India Pakistan Nuke Scenario - NFU Policy - Massive Retaliation & Possible War Scenarios

lcafanboy

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India Pakistan Nuke Scenario - NFU Policy - Massive Retaliation & Possible War Scenarios

Hey Guys Let's start & Discuss, India Pakistan Nuke Scenario, NFU Policy, Massive Retaliation by India & Possible War Scenarios

After a Pakistani TNW strike, India can go for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal: Former NSA Shivshankar Menon


Former NSA says “massive response” provides counter force option (Above: an Indian Agni-4 IRBM)

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 18th March 17


Former national security advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon has shed new light on an especially worrying aspect of India’s nuclear doctrine --- New Delhi’s barely credible promise of automatic, “massive” nuclear retaliation against any adversary that targets India, or Indian forces anywhere, with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

The credibility gap in this strategy of “massive retaliation”, as pointed out by critics worldwide, is that it would cause carnage in the adversary’s towns and cities but leave intact much of his nuclear arsenal. With those surviving nukes (second-strike capability), the adversary would then wreak havoc on Indian towns and cities.

It is hard for New Delhi, globally regarded as a restrained power, to convince analysts and adversaries that it would knowingly trigger the catastrophic deaths of millions of civilians on both sides by responding “massively” to a far smaller attack --- even, a single Pakistani Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) that killed perhaps a hundred Indian soldiers deep inside Pakistani territory.

Yet, India’s nuclear doctrine, promulgated on January 4, 2003, undertakes that “Nuclear retaliation to a first strike [by an adversary] will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”

Now Menon, in his recent book entitled “Choices: Inside the making of Indian foreign policy”, indicates that India’s threat of “massive retaliation” need not involve nuclear strikes against Pakistani urban centres (“counter-value”, or CV strikes). Instead, India’s “massive response” could take the form of targeting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (“counter-force”, or CF strikes), leaving that adversary with a greatly diminished capability of striking back at India.

In a key paragraph in his book, Menon --- who, as NSA, oversaw nuclear targeting policy --- analyses the meaning of a “massive” strike. He says: “There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.”

Menon carefully differentiates between “first use” (which Indian nuclear doctrine forbids) and “first strike”, which --- in widely-accepted nuclear vocabulary --- refers to a disarming CF strike aimed at leaving an adversary without nuclear recourse.

Menon clearly enunciates the logic of a disarming CF strike: “India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response…” In other words, India’s “second strike” (in response to a TNW against its forces) must leave Pakistan with little or no “third strike” capability.

But does a disarming counter-force strike (which Menon terms a “comprehensive first strike”) amount to a “massive” response, which Indian doctrine mandates? A senior Indian official asks: “Who says a “massive” response must necessarily be directed at CV targets?

Menon’s insights extend the focus of India’s second-strike well beyond counter-value targets to counter-force targets.

Contacted by Business Standard, Menon declined to elaborate, stating only: “India’s nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for.”

Menon’s book has been in print since November, but only now has this nuance been noted by Vipin Narang, a highly regarded nuclear strategist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This week, Narang tweeted: “Indian strategy following Pak tacnuke (tactical nuclear) use is neither proportional response nor massive retaliation. But [rather, it is a] disarming counterforce strike.”

Even so, serious question marks remain over how effectively, or whether at all, India can actually execute a disarming CF strike that takes out most of Pakistan’s nukes. Partly because of the possibility of Indian attack, Pakistan is building up its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country, running its Khushab nuclear reactor at full tilt to produce plutonium. It is currently estimated to have 120-130 nuclear warheads.

Especially difficult for India to target are Pakistan’s small, highly mobile TNWs that are basically truck-mounted, tube-launched artillery.

Furthermore, any impression in Pakistan of Indian counterforce strikes, or the fear that the nukes might soon be lost, would incentivize their early use --- the “use them or lose them” dilemma.

