India's border plans will go nowhere: china is pissed haha!

[LurkerBaba]

More yammering...

India's undue worry about China results from inferiority complex

By Li Hongmei

BEIJING, Nov. 24 (Xinhuanet) -- India jitters at the sight of China gaining prestige in Asia, in particular, in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and takes China's ever-growing regional influence in recent years as a strategic encirclement to target and contain India.

Not a few Indians believe the Chinese have a tradition of favoring encirclement game, as Jaswant Singh, former Indian finance minister, foreign minister, and defense minister, put it in his recent article: Asia's Giants Colliding at Sea?

"China, has wei qui (known in Japan as go), which focuses on strategic encirclement. As Sun Tzu advised many centuries ago, 'Ultimate excellence lies...not in winning every battle, but in defeating the enemy, without ever fighting." Singh wrote in the article.

It sounds nothing more than a loud jealousy, for the simple reason that China has done what India could not, especially when India perceives that China's influence has well reached to its doorsteps and created tremendous impact on those who should have banked on India as imagined.

"For India, the sense that a struggle for regional mastery is occurring has become increasingly keen. Chinese activity in Pakistan and Myanmar, the expansion of China's port agreements in the Indian Ocean (the so-called 'string of pearls'), and heightened Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean have jangled India's security antennas." said the article.

This also explains why India has been living under the delusion that China lays out a strategic chessboard to lock up and contain India, and thereby every act and every move of China could touch a raw nerve of India.

Jealousy can sometimes be put in the same breath of inferiority. India could trace its sense of being so self-abased to the brief border war with China in 1960s, when it was beaten by the Chinese army. And India has since eyed China with deep-seated distrust. The Indian media are always given to wild speculations on what on earth China intends to do. Any move Dragon takes in the region would in all likelihood vex Elephant.

On this basis, India would be bent on plotting to break through the so-called Chinese encirclement, and Mr. Singh would produce the delusional article conjuring up a picture of two giants colliding at sea.

Perhaps, when Mr. Singh turned out the article, he has yet to comprehend what it is as reality: What China has thus far done is a have-to as a nascent leading power with steady development, but China has already avoided setting foot on a path that many other great powers would follow in their history of growth and rise----invasion and plunder.

Instead, China has sought after a win-win model when it develops economic and trade relations with its neighbors, including India.

Why India appears so impatient to take more agreeable strategies in its periphery is still beyond understanding. But one thing is certain: Today's India, no matter how anxious it intends to lead the region and even the world, is far from potent and prosperous to act of its own accord----By currying favor with China's neighbor, in particular, those who have brewed disputes with China, India would assume, it could instigate these smaller nations to engage in a gang fight against China and contain China's growing clout in the region.

Unfortunately, either India or Mr. Singh seems to have miscalculated the situation: Nowadays, it is no longer those who have only teeth and muscle that can finally loom on the horizon posing as winners, but those who are confident and courageous, and have a strong body with a sound mind, the latter more important for a great power.

India might as well bear in mind: To build up a real power, neither self-satisfaction nor self-inferiority is a mature and constructive mindset.

In actuality, India has already learnt a good lesson in this regard. Its iron-clad suspiciousness of China and shortfall of confidence in opening to others put sand in the wheels of its own progress.

Two months ago, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, or ICBC - the world's biggest lender by market value, set up business in India, which is the first of four Chinese lenders to start operations in India and was expected to greatly boost investment in India's backward infrastructure sectors and foster the growth of a rupee-yuan market. While in comparison, even more than a decade ago, the same operations started up in Southeast Asian countries bringing an impetus to the local economies and remain as booming even today.

Back in 2006, China and India reopened crossborder trade through the Himalayan Nathu La Pass, 44 years after a brutal frontier war shut down the ancient route. It was expected to give a major boost to bilateral trade between the two countries. But, it turns out to be a picture of contrasts----ambitious tradesmen on the Chinese side vs. slackness of the Indian businessmen.

If India were as courageous as what China has managed to do----daringly reaching out to attract foreign investment and confidently going global, and perhaps, if India could forgo its restrictions on Chinese products and investment, it would progress even faster and would really rival China in the foreseeable future. "No competition, no progress", which is an inbuilt principle in market economy.

If India could carry itself with some ease and confidence, it would not be belittled by others, including China. But if it persisted in its "strategic encirclement" thinking of its giant neighbor, India would virtually step on a loss-making route, at least, in mentality.

