India out of the loop on Af-Pak

[Sridhar]

Emo , post the link always when you post any news item

 

[Yusuf]

Afaik, India has only invested in infrastructure, i.e. roads, buildings and other infrastructure. I don't see how all this would be in jeoperdy incase Taliban seized power.

Yes, infrastructure is made to move goods. What goods? Oil can be a very big thing. India is investing a lot in Tajikistan and is using Laxmi Mittals goodwill in Kazakistan to open up avenues there as well.

Have a look at the map. India has concentrated on making a road from Iran to Astan. Once things firm up there can be a pipeline in future from CAR. Maybe road for now.. Taliban being anti India, will takeover all that. Destroy it. Indias road to CAR closes.

 

[Neo]

Also take the Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan into consideration.

Valid point, an India friendly governemt in Kabul is a must since Tajikistan doesn't share border with Pakistan. The AFB can not be used against Pakistan without a formal permission from Kabul.

 

[Neo]

Yes, infrastructure is made to move goods. What goods? Oil can be a very big thing. India is investing a lot in Tajikistan and is using Laxmi Mittals goodwill in Kazakistan to open up avenues there as well.

Have a look at the map. India has concentrated on making a road from Iran to Astan. Once things firm up there can be a pipeline in future from CAR. Maybe road for now.. Taliban being anti India, will takeover all that. Destroy it. Indias road to CAR closes.

Still I fail to understand how all that wil be in jeoperdy if India's political ambition to use Afghanistan as proxy is marginalised by Af-Pak policy. India can still do business by aiding Kabul with the infracstructure. If you loose Afghanistan completely you still have the option to use Ashqabat-Meshed-Chahbahar route.
Af-Pak policy nullifies Indian political ambitions to contain Pakistan, thats the only think that wil change.

 

[Yusuf]

I really fail to understand what political goal vis a vis Pakistan will change. We dont want the current dispensation to fail only because of terrorism. There is nothing to contain Pakistan. I have just got the feeling that Pakistan is just over reacting to Indian presence there.

 

[Phenom]

The fact is India has no leverage in Afganistan, the whole idea of sending in aid without any real military leverage was a mistake. Several Indians had died there and the government has got nothing in return, all the road building and medical camps wouldn't achieve anything when the other side is willing to use machine guns and grenades.

Lets hope the govrnment wakes up, aligns itself with the Iranians, Russians and any other anti-taliban factions within Afganistan to make sure Pakistan and Taliban doesn't enjoy the same advantage they had in 2000 during the Indian airline hijack.

 

[S.A.T.A]

The art of Diplomacy,like a renaissance Davinci,has many layers of strategy and camouflaged intent behind it.If anybody thought India's grand Afghan strategy was to somehow become a military protectorate and call the shots there,they are mistaken.When American coalition invaded Afghanistan,in the aftermath of the 9/11,India's core strategy as conceived by the kautalya's in south block was how the current events could be used to inflict damage to Pakistan.Taliban,economic development,whether Coalition forces will withdraw now or later was completely secondary.That India would always play a secondary(mostly diplomatic)role in Afghanistan was something that south block never forgot.question was how we would exploit this window of opportunity.

Mostly it has been resounding success.Pakistan's Afghan quagmire is more deeper than it had been when the Russian forces withdrew.Pakistan has burnt a lot bridges in the Pashtun belts and simmering discontent and distrust will keep the Tribal belts broiling long after the Americans have withdrawn from Afghanistan.we have in a way turned the North western pashtun dominated region into another Baluchistan,This is no mean achievement(and we certainly played our part,which although involved some sacrifices too).This is was our core objective.

 

[ajtr]

India diminished in Afghanistan

The picture of Afghanistan that has emerged after the London Conference in January is that both reintegration of and reconciliation with the Taliban are key ingredients of the US-led coalition exit strategy. The West has realised that the Taliban cannot be defeated as long as Pakistan continues to provide succour and sanctuary to the Taliban — its strategic asset for its long-term interests.

Despite this, Pakistan has reinforced it position as the frontline state by being accepted as the lead facilitator in reconciliation with the Taliban. Pakistan’s Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and ISI chief Lt Gen Shuja Pasha have scored a major victory in getting the US to recognise Islamabad’s “legitimate strategic quest for strategic depth”. The one-year extension to Lt Gen Pasha who was to retire next month will ensure continuity and facilitate his promotion as the next Army Chief in case Gen Kayani does not get an extension.

