India votes Against Israel in UNHRC Resolution

[ladder]

my point was Israel will not give a shit about this UNHRC voting, as simple as it is the UNHRC doesn't has a proper mechanism to impose its will (gutless), my question is does security council gets any say in this.

Security council has USA veto. And General Assembly where no one has a veto is only advisory in nature and not strictly enforceable. ( Can't be enforced if USA puts it's weight behind.)

So, Israel wasn't desperate for Indian support when it entered into the offensive, but abstaining would have been welcomed by Israel. Now Putin too has issued positive statement though Russia also voted in favor of the resolution.

Till today USA support alone can counter weigh pressures from many such resolutions.

 

[ladder]

Abstain and issue a statement that india wishes to see minimal loss of life but fully supports israels right to defend it's citizens and hopes its military objectives are soon met. Intefering while their citizens still have rockets fired at them and their soldiers are still in a hostile zone is not how you treat a friend.

And why should India abstain from a resolution that calls for strict enforcing of International law? Does international law take away from Israel to defend it's interests? Let the observers on ground see and report back. Why you have to conclude that the outcome will be against Israel?

 

[Voldemort]

I CONDEMN this move. What is the Modi govt trying to do? Win Muslim hearts? Israel is dealing with these people in an exemplary manner, something which we can never do. Very very disappointing. Not a good sign for our future!

 

[ladder]

@JMM99, please give your views on the text of the resolution. And specially on the ROE which should followed in this kind of situation. ( I know ROE and International law are among your favorite topics)

 

[Voldemort]

Statement issued- India is deeply concerned at the steep escalation of violence between Israel and Palestine, particularly heavy airstrikes in Gaza and disproportionate use of force on ground, resulting in tragic loss of civilian lives, especially women and children and heavy damage to property

 

[Voldemort]

Statement contains the word 'disproportionate'. We expect every country in the world to do the same thing that we did after terrorist attacks on our soil. That is- REQUEST the other govt to take action, cry a little and stop playing cricket. That is proportionate reaction.

 

[AVERAGE INDIAN]

UNHRC is joke so i don't think it really matters , if you look at some of the members of the Human Rights Council. Here are a few of the human rights standouts: Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Cuba and China.Yes, some of the biggest abusers of human rights are members of the Human Rights Council.So I'll ask again. What the heck do we get from the UN if the abuse is in our country and our ally? Answer – nothing.Ever since the days of Arafat this stupid organization has been used to silence the common sense factor in the world

 

[fyodor]

Modi betrays....

 

[anoop_mig25]

I can`t understand while people are condemning Modi gov moves to support resolution .......

Its way better then what CPI/CPM demands complete stopping all relations with Isreal

And why give too hutus too resolution which isnt enforceable

 

[JBH22]

 

[rock127]

UNHRC is joke so i don't think it really matters , if you look at some of the members of the Human Rights Council. Here are a few of the human rights standouts: Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Cuba and China.Yes, some of the biggest abusers of human rights are members of the Human Rights Council.So I'll ask again. What the heck do we get from the UN if the abuse is in our country and our ally? Answer – nothing.Ever since the days of Arafat this stupid organization has been used to silence the common sense factor in the world

One of the biggest example of countries violating Human Right and biggest source of terrorism.

India SHOULD have abstained when US and EU did.

Also UN is not much of use anyway.

 

[Otm Shank]

And why should India abstain from a resolution that calls for strict enforcing of International law? Does international law take away from Israel to defend it's interests? Let the observers on ground see and report back. Why you have to conclude that the outcome will be against Israel?

The UN would politicize it..collateral damage to one side is human rights violations to another. This would prolong the conflict into a low intensity war that will go on forever claiming many more casualties.

The first Right/law/rule is to protect their citizens and theres been alot of proof of paleatinian groups using civilian, humanitarian and even UN schools as shelters and for storing weapins.

The Israelis deserve the same leeway lanka was given leeway to bring peace and prosperity to their country.. which a same kind of proposal india voted against just days before, no?

 

[JMM99]

@ladder

I hope this three part posting is helpful.