In a nutshell, to grow up to be a real power and stand as a sound competitor, India needs to, first and foremost, break through its own psychological fence.

Seriously, where does Chinese media get it's reporters from ? This one sounds like an angry pre pubescent kid !

 

[Dovah]

^^This explains a lot about our Chinese friends here, actually.

 

[S.A.T.A]

If India didn't have the confidence to go global, most of east Asia including China wouldn't have a civilization to talk about. I often wondered if the Chinese posters on the forum appeared stupid because they cannot articulate their thought a little better,language constraints perhaps. But reading this article published in a leading Chinese journal, makes me think the problem is much deeper and the intellectual malnourishment evidently affects substantial segment of its intelligentsia.

 

[The Messiah]

Chinis are crying like little baby! That means whatever we are doing is correct thing to do

 

[Ray]

It is unfortunate that China believes that they alone can arm themselves to the teeth and so whatever they wish to do.

A rather unusual psychology indeed!

 

[Ray]

From the Chinese newspaper's report, one can fathom the worry that seems to have seized the Chinese Politburo about India paying China back in the same coin.

Bharat Karnad has suggested that India should give nuclear armed Brahmos to Vietnam so that China realise what it is to have one's neighbour given nuclear weaponry and knowhow, as China shamelessly flouting the non proliferation treaty that they have signed has done by giving Pakistan missiles and nuclear technology to include assistance in building Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

 

[The Messiah]

From the Chinese newspaper's report, one can fathom the worry that seems to have seized the Chinese Politburo about India paying China back in the same coin.

Bharat Karnad has suggested that India should give nuclear armed Brahmos to Vietnam so that China realise what it is to have one's neighbour given nuclear weaponry and knowhow, as China shamelessly flouting the non proliferation treaty that they have signed has done by giving Pakistan missiles and nuclear technology to include assistance in building Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

I support this. Chinis only understand eye for an eye type of justice.

 

[johnee]

If chinese commies are indeed alarmed at Indian defence measures, then they may plan some adventure to 'teach a lesson' before the window of opportunity closes. They may use paki proxies, or indian maoists or may be the dlagon itself will enter the fray.

 

[johnee]

India needs the ability to hit Beijing.

 

[lemontree]

India needs the ability to hit Beijing.

That ability is under development and will be a reality in 2 years. As of now our ability exists to waste their east coast if the need arises.
Their CMC of our region at Chengdu and other crucial infrastructure is well within the range of our existing weapons.

 

[Ray]

This is what Ali Ahmed, an ex Army officer, now a research scholar with IDSA has to say:

India, China, and the US: The Debate in India

The latest spat in the South China Sea, in a first, involves China and India. An Indian naval ship, INS Airavat, transited through the sea claimed by China as its "territorial waters". It had left a Vietnamese port after a spot of maritime diplomacy. While at sea, it is reported to have received a radio transmission asking it to explain its presence. The Chinese maintain that they have no record of this incident. Vietnam insists that it has no information. The story broke in the Indian press over a week after the incident. It serves as a useful entry point into discussing the India-China strategic equation, with India's relationship with the US serving as backdrop.

India's presence in the South China Sea dates to 2000 and is part of its strategy of engaging with East Asia and South East Asia. The hawks have it that the strategy must be pursued with a vengeance so as to counter what they perceive as China's encirclement of India. The moderates prefer to view the incident in perspective, concentrating on engaging China and the region rather than prematurely ruffling feathers.

In the background is the most fundamental geopolitical change underway over the past two decades, that of a rising China. The relative decline of the US, of more recent vintage, has led to fears of a vacuum emerging. India has in tandem enhanced its profile in the region, a move some see as a balance to China. Indeed, Hillary Clinton, during her recent five-day visit to India for a "strategic dialogue", said, "As India takes on a larger role throughout the Asia Pacific, it does have increasing responsibilities"¦In all of these areas, India's leadership will help to shape positively the future of the Asia Pacific. That's why the United States supports India's Look East policy, and we encourage India not just to look east, but to engage East and act East as well"¦"

The debate between the hawks and moderates is essentially about the extent of proximity to US and corresponding distance from China. It is played out at two levels: the strategic and operational.