Indian public debate has traditionally focused on another aspect of our doctrine --- the commitment of “No First Use” (NFU) of nuclear weapons. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) questioned NFU in its pre-2014 election manifesto, before backing off quickly. Then, last year, former defence minister Manohar Parrikar raised questions over the need for NFU, before the BJP dismissed that as his “personal view”.


However, given Pakistan’s conventional military weakness in the face of a sudden Indian offensive under the “Cold Start” doctrine, Rawalpindi’s operationalization of TNWs, and its declared plan to use them early in a conflict, make India’s response a matter of life and death for millions.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2017/03/after-pakistani-tnw-strike-india-will.html?m=1

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Time to nuke the storm in the teacup
Published March 29, 2017
SOURCE: LIVEMINT



During the recently concluded 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Vipin Narang of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology set the cat among the pigeons by suggesting that India’s nuclear strategy, if not the doctrine, might be undergoing some significant changes. At the centre of attention are two of the most debated aspects of the doctrine: (1) no first use, and (2) massive retaliation. Narang derived the strength of his argument from Shivshankar Menon’s 2016 book Choices: Inside The Making Of India’s Foreign Policy.

In the book, Menon extols the utility of the no-first-use (NFU) doctrine but also goes on to say: “Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS (nuclear weapon state) that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.” Narang marshalled the remarks of B.S. Nagal, former commander-in-chief of the Strategic Forces Command, and Manohar Parrikar, former defence minister, questioning no first use to boost his claim.

While Menon agrees with the promise of “massive retaliation” stated in India’s nuclear doctrine, he seems to shift its meaning from inflexible and non-credible countervalue targeting of urban centres to a counterforce targeting of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile. In exact words, Menon says: “India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.”

Both of Menon’s arguments when combined suggest that once India is convinced that Pakistan is going to unleash its tactical nuclear weapons, New Delhi will launch a disarming first strike to eliminate Pakistan’s stockpile of high-yield nuclear weapons. Narang contends that India’s development of Mirvs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and missile defences further indicates that this may indeed be India’s evolving strategy. After all, Mirvs will enhance first-strike efficiency and missile defences will help neutralize Pakistan’s remaining weapons after a majority of them have been eliminated in the first strike.

If this is the case, then Pakistan will be incentivized to go first. And why will it start with tactical nukes? It will indeed be tempted to start with strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, in theory, a nuclear war could ensue tomorrow. But let us step back for a moment. Perhaps too much is being read into the chapter which Menon has clearly written to defend India’s NFU pledge—consistent with the overall tenor of the book which portrays India as a restrained power with mature leadership. It is difficult to imagine that Menon has deliberately ended up building a case for India triggering a nuclear war with guaranteed mutually assured destruction just because a company-sized troop is in danger of being attacked with short range nuclear weapons on the soil of Pakistan.

Moreover, if Menon was going so much against conventional wisdom, he needed to elaborate further. For instance, a comprehensive counterforce strike just when Pakistan’s use of tactical nukes is imminent would hardly be more credible than countervalue targeting after the tactical nukes have been used. If the latter’s lack of credibility stems from political unwillingness, the former’s comes from a lack of capability—immaculate intelligence and accurate missiles are required to implement a comprehensive counterforce doctrine. The task is even more difficult to contemplate with the proliferation of mobile land-based weapons systems and Pakistan’s moves towards sea-based platforms.

Menon’s chapter also gives contradictory signals and is casually written. For instance, at one point he also opens the door for a mixed counterforce and countervalue targeting: “There is nothing in the present doctrine that prevents India from…choosing a mix of military and civilian targets for its nuclear weapons”. Surely, countervalue (even if mixed with counterforce) targeting does not make sense with first strike in response to mere sabre-rattling using tactical nukes in Pakistan.

Further, at another point Menon says that Indian doctrine talks of “punitive retaliation”. He is plain wrong here. The phrase “punitive retaliation” was used in the draft doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board in 1999. The official doctrine which was released in 2003 by the cabinet committee on security changed it to “massive retaliation”. In other words, India consciously chose to make the doctrine more inflexible.