Application of IHL in Gaza - Part 1

Googling - Israel "occupied territories" IHL pdf - results in over 40000 hits. I suspect that hundreds (perhaps thousands) of articles touch on application of International Humanitarian Law in Israeli-"occupied territories" (West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza). I claim no particular expertise in that area, much of which is more colored by irrationality than by rationality.

Here are some recent resources that I've found helpful in gaining a basic understanding of a complicated specific legal situation, as viewed as a subset of the even more complicated general legal regime of "Occupation Law" (and its more recent buzzwords of "transformational occupations" and "transformative occupations"). Since major powers (e.g., Russia, China, India, Brazil, Japan, U.S.) are not likely to be occupied, their direct involvement in occupations will most likely come as a result of military interventions by them and their subsequent roles as occupiers (and perhaps as attempted state-builders). Citizens of major powers might keep that in mind.

2011 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, pp.26-29, has an excellent summary of the Law of Occupation - or, more correctly, an excellent summary of all the issues that would have to settled before one could speak of a generally-accepted Law of Occupation - (my emphasis added in text below):

2) The Law of Occupation

As mentioned in the report submitted to the 30th International Conference, recent years have been characterized by an increase in extraterritorial military interventions. Along with the continuation of more classical forms of occupation, some of these interventions have given rise to new forms of foreign military presence in the territory of a state, on occasion consensual, but more often not. These new forms of military presence have - to a certain extent - refocused attention on occupation law. Outlined below are some legal questions that have been generated in relation to this specific area of IHL.

The 2012 ICRC Report, Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory, is briefly discussed in Part 2 (next post).

a) Beginning and End of Occupation

To begin with, it should be noted that renewed international attention on the law of occupation has essentially been focused on the substantive rules of occupation law rather than on issues surrounding the conditions that must be established for the beginning and end of occupation. In other words, relatively little attention has been paid to the standards on the basis of which the existence of a state of occupation may be determined. This is unfortunate given that the question of whether there is occupation or not is central to the application of the relevant body of IHL and needs to be answered before any substantive question of occupation law can be addressed.

Practice has demonstrated that many states put forward claims of inapplicability of occupation law even as they maintain effective control over foreign territory or a part thereof, due to a reluctance to be perceived as an occupying power. Their assertions are partly facilitated by the fact that IHL instruments do not provide clear standards for determining when an occupation starts and terminates. Not only is the definition of occupation vague under IHL, but other factual elements - such as the continuation of hostilities and/or the continued exercise of some degree of authority by local authorities, or by the foreign forces during and after the phase out period - may render the legal classification of a particular situation quite complex.

In addition, recent military operations have underlined the necessity of more precisely defining the legal criteria on the basis of which a state of occupation may be determined to exist when it involves multinational forces. Are the criteria for the beginning and end of occupation the same in such a case? Who are the occupying power(s) when a coalition of states is involved? Can all the troop contributing countries be considered occupying powers for the purposes of IHL?

Linked to the issue of the applicability of occupation law is the question of the determination of the legal framework applicable to invasion by and the withdrawal of foreign forces. It is submitted that a broad interpretation of the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention during both the invasion and withdrawal phases - with a view to maximizing the legal protection conferred on the civilian population - should be favoured. An issue that would benefit from elaboration in the invasion and withdrawal phase is the exact legal protections enjoyed by those who are in the power of a belligerent, but are neither on territory occupied by it nor on its own territory.

It is submitted that the range of questions posed above raise important humanitarian challenges and would deserve appropriate legal clarification.

This issue re: Gaza will be more specifically addressed by the sources linked in Parts 2 and 3 (next two posts). Back to the 2011 ICRC Report:

b) The Rights and Duties of an Occupying Power

The law of occupation has also faced recurrent challenges on the basis that it is ill-suited for contemporary occupation. The reluctance of some states to accept its application is often justified by claims that situations in which they are or might be involved in differ considerably from the classical concept of belligerent occupation. In other words, it has been argued that current occupation law is not sufficiently equipped to deal with the specificities of the new features of occupation.