At the strategic level, the two positions are in a democratic contest within the national security system. The chairperson of India's National Security Advisory Board, K. Shankar Bajpai, a tier for recommendatory input from professionals and thinkers in the National Security Council system, in a recent trenchant criticism bemoaned, "That"¦our wider priorities currently include"¦the changing power equations to our East (of which the global consequences of China's ascension is a vital, but separate issue), and several interests in the Indian Ocean. In which of these are we intellectually, much less militarily, equipped to do anything?"

His argument, representative of the more assertive position, is that India's strategic frontiers stretch from Suez to Shanghai, an expansion from the earlier stretch from Aden to Singapore. Answering the question he poses himself, "How to develop influence within our strategic frontiers?", his counsel is: "the one option we still shy away from is America", the reasoning being, "until we are able to do more on our own, we must develop partnerships, or at least ad-hoc collaborations"¦"

The National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, on the other hand, has a more nuanced take. To him the issue most likely to affect India's future ability to transform itself is the rise of China. His argument is that, "India's interest is clearly in an inclusive world order, with China as one of its cooperative members"¦. But this will require much better communication between India and China and no misunderstanding of each other's actions and motives."

At the operational level, the attack by India's strategic community on what they see as Delhi's desultory policies is intense. A representative opinion, voiced by a military funded think tank, has it that, "The first requirement is to upgrade India's military strategy of dissuasion against China"¦. Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary's territory through the launching of major offensive operations." The recommendation is therefore for offensive and firepower capabilities.

India's NSA, no doubt already having deliberated over such demands, has it in response that, "Our goal must be defense, not offense, unless offense is necessary for deterrence or to protect India's ability to continue its own transformation. We must develop the means to defend ourselves." It is no wonder then that the defense ministry has reportedly returned a Rs. 1200 billion (approximately US$25-30 billion) plan to refurbish the military for a face-off with China, for reconsideration.

Summing up, the two views are at odds on two counts. Hawks would prefer taking on China more assertively and in partnership with the US. The moderates, who currently control policy, prefer engagement with China and, in respect of the US relationship, as the NSA put it, India "will continue to walk her own path in the world."

There is a third view, less visible these days largely on account of the Left parties having been eclipsed in the last polls. It is that the discussion is subject to the limitations of international relations theories that see the world as anarchic and balancing as the only recourse. Instead, in this perspective, Asian values need revisiting to bring about a regime of tolerance and non-violence. Reliance on western perspectives of how nation-states behave in a power-reliant world makes for a tension-filled future. The interest of the US is in seeing a self-perpetuation of suspicion in order that its relevance extends indefinitely. Working towards a pan-Asian identity and interaction can serve as an antidote.

How the debate turns out in India between the two mainstream and one marginalized position may prove consequential to the future strategic movement in Asia. Future crises, for which the current 'crisis that isn't' serves as a precursor, can be expected to lend energy to the debate.

India, China, and the US: The Debate in India | Foreign Policy Journal

A few issues are worth noting:

1. The Indian presence in the South China Sea is not of recent origin. It began in 2000.

2. The decline of the US and its presence in the Pacific, has given rise to China's excessive muscling (in a manner of speaking).

3. India is trying to fill the vacuum caused by the US absence in strength in this region.

4. The US is encouraging India to fill the vacuum caused as is exhibited by the 'strategic dialogue' the US top functionaries, to include the Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, has had and are having with India.

5. India has finally kickstarted her, otherwise dormant, 'Look East' policy.

6. The debate of the Indian hawks and the Indian doves is basically on two level - strategic and operational and the extent of proximity to US and corresponding distance from China.

7. The hawks believe India's strategic frontiers stretch from Suez to Shanghai, an expansion from the earlier stretch from Aden to Singapore though K Shankar Bajai feels "the one option we still shy away from is America", the reasoning being, "until we are able to do more on our own, we must develop partnerships, or at least ad-hoc collaborations"¦"

8. The doves led by Shiv Shankar Menon feels "India's interest is clearly in an inclusive world order, with China as one of its cooperative members"¦. But this will require much better communication between India and China and no misunderstanding of each other's actions and motives."

9. At the operational level, a think tank has opined that the first requirement is to upgrade India's military strategy of dissuasion against China"¦. Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary's territory through the launching of major offensive operations." The recommendation is therefore for offensive and firepower capabilities.

10. Their is the view that "Our goal must be defense, not offense, unless offense is necessary for deterrence or to protect India's ability to continue its own transformation. We must develop the means to defend ourselves." It is no wonder then that the defense ministry has reportedly returned a Rs. 1200 billion (approximately US$25-30 billion) plan to refurbish the military for a face-off with China, for reconsideration.