The phrase “massive retaliation” has a particular meaning—it was first expounded in a January 1954 speech by then US secretary of state John Foster Dulles in clear countervalue terms. Interestingly, Dulles later retracted to a great extent in the April 1954 issue of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, Menon at best is cryptic and at worst contradictory and confused. Neither helps the Indian cause, especially when your adversary is a military-industrial complex looking for excuses to build more nuclear weapons and amass more powers to the detriment of its own country and people.

Perhaps it is time for India to undertake a comprehensive review of its nuclear doctrine and release an updated version to kill the unnecessary speculation. It will be good for India to climb down from its “massive retaliation” perch but it should stick steadfastly to its NFU pledge
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Ivxg7a5QQL9jeEkpxFAiNO/Time-to-nuke-the-storm-in-the-teacup.html
 

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India may abandon its ‘no first use’ nuclear policy: Expert

India may abandon its ‘no first use’ nuclear policy and launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan if it feared that Islamabad was likely to use the weapons first, a top nuclear expert on South Asia has claimed.

The remarks by Vipin Narang, an expert on South Asian nuclear strategy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, before a Washington audience was though a negation of India’s stated policy of ‘no first use’.

During the 2017 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Narang said, “There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first”.

He said India “may” abandon the policy and launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan if it believed that Pakistan was going to use nuclear weapons or most likely the tactical nuclear weapons against it.

But, he pointed out, India’s preemptive strike may not be conventional strikes and would also be aimed at Pakistan’s missiles launchers for tactical battlefield nuclear warheads.

“India’s opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full ‘comprehensive counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction,” Narang said.

He said this thinking surfaces not from fringe extreme voices or retired Indian Army officers frustrated by the lack of resolve they believe their government has shown in multiple provocations, but from no less than a former Commander of India’s Strategic Forces, Lt Gen BS Nagal.

It also comes perhaps more importantly and authoritatively, from the highly-respected and influential former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon in his 2016 book ‘Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy’, the nuclear strategist said.

“Serious voices, who cannot be ignored, seem to suggest that this is where India may be heading, and certainly wants to head,” Narang said.

“So our conventional understanding of South Asia’s nuclear dynamics and who, in fact, might use nuclear weapons first and in what mode may need a hard rethink given these emerging authoritative voices in India who are not content to cede the nuclear initiative to Pakistan,” he said, adding that this would mark a major shift in Indian strategy if implemented.

“In short, we may be witnessing what I call a ‘decoupling’ of Indian nuclear strategy between China and Pakistan.”

Sameer Lalwani, senior associate and deputy director South Asia at the Stimson Center, an American think-tank, said Narang’s remarks challenged the conventional wisdom of South Asia’s strategic stability problem.

Based on recent statements and writings of high-level national security officials (serving and retired), Narang argued that India may be exhibiting a “seismic shift” in its nuclear strategy from ‘no first use’ to a preemptive nuclear counterforce allowing for escalation dominance or a “splendid first strike” against Pakistan, Lalwani said.

http://indianexpress.com/article/in...s-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-expert-4578788/

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http://www.hindustantimes.com/india...says-expert/story-P5N8QuKOldxAJ9UPjboijM.html

India could strike Pakistan with nuclear weapons if threatened, says expert
INDIA Updated: Mar 21, 2017 16:11 IST



Relations between the neighbours are at the lowest since a string of militant attacks on Indian military installations which New Delhi blames on Pakistan-based militants. India last year claimed to have carried out surgical strikes against militant launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir but Islamabad denied any such operation took place.

In February, both countries extended a bilateral pact, dealing with reducing the risk of nuclear weapon-related accidents including a war, for a period of five years. India hand Pakistan have fought three full-fledged wars besides the 1999 Kargil hostilities.