While reintegration — buying off the pragmatist lower level Taliban — will be easier than reconciling with their radicalised leaders who have a strong support among Pushtoons on both sides of the Durand Line, Gen Kayani and Gen Pasha have promised to deliver a package deal to be worked out with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

President Karzai who favours reintegration has been accused of dragging his feet over reconciliation which he believes will undermine his position as elected President. He realises some form of power-sharing is inevitable for an inclusive Government. A loya jirgah planned for April 29 in Kabul will give its blessings for reintegration and reconciliation followed by the Kabul Conference in May to concretise plans for delivering on provisions of the London Conference to cover security, good governance and development. Parliamentary elections due in August, if held, are bound to deflect from Operation Mushtaraq which has made modest gains in the Helmand Province.

The military surge which is the key driver to reintegration and reconciliation could have proved more effective had the Pakistani Army cooperated by sealing exit routes for escaping Taliban. Compensating for this lacuna, the US has employed regular drone attacks against Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan. Gen Stanley McChrystal’s plan to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of strength has holes which Pakistan will not plug.

Coalition forces have captured Marjah, the poppy capital of the Taliban which provided them with $ 2 million every month. Logically the next target is Kandahar, the Taliban heartland. If it is taken in the next few months, it would put the Taliban under extreme pressure and facilitate one if not both reintegration and reconciliation. The devastating multiple suicide attacks in Kandahar last week were a warning to coalition forces against stirring the hornet’s nest.

By acknowledging Pakistan’s pivotal role in peace and stability in Afghanistan, and downgrading India’s importance, Mr Karzai has made a dramatic turnaround from the days he refused to shake hands with President Pervez Musharraf. On a visit to Islamabad last week he described India “as a close friend of Afghanistan but Pakistan is a brother of Afghanistan. Pakistan is a twin brother. We are conjoined twins. There is no separation”. He has realised that without the Generals in Pakistan, there can be no reconciliation with the Taliban. Further in Islamabad he emphasised Afghanistan’s neutrality and stressed he did not want proxy wars between India and Pakistan and the US and Iran.

After the London Conference, both the US-led coalition and Afghanistan have put all their eggs in the Pakistani basket. What is not clear is US intention: Cut and run or stay the course beyond 2012. For the present it seems mid-2011 is only the time line for thinning out to commence and not any upstick of forces. A process of handing-taking over will start, based on a flexible transition timetable, commensurate with political and military capacity-building as well as development. In other words, a sequential transfer of authority to the Afghan Government, including ownership of the peace process.

Shaping up are two scenarios: A Karzai-led inclusive Government; a Taliban-led or dominated regime. Pakistan’s flag flies higher than India’s in Afghanistan. India’s stature has diminished due to a number of reasons: Rejection of its passionate advocacy that talking to Taliban is like frying snowflakes; not being consulted on AfPak; not invited to the Istanbul Conference and being sidelined at the London Conference. The final blow was the deadly third targeted attack last month against Indian interests in Kabul in which, among others, three Army Majors teaching English to the Afghan Army were killed.

The ISI-sponsored strike revealed the growing vulnerability of Indian assets and New Delhi’s failure to protect them. Though initially mixed messages emanated from North and South Blocks about our resolve and staying power, in the end several hundred additional commandoes have been despatched to bolster our defences. Periodic polls conducted among Afghans by ABC, BBC and ARD have given India and Indian workers the highest popularity rating for their contribution to development and reconstruction.

The skilful use of just soft power without pitching for any military role especially in training of Afghanistan’s security forces ignored ground reality and reduced India’s relevance. New Delhi failed to work through Washington, Kabul and London to raise its work profile in Afghanistan. Worse, without India indulging in dirty tricks, Pakistan has succeeded in accusing it of meddling in Balochistan from Afghanistan. New Delhi should have initiated dialogue with Pakistan over Afghanistan in the Musharraf era. Now it will refuse to do so.

India's big handicap (and also saving grace) is not having contiguous borders with Afghanistan. Despite the apparent setback, India must dig in. it should continue with its development work which is bound to cost more and be more proactive in military training. Mr Karzai has not yet accepted Gen Kayani’s offer of training the Afghan Army, whose Chief, Gen Bismillah Khan, is keen to send platoon to battalion size units for training in India. But India has preferred to maintain a low profile.