Recent occupations have, in particular, triggered much legal commentary about the failure of occupation law to authorize the introduction of wholesale changes in the legal, political, institutional and economical structure of a territory placed under the under effective control of a foreign power. It has been contended that occupation law places an undue emphasis on preserving the continuity of the socio-political situation of an occupied territory. It has also been claimed that the transformation of an oppressive governmental system or the rebuilding of a society that has completely collapsed could be achieved during an occupation, and be in the interest of the international community, as well as authorized by the lex lata.

The far-reaching political and institutional changes undertaken in recent occupations have thus generated tension between the requirement of occupation law that the occupying power respects the laws and institutions in place and the perceived need to fundamentally alter the institutional, social or economic fabric of an occupied territory. It has been contended that, to reduce this tension, IHL should permit certain transformative processes and recognize the occupying power's role in fostering them. Such a position, however, raises the question of
the validity of limitations posed by IHL on an occupying power's rights and duties as reflected in article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Given that occupation law does not expressly give "carte blanche" for various transformations that might be desired by an occupying power, some contemporary interpretations have aimed to achieve that result by granting an occupying power increasing leeway in the administration of an occupied territory. It is submitted that the limits to an occupying power's freedom - or not - to effect changes in an occupied territory need to be identified more clearly.

Prolonged occupation raises a whole set of legal questions in itself. Even though IHL contemplates the possibility that occupation may be of a protracted nature, none of the relevant IHL instruments place limits on the duration of effective control over a foreign territory. However, prolonged occupations place IHL under considerable strain insofar as they call into question some of the underlying principles of occupation law, in particular the provisional character of occupation and the necessity to preserve the status quo ante. As neither the 1907 Hague Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention specify any lawful deviations from existing law in this scenario, many have argued that prolonged occupation necessitates specific regulations in response to the practical problems arising in such cases. The other view is that occupation law is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the humanitarian and legal concerns arising in prolonged occupation.

In addition to the issues raised above, it should be noted that human rights law may play an important role in delimiting an occupying power's rights and duties. This body of law is widely recognized as applicable in situations of occupation and, consequently, may impose formal obligations on an occupying power, or serve as a basis for altering existing local laws. The International Court of Justice has pointed to the relevance of human rights law in times of occupation and to an occupying power's legal obligation to take this body of norms into
account in both its conduct and in the policies it develops in an occupied territory.[18]

18. ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment 2005 & Judgment 2006.

It is therefore necessary to identify how, and to what extent, human rights law applies in occupied territory and to explore the interplay between human rights law and the law of occupation.

Prolonged occupations give rise to situations which are neither fish nor fowl. Confusion as to the rights and obligations of the "occupying powers" were present even in internationally-regulated situations - the League of Nations Mandate system post-WWI, and the UN Trusteeship system post-WWII.

E.g., Constitutional Law: Executive Agreements: International Law: Executive Authority concerning the Future Political Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 66, No. 6 (Apr., 1968), pp. 1277-1292 (article consists of 16 pages authored by JMM99) Published by: The Michigan Law Review Association.

Back to the 2011 ICRC Report:

c) The Use of Force in Occupied Territory

Another challenge raised by recent examples of occupation is the identification of the legal framework governing the use of force by an occupying power. Occupation is often characterized by the continuation or resumption of hostilities between, on the one hand, the occupying forces and, on the other, the armed forces of the occupied territory and/or other organized armed groups more or less affiliated to the ousted government. Force might also be used by an occupying power within the framework of its obligation to restore and maintain public order in an occupied territory. Even though article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations has always been interpreted as a central provision of occupation law, its implementation still raises important operational and legal questions, particularly when it comes to the use of force by an occupying power. As some occupations have evidenced, regulation of the use of force in cases of civil unrest and in response to ongoing armed opposition (hostilities) is not clear-cut.

Although an occupying power is meant to maintain security by means of law enforcement, uncertainty persists with regard to the applicable legal regime in situations where it is difficult to distinguish civil unrest from hostilities or where an occupying power is confronted by both at the same time in the entirety, or parts of, an occupied territory. The law of occupation is silent on the separation or interaction between law enforcement measures and the use of military force under a conduct of hostilities paradigm, thus leaving a significant degree of uncertainty regarding identification of the relevant legal regime(s) governing the use of force in occupied territory. This inevitably opens the door to different interpretations on how force may be resorted to in an occupied territory, in what circumstances and according to which body of law. Ultimately, uncertainty over the applicable legal regime may affect the protection afforded to an occupied population. It is believed that there is a need to clarify how the rules governing law enforcement and those regulating the conduct of hostilities interact in practice in the context of an occupation.