As evidence for his theory, Narang cited recent remarks and policy prescriptions from leading Indian strategists and a book by Shivshankar Menon, who oversaw nuclear targeting for India as National Security Adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Narang also quoted Menon as telling Ajai Shukla, a defense analyst with Business Standard, that “India’s nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for”.


To buttress his theory, Narang cited this para from Menon’s book, “Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy”, which was released in November 2016 but has found a new celebrity recently, to build his case: “There is a potential gray area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapon state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.”

New Delhi declared its no-first use strike policy in 2003, undertaking to not start a nuclear war in a neighborhood packed with nuclear actors Pakistan and its hermetically stoic backer China, countries that had fought wars with India.



Read more


But it set aside some key exceptions, gray areas, such as reserving the right to strike first if it came under biological or chemical attack, that may have left the door open, for arguments sake, to a latter day switch to a more aggressive stand.

Under its earlier policy India had hoped to use the threat of “massive counter-value retaliation” — read civilian targets such as urban populations mostly — disproportionate in intensity to the attack, as a disincentive for a nuclear attack against it.

But as Pakistan, which has the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal, segued to smaller battlefield nuclear weapons, called tactical weapons, to offset Indian superiority in conventional warfare, New Delhi was forced to rethink its choices.

There are also worries in India that New Delhi might not have full information on the whereabouts of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and tactical warheads that are much smaller and mounted on lorries to be driven around to escape detection through satellite imagery.
 

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Pakistan's nuclear bluff only works if India is afraid to use nukes, if once India decides to use nukes then entire pakistans strategy is going to become obsolete.
 

lcafanboy

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Pakistan's nuclear bluff only works if India is afraid to use nukes, if once India decides to use nukes then entire pakistans strategy is going to become obsolete.
That precisely is happening now.

I have started this thread to discuss such issues and possible scenarios.
 

Bornubus

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Man someone tell the Govt to buy some real TEL instead of shitty looking military variants of Civilian trucks. The missiles itself are painted in white colour a sign of Peace instead of Military camo.


And nukes on dedicated TEL itself is a sort of Psychological warfare. The only TEL in service is for Coastal defense P 15 Termit missile.


Reminds me Pralaynath Nuclear Missiles from Tiranga


images (1).jpg



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lcafanboy

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How Pakistan Is Planning to Fight a Nuclear War

Kyle Mizokami

March 25, 2017

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Sandwiched between Iran, China, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan lives in a complicated neighborhood with a variety of security issues. One of the nine known states known to have nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and doctrine are continually evolving to match perceived threats. A nuclear power for decades, Pakistan is now attempting to construct a nuclear triad of its own, making its nuclear arsenal resilient and capable of devastating retaliatory strikes.

Pakistan’s nuclear program goes back to the 1950s, during the early days of its rivalry with India. President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously said in 1965, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

The program became a higher priority after the country’s 1971 defeat at the hands of India, which caused East Pakistan to break away and become Bangladesh. Experts believe the humiliating loss of territory, much morethan reports that India was pursuing nuclear weapons, accelerated the Pakistani nuclear program. India tested its first bomb, codenamed “Smiling Buddha,” in May 1974, putting the subcontinent on the road to nuclearization.

Pakistan began the process of accumulating the necessary fuel for nuclear weapons, enriched uranium and plutonium. The country was particularly helped by one A. Q. Khan, a metallurgist working in the West who returned to his home country in 1975 with centrifuge designs and business contacts necessary to begin the enrichment process. Pakistan’s program was assisted by European countries and a clandestine equipment-acquisition program designed to do an end run on nonproliferation efforts. Outside countries eventually dropped out as the true purpose of the program became clear, but the clandestine effort continued.

Exactly when Pakistan had completed its first nuclear device is murky. Former president Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar Bhutto’s daughter, claimed that her father told her the first device was ready by 1977. A member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission said design of the bomb was completed in 1978 and the bomb was “cold tested”—stopping short of an actual explosion—in 1983.