There is no deadline for the vacation of foreign troops. This is US-led Nato’s first out-of-area expeditionary operation with an eye on China and Central Asian resources. India needs to reestablish contact with Pushtoons as New Delhi is seen through the prism of the erstwhile Northern Alliance. Although a regional compact was not discussed in London, India should intensify coordination with regional players and explore backchannel conversations with the Taliban.

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan and the Afghanistan Endgame

India and Pakistan vie for influence in Kabul

After the failure of high level talks between India and Pakistan over their long running disputes, both countries are now locked in an escalating proxy war in Afghanistan.

If no solution is found to reconcile Pakistani and Indian interests in Afghanistan, the coming months might see stepped up terrorist attacks against Indians in Kabul and the return of militants infiltrating Indian Kashmir from Pakistan.

The fact that in recent weeks a large number of Taliban operatives have been captured in Pakistan signals an intensified struggle over the fate of Afghanistan rather than a winding down of the conflict.

With Afghan President Hamid Karzai seeking negotiations with the Taliban, some of whom Pakistan distrusts, along with India increasingly concerned about the Pakistan-backed Taliban coming to power in Kabul, the conflict is reaching a new stage of intensity. Even as an intensive US and NATO military offensive against the Taliban is underway in southern Afghanistan, neighboring states are already considering the Americans as good as gone and preparing for an end game scenario with old rivalries renewed.

While Pakistan charges India with undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, India fears that Pakistan is preparing the ground for pro-Pakistan elements from the Taliban to negotiate with Kabul, in an attempt to force India out of Afghanistan after US forces start a slow withdrawal in July 2011. Meanwhile, a year after Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out Mumbai attack they are yet to be brought to justice.

Against this backdrop, Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries met in New Delhi at the end of February but failed to make any progress. Just a day later a suicide squad in Kabul hit two hotels, killing 16 people including 7 Indian civilians and two Indian army majors. Three days later the Afghan government accused Lashkar-e-Taiba of being responsible for the Kabul attack.

In a series of briefings to the Pakistani and foreign media, Pakistani generals have portrayed India as seriously threatening Pakistan, using its embassy and consulates in Afghanistan to harbor, train and fund Baloch separatists who are waging an insurgency in Balochistan province, trying to undermine Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and even for backing elements of the Pakistani Taliban. Tensions heightened after four Pakistani workers were gunned down in Kandahar in early March by unknown assailants. The Pakistani media has accused the Indian consulate in Kandahar of organizing the attack.

Pro-military commentators have risen to the occasion demanding that as Pakistan now faces a two-front situation, India should be pushed out of Afghanistan by the Taliban or as a pre-condition which the US must accept, if and when peace talks between the Taliban and the Kabul government are held.

India was seriously rattled when the US and NATO agreed at the January 28 London conference on Afghanistan to begin "re-integrating" Taliban fighters and field commanders and lavishly funding a peace package for them. President Karzai went much further by demanding ‘reconciliation' with the mainstream Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar. India was aghast at the unanimity of the international community which is tiring of the war in Afghanistan, as India has vociferously opposed any dialogue with the Taliban.

India sees the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda working closely with anti-Indian groups based in Pakistani Punjab, such as Lashkar, who have begun to re-infiltrate into Indian Kashmir to restart the guerrilla war which has been dormant since 2004. Even US officials say that Punjabi militants are increasingly fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Although Karzai has declared that "Afghanistan does not want proxy war between India and Pakistan," India's real concern is that Pakistan appears determined to position itself center stage of any dialogue between the Taliban and Kabul. Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence Bureau recently arrested key Afghan Taliban leaders who have been engaged in talks with representatives of the Karzai administration without Pakistan's ISI being involved.

Senior US officials in Washington say the initial arrest of the powerful second in command Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi in early February was accidental – after the CIA discovered the location of a meeting of Taliban commanders where Barader was found. The ISI arrested him and then decided to bring in all his supporters, resulting in more arrests. Kabul's request that Barader be extradited was refused. Despite repeated requests, US officials have been given only limited access to question Barader and even less access to question other arrested Taliban.

However, despite his significant sanctuary in Pakistan, Barader was at odds with the ISI talking independently to Karzai's representatives without taking the ISI into confidence and instead enlisting the help of Saudi Arabia. Over the past 12 months Saudi Arabia has been intermittently involved in helping the two sides hold informal talks that so far have not led to real negotiations, although they have the potential to do so. The Saudis, although close allies of Pakistan, had also appeared willing to keep the ISI out of the dialogue.