The position generally taken by the ICRC, as to the use of force by occupiers, is laid out in 2012 Watkin, Use of force during occupation: law enforcement and conduct of hostilities:

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Kenneth Watkin is a former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the United States Naval War College and previously served as the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Forces.

Abstract

This article explores the law governing the maintenance of public order and safety during belligerent occupation. Given the potential for widespread violence associated with international armed conflict, such as occurred in 2003–2004 in Iraq, it is inevitable that military and police forces will be engaged in activities that interface and overlap. Human-rights-based norms governing law enforcement, such as the right to life, are found in humanitarian law, permitting an application of both law enforcement and conduct of hostilities norms under that body of law. This results in the simultaneous application of these norms through both humanitarian and human rights law, which ultimately enhances the protection of inhabitants of the occupied territory.

I believe it's fair to state that reasonable people can and do differ on what findings of fact should be drawn from Gaza, and also on what conclusions of law are applicable. Given the absence of an effective international court system, as well as extremists on both sides, the Gaza issues become very political - and international law will (IMO) have little to do with the eventual outcome.

- to be cont. in Parts 2 and 3 -

 

[Jagdish58]

This is Nehru and gandhiyan tactic which we are using for 67 years keeping minorities happy with vote bank policy , one should be ashamed before showing fingure on others

List of massacres in India - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So many communal massacre etc have taken place right under the shadow of Democracy it is easy to blame X or Y or Z but we have to look into ourself first:thumb:

 

[JMM99]

Application of IHL in Gaza - Part 2

The President of the ICRC has specifically addressed the Gaza situation, following the guidelines presented in the 2012 Watkin monograph. 2013 Maurer, Challenges to international humanitarian law: Israel's occupation policy, p.4 pdf:

First and foremost, the rules set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions represent universal legal standards recognised by states and international courts alike as paramount in armed conflicts and military occupation. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory – that is, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip – the applicable legal framework is the law of belligerent occupation. This consists of the rules enshrined in the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and customary IHL. The latter provides a critical and universally accepted legally binding framework to ensure respect for the life and dignity of people living under military occupation.

While the Israeli government has consistently contested that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable de jure to the situation prevailing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, it does nevertheless accept a de facto application of what it calls the 'humanitarian provisions' of the Convention. Moreover, the Israeli Supreme Court has clarified that certain provisions of the Convention as well as the rules of the 1907 Hague Regulations reflect customary IHL and are therefore binding on the authorities in the territories.

2012 ICRC, Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory (154 pages on various areas of "occupation law"); and 2012 IRRC, Occupation (ICRC's review journal; 455 pages on various areas of "occupation law"), cover most completely the ICRC view of "Occupation Law". The IRRC journal includes this specific article, pp. 209-238 pdf, "Kretzmer, The law of belligerent occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel":

Abstract

Since the 1967 War, in the course of which Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, the Supreme Court of Israel has considered thousands of petitions relating to acts of the military and other authorities in those territories (OT). This article reviews the contribution to the law of belligerent occupation of the Court's jurisprudence in these cases. After discussing issues of jurisdiction and the applicable norms, the article reviews the way in which the Court has interpreted military needs, the welfare of the local population, changes in the local law, and use of resources; the attitude of the Court to the long-term nature of the occupation and the existence of Israeli settlements, settlers, and commuters in the OT; the introduction of a three-pronged test of proportionality in assessing military necessity; and hostilities in occupied territories. In the final section, I draw some general conclusions on the Court's contribution to the law of occupation.
...
Concluding comments

The Israeli occupation has gone on for a long time – far too long, in fact, for it to be regarded as a normal situation of occupation. It would be naïve to think that a domestic court could deal with such an anomalous situation as if it were an outside, neutral, observer that is oblivious to the political realities in its own country. While commentators may be highly critical, and justifiably so, of the approach of the HCJ on many questions, including, of course, its refusal to rule on the legality of Israeli settlements, it should be appreciated that in Israel itself the Court has been under attack. Its willingness to review all actions of the military authorities – and occasionally to interfere with security decisions – has not been well received in many quarters and has affected the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of large sections of the Israeli public.