Benazir Bhutto later claimed that Pakistan’s bombs were stored disassembled until 1998, when India tested six bombs in a span of three days. Nearly three weeks later, Pakistan conducted a similar rapid-fire testing schedule, setting off five bombs in a single day and a sixth bomb three days later. The first device, estimated at twenty-five to thirty kilotons, may have been a boosted uranium device. The second was estimated at twelve kilotons, and the next three as sub-kiloton devices.

The sixth and final device appears to have also been a twelve-kiloton bomb that was detonated at a different testing range; a U.S. Air Force “Constant Phoenix” nuclear-detection aircraft reportedly detected plutonium afterward. Since Pakistan had been working on a uranium bomb and North Korea—which shared or purchased research with Pakistan through the A. Q. Khan network—had been working on a uranium bomb, some outside observers concluded the sixth test was actually a North Korean test, detonated elsewhere to conceal North Korea’s involvement although. There is no consensus on this conclusion.

Experts believe Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile is steadily growing. In 1998, the stockpile was estimated at five to twenty-five devices, depending on how much enriched uranium each bomb required. Today Pakistan is estimated to have an arsenal of 110 to 130 nuclear bombs. In 2015 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center estimated Pakistan’s bomb-making capability at twenty devices annually, which on top of the existing stockpile meant Pakistan could quickly become the third-largest nuclear power in the world. Other observers, however, believe Pakistan can only develop another forty to fifty warheads in the near future.

Pakistani nuclear weapons are under control of the military’s Strategic Plans Division, and are primarily stored in Punjab Province, far from the northwest frontier and the Taliban. Ten thousand Pakistani troops and intelligence personnel from the SPD guard the weapons. Pakistan claims that the weapons are only armed by the appropriate code at the last moment, preventing a “rogue nuke” scenario.

Pakistani nuclear doctrine appears to be to deter what it considers an economically, politically and militarily stronger India. The nuclear standoff is exacerbated by the traditional animosity between the two countries, the several wars the two countries have fought, and events such as the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, which were directed by Pakistan. Unlike neighboring India and China, Pakistan does not have a “no first use” doctrine, and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, particularly low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, to offset India’s advantage in conventional forces.
Pakistan currently has a nuclear “triad” of nuclear delivery systems based on land, in the air and at sea. Islamabad is believed to have modified American-built F-16A fighters and possibly French-made Mirage fighters to deliver nuclear bombs by 1995. Since the fighters would have to penetrate India’s air defense network to deliver their payloads against cities and other targets, Pakistani aircraft would likely be deliver tactical nuclear weapons against battlefield targets.

Land-based delivery systems are in the form of missiles, with many designs based on or influenced by Chinese and North Korean designs. The Hatf series of mobile missiles includes the solid-fueled Hatf-III (180 miles), solid-fueled Hatf-IV(466 miles) and liquid-fueled Hatf V, (766 miles). The CSIS Missile Threat Initiative believes that as of 2014, Hatf VI (1242 miles) is likely in service. Pakistan is also developing a Shaheen III intermediate-range missile capable of striking targets out to 1708 miles, in order to strike the Nicobar and Andaman Islands.

The sea component of Pakistan’s nuclear force consists of the Babur class of cruise missiles. The latest version, Babur-2, looks like most modern cruise missiles, with a bullet-like shape, a cluster of four tiny tail wings and two stubby main wings, all powered by a turbofan or turbojet engine. The cruise missile has a range of 434 miles. Instead of GPS guidance, which could be disabled regionally by the U.S. government, Babur-2 uses older Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene Matching and Area Co-relation (DSMAC) navigation technology. Babur-2 is deployed on both land and at sea on ships, where they would be more difficult to neutralize. A submarine-launched version, Babur-3, was tested in January and would be the most survivable of all Pakistani nuclear delivery systems.