The Obama administration is still far from accepting the idea of negotiating with the Taliban leadership and US officials were annoyed with Karzai after the London conference for raising the issue, but the ISI and the military are now forcing the pace to have a three way dialogue between Kabul, Islamabad and the Taliban, while also pushing the US administration to accept such a dialogue and agree to a major role for the ISI.

India has now embarked on a diplomatic offensive to counter Pakistan's growing role, sending National Security Adviser Shivsankar Menon to Kabul in early March and the Foreign Minister S M Krishna to Iran in coming weeks. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's hastily arranged trip to Afghanistan this week underlined Tehran's keen interest in the Afghanistan endgame. India has asked Karzai about his secret negotiations with the Taliban and how India can play a role. At the same time India appears to be wanting to rebuild the alliance with Iran, Russia and the Central Asian Republics that opposed the Taliban in the 1990s and supported the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance.

Missing as yet from this complicated maneuvering is the US administration, which will have to decide soon on supporting Kabul-Taliban talks if it is not to see its military and economic development offensives in Afghanistan undermined by growing regional rivalries. Also missing from the equation is Pakistan's civilian government, which has been bypassed in the foreign policy decision making by the military and the ISI. It is well known that the much weakened President Asif Zardari would like to improve relations with India and Afghanistan and encourage trade and investment, rather than foment a new set of regional tensions.

However a too overt Pakistani role is likely to be rejected by Karzai, by Afghanistan's non-Pashtuns and civil society and even by many Taliban who are tired of fighting and would like to end their dependence on Pakistan.

Any sign of excessive Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would immediately prompt a reaction from India, Iran, China and the Arab Gulf states, which could include backing anti-Pakistan proxies in Afghanistan and making it even more difficult for Afghanistan to achieve peace and stability.

Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist and author, most recently of "Descent into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia." Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online, the flagship publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

 

[ajtr]

India needs new strategy

Afghanistan is proving the quagmire for not just the US and the NATO allies, but also for Pakistan and India. Both the countries are now getting wrapped in the Afghan cloak, with relations strained and angry at all levels as terror blasts continue to take their toll, and diplomacy continues to fail to settle what should be simple issues but are getting increasingly complex by the day.
Pakistan is America’s strategic ally for Afghanistan to the point where India has been isolated. India, however, continues to strive to hold on to its few assets in Afghanistan in a bid to foil Islamabad’s plans to control Kabul, politically and strategically if and when the Americans manage to execute their exit policy. The attack on the guesthouse in Kabul that is a favourite with visiting Indians was a clear indication that their safety and security is now at high risk. And that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is not just incapable but also unwilling to ensure that all Indians working and living in Kabul are given adequate protection.
It is apparent from the few leaked stories that are now appearing in the media that national security adviser Shiv Shankar Menon returned from his visit to Kabul with the distinct impression that Indians there are no longer secure. The government seems to be seriously contemplating reducing the strength of missions in Kabul, and recalling soft targets like doctors and others. It is clear that the decision to send paramilitary forces for the protection of Indians in Afghanistan is not a foolproof arrangement against suicide bombers, and the issue of security will remain wide open.
Pakistan has been urging the US to put pressure on India so that it closes its consulates in Afghanistan and curtails its presence in that country. New Delhi refused to succumb to the pressure but clearly now the threat of violence and the lukewarm response of the Karzai government is forcing a decision that does not serve Indian interests in the long run. But the choice is difficult and the government cannot be blamed for whittling down its presence in the violence torn country.
Terrorism continues to unsettle Pakistan, but instead of coping with the situation the Gilani government has decided to up the ante against India by blaming it for every old and new act of violence. The Lahore attack recently is a case in point with Gilani’s absurd charges drawing an irate response from the government here. The point however, is that Pakistan has decided not to continue talks with India and to keep the hostilities alive so that it does not have to shift the troops from the borders with India into ongoing operations along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s willingness to talk despite the odds has been interpreted by Islamabad as weakness, and the anti-India cacophony has only intensified as a result.
The hardening of Pakistan policy is evident from this, as well as its decision to parade anti-India jihadi groups on Kashmir Solidarity Day all over that country, and its decision to invite the hardline Kashmiri separatists to visit Pakistan. Islamabad has decided to recognise only the Geelani faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, ignoring the more moderate voice of Mirwaiz Omar Farooq. It has also sought to create a new leadership that can replace the ageing and ailing Geelani, with two new invitees — the rabid Asiya of the Dukhtaran-e-Millat and Adbul Qayum of the Kashmir Bar Council.
New Delhi seems to be bereft of strategy as the visit of Menon to Kabul suggests. His agenda should have been to get Karzai back on track but clearly he either did not even venture into this territory but this is hard to believe, or he just did not meet with any success. The last seems more likely as Karzai who was always vocal in criticising Pakistan, is now Islamabad’s friend and has moved quite a distance away from India.
The result of what could well be a complete diplomatic misadventure is that India will have a Taliban government sitting in Kabul and eventually even dictating to those in charge of Islamabad. The question is not of a good or bad Taliban as everyone knows it is of a pliable and rigid Taliban. And the bad might be present in large numbers in the ‘pliable’ that Pakistan is trying to get to form a government in Kabul. The choices before India are now very few, as the strategists in government should have seen this coming but obviously were too arrogant or blind to sense it. Instead of opening all links with the remnants of the Northern Alliance, the war lords and even sections of the Taliban, Indian foreign policy focused for several years only on the nuclear deal with the US, and the dialogue with Pakistan. Afghanistan was handled in a totally kick jerk fashion and now that New Delhi is waking up to the reality it finds itself pretty much on the periphery with insignificant say in developments in the region.
Indian nationals have become the target of the Taliban, which is not fighting the US in the same manner as al-Qaeda. New Delhi does not have the support it needs to protect them, and this has been pretty much made clear to the government here. US envoy Richard Holbrooke’s first comment after the terror attack in Kabul that Indians were not the intended target is a striking example of the US disinterest, and although he retracted later, the message had come through with all its implications. This is adding to muscle-flexing in Islamabad with its foreign minister and prime minister making statements that just do not compliment politicians of their seniority.
This has to stop. And it is time that the PMO, MEA and MHA sat down in strategy sessions, invited strategic experts who necessarily do not see eye to eye with the government, and worked out a strategy for the region that could help India handle Afghanistan and Pakistan from a position of strength and not weakness. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must allow foreign policy and decision making to come back to India from Washington, and evolve a strategy that furthers Indian and not American interests.