In stressing the centrality of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, in ruling that military commanders must find a balance between military needs and the welfare of the local population, and in subjecting this balance to the test of proportionality, the Court has helped to develop the law of belligerent occupation.

Without belittling this contribution, it seems to me that the Court's real contribution to occupation law lies not on the substantive level but in its very willingness to subject acts of the military authorities in occupied territory to judicial review in real time. Such review has been a welcome innovation. It has had a restraining effect on the acts of the authorities that cannot be judged solely by looking at the Court's jurisprudence. In many cases, the threat of judicial review, submission of a petition, or remarks of the judges during the hearings have led the authorities to reconsider their position and back down, wholly or partially.

Alongside this significant restraining influence of judicial review, requiring the military authorities to defend their actions in court on the basis of the norms of the international law of belligerent occupation, and discussing these norms in a judicial forum, may well be the Court's main contribution to law in a situation of belligerent occupation.

Also of materiality to Gaza in this 2012 IRRC monograph are (starting at p.135 pdf) "Ferraro, Determining the beginning and end of an occupation under international humanitarian law":

Abstract

International humanitarian law (IHL) does not provide a precise definition of the notion of occupation, nor does it propose clear-cut standards for determining when an occupation starts and when its ends. This article analyses in detail the notion of occupation under IHL and its constitutive elements, and sets out a legal test for identifying when a situation qualifies as an occupation for the purposes of IHL. It concludes by suggesting an adjustment of the legal test to the specific characteristics of occupation by proxy and occupation by multinational forces.

and (starting at p. 167 pdf) "Koutroulis, The application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in situations of prolonged occupation: only a matter of time?":

Abstract

The article deals with the effect of the time factor in the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) in 'prolonged belligerent occupations'. It demonstrates that IHL applies in its entirety to such situations and that the adjustments necessary can be made through the interpretation of existing IHL norms. As for IHRL, the protracted character of an occupation reinforces the importance of respecting and applying human rights. It cannot, however, be invoked in order to influence the interpretation of the notion of a state of emergency leading to the adoption of derogations from IHRL rules.

- to be cont. in Part 3 -

 

[JMM99]

Application of IHL in Gaza - Part 3

The divergences between the Israeli and Palestinian positions are exemplified by two 2010-2011 law review articles.

2010 Solomon, The Great Oxymoron: Jus in Bello Violations as Legitimate Non-Forcible Measures of Self-Defense: The Post-Disengagement Israeli Measures Towards Gaza as a Case Study:

Abstract

Modern warfare and the war on terror against mainly non-State actors have obliged States to resort to innovative measures which blur the limits between jus in bello and jus ad bellum and create a legal oxymoron where the same measures constitute international law violations should they be perceived under jus in bello and legitimate means of self-defense should they be seen under the lens of self-defense and jus ad bellum. In order to demonstrate the particular axiom the note will use the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a factual and normative framework and will put under its kaleidoscope the post-disengagement Israeli measures towards Gaza.
...
IV. Conclusion

66. In modern warfare, the hiding of combatants amidst civilian population often renders military operations not only the ultimum refugium but also an undesirable scenario, should the sanctity of life and enemy civilian casualties be taken into consideration. Under these circumstances, recourse to non-forcible defensive measures becomes an imperative need. The Gaza Strip is such a densely populated area, where civilians are prone to be engaged amidst military operations. As such, the Israeli measures following Israel's disengagement from the Strip should be viewed as an attempt to lead to the abandonment of the practice of rocket launching, so that such a military operation will not be rendered necessary.

67. This article tried to demonstrate that although such measures are per se jus in bello violations, seen as a response to the use of force by the other side, they can be perceived as non-forcible jus ad bellum measures. The cases of targeted killings and the erection of the security fence come to support such a conclusion.