Pakistan is clearly developing a robust nuclear capability that can not only deter but fight a nuclear war. It is also dealing with internal security issues that could threaten the integrity of its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan and India are clearly in the midst of a nuclear arms race that could, in relative terms, lead to absurdly high nuclear stockpiles reminiscent of the Cold War. It is clear that an arms-control agreement for the subcontinent is desperately needed.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

Image: Pixabay/Public domain


http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-pakistan-planning-fight-nuclear-war-19897?page=2
 

captscooby81

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We have so far built 5 MMT of strategic reserve which will only serve for 10 days we are planning to increase it to 15 MMT in the near future which will make us sustain for a month .. No way we are anywhere close to 1 year of reserve crude storage ..Our Big neighbour in the north is trying to reach 200 Millions by 2020 to meet 90 days of Crude requirement ..

To escape sanctions and prevent oil Embargo India building strategic reserve of oil for full one year at 5 different places. Right now we have storage for three months in place and ready.
 

lcafanboy

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If nuking Pakistanis can save India and what ever nukes left by Pak could be taken care by our BMD, I would say, better they be dead, rather than us, i am in for such change.
India will definitely go for Pakistani nukes in the opening phase of war. Any big terrorist attack can also attract pre emptive nuke attack by India to take out all nuclear weapons of Pakistan and several population centres could also be targeted.
 

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A submarine-launched version, Babur-3, was tested in January and would be the most survivable of all Pakistani nuclear delivery systems.
Which was 100% fake!! 'Submarine-launched' my ass! :pound:

And they talk of 'tactical nukes' on their Nasrs. When was it tested? Where? If not, are the Porkis sure they will work? Computer testing is not the real thing. Technology for making miniaturized nukes is only with a few countries and Pakistan is not one of them! We need to call their bluff.

Later, more on the effectiveness of their Nasrs (ie, assuming they are armed with miniature nukes). They are actually damp squibs. I will prove it! :cool3:
 
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HariPrasad-1

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Pakistani Media Rattled by India's New Nuclear Doctrine and Scrapping of NFU Policy.

You guys might have heard about the Pakistan's new doctrine to counter Indian cold start with a non nuclear option. It is the result of Recent Indian policy of striking pakistan's nuclear arsenal in preemptive strike. When Agni VI shall be tested, You will hear similar things from china that India and china are not enemy but friends etc.
 

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You guys might have heard about the Pakistan's new doctrine to counter Indian cold start with a non nuclear option. It is the result of Recent Indian policy of striking pakistan's nuclear arsenal in preemptive strike.
The million dollar question is: Does India know exactly where the Paki nukes are stored? If not, this counter force strategy of knocking out the nukes in a pre-emptive strike doesn't hold water. We can however destroy all their nuclear facilities, but that won't prevent the Pakis from launching a first strike as their nukes are far removed from these facilities.
 

captscooby81

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That is very very serious question ... Do we really know where to porki s have hidden their Nukes .. With the past experience of our Intelligence team s performance i will be little skeptical about their knowledge on the paki s nuclear arsenal either the number or Weapons they have nor the locations of those .. Even if we not able to destroy the nuke we should first destroy their delivery mechanisms in the first wave once we take out those . Then may be in the second wave we can concentrate on taking out the Nuke s ..Lets hope MI and RAW all other agencies don t be lethargic on one particular area of intelligence gathering ..

The million dollar question is: Does India know exactly where the Paki nukes are stored? If not, this counter force strategy of knocking out the nukes in a pre-emptive strike doesn't hold water. We can however destroy all their nuclear facilities, but that won't prevent the Pakis from launching a first strike as their nukes are far removed from these facilities.
 

sayareakd

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The million dollar question is: Does India know exactly where the Paki nukes are stored? If not, this counter force strategy of knocking out the nukes in a pre-emptive strike doesn't hold water. We can however destroy all their nuclear facilities, but that won't prevent the Pakis from launching a first strike as their nukes are far removed from these facilities.
We know where they store it, there SPD and other things, our friend Raj Sir has scan every inch of Pak, in private initiative.

Our strategy is to nuke all Pak and let our BMD take care of what ever they can throw in.
 

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