 

[ajtr]

India’s dilemma in Afghanistan

For a couple of hours on Wednesday, there was confusion in newsrooms with the home and the external affairs ministries speaking in different voices. Candid home ministry sources talked about a cautious approach on future Indian investment in Afghanistan’s development. India would not take up new projects in far-flung Afghan badlands and would club already-begun activities for security reasons. And there could be an advisory discouraging Indians from working in private firms in Afghanistan.
Coming from the ministry responsible for security of Indians in Afghanistan, it seemed like a sensible, commonsense approach. Seven Indians were killed in a gory attack in Kabul. This airing of concern by one ministry drew a sharp response from another. The MEA stated there were no plans to scale down Indian activity.
The foreign office response did prevent Delhi from sending out a signal it doesn’t really want to send out. Even if India has decided to scale down, it wouldn’t like to tell the world that a regional power is so rattled by Pakistan-abetted attacks. Remember, only the other day Manmohan Singh was telling Parliament that Kabul-type attacks will not bend India’s will.
Delhi must prepare to take tough decisions if the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates further. With a longer rope allowed by the exiting Americans and the Taliban now even more under Islamabad’s influence, terror groups could make things more difficult for India in coming months. Scaling down — even pulling out and cutting Delhi’s losses — would remain an option.
But a wiser course would be to prepare now to dig in. The American intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 gave India a chance to get back into Afghanistan. India has invested over $1.2 billion in projects ranging from the Afghan Parliament building and the 220-kilometre Zaranj-Delaram road — which provides Afghans access to an Iranian port, an alternative to Pakistan’s Karachi — to schools and clinics set up with the involvement of local communities.
India needs to build on the goodwill generated by these activities to counter waiting-to-step-in Pakistan. Afghanistan, which shares a border with that part of Kashmir which is technically India’s, is strategically too important to be abandoned. India needs to stay engaged. So do the external affairs and home ministries, with each other.
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[ajtr]

India to engage with Iran on Afghanistan

NEW DELHI: India will shortly hold high-level discussions with Iran as part of its strategy to hold consultations with all regional stakeholders to stabilise Afghanistan and develop alternate energy transit sources and routes.