There are two views over China in India. One is what Bharat Karnad advocates, which is go the whole hog and take on China. He even advocates arming Vietnam with Brahmos with nuke (as China has done with Pakistan) and also negotiate for a naval base in Vietnam that overlooks Hainan of China.

The other view is that engage China in dialogue.

The Hawks want to take on China more assertively and in partnership with the US.

The moderates, who currently control policy, prefer engagement with China and, in respect of the US relationship, as the NSA put it, India "will continue to walk her own path in the world."

The third view of the Left is that the Asian values need revisiting to bring about a regime of tolerance and non-violence. Reliance on western perspectives of how nation-states behave in a power-reliant world makes for a tension-filled future.

All these views are interesting, but the manner in which the Indian Govts normally responded is usually peacelike.

However, there seems to be some aggressive gene surfacing within the Indian Govt for a change wherein India is getting proactive in her relations with China as is seen in the South China Sea and also the rapid re-arming of India and beefing up the Line of Actual Control.

All this has spooked China.

China seem to be mortified over the US India collusion and the military overtures of the SE Asia countries towards China assisted by the US and the convergence of interest of all concerned to include Australia and Japan.

The times will be hard on China in the near future.

Interesting times ahead!

 

[Ray]

This is what Bharat Karnad has to say:

Noted Author Blasts Indian Military's Ability to Confront China, Says: Indian Security Forces 'Have Become More and More Like the Indian Government – Cautious, Defensive"¦ And Risk-Averse When It Comes to China'

n a recent article, renowned Indian strategic affairs writer Bharat Karnad questioned the mental attitude preparedness of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force to confront China, which he described as India's "only consequential foe." Karnad's article comes amid the growing challenges from the Chinese military to the U.S. and Indian vessels in the South China Sea. In September 2011, Indian media reported that Chinese Navy confronted an Indian vessel off the coast of Vietnam.

Bharat Karnad, who has authored several books on India's strategic and nuclear policy, is a professor in national security studies at the Centre of Policy Studies (CPS), a research institute based in New Delhi. In his article titled "Indian Armed Forces Have China Syndrome," Karnad slammed the chiefs of the Indian military for not recognizing the growing Chinese threat to India's interests.

Karnad went on to argue that India needs to enter military-to-military collaborations with like-minded countries such as Vietnam to confront China, stating: "Whatever the Indian military's level of eagerness or the lack of it to go toe-to-toe with China, it may be prudent to arm on a priority basis a bold and plucky Vietnam, which has repeatedly shown that it takes no guff from anybody, with everything Hanoi desires, including the nuclearized Brahmos supersonic cruise missile."

Following are excerpts from the article:[1]

"As Soon as China Heaves into View, Our Military Leadership, Much Like the Indian Government, Freezes Up, Its Reluctance Reflecting"¦ a Deep Down Conviction that It Cannot Cope"

"Over the years, the Indian Armed Services have become more and more like the Indian government – cautious, defensive, incremental in thought and action, and risk-averse when it comes to China, an adversary that's perhaps better endowed, if not more competent, in fighting wars. Willingness to tangle with an equal or superior foe is the measure by which would-be great powers [such as India] are judged. It is also a reasonable criterion for the citizenry to gauge whether the country, in fact, has secured military value and muscle for the vast monies expended on national defense"¦.

"[A]s soon as China heaves into view, our military leadership, much like the Indian government, freezes up, its reluctance reflecting less the actual correlation of forces than a deep conviction that it cannot cope. This establishment attitude is everywhere, reflected most recently in former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra on a weekend television show saying point blank that India should do nothing to rile China until it is economically in a position to offer resistance – which is a recipe essentially to do nothing.

"The Army Chief, General V.K. Singh, has talked forthrightly of Chinese violations of the disputed border but, like his predecessors, done precious little to rid the army of its Pakistan fixation and transform it into a land force capable of taking the fight to the Chinese on the Tibetan plateau.

"To crow about [Indian Army's] two Mountain Divisions and additional two divisions under raising as meaningful offensive warfare capability in the Himalayas is misleading, as these constitute a force that is neither large enough nor potent enough to do more than beef up the defensive line 40-50 miles behind the Line of Actual Control [LAC], which pre-positioning ends up ceding this wide belt of border land to China before the hostilities even begin."