68. In an era when—especially after World War II—the horrors of war have become evident to all humanity, it is humanity's duty to applaud any attempts to diminish, if not uproot, the use of force in international relations. Non-forcible defensive measures are a policy which is in tandem with contemporary developments in international law and which should be sanctioned by all peace-loving nations. No matter the pain—and there is pain—the gain is ultimately huge for world peace and stability.

The thrust of this article is an attempt to sanction "jus in bello" violations in warfare by boot-strapping the argument that the violator had the right to go to war ("jus ad bellum") and therefore what it does in conducting war ("jus in bello") is sanctioned by its "jus ad bellum" right. The flip side of this argument would be that one who goes to war without a "jus ad bellum" right cannot have "jus in bello" rights - so that all of its acts of warfare are war crimes.

I believe this is a cuckooland argument; and I will stick with the "Laws of War" as constituting three separate divisions, whose alleged violations are decided separately:

1. Jus ad Bellum - the right or wrong of going to war.

2. Jus in Bello - the right or wrong of what is done in conducting war (your means of warfare).

3. Jus post Bellum - the right or wrong of what is done after major hostilities have ceased, which includes "Occupation Law" (more generally, "Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory" as put by the ICRC in its 2012 report).

Under my syllogism (which is more generally accepted, including by the ICRC), a state could be in violation of "Jus ad Bellum" (e.g., by starting an "aggressive war"), yet still comply fully with the Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum "rules". On the other hand, a state going to war in compliance with Jus ad Bellum could then violate the Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum rules, to be guilty of war crimes in those areas.

2011 Koutroulis, Of Occupation, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: A Reply to Solon Solomon's "The Great Oxymoron: Jus In Bello Violations as Legitimate Non-Forcible Measures of Self-Defense: The Post-Disengagement Israeli Measures towards Gaza as a Case Study":

Abstract

This reply critically addresses three arguments advanced in Solon Solomon's article.

Firstly, it underscores the existing doubts as to the evolution of the right to self-defense towards encompassing operations against non-State actors.

Secondly, it demonstrates that, contrary to Solomon's suggestion, Gaza continues to be occupied by Israel after the 2005 disengagement. This qualification blocks Israel from invoking its jus ad bellum right to self-defense against actions emanating from Gaza.

Finally, this reply argues that, even if the self-defense argument is accepted, the legality of Israeli measures under international law depends on their conformity with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, since both legal regimes are independent from one another and apply simultaneously to Israeli actions.
...
V. Conclusion

30. In his article, Solon Solomon places his arguments mainly in the jus ad bellum sphere and pleads in favour of the legality of Israeli actions. Whether he is right or wrong was not the object of this reply. This reply tried to make clear that the legality of Israeli actions under jus ad bellum does not prejudge in any way their (il)legality under jus in bello. In this vein, Solomon's ad majore ad minus argument, according to which since Israel's right to self-defense would justify a military operation, it justifies the measures Israel adopted, does not affect in the slightest the legality of these measures under jus in bello.

31. In this respect, if jus ad bellum is accepted as being applicable to Israeli measures, the simultaneous application of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello to these measures does give Israel the choice to focus on one legal regime rather than the other, if it feels that this will help justify or legitimize its operations in the eyes of the international community. But this choice is one of a political nature. In the legal realm, such a choice does not exist and political arguments do not dispense Israel from having to abide by the jus in bello rules applicable to its actions.

The first argument by Koutroulis (no self-defense by a state against a non-state actor) is strictly from cuckooland. If that were accepted, India could not defend against a Mumbai-type attack; and the US could not defend against a 9/11-style attack.

His second point (the Gaza occupation didn't end in 2005) is a factual and legal point upon which reasonable people can differ; but, even if the occupation continued, one can find credible legal authorities for the occupying military force to conduct military operations - subject to Jus in Bello rules ! - against factions of the occupied population that resort to a level of violence that equates to an armed conflict.

Koutroulis' third point is stated in a somewhat confusing manner in the abstract and conclusion; see my three-part syllogism above for separate analysis of alleged Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum violations.

Finally, a useful source list focused on legal issues in the Israeli-"occupied territories" is found here, 2012 PHAP, Thematic Workshop on Occupation Law - Rights, Obligations and Contemporary Challenges - reference readings, video & audio (hyperlinked).

Regards and Best to All

Mike