New Delhi is currently holding consultations with Uzbekistan, which shares ethnic ties with a section of the Afghan people. And before that, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao visited Kyrgyzstan to discuss, among other things, how the country's leadership is looking at the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur visited another Central Asian country Turkmenistan, again to discuss Afghanistan and energy issues, diplomatic sources say.

These consultations on Afghanistan and energy were topped by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during the latter's one-day visit here last week, and with the top Saudi Arabian leadership during Dr. Singh's first visit to a Gulf country earlier this month.

Indian diplomatic moves acquired momentum after it was excluded from a preparatory meeting for the London conference on Afghanistan and felt Pakistan could acquire a prominent role following its success in nabbing several top Afghan Taliban leaders of ‘Quetta Shura' and its perceived hold over some of the organisations engaged against NATO troops.

The U.S. move to funnel supplies for soldiers in Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network, a commercially-based logistical corridor connecting the Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan through Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, has also increased the significance of these countries in settling the Afghan question. In line with the increasing reliance on these countries for sending supplies, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke visited four Central Asian countries for bilateral talks on Afghanistan.

Of these countries, India is especially keen on closer engagement with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Iran in view of the close linkages with western and northern Afghanistan.

All U.S. supplies into Afghanistan come from several routes, but converge in Uzbekistan, and India is currently assessing its leadership's views based on its close ties with Afghan Uzbeks, some of whom have fallen out of favour with the current U.S. administration.

In the area of energy, India has broached with Turkmenistan the possibility of sending its gas to northern Iran.

 

[ajtr]

Nothing much is going to change in Afghanistan. Basically the economy of the country has shifted towards a drugs production and export economy. This has ironically developed around the same Helmand province where American invested irrigation projects 3-4 decades ago have actuallu increased acreage - but all that irrigation goes into production of poppy as that is highly lucrative.

The illegal drugs trade profit is beneficial to many forces.

(1) American or western intelligence and undercover operators - who can use this non-budget non-country money to sponsor covert operations against their strategic enemies in the region. They get a control over this money by allowing virtual protection - and one more reason to have military presence in the region.

This is a possible reason that the David Headley types or the D-company cannot be touched much by India.

(2) Warlords - who can use their initial power base out of tribal clan loyalties and networks and then reinforce that with controlling a stake in the drugs profits. Americans have selected their pet warlords and pushed others away who will seek anti-American backing. But the warlord culture remains because of foreign sponsorship. For foreign parties it is easier to deal with individuals rather than at a population level. Typically this is the footprint of western approach - they always look for dictators and personal influence which is how they treat culotures they do not understand.


(3) Taliban : - for them drugs production for their enemies can be part of an useful strategy to weaken "enemy" societies over the long term and be a drain on their economies. Moreover it is vital for them to have a source of revenue to fund their long term goals. Moreover since the drugs trade has become an established feature, Talebs will need to control it so that other bases of power cannot try to raise their heads on the basis of profits of the drugs trade.

So, the Afghanistan situation will remain a scene of constant civil-war between all these groups, as well as entoties like Pakistan or China, Iran and Russia jockeying for geo-political toe-holds.

India's short term and long term minimum objectives here are obviously contradictory. In the short term, non-involvement, a degree of neutrality, general goodwill among populations, containing Taliban backed terror attacks into India or preventing use of Afghanistan by Pakistan for similar purposes. However in the long term, this very same neutrality - non-involvement, not projecting military power means the Islamists forces and the traditional greed with which the Afghanistan region has targeted the lucrative plains of India will gain strength and put in place their long term goals of expansion.

Now there will be many external powers interested to egg them on.

 

[ahmedsid]

I feel India will be bringing on Iran onto the Afghanistan Case with vigor. This can be seen by the latest Indian overtures to Iran, not agreeing to sanctions on Iran. Iran has a Say in Afghanistan. Pakistan shouldnt think that it owns Afghanistan and its the only legitimate country sharing a border with Afghanistan. India might not share a long border with Afghanistan, but rest assured what happens in Afghanistan will have an impact on India. We all know how Pakistan tries to recruit fighter from Afghanistan for Jihad in Pakistan. So Nobody can Keep India out of Afghanistan, No Pakistan, Not Uncle Sam!