"[Indian] Navy is At the Sharp End of Imminent Military Confrontations, Which are Bound Increasingly to Determine the Nature of the Sino-Indian Strategic Equilibrium; But the Indian Navy Seems to Be in No Frame of Mind to Proactively Protect National Interests"

"The Indian Air Force, likewise, is air defense minded in the eastern theatre [vis-à-vis China], despite its having the largest complement of Tezpur and Chabua-based Su-30MKI, arguably the best combat and strike aircraft flying bar the F-22 Raptor, that can, if offensively deployed, keep the Chinese PLA on tenterhooks. But whatever the army and air force dispositions, the navy is at the sharp end of imminent military confrontations, which are bound increasingly to determine the nature of the Sino-Indian strategic equilibrium obtaining in the future.

"But the Indian Navy seems to be in no frame of mind to proactively protect national interests in the South China Sea, or anywhere else that Chinese ships may venture. This much may be gleaned from the op-ed piece by retired Admiral Arun Prakash ('Where are Our Ships Bound?,' Indian Express, Oct. 1, 2011). Astonishingly, Prakash blames [oil and gas exploration firm] ONGC Videsh Ltd. and MEA [Ministry of External Affairs] for trying to precipitate a confrontation in the South China Sea, which the former naval chief deems too distant for Delhi to 'take a stand on principle or adopt an assertive posture vis-a-vis China' particularly in the absence of 'a viable trans-national capability.'

"His reference is to the mid-July challenge by a suspected Chinese naval vessel to the amphibious assault ship INS Airavat [of India] steaming north from Nha Trang to Haiphong that went unreported until, possibly Hanoi, mindful of the fact that an aggressive China has the effect of leaving the Indian government and the Armed Services in a tizzy, sought to test Delhi's resolve to help protect India's energy stake in the South China Sea and Vietnam's 'territorial integrity' by leaking the news of this non-incident to the international press.

"The Indian government and MEA's instincts to run away from a fight with China were forestalled by the "¦ state visit of the Vietnamese president, Truong Tan Sang, resulting in surprisingly strong statements supportive of Vietnamese interests by the External Affairs Minister, S. M. Krishna."

"The Military's Unwillingness to Tangle with China, the Only Consequential Foe India Faces, is Rooted in a Host of Reasons; [India] is Still to Get a Service Chief of Staff Who Calls a Spade a Shovel"

"The more troubling thing is Admiral Prakash's implied contention that the Navy, in effect, ought to be allowed to choose its fights. That's not how it works. Wars are imposed by situation and circumstance or triggered by sustained violation of sovereignty or chance trampling of national interests.

"The military, navy included, better damn well be prepared for any contingency at all times. There is no excuse for trying to escape a fight by pleading logistical void and absence of wherewithal. Because then the question will be asked: What exactly has the navy, which ballyhoos its strategic mindset as much as it does its blue water capability build-up, been preparing for?

"The military's unwillingness to tangle with China, the only consequential foe India faces, is rooted in a host of reasons, among them the fact that the country is still to get a service chief of staff who calls a spade a shovel, and shakes up the national security establishment by ruthlessly restructuring his service with the Chinese threat primarily in mind, thereby seeding an operational reorientation of the Indian military as a whole north and eastward – something desperately required if it means to be relevant in the unfolding geostrategics of the extended region and Asia."

"If We Lack the Stomach for a Fight Let's at Least Equip a Country [i.e. Vietnam] That Does Have the Guts to Take on China"

"Dealing with China demands finesse and forcefulness. So far what has been on view is the former, as configured by the ingloriously ambivalent MEA and a little-known body of appeasers comprising the 'China Study Group.' Too much nuance and too little counter-force has resulted in China gaining massive psychological and political advantage, further encouraging it to do as it pleases.

"Whatever the Indian military's level of eagerness or the lack of it to go toe-to-toe with China, it may be prudent to arm on a priority basis a bold and plucky Vietnam, that has repeatedly shown it takes no guff from anybody, with everything Hanoi desires, including the nuclearized Brahmos supersonic cruise missile.

"If we lack the stomach for a fight let's at least equip a country [i.e. Vietnam] that does have the guts to take on China. It will keep a worried Chinese South Seas Fleet tied to its Sanya base on Hainan Island because, sure as hell, it won't be the Indian Navy, which shies away from stressful encounters east of Malacca."

