploying BMD to protect command and control centers, nuclear forces, and New Delhi. Regarding strategic stability, BMD mainly affects the third axis: the ability of a nuclear-weapon state to deter a nuclear first strike. The Cold War understanding of strategic stability was based on mutual vulnerability. Strategic stability entails no advantage or incentive for launching a first strike and both states having a second-strike capability. It is reinforced by BMD in a state that has a no-first-use policy. One conclusion is that BMD reduces the incentive for a nuclear first strike, because BMD will protect political leadership and guarantee a second-strike capability. This enhances strategic stability. When confronted with the fear of greater damage, an aggressor state will avoid the temptation of a nuclear first strike. The positive effect of BMD on strategic stability will accrue if India retains a commitment to no first use, as this posture reduces the incentives for both preventative strikes and preemptive ones. “Therefore,” writes Jacob, “those demanding the withdrawal of NFU should consider the potential of a limited BMD system in strengthening India’s deterrence.”

A selective BMD, like the options proposed above for India, is designed to protect the political leadership and structures associated with situational awareness, analysis, transmission, responses, and retaliation. It improves second-strike capability and also raises the nuclear-use threshold. As long as strategic vulnerability is maintained, the BMD should not be considered destabilizing to the strategic balance.

With Pakistan, the situation of strategic stability is complicated because India’s BMD program will always be interpreted as an offensive measure designed to thwart Pakistan’s deterrent arsenal. India’s ability to maintain strategic stability and prevent a decapitating strike, while Pakistan is building the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal directly across the border, is enabled by BMD. Even if Pakistan rejects India’s arguments, the defensive aspect of BMD will ensure that the nuclear equation between India and Pakistan does not become unbalanced.

While there are disagreements about the ultimate effectiveness and price tag of BMD, building a BMD system clearly provides valuable side benefits, like better intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, detection, tracking and situational awareness. Technology developed for BMD systems can pay dividends in other sectors, including space technology.

Conclusion

There are three primary determinants for the final format of India’s BMD: the deterrence imperative to maintain mutual vulnerability and stability in the face of growing arsenals in the neighborhood; the imperative to protect political leadership; and the necessity of protecting the second-strike retaliatory capability.

BMD’s employability in India may be attributed to a number of factors: the strategic lessons from India’s past mistakes, collaborative nuclear threats, nuclear saber rattling, massive military buildup, and nuclear buildup in the neighborhood. Any capability that contributes to defeating these threats will likely be viewed positively in India. Indian strategic culture is well summed in the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote in the early nineteenth century that “the defensive form of war is in itself stronger than the offensive.” Inherent in India’s decision to develop BMD is this preference for defense over retaliatory offense. India’s ballistic missile defense is a result of its defensive strategic mindset, combined with its no-first-use doctrine and the incentives presented by its strategic environment, especially Pakistan’s nuclear development. BMD is ultimately meant to ensure a survivable command and control and a survivable second-strike capability, to guarantee enhanced deterrence in the face of two adversarial nuclear-weapon states in the region.

A BMD system in India, a relatively new nuclear-weapon state with finite economic resources, will be small—definitely not large enough to make the arsenals of India’s adversaries ineffective or useless. The policy of no first use makes India’s leadership vulnerable, so the importance of BMD for making sure the government and the survivable second-strike retaliatory capability are intact after nuclear strikes cannot be overstated. Limited BMD remains vital for India’s effort to maintain strategic stability. (Adapted Dissertation)

Lieutenant General Balraj Nagal (Retd) is the director of the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi. Views expressed as his own.
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[Indx TechStyle]

There are only two systems in the world that can intercept ICBMs. Besides them, many smaller systems exist (tactical ABMs), that generally cannot intercept intercontinental strategic missiles, even if within range,an incoming ICBM simply moves too fast for these systems. :biggrin2:

We are ourselves developing systems for ICBMs.
For speed of ICBM, we have a DMRJ Scramjet, Quasi BMs and now making HGVs which is simply too fast against ICBMs.:biggrin2:
Anyway, we have threat from P5 only, from pakis, NoKos etc. we have bigger nukes, bigger country, better delivery systems and now even ABMs.
We are even going to use advanced satellites to monitor missiles.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Of course, you should feel the threat, as ICBMs usually use the trajectory which optimizes range for a given amount of payload (the minimum-energy trajectory); an alternative is a depressed trajectory, which allows less payload, shorter flight time, and has a much lower apogee,

No problem, we also have our own ICBMs and are making even more and better.
Further, we have sea based as well.

and very defensive with protective layer against Scramjet, BMs, HGVs. :biggrin2: Bravo.

Intellegent person, did you even bother to read my post, these countermeasures are specially made against ICBMs.
Moreover, we have lasers enough to destroy internal circuits of missiles and divert or kill it.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/indian-laser-and-directed-energy-weapon-dew-thread.76144/

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

Can Indian Defence system Destroy missiles in space basically ICBMs

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

Is Exo-Atmospheric Missile Defence system a anti icbms system if it is then india has it as per wiki

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

would call India Bharat now cause it was the original name of bharat jai bharat

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Is Exo-Atmospheric Missile Defence system a anit icbms system if it is then india has it as per wiki

We recently placed a geosynchronous satellite with an accurate apogee. So, we can definitely do that, as well as we can make anti satellite missile.
Government must rush up for an ASAT test ASAP before yanks, rusks and chinks come up with other monopoly treaty for banning ASAT Tests.

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

What about KAli Then is it also a anti balistic missile sysytem sorry if iam asking too many question just curious

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

We recently placed a geosynchronous satellite with an accurate apogee. So, we can definitely do that, as well as we can make anti satellite missile.
Government must rush up for an ASAT test ASAP before yanks, rusks and chinks come up with other monopoly treaty for banning ASAT Tests.

Chinks Already HAVE ASAT sYSTEM

 

[AbhinavTheBrahmin]

Your attacking anti-BM missile has maybe 5 minutes to travel from wherever it is launched to hit a target, which, by the way, is accelerating not very quickly to extreme speeds. Realistically, for any reasonable anti-BM missile design, it's got about 2 minutes to get from the launch platform to the target before the ICBM is traveling too fast and reach the target. So, I think. It's impossible to catch. Bravo :biggrin2:

wAIT fOR kALI BRO i heard that Pakistan is buying ly 80 lomads defence system so lets wait and watch