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Iran's 'double game' in Afghanistan

It must have felt very uncomfortable for President Hamid Karzai to have his guest and "brother", Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, use a press conference in Kabul to attack Afghanistan's main donor and ally, the United States. "They themselves created terrorists and now they're saying that they are fighting terrorists," said Ahmadinejad, accusing the US of playing a "double game" in Afghanistan.

Ahmadinejad was in fact returning a compliment by the US defence secretary, Robert Gates, who only hours earlier had accused Tehran of "playing a double game" of offering friendship to the Afghan government while at the same time giving "low-level support" and money to the Taliban.

Karzai had always hoped to be the mediator between Iran and America, yet on this occasion, unwittingly, he became the messenger of abuse. He looked distinctly uneasy in the press conference, never knowing what Ahmadinejad may come up with in his next sentence.

"Your country is located on the other side of the world, so what are you doing here?" said Ahmadinejad, criticising the US presence in Afghanistan. Yet he didn't seem to be full of novel ideas for resolving the complex web of problems facing Afghanistan. He suggested empowering "the Afghan government, the legal Afghan government, and the legal government's running of the country and its security issues".

His stress on the word "legal" was not without reason. Like his own second term, Karzai's election was marred by fraud. Both men in fact share the precarious status of being regarded as contested presidents. They were both the first to congratulate each other after the doubtful results of their election were announced.

Yet despite sharing this relative lack of authority, and despite the deep historical and cultural ties that link Iran and Afghanistan, the two men have a lot that sets them apart. In Ahmadinejad's frame of mind, Karzai is regarded as an American stooge and weak. Karzai, in turn, views Ahmadinejad as being far too much of a fundamentalist and not necessarily as well-intentioned as he likes to pretend.

Thus there is lingering underlying distrust. While Karzai has frequently praised Iran's aid, he is watching cautiously where Iran's hundreds of millions of dollars are spent. Although much has gone towards drug eradication and humanitarian aid, the bulk of projects funded by Iran are focused in Herat province in western Afghanistan, near the border with Iran. Funds have been pouring in for road and rail reconstruction along the main transit route between the two countries. This aids the flow of trade – especially non-oil exports from Iran to Afghanistan – steadily rising from over £50m in 2001, now estimated to be £665m.

The former powerful governor of Herat, General Ismail Khan, is a close ally of Iran. When defeated by the Taliban in 1995, Khan fled to Iran with thousands of his men. Now Iran is building on that connection, improving trade links through Herat while keeping an eye on American movements along its eastern border. Iran is concerned that Washington may use this border for espionage activity or for mounting a potential attack against Iran.

A further source of concern for Karzai is that Iran has close ties to Shia Muslims led by Karim Khalili – another former mujahideen leader who is currently the vice-president. His Islamic Unity party was funded by Iran during the years of civil war and was the second most potent force against the Taliban. Iran now funds major projects in areas densely populated by Shias, such as in Bamyan.

Some American security analysts argue that Iran holds these ties with the former mujahideen "warlords" in order to have the possibility of causing tension should the need arise. They could be right, since president Ahmadinejad spent the rest of his visit meeting with them.

"History shows that invading powers have never been victorious in Afghanistan," said Ahmadinejad at a luncheon attended by former mujahideen leaders. He then met with two more: Sebghatollah Mojaddedi and Younis Qanooni, now presiding over Afghanistan's senate and parliament respectively. It was by using its contacts with these leaders that Iran helped Washington defeat the Taliban in 2001. However, now many of them have moved on and prefer the international forces to remain in Afghanistan.

So Robert Gates is probably wrong to assume that Iran is funding the Taliban. Iran has long been an enemy of the Taliban, regarding them as Wahhabi Muslims funded by Saudi Arabia. It prefers instead to invest in those players who are both anti-Taliban and anti-American. And although many of those are currently in key political positions, Iran knows that when the time is right, they will switch sides. In that sense, the US defence secretary is probably right to be concerned about Iran playing a "double game", but then Afghanistan has always been a land of international and local double games.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/11/ahmadinejad-karzai-iran-afghanistan-us

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan : Tickets to the endgame

Pakistan wants a say in ending the war, and it knows how to ask

Mar 18th 2010 | ISLAMABAD | From The Economist print edition

A HIGH-LEVEL delegation of Pakistanis is due to sweep into Washington for the restart on March 24th of a “strategic dialogue” with America. The Pakistanis have muscled their way to the table for what looks like a planning session for the endgame in Afghanistan. The recent arrest of the Taliban’s deputy leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and a clutch of his high-ranking comrades, has won them a seat.