Link

[1] Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist

 

[Ray]

This is what Bharat Karnad has to say:

Noted Author Blasts Indian Military's Ability to Confront China, Says: Indian Security Forces 'Have Become More and More Like the Indian Government – Cautious, Defensive"¦ And Risk-Averse When It Comes to China'

n a recent article, renowned Indian strategic affairs writer Bharat Karnad questioned the mental attitude preparedness of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force to confront China, which he described as India's "only consequential foe." Karnad's article comes amid the growing challenges from the Chinese military to the U.S. and Indian vessels in the South China Sea. In September 2011, Indian media reported that Chinese Navy confronted an Indian vessel off the coast of Vietnam.

Bharat Karnad, who has authored several books on India's strategic and nuclear policy, is a professor in national security studies at the Centre of Policy Studies (CPS), a research institute based in New Delhi. In his article titled "Indian Armed Forces Have China Syndrome," Karnad slammed the chiefs of the Indian military for not recognizing the growing Chinese threat to India's interests.

Karnad went on to argue that India needs to enter military-to-military collaborations with like-minded countries such as Vietnam to confront China, stating: "Whatever the Indian military's level of eagerness or the lack of it to go toe-to-toe with China, it may be prudent to arm on a priority basis a bold and plucky Vietnam, which has repeatedly shown that it takes no guff from anybody, with everything Hanoi desires, including the nuclearized Brahmos supersonic cruise missile."

Following are excerpts from the article:[1]

"As Soon as China Heaves into View, Our Military Leadership, Much Like the Indian Government, Freezes Up, Its Reluctance Reflecting"¦ a Deep Down Conviction that It Cannot Cope"

"Over the years, the Indian Armed Services have become more and more like the Indian government – cautious, defensive, incremental in thought and action, and risk-averse when it comes to China, an adversary that's perhaps better endowed, if not more competent, in fighting wars. Willingness to tangle with an equal or superior foe is the measure by which would-be great powers [such as India] are judged. It is also a reasonable criterion for the citizenry to gauge whether the country, in fact, has secured military value and muscle for the vast monies expended on national defense"¦.

"[A]s soon as China heaves into view, our military leadership, much like the Indian government, freezes up, its reluctance reflecting less the actual correlation of forces than a deep conviction that it cannot cope. This establishment attitude is everywhere, reflected most recently in former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra on a weekend television show saying point blank that India should do nothing to rile China until it is economically in a position to offer resistance – which is a recipe essentially to do nothing.

"The Army Chief, General V.K. Singh, has talked forthrightly of Chinese violations of the disputed border but, like his predecessors, done precious little to rid the army of its Pakistan fixation and transform it into a land force capable of taking the fight to the Chinese on the Tibetan plateau.

"To crow about [Indian Army's] two Mountain Divisions and additional two divisions under raising as meaningful offensive warfare capability in the Himalayas is misleading, as these constitute a force that is neither large enough nor potent enough to do more than beef up the defensive line 40-50 miles behind the Line of Actual Control [LAC], which pre-positioning ends up ceding this wide belt of border land to China before the hostilities even begin."

"[Indian] Navy is At the Sharp End of Imminent Military Confrontations, Which are Bound Increasingly to Determine the Nature of the Sino-Indian Strategic Equilibrium; But the Indian Navy Seems to Be in No Frame of Mind to Proactively Protect National Interests"

"The Indian Air Force, likewise, is air defense minded in the eastern theatre [vis-à-vis China], despite its having the largest complement of Tezpur and Chabua-based Su-30MKI, arguably the best combat and strike aircraft flying bar the F-22 Raptor, that can, if offensively deployed, keep the Chinese PLA on tenterhooks. But whatever the army and air force dispositions, the navy is at the sharp end of imminent military confrontations, which are bound increasingly to determine the nature of the Sino-Indian strategic equilibrium obtaining in the future.

"But the Indian Navy seems to be in no frame of mind to proactively protect national interests in the South China Sea, or anywhere else that Chinese ships may venture. This much may be gleaned from the op-ed piece by retired Admiral Arun Prakash ('Where are Our Ships Bound?,' Indian Express, Oct. 1, 2011). Astonishingly, Prakash blames [oil and gas exploration firm] ONGC Videsh Ltd. and MEA [Ministry of External Affairs] for trying to precipitate a confrontation in the South China Sea, which the former naval chief deems too distant for Delhi to 'take a stand on principle or adopt an assertive posture vis-a-vis China' particularly in the absence of 'a viable trans-national capability.'