The Pakistani team, led by the foreign minister, will include both the army chief and the head of the army’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). America has upgraded its own representation at the talks, last held in mid-2008, from deputy-secretary to secretary-of-state level. The dialogue is supposed to cover the gamut of bilateral issues, including help for Pakistan’s fragile economy, and even, on its ambitious wish-list, civil nuclear technology.

But the future of Afghanistan is the most pressing topic, and in Pakistan that issue is always controlled by the powerful army and the ISI. Pakistan believes that the Americans are coming to understand its fear of encirclement: a rising India to the east, uncertain relations with Iran to the west and growing Indian influence in Afghanistan to the north-west.

Whereas some see in Pakistan’s arrest of Mr Baradar hints of a strategic shift against its old jihadist proxies, it seems depressingly more likely to be an attempt by the ISI to grab control of the Taliban’s negotiating position. Mr Baradar had been making overtures directly to Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul—bypassing Pakistan.

According to a senior Pakistani official, the detention of Mr Baradar is a double victory for Pakistan. It has captured a Talib who had become troublesome. And it hoped to win plaudits for cracking down on the insurgency’s leaders, meeting longstanding demands from the NATO-led coalition and Afghan government.

Instead, it finds itself criticised anew, despite dropping the denials it has maintained since 2001 that Afghan Taliban leaders were on its soil, and despite having acted against one of them. By some accounts Mr Karzai is angry that his favourite Talib was locked up. Other regional powers, such as India, Iran and Russia, are said to be alarmed that Pakistan is putting itself in the driving seat in the Afghan negotiations. According to Ahmed Rashid, a veteran observer of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s reinvigorated interference in its neighbour’s affairs risks setting off a regional competition for influence that could push Afghanistan back into the sort of civil war it endured in the 1990s, between proxies backed by outside powers.

Pakistan’s position has evolved. Rather than seeing the ethnic-Pushtun Taliban as its best hope of a friendly government in Kabul, its policymakers would now prefer the Taliban to be part of a broader-based Afghan government. Perhaps it has realised at last that extremists wielding unbridled power from Kabul tend to export disaster across the porous border they share. So Pakistan also needs links with non-Taliban elements in Afghanistan.

America is taking a harder line than most of its partners, Britain included, in seeking to weaken the insurgency, perhaps even inducing some rebel commanders to defect, before considering talks with the Taliban leadership. But as America plans to start drawing down its forces next year, the jostling for a political settlement is well under way. Pakistan’s basic demand is that any future regime in Kabul must be Pakistan-friendly, by which it means not too close to India. The Pakistanis believe they are close to convincing America that they hold the key to stabilising Afghanistan.

http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15731374

 

[Yusuf]

If the Americans withdraw next year and the Taliban steam roll into Astan, then what will be the American response? Recognize the very group it has fought against the last 10 years. All credibility of the superpower down the drain. Along with that the world becomes more unsafe. And then we have another 9/11, coming from AQ and Taliban combine, then what?

 

[ahmedsid]

If the Americans withdraw next year and the Taliban steam roll into Astan, then what will be the American response? Recognize the very group it has fought against the last 10 years. All credibility of the superpower down the drain. Along with that the world becomes more unsafe. And then we have another 9/11, coming from AQ and Taliban combine, then what?

The Day the USA Leaves Afghanistan will be the Day it looses everything it ever built up, Just like the Soviet Union did in the late 80s. The Jihadis will Yell Victory, and Claim Victory Rightly so, because they will prove once again its divine intervention in support of their repressive ways of life. It will embolden many sleeper cells in USA to rise up too. The Best thing for the USA to do is to vacate Iraq, focus on Afghanistan. Thats what I would do! But then, Oil matters!

 

[ajtr]

hey,USA never lost a war.even if they lose their media will hype it as win like all war movies related to Vietnam war.

 

[Dark_Prince]

The Day the USA Leaves Afghanistan will be the Day it looses everything it ever built up, Just like the Soviet Union did in the late 80s. The Jihadis will Yell Victory, and Claim Victory Rightly so, because they will prove once again its divine intervention in support of their repressive ways of life. It will embolden many sleeper cells in USA to rise up too. The Best thing for the USA to do is to vacate Iraq, focus on Afghanistan. Thats what I would do! But then, Oil matters!

I can't write a better and more intelligent response!! (Perfect)
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Why are Americans Buffoons?,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,