"His reference is to the mid-July challenge by a suspected Chinese naval vessel to the amphibious assault ship INS Airavat [of India] steaming north from Nha Trang to Haiphong that went unreported until, possibly Hanoi, mindful of the fact that an aggressive China has the effect of leaving the Indian government and the Armed Services in a tizzy, sought to test Delhi's resolve to help protect India's energy stake in the South China Sea and Vietnam's 'territorial integrity' by leaking the news of this non-incident to the international press.

"The Indian government and MEA's instincts to run away from a fight with China were forestalled by the "¦ state visit of the Vietnamese president, Truong Tan Sang, resulting in surprisingly strong statements supportive of Vietnamese interests by the External Affairs Minister, S. M. Krishna."

"The Military's Unwillingness to Tangle with China, the Only Consequential Foe India Faces, is Rooted in a Host of Reasons; [India] is Still to Get a Service Chief of Staff Who Calls a Spade a Shovel"

"The more troubling thing is Admiral Prakash's implied contention that the Navy, in effect, ought to be allowed to choose its fights. That's not how it works. Wars are imposed by situation and circumstance or triggered by sustained violation of sovereignty or chance trampling of national interests.

"The military, navy included, better damn well be prepared for any contingency at all times. There is no excuse for trying to escape a fight by pleading logistical void and absence of wherewithal. Because then the question will be asked: What exactly has the navy, which ballyhoos its strategic mindset as much as it does its blue water capability build-up, been preparing for?

"The military's unwillingness to tangle with China, the only consequential foe India faces, is rooted in a host of reasons, among them the fact that the country is still to get a service chief of staff who calls a spade a shovel, and shakes up the national security establishment by ruthlessly restructuring his service with the Chinese threat primarily in mind, thereby seeding an operational reorientation of the Indian military as a whole north and eastward – something desperately required if it means to be relevant in the unfolding geostrategics of the extended region and Asia."

"If We Lack the Stomach for a Fight Let's at Least Equip a Country [i.e. Vietnam] That Does Have the Guts to Take on China"

"Dealing with China demands finesse and forcefulness. So far what has been on view is the former, as configured by the ingloriously ambivalent MEA and a little-known body of appeasers comprising the 'China Study Group.' Too much nuance and too little counter-force has resulted in China gaining massive psychological and political advantage, further encouraging it to do as it pleases.

"Whatever the Indian military's level of eagerness or the lack of it to go toe-to-toe with China, it may be prudent to arm on a priority basis a bold and plucky Vietnam, that has repeatedly shown it takes no guff from anybody, with everything Hanoi desires, including the nuclearized Brahmos supersonic cruise missile.

"If we lack the stomach for a fight let's at least equip a country [i.e. Vietnam] that does have the guts to take on China. It will keep a worried Chinese South Seas Fleet tied to its Sanya base on Hainan Island because, sure as hell, it won't be the Indian Navy, which shies away from stressful encounters east of Malacca."

Link

[1] Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist

 

[Ray]

May see

U.S.-India Engagement: Laying the Foundations for a New Asian Security Architecture
U.S.-India Engagement: Laying the Foundations for a New Asian Security Architecture

 

[lemontree]

Sir, Bharat Karnad is not being fair. You know how we are pulled back by the political establisment.

 

[johnee]

Lemontree,
India needs the ability to hit Beijing from any part of India.

 

[Tianshan]

I often wondered if the Chinese posters on the forum appeared stupid because they cannot articulate their thought a little better,language constraints perhaps. But reading this article published in a leading Chinese journal, makes me think the problem is much deeper and the intellectual malnourishment evidently affects substantial segment of its intelligentsia.

true, the big problem is that we lack intelligence.

we sound stupid, not because of language constraints, but because of a deep malaise within the modern chinese way of thinking.

 

[sesha_maruthi27]

I think the west is trying to play spoil sport with Asia's economy just by provoking the Indians against their Chinese counterparts, so that we end up kicking each others ass and the west could in the mean time develop their economy by offering pea-nuts and taking large amount of money for their so called sophisticated and technologically more advanced defence equipments. We (CHINA and INDIA) must take steps which may lead to good mutual understanding between both the countries and must stay away from any conflict at the time when we as a part of Asia are raising as GLOBAL POWERS and a larger economy as we are in the last stage of "icing the cake for celebrations". We must understand that the west is trying to destroy our party by damaging the cake which we are slowly and steadily bringing